Aaron Dwain Smith v. State of Arkansas
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CACR08-260
Opinion Delivered
November 12, 2008
AARON DWAIN SMITH
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-06-601-IV]
V.
HONORABLE MARCIA R.
HEARNSBERGER, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Chief Judge
A jury found appellant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he was
sentenced as a habitual offender to thirty-five years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that
the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred in refusing to
reduce the charge to a Class D felony, that the trial court erred by ordering his attorney not
to argue to the jury that the State had failed to prove that he had knowledge of the firearm,
and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We reverse and remand.
Because preservation of an appellant's right to freedom from double jeopardy requires
a review of the sufficiency of the evidence prior to a review of trial errors, Harris v. State, 284
Ark. 247, 681 S.W.2d 334 (1984), we first address appellant’s sufficiency argument. When
the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the test is whether there is substantial
evidence to support the verdict. Britt v. State, 83 Ark. App. 117, 118 S.W.3d 140 (2003). In
determining whether the evidence is substantial, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, considering only the proof that supports the verdict. Id. Substantial
evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond
suspicion or conjecture. Lukach v. State, 310 Ark. 119, 835 S.W.2d 852 (1992). In making
this review, we consider all of the evidence favorable to the verdict that was introduced at
trial, including any evidence that we may subsequently determine to have been improperly
admitted. Hardrick v. State, 47 Ark. App. 105, 885 S.W.2d 910 (1994).
Here, there was evidence that a Hot Springs police officer assigned to patrol the
Housing Authority grounds saw appellant on the Housing Authority premises on September
16, 2006. The officer had personal knowledge that appellant had been banned from the
premises. The officer approached appellant, who was standing next to the driver’s door of his
truck, and asked for identification. A warrant check showed that appellant had an outstanding
arrest warrant for failure to appear. Appellant was then placed under arrest for criminal
trespass and confined to the back seat of the officer’s patrol car. The arresting officer then
asked appellant if he was a convicted felon. Appellant said, “Yes.” The arresting officer then
walked away from the patrol car toward appellant’s truck Two other officers arrived and
searched appellant’s truck, which was parked on Housing Authority premises, and found a
firearm under the driver’s seat. The arresting officer then entered the patrol car and began
driving appellant to the police station for processing. As he was doing so, approximately six
minutes after the arresting officer had asked appellant if he was a convicted felon, appellant
spontaneously stated, “I carry that pistol because some people are trying to kill me.”
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Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2005) prohibits possession of
firearms by persons who have been convicted of a felony. Appellant concedes that he was a
felon at the time of the incident and argues only that the evidence is insufficient to show that
he knowingly possessed the firearm. However, appellant’s argument completely ignores the
evidence that he spontaneously told the arresting officer that he had the pistol for self-defense
from people who were trying to kill him. Whether admitted rightfully or wrongfully, this
evidence must be considered in determining the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to Harris
v. State, supra. See Davis v. State, 318 Ark. 212, 885 S.W.2d 292 (1993). When evidence of
appellant’s statement is considered, the evidence is quite clearly sufficient to support a finding
that he knowingly possessed the firearm.
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to reduce the felon-inpossession charge from a Class B felony to a Class D felony. Possession of a firearm by a felon
is a Class D felony unless the firearm was being used in a crime, the defendant had a prior
violent felony conviction, or the defendant had previously been convicted of being a felon
in possession of a firearm, in which case the offense is a Class B felony. Ark. Code Ann. §
5-73-103(c) (Repl. 2005). Here, appellant argues that a facsimile copy of a sentencing order
showing that he had previously been convicted of felon in possession of a firearm was
erroneously admitted and that, in any event, it does not constitute substantial evidence to
show that he was the person convicted because it does not contain his Social Security number
or other identification other than his name. We find no error. Arkansas Code Annotated
section 5-4-504(a) (Repl. 2006) provides that, for the purpose of showing habitual-offender
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status, “[a] previous conviction or finding of guilt of a felony may be proved by any evidence
that satisfies the trial court beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was convicted or
found guilty.” It has been held that this provision indicates the clear intent of the legislature
to permit proof of prior convictions by means other than those expressly listed elsewhere in
the statute, Mulkey v. State, 330 Ark. 113, 952 S.W.2d 149 (1997), and, although the lack of
a Social Security number or other identification other than appellant’s name goes to the
weight of the evidence, it cannot be said that the sentencing order introduced in this case was
legally insufficient to support a finding of a prior conviction.
Appellant further argues that his statement that he possessed the firearm must be
suppressed because he was in custody at the time it was made. Statements arising from
custodial interrogation are presumed to be involuntary. The burden is thus on the State to
prove that a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to an attorney, and that he voluntarily made the statement.
Scales v. State, 37 Ark. App. 68, 824 S.W.2d 400 (1992). On appeal from the denial of a
motion to suppress, we make an independent review based on the totality of the
circumstances, but we defer to the trial court’s superior position to determine the credibility
of the witnesses who testify to the circumstances of a defendant’s custodial statement, and we
will not reverse the trial court’s findings of historical fact unless they are found to be clearly
erroneous. Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003); Brunson v. State, 41 Ark.
App. 39, 848 S.W.2d 936 (1993); see Davis v. State, 351 Ark. 406, 94 S.W.3d 892 (2003).
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Appellant asserts that his statement regarding the firearm was the result of custodial
interrogation because the arresting officer had previously asked him if he was a felon. We do
not agree. Viewing the record in its entirety and giving due deference to the trial court’s
superior position to assess credibility, it appears that the question regarding felony status was
the only instance of interrogation, and that several minutes passed between that question and
appellant’s statement that he kept the firearm for protection. Viewed in this light, we think
the trial judge did not err in finding that the statement was spontaneous:
A spontaneous statement is admissible because it is not compelled
or the result of coercion under the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
against self-incrimination. Arnett [v. State,], 353 Ark. 165, 122
S.W.3d 484 [(2003)]; Fairchild [v. State,], 349 Ark. 147, 76
S.W.3d 884 [(2002)]. In determining whether a statement is
spontaneous, we focus on whether the statement was made in
the context of a police interrogation, meaning direct or indirect
questioning put to the accused by the police with the purpose of
eliciting a statement from him.
State v. Pittman, 360 Ark. 273, 276, 200 S.W.3d 893, 896 (2005).
We do, however, find merit in appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in
refusing to allow his attorney to argue that appellant’s knowledge of the presence of the
weapon was an essential element of the offense. It is clear from the record that the trial judge
ruled that possession of a firearm by a felon was a strict-liability offense requiring no
knowledge that a weapon was present, and that the judge not only forbade appellant from
arguing lack of knowledge but also permitted the State to argue affirmatively in closing that
evidence of appellant’s knowledge was not required for a finding of guilt. To do so was error.
Possession of a firearm by a felon is not a strict-liability offense; instead, it must be shown that
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the firearm was possessed purposely, knowingly, or recklessly. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-2-203
and 204 (Repl. 2006); Fisher v. State, 290 Ark. 490, 720 S.W.2d 900 (1986). We think that
the error tainted the jury verdict and deprived appellant of a fair trial, and we therefore reverse
on this point and remand.
Reversed and remanded.
B AKER and H UNT, JJ., agree.
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