Joe Richardson v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CACR08-321
Opinion Delivered
JOE RICHARDSON
APPELLANT
N OVEMBER 19, 2008
APPEAL FROM THE SALINE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CR-2007-234-3]
V.
HONORABLE GRISHAM A.
PHILLIPS, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
Appellant Joe Richardson appeals his November 16, 2007 conviction by a Saline
County jury on a charge of rape, for which he was sentenced as a habitual offender to thirty
years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the circuit court
erred in denying his motions for (1) a directed verdict; (2) a mistrial; and (3) a limitation of
the scope of Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b). We affirm.
Appellant was charged with raping his stepdaughter, K.M., D/O/B June 21, 1991,
after allegations were made that he had engaged in sexual conduct with her on an almost
weekly basis for nearly two years, beginning when she was fourteen years of age. The
conduct included sexual touching; his masturbating while standing by her bedside at night;
making her masturbate him with her hands; frottage from the back while he bent her over a
bed; and penetrating her vagina with his tongue and his finger.
At trial, the State presented testimony from K.M., who testified as to the allegations
of sexual abuse as set forth above, that specifically included appellant penetrating her vagina
with his tongue and with his finger. Just after her testimony concluded, the circuit court
recessed for a lunch break. When court was called back into session, one juror was late
returning, and she apparently saw appellant being led back into the courtroom in handcuffs.
Appellant’s counsel moved for a mistrial, which the circuit court denied. The circuit judge
did speak to the juror about the incident outside the presence of the other jurors and
explained to her that what occurred is common practice as defendants are considered to be
in custody as of the time the trial begins. The witness was instructed that the handcuffs had
no bearing on appellant’s innocence or guilt and that she should not share the information
with the other jurors.
The next witness to testify for the State was the victim’s mother, Lisa Bonner. Ms.
Bonner, who was divorced from appellant by the time of the trial, testified that around 4:30
a.m. on February 12, 2007, she discovered appellant in K.M.’s bedroom masturbating as he
stood by her bed. She also testified as to their sexual history, which included behavior similar
to what she witnessed in her daughter’s room that night.
Additional testimony was presented by S.H., whose mother had previously been
married to appellant. She testified that, from the time she was approximately five years old
until she reached the age of fourteen, appellant engaged in sexual activities with her similar
to those testified to by K.M., as well as anal and vaginal penetration with his penis and making
her perform oral sex on him. Appellant was never tried on related charges, and S.H.
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explained that she had recanted her allegations although they had, in fact, occurred. During
S.H.’s testimony, appellant objected that her testimony went beyond the scope of what is
anticipated with the “pedophile exception” to Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence
and moved for a limitation of the scope of the testimony. The motion was denied.
After the State rested its case in chief, appellant’s counsel moved for a directed verdict,
stating, “Your Honor, I have the standard motion for directed verdict on the grounds that the
evidence of rape is insufficient to be submitted to the jury.” Appellant’s counsel also renewed
his motion for a mistrial. The circuit court denied both motions.
Appellant then testified on his own behalf, at which time he denied the allegations and
offered possible explanations of why K.M. and her mother might have falsely accused him.
He also acknowledged at least two other convictions on other, non-sexual, charges. At the
close of appellant’s testimony, his attorney renewed his motion for directed verdict “on the
specific allegation that the State failed to submit sufficient proof upon which the case should
be submitted to the jury,” and also renewed his motion for a mistrial. The circuit court again
denied both motions.
The State then called rebuttal witness, Latisha Franks, another of appellant’s ex-wives
and the mother of two of his children. After the State rested in the rebuttal phase, appellant’s
counsel renewed all of his motions, “the motion for directed verdict on the grounds the
evidence is insufficient to have the case submitted to the jury,” and the motion for mistrial.
The circuit court again denied the motions, and the jury returned a guilty verdict and
recommended a sentence of thirty years.
The circuit court so sentenced appellant, as
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evidenced by the judgment and commitment order entered on November 16, 2007, and
appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on December 12, 2007.
1. Denial of Motion for Directed Verdict
We first consider whether this issue is preserved for appeal. Arkansas Rule of Criminal
Procedure 33.1(b) provides that in a jury trial a motion for a directed verdict must be made
at the close of all of the evidence. If a motion is made at the conclusion of the State’s
evidence, then it must be renewed at the close of all of the evidence. Rule 33.1(c) further
provides that the failure of a defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the times
and in the manner required will constitute a waiver of any question pertaining to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c). Appellant moved
for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case in chief, and that motion was denied. He
properly renewed his motion at the close of his case, as well as at the close of the State’s
rebuttal witness testimony. Accordingly, he made the motions at the proper time; however,
the inquiry does not end there.
A directed-verdict motion is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and requires
the movant to apprise the trial court of the specific basis on which the motion is made. Tryon
v. State, 371 Ark. 25, 263 S.W.3d 475 (2007). When a motion for a directed verdict does not
identify particular or specific elements of proof that are missing from the State’s case, the
motion fails to properly apprise the trial court of the asserted error. See id. A directed verdict
motion must be a specific motion in order to apprise the trial court of the particular point
raised, since when specific grounds are stated and the absent proof is pinpointed, the trial court
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can either grant the motion, or, if justice requires, allow the State to reopen its case and
supply the missing proof. Tester v. State, 342 Ark. 549, 30 S.W.3d 99 (2000). The movant
is then bound by the scope and nature of the objections and arguments presented at trial. Id.
As our supreme court has explained, the preservation of a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence is dependent on the defendant making the specific challenge to the trial court that
he seeks to make on appeal. E.g. Conner v. State, 334 Ark. 457, 982 S.W.2d 655 (1998).
The State contends, and we agree, that appellant’s motion for directed verdict and the
renewals thereof were not sufficiently specific to satisfy the requirements of Arkansas Rule of
Criminal Procedure 33.1(c). The rule is strictly construed requiring not only a timely motion,
but also a statement specific enough to show how the proof was insufficient so that the State
may be allowed an opportunity to reopen its case and present the missing proof. See Eastin
v. State, 370 Ark. 10, 257 S.W.3d 58 (2007). Appellant made no such motion, but rather
generally alleged that the proof was insufficient to go to the jury. Because appellant failed to
make a sufficiently specific motion, we hold that this issue is not preserved for our review and
affirm on that basis.
2. Denial of Motion for Mistrial
A mistrial is a drastic remedy and should be declared when there has been an error so
prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing the trial, or when it cannot be cured
by an instruction or admonition. See Holsombach v. State, 368 Ark. 415, 246 S.W.3d 871
(2007). The trial court has wide discretion in granting or denying a motion for mistrial, and,
absent a showing of abuse of that discretion or manifest injustice, its decision will not be
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disturbed on appeal. See Tryon, supra. It is not prejudicial per se for a defendant to be brought
into court handcuffed, and the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice. Breedlove
v. State, 62 Ark. App. 219, 970 S.W.2d 313 (1998).
As previously stated, one of the jurors was late returning to the courtroom after a short
recess. At that time, she saw appellant in handcuffs as he was led down the hall by an officer.
The juror was brought before the judge, who explained that once a trial begins, all defendants
are considered to be in custody, which explained why appellant was in handcuffs. She was
admonished not to share what she had seen with the other jurors. Appellant’s attorney moved
for the court to declare a mistrial at that time and renewed the motion at the close of the
State’s case in chief, at the conclusion of the evidence, and once again before jury instructions
were given. The circuit court denied all the motions.
Appellant cites Meny v. State, 314 Ark. 158, 861 S.W.2d 303 (1993), in which our
supreme court held that the defendant was not prejudiced by a momentary and inadvertent
encounter with potential jurors while he was in handcuffs. Appellant attempts to distinguish
Meny, because here, he was observed in handcuffs by an actual juror who had heard the
alleged victim’s testimony just prior to the recess. Although his counsel had conducted crossexamination prior to the recess, he had not yet called any witnesses. He maintains that the
State had an advantage in the trial in presenting its evidence.
He contends that the
combination of K.M.’s testimony followed by the image of the alleged rapist in handcuffs was
prejudicial, leaving quite an impact on the juror’s judgment.
Appellant further argues that prejudice must be inferred based upon his conviction.
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Although he acknowledges that a single juror cannot decide the outcome of a case, appellant
asserts that she had a prejudicial impact on the jury’s decision, even if she did not
communicate the incident to the other jurors. Because of the psychological impact and
prejudicial nature of the image of appellant in handcuffs, which was viewed by an actual juror,
appellant alleges that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial.
The State cites Tryon, supra, regarding the limited situations in which a mistrial should
be declared: (1) when there is error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing
the trial; (2) when it cannot be cured by an instruction to the jury. Restraints are not per se
prejudicial, and appellant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice; this court will not
presume prejudice when there is nothing in the record to indicate what impression may have
been made on the jurors or where the appellant fails to offer any proof of prejudice. See
Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 728, 67 S.W.3d 548 (2002). Under these standards, the State
contends, and we agree, that appellant’s argument is without merit.
The State reiterates the circuit judge’s explanation and admonition to the juror, and
further points out that the juror stated, “I did see him come in, but I didn’t notice [the cuffs],
I really didn’t.” The circuit judge went so far as to explain that it was normal for them to use
cuffs at that time, and he asked the juror “to not draw any inferences as to his guilt as a result
of that,” in addition to asking her not to share the information with the other jurors. Counsel
on both sides also offered more information, with the prosecutor interjecting that appellant
is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, and defense counsel adding that “[t]hey just
don’t want a defendant to run off in the middle of a trial is the only reason.” The circuit
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judge agreed with those statements and stated that the restraints “did not mean a thing.”
Additionally, the State disputes appellant’s reliance on Meny, supra, stating that the
completion of the voir dire process, being sworn in, and being instructed regarding her duty
as a juror prior to seeing appellant in handcuffs left a smaller chance of prejudice than occurred
in Meny. Regardless, the standard is the same for potential and sitting jurors — appellant must
demonstrate that prejudice occurred, and whether it occurred is a matter for the sound
discretion of the circuit court. See Lawson v. State, 74 Ark. App. 257, 47 S.W.3d 294 (2001).
Appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice below, and again has failed to do so on
appeal. He merely invites the court to infer prejudice from the conviction, which we will not
do. See Williams, supra. We hold that the circuit court cured any prejudice that might have
otherwise occurred with the admonition to the juror.
Finally, the State counters appellant’s contention that prejudice must be inferred by the
conviction. Appellant was sentenced to thirty years as a habitual offender who committed a
Class Y felony, which was well within the ten-to-sixty years or life sentence that was possible.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401 (Repl. 2006); § 5-4-501 (Repl. 2006); and § 5-14-103 (Repl.
2006). A defendant who receives a sentence within the statutory range short of the maximum
sentence cannot show prejudice from the sentence itself. See Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76
S.W.3d 825 (2002).
3. Denial of Motion to Limit Scope of Ark. R. Evid. 404(b)
Rulings on admissibility of evidence are matters within a circuit court’s discretion, and
those rulings are not disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion and
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prejudice. See Grant v. State, 357 Ark. 91, 161 S.W.3d 785 (2004). An abuse of discretion
is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit court’s decision, but
requires that the circuit court acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due
consideration. Id.
The State initially contends that this argument is not preserved for our review because
no contemporaneous objection was made at the first opportunity, which is required to
preserve an argument for appeal. See Ridling v. State, 360 Ark. 424, 203 S.W.3d 63 (2005).
Additionally, the State maintains that appellant attempts to change his argument on appeal,
citing Hunter v. State, 330 Ark. 198, 952 S.W.2d 145 (1997), which states that issues raised
for the first time on appeal will not be considered because the circuit court never had an
opportunity to rule on them. See also London v. State, 354 Ark. 313, 125 S.W.3d 813 (2003).
Appellant’s objection to S.H.’s testimony regarding the alleged sexual abuse she
endured while appellant was her stepfather states as follows:
The State’s clearly entitled to obtain some form of 404(b) evidence from another
victim under the child pedophile exception. I was advised that they would be calling
[S.H.]. I don’t have an objection to that. I read all the most recent cases on it, so that
is allowable, if it’s related, if it’s similar in nature, if it’s not too distant in the past, but
there seems to be a level of just general pandering or overemotional content and that’s
not my understand [sic] of what 404(b) is allowed for. It’s my understanding 404(b)
is to show a specific pattern, characteristic, trait or specific event, not to go through
a victim’s entire life story and history for dramatic and emotional impact. So, I’d
object to it and ask that it be limited to the scope of what the rule allows.
While appellant argues in his brief that S.H. testified regarding her “acutely feminine
clothing” in order to “depict alleged brutality to a young, innocent child,” that testimony was
not mentioned in the objection. Although those exact words regarding her clothing were not
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part of appellant’s objection, we hold that the content of his argument, when viewed in its
totality, was sufficiently similar to the objection made at trial to preserve the issue for review.
As to the timing concern, the State explains that the objection came several questions
after S.H.’s clothing was discussed.
The State also questions the timing of appellant’s
objection regarding S.H.’s testimony about him falling into a more fatherly role and having
a more loving, caring attitude after the alleged sexual abuse. That objection was made two
questions after the testimony was given and failed to cite this specific testimony as
objectionable. While appellant’s objections did not immediately follow the questions at issue,
the two questions that followed merely requested clarification and further explanation of
S.H.’s depiction of appellant’s behavior before and after the incidents of abuse. Accordingly,
we will address the merits of appellant’s argument.
Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b) states that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. Evidence offered under Rule 404(b) must be independently relevant to make the
existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. Allen v. State, __ Ark. __, __ S.W.3d __ (Sept. 25, 2008). In other words, the
prior bad act must be independently relevant to the main issue, in that it tends to prove some
material point rather than merely proving that the defendant is a criminal. Id.
Arkansas appellate courts have long recognized a “pedophile exception” to Rule
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404(b). Allen, supra. We have approved allowing evidence of the defendant’s similar acts
with the same or other children when it is helpful in showing a proclivity for a specific act
with a person or class of persons with whom the defendant has an intimate relationship. Id.
The rationale for this exception is that such evidence helps to prove the depraved sexual
instinct of the accused. Id. For the pedophile exception to apply, we require that there be
a sufficient degree of similarity between the evidence to be introduced and the sexual conduct
of the defendant. Hamm v. State, 365 Ark. 647, 232 S.W.3d 463 (2006). We also require that
there be an “intimate relationship” between the perpetrator and the victim of the prior act.
Id.
Rule 404(b), however, makes no distinction between substantiated and unsubstantiated
conduct, or between charged and uncharged conduct. Our supreme court has explicitly held
that our application of the pedophile exception does not require that the prior act be charged
or substantiated. See Bell v. State, 371 Ark. 375, 385, __ S.W.3d __, __ (2007).
In Hernandez v. State, 331 Ark. 301, 962 S.W.2d 756 (1998), the appellant urged our
supreme court to establish parameters for the admission of evidence pursuant to the pedophile
exception.
The supreme court rejected this argument, holding that Arkansas Rule of
Evidence 403 provides the necessary “parameters.” In response to an objection that evidence
is unfairly prejudicial, the probative value of the evidence must be weighed against the danger
of unfair prejudice. See Tull v. State, 82 Ark. App. 159, 119 S.W.3d 523 (2003). The standard
of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id.
The State presented testimony from S.H., who testified regarding sexual abuse inflicted
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upon her while appellant was her stepfather. She explained that appellant had been arrested
on charges, but that she had recanted the allegations and the charges were dropped.
Appellant’s attorney objected to the testimony because of its “overly-emotional content.” He
acknowledged that he expected the testimony under the 404(b) pedophile exception, but he
argued that the testimony went beyond the scope of the exception — depicting the witness’s
entire life story, including descriptions of acutely-feminine clothing (“frilly dress”) to depict
alleged brutality to a young, innocent child. He also claims that S.H.’s reminiscing about his
behavior after alleged sexual acts — that he would fall into a more fatherly role and portray
a more loving, caring attitude — was prejudicial because it did not demonstrate a 404(b)
pattern, but rather presented an emotional reflection of a little girl yearning for the love of a
father figure. He maintains that the prejudicial effect of S.H.’s testimony far outweighed the
probative value and should have been excluded, or at least limited, pursuant to Arkansas Rule
of Evidence 403.
The State correctly notes that S.H.’s testimony regarding appellant’s sexual acts against
her are markedly similar to the acts described by the victim in this case, as well as appellant’s
more recent sexual behavior as described by the victim’s mother. See Flanery v. State, 362
Ark. 311, 208 S.W.3d 187 (2005) (testimony admissible under the pedophile exception). The
State argues, and we agree, that the evidence regarding S.H.’s clothing was properly admitted
under Rule 404(b) and the pedophile exception because it established a particular kind of
sexual behavior (frottage) that was also inflicted on K.M., and also because it was part of
S.H.’s vivid memory of the events she described for the jury.
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Likewise, with regard to S.H.’s testimony that appellant was angry and abusive before
the sexual assaults but more caring and paternal afterward, the State asserts that the
information was relevant to show his intent, plan, motive, preparation, and opportunity, as
well as his depraved sexual instinct toward his stepdaughters. The State claims that the
testimony showed that appellant used this behavior to manipulate them into “capitulation and
secrecy.” K.M. testified regarding appellant’s typically brutal temper versus his “shushing”
her to get her to remain quiet during the sexual abuse and his comments that he “wanted to
make [her] feel good[.]” Accordingly, we hold that the testimony was properly admitted
pursuant to Rule 404(b) and affirm.
Affirmed.
V AUGHT and H UNT, JJ., agree.
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