Eric Paul Worth v. State of Arkansas
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
No.
DIVISION I
CACR 08-338
Opinion Delivered
ERIC PAUL WORTH
APPELLANT
OCTOBER 22, 2008
APPEAL FROM THE GRANT
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CR-2007-6-1]
V.
HONORABLE CHRIS E WILLIAMS,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
Appellant Eric Paul Worth was convicted by a jury of two counts of internet stalking
of a child, and he was sentenced to two consecutive eight-year prison terms. Arkansas Code
Annotated section 5-27-306 (Repl. 2006) provides in relevant part:
(a) Person commits the offense of internet stalking of a child if the person
being twenty-one (21) years of age or older knowingly uses a computer online
service, internet service, or local internet bulletin board service to:
....
(2) Seduce, solicit, lure, or entice an individual that the person believes to be
fifteen (15) years of age or younger in an effort to arrange a meeting with the
individual for the purpose of engaging in:
(A) Sexual intercourse;
(B) Sexually explicit conduct; or
(C) Deviate sexual activity as defined in § 5-14-101
Mr. Worth now appeals, arguing only that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion
for directed verdict. We affirm.
An appeal from a denial of a motion for directed verdict is a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence. Winston v. State, 372 Ark. 19,
S.W.3d
(2007). In
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether the verdict
was supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Evidence is substantial
if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it is of sufficient force and character
to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture.
Fudge v. State, 341 Ark. 759, 20 S.W.3d 315 (2000).
On January 10, 2007, Sheridan Police Officer David Holland entered an internet chat
room posing as “Cheryl Kidd.” Mr. Worth, who was then twenty-one years old, made
contact with “Cheryl” in the chat room and inquired about her age and sex. “Cheryl”
replied that she was a fourteen-year-old female.
A conversation followed wherein
Mr. Worth made sexually explicit comments, which included asking “Cheryl” if she wanted
to lose her virginity. “Cheryl” said that she did, and upon appellant’s prompting indicated
that she had been sexually active before but only with another fourteen-year-old girl, who
was a friend named “Bree.” Mr. Worth then asked “Cheryl” to find out if her friend would
agree to a threesome. “Cheryl” said she would ask her friend, and the conversation ended
when she represented that her mother had come home.
After three failed attempts by the appellant to contact “Cheryl” again, he successfully
contacted her in the internet chat room on January 12, 2007. During that conversation,
“Cheryl” indicated that she and her friend both would have sex with him. She gave
Mr. Worth her home address and they discussed him meeting her there in a few days.
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On January 15, 2007, after thirty-two failed attempts, Mr. Worth again made contact
with “Cheryl” on the internet to set up what he thought was going to be a threesome with
the two girls. During that chat, appellant made several more explicit comments about having
sexual relations with the girls. He drove from his residence in El Dorado to her stated
address in Sheridan pursuant to her directions. Upon arriving at the designated location,
Mr. Worth was arrested.
After the police arrested Mr. Worth, they searched his truck and found a quantity of
condoms and a loaded pistol. Mr. Worth was transported to the Sheridan Police Department
where he waived his Miranda warnings and agreed to make a statement. During his interview
with the police, Mr. Worth admitted that he had driven to Sheridan with the intention of
having sex with two fourteen-year-old girls.
For reversal of his convictions, Mr. Worth now argues that there was no substantial
evidence that he committed internet stalking of a child. He notes that the culpable mental
state for that crime is “knowingly,” and argues that the State’s proof was insufficient because
it failed to establish that he had actual knowledge of the victim’s age. In support of his
argument, Mr. Worth relies on our decision in Coleman v. State, 12 Ark. App. 214, 671
S.W.2d 221 (1984).
As argued by the State, Mr. Worth’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not
preserved for review. Rule 33.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in
pertinent part:
-3-
(a) In a jury trial, if a motion for directed verdict is to be made, it shall be made
at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution and at the close of all of the
evidence. A motion for directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor.
....
(c) The failure of a defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at
the times and in the manner required in subsections (a) and (b) above will constitute
a waiver of any question pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
verdict or judgment. A motion for directed verdict or for dismissal based on
insufficiency of the evidence must specify the respect in which the evidence is
deficient. A motion merely stating that the evidence is insufficient does not preserve
for appeal issues relating to a specific deficiency such as insufficient proof on the
elements of the offense.
In the present case Mr. Worth moved for directed verdict at the close of the case on the
grounds of entrapment and also on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to convict him
of internet stalking. However, Mr. Worth did not make any argument pertaining to his lack
of knowledge of the victim’s age. Because Mr. Worth’s directed-verdict motion posed a
general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and failed to specify any elements of the
crime that had not been proven, we need not address his sufficiency argument now being
raised for the first time in this appeal. See Pinell v. State, 364 Ark. 353, 219 S.W.3d 168
(2005).
Even had appellant’s argument been properly preserved, it has no merit. Mr. Worth’s
reliance on Coleman v. State, supra, is misplaced because that was an appeal from a first-degree
battery conviction, and the victim’s age was not an element of the offense as Mr. Worth
suggests in his brief. The issues in that appeal involved jury instructions and were unrelated
to the sufficiency issue being raised in the instant appeal.
-4-
To establish the offense of internet stalking of a child the State must prove that the
person knowingly uses the internet to seduce someone he “believes to be 15 years of age or
younger” in an effort to arrange a meeting for a sexual purpose. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27306(a)(2) (Repl. 2006)(emphasis added). The statute does not require that the defendant
know the intended victim’s age. In this case the evidence at trial showed that Mr. Worth
engaged in internet chats with an undercover officer who represented himself to be fourteenyear-old “Cheryl Kidd,” and that Mr. Worth arranged to meet “Cheryl” and her fourteenyear-old friend “Bree” for the purpose of engaging in sexual relations with the girls. After
his arrest, Mr. Worth confessed to the police that it was his intention to have sex with two
fourteen-year-old girls. Because the State proved that appellant believed the victim to be
fifteen years of age or younger, and there is no statutory requirement that appellant have
actual knowledge of the victim’s age, Mr. Worth’s sufficiency argument fails. There was
substantial evidence to support his convictions.
Affirmed.
MARSHALL and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.
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