Taimak Antwan Gaston v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
JUDGE DAVID M. GLOVER
DIVISION II
CACR08-37
June 18, 2008
TAIMAK ANTWAN GASTON
APPELLANT
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE OUACHITA
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[CR2006-213-3]
HONORABLE EDWIN A. KEATON,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
Appellant, Taimak Gaston, was tried by a jury and found guilty of the offenses of
aggravated robbery and first-degree murder. He was sentenced to 540 months in the Arkansas
Department of Correction. For his two points of appeal, appellant contends: 1) the trial court
erred by denying his motion for directed verdict, and 2) the trial court erred by allowing the
State to call witnesses for the sole purpose of impeaching them with prior inconsistent
statements as a subterfuge to introduce inadmissible hearsay. We affirm.
I. Denial of Motion for Directed Verdict
A defendant’s right to be free from double jeopardy requires a review of the sufficiency
of the evidence prior to a review of any asserted trial errors. Brown v. State, 100 Ark. App.
172, ____ S.W.3d ____ (2007). Consequently, we first examine the trial court’s denial of
appellant’s motion for a directed verdict. We treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence, view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State
and consider only evidence that supports the verdict, and affirm if substantial evidence
supports the verdict. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence that is forceful enough to compel a
conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id.
The first three subpoints of appellant’s first argument merely set out applicable statutory
and case law. The first subpoint explains the overall standard of review. The second subpoint
focuses on appellant’s first-degree murder conviction; he merely makes a conclusory statement
that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that he committed the offense, and
he then sets out the statutory definitions of the offense and statutory and case-law explanations
of the requisite intent for first-degree murder. But there is no development of how those
concepts were insufficiently proven by the State. Similarly, for his third subpoint with respect
to his aggravated-robbery conviction, appellant makes a conclusory assertion that the State
failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that he committed the offense, quoting the
statutory definition of aggravated robbery and the requisite intent. Therefore, to the extent
that appellant is even asserting these comments as bases for reversal, the first three subpoints
can be quickly disposed of as having no merit.
The crux of appellant’s first argument lies in his fourth subpoint where he contends
that the only evidence supporting his conviction is the uncorroborated testimony of
accomplices. On this subpoint, we disagree and find no basis for reversal.
In Martin v. State, 346 Ark. 198, 202-03, 57 S.W.3d 136, 139-40 (2001), our supreme
court explained:
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Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-111(e)(1) (1987) provides that a person cannot be convicted
of a felony based upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless that testimony is
“corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense.” Corroboration is not sufficient if it merely establishes that
the offense was committed and the circumstances thereof. Id. It must be evidence of
a substantive nature since it must be directed toward proving the connection of the
accused with the crime and not directed toward corroborating the accomplice’s
testimony. Meeks v. State, 317 Ark. 411, 878 S.W.2d 403 (1994). The test for
determining the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence is whether, if the testimony
of the accomplice were totally eliminated from the case, the other evidence
independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its
commission. McGehee, 338 Ark. at 159, 992 S.W.2d at 110; Marta, 336 Ark. at 73,
983 S.W.2d at 924.
Circumstantial evidence may be used to support accomplice testimony, but it,
too, must be substantial. Marta, 336 Ark. at 73, 983 S.W.2d at 924 (citing Peeler v.
State, 326 Ark. 423, 932 S.W.2d 312 (1996)). Corroborating evidence need not,
however, be so substantial in and of itself to sustain a conviction. Flowers v. State, 342
Ark. 45, 25 S.W.3d 422 (2000). Where circumstantial evidence is used to support
accomplice testimony, all facts of evidence can be considered to constitute a chain
sufficient to present a question for resolution by the jury as to the adequacy of the
corroboration, and the court will not look to see whether every other reasonable
hypothesis but that of guilt has been excluded. Johnson v. State, 303 Ark. 12, 792
S.W.2d 863 (1990).
Here, it is not necessary to recount the lengthy testimony of the many witnesses. It
is sufficient, however, for purposes of this opinion to explain that the evidence, after the
accomplice testimony is excluded, consists of the following: 1) the testimony of two women,
Angela Snyder and Meisha Flannigan, that appellant was in a car with three other persons
who had admittedly taken part in the robbery and murder of the victim during the same time
frame as those events occurred; 2) the presence of appellant’s DNA on a red bandana and
testimony that the perpetrators wore red bandanas; 3) the discovery of a gun box and
ammunition in appellant’s closet that were of the same type as the weapons used in the
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incident; and 4) the testimony from Akeem Avery, appellant’s cousin, that on August 22, he
was at Corby Roger’s house and that appellant was there, along with others who had
admittedly taken part in the robbery and murder.
As explained in the above-quoted passage, the test for determining the sufficiency of
the corroborating evidence is whether, if the testimony of the accomplices were totally
eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends
to connect the accused with its commission. There is no question that there was evidence
independently establishing the crime. The issue, therefore, is whether the independent
evidence “tends to connect the accused with its commission.” We hold that it does.
II.
The trial court erred by allowing the State to call witnesses for the sole purpose of
impeaching them with prior inconsistent statements as a subterfuge to introduce
inadmissible hearsay.
In making his second argument, appellant relies upon Roberts v. State, 278 Ark. 550,
551-52, 648 S.W.2d 44, 45-46 (1983), in which our supreme court explained:
Prior to trial appellant filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit references
to the December 23 statement. At the pretrial hearing it was disclosed that Richard
had made two statements subsequent to the December 23 statement in which he stated
that parts of the December 23 statement were untrue. The two subsequent statements
about the incident were consistent with his eventual testimony at trial. The trial court
ruled that the statement of December 23 would be admissible for the purpose of
impeaching Richard’s testimony.
We first note that although Richard fully admitted making the prior
inconsistent statements, the trial court subsequently allowed the prosecution to
introduce the complete text of the statement through a deputy sheriff. To do so was
error. Once a witness has fully and unequivocally admitted making the prior
inconsistent statement, then it cannot be proven again through another witness.
McCormick, Evidence, § 37 at 72-73 (2d ed. 1972). We also note that in this
particular case, the prior inconsistent statements could not be a part of the proof in the
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case because they are expressly excluded as substantive evidence under Rule 801 (d)
(1) (i), Uniform Rules of Evidence, Ark. Stat. Ann. 28-1001 (Repl. 1979) which
maintains as hearsay unsworn out-of-court statements in criminal cases.
We still must decide whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to
impeach Richard, its own witness, with his December 23 hearsay statement by asking
him if he had in fact made the prior inconsistent statements. Under the circumstances
of this case we believe the trial court erred by allowing the impeachment because the
probative value of such testimony was far outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Therefore, this evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403, Ark.
Stat. Ann. 28-1001 (Repl. 1979).
The State argues that asking Richard about his prior inconsistent statements was
for impeachment purposes, but it really was a mere subterfuge. The only conceivable
reason that the State could have for impeaching its own witness was to bring before
the jury hearsay information not admissible as substantive evidence, hoping that the
jury would accord it substantive value although it was clearly inadmissible as such
under Rule 801 (d) (1) (i). In this instance the danger of convicting the defendant on
unsworn testimony is too great; the limiting instruction to the jury directing them to
consider the prior inconsistent statement for impeachment only was not a sufficient
safeguard.
In Lewis v. State, 288 Ark. 595, 600-02, 709 S.W.2d 56, 59 (1986), however, our
supreme court further explained:
In Chisum v. State, 273 Ark. 1, 616 S.W.2d 728 (1981), rehearing denied, this
court held that statements made by a witness to the sheriff during his investigation
were admissible for impeachment purposes as inconsistent, out-of-court statements
under Rule 613 when the witness professed at the trial not to remember what she told
the sheriff. We explained in Chisum that it was formerly the rule that inconsistent
statements were admissible only for impeachment and not as substantive evidence.
That limitation has been abolished in civil cases and modified in criminal cases to the
extent that prior statements given under oath and subject to the penalty of perjury are
admissible as substantive evidence. The common law rule still prevails in criminal cases
that prior inconsistent statements not made under oath, as in the case before us, are
admissible only for impeachment purposes.
We considered the question of unsworn prior statements again in Roberts v.
State, 278 Ark. 550, 648 S.W.2d 44 (1983), rehearing denied, where we held it was
permissible for a party to impeach his own witness by the use of a prior inconsistent
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hearsay statement if the probative value on the issue of impeachment outweighs the
prejudicial effect arising from the danger that the jury will give substantive effect to the
prior inconsistent statement.
Applying these rules to the case at bar, we find that the trial judge complied
with the provisions of Rule 613. Both Ms. Tolliver and the appellant were afforded
an opportunity to explain or deny Ms. Tolliver’s statement, and the appellant was able
to interrogate the witness. The trial judge correctly ruled that the statement was
admissible solely for impeachment purposes and in turn admonished the jury to only
consider the evidence in that light. Also, the trial judge weighed the prejudicial effect
versus the probative value of the statement in making his decision, as required by
Roberts.
It is a general rule that relevancy of evidence is within the trial court’s discretion
and, absent a showing of abuse of that discretion, its decision will be affirmed. Ford v.
State, 276 Ark. 98, 633 S.W.2d 3 (1982), rehearing denied. We have held that the similar
problem of weighing the prejudicial effect of cumulative evidence against its probative
value is a matter of balancing which is primarily the function of the trial judge in the
exercise of his discretion. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980). The
exercise of that discretion should not be interfered with on appeal in the absence of
manifest abuse. Id. Here, no such manifest abuse has been demonstrated. The
admissibility of evidence must necessarily be decided on a case-by-case basis. The trial
court properly limited the testimony and correctly instructed the jury. In addition, the
appellant has failed to show that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the court's
ruling. Unif. R. Evid. 103(a).
See also Kennedy v. State, 344 Ark. 433, 42 S.W.3d 407 (2001).
Here, when responding to appellant’s objection to the introduction of the challenged
testimony, the prosecutor explained that Tony Gaston, appellant’s brother, had told him,
when they reviewed the videotaped statement together, that he could not specify which parts
of the statement he was recanting and which parts he was not. The trial court concluded that
the prosecutor could not know what, if anything, Tony was recanting and allowed him to be
called as a witness. Then, with respect to Akeem Avery, the prosecutor told the judge that
Avery’s account of events had been consistent every time he had talked to Avery, including
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the Friday before the trial started. The trial court determined that under those circumstances
Roberts did not apply and allowed the State to call Avery, also.
On the stand, Avery was asked if he had heard Ronnie Gaston or anyone else talk
about “hitting a lick.” Avery denied having heard any such thing and stated that he was lying
to the police when he had earlier told them that he had. In responding to appellant’s
objection, the trial court reasoned that appellant had not presented any evidence in his earlier
objection to show that the prosecutor knew Avery’s trial testimony would differ from his
prior statements.
Following the court’s ruling, appellant sought a mistrial in connection with this
testimony, which was denied. Appellant alternatively sought and was granted the following
admonition to the jury: “Evidence that a witness previously made a statement which is
inconsistent with his testimony at trial may be considered by you for the purpose of judging
the credibility of the witness but may not be considered by you as evidence of the truth of
the matter set forth in that statement.”
The facts of this case are sufficiently distinguishable from the Roberts case to make it
inapplicable. In Roberts, the child witness (son of the victim and the defendant) made
subsequent statements that were consistent with his trial testimony and inconsistent in
significant respects from the first statement that he gave the police. Thus, the police knew
which parts of the original statement that the witness gave were inconsistent with his
subsequent statements. In addition, the son fully admitted making the prior inconsistent
statement in which he said that his dad shot his mom, but the court nevertheless allowed the
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State to introduce the complete text of the statement through a deputy sheriff. The supreme
court concluded that allowing such an impeachment under the facts of Roberts was error
because the probative value of the testimony was far outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, and that the only conceivable reason the State could have for impeaching its own
witness was to bring before the jury hearsay information not admissible as substantive
evidence, hoping that the jury would accord it such under Rule 801 (d)(1)(i).
Here, as the trial court explained, Tony Gaston would not pinpoint for the prosecutor
which parts of his original statement were untrue, and Akeem Avery’s account to the
prosecutor remained consistent even through the Friday night prior to trial.
Affirmed.
GRIFFEN and HEFFLEY, JJ., agree.
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