Phillip B. Jones v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, JUDGE
DIVISION I
CACR07-770
February 27, 2008
PHILLIP B. JONES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR 06-540]
V.
HONORABLE CHRIST OPHER
CHARLES PIAZZA, CIRCUIT JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
REVERSED AND DISMISSED
The circuit court convicted appellant, Phillip B. Jones, of the crimes of possession of
cocaine with the intent to deliver, possession of marijuana, possession of a firearm by a felon,
and simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms.1 He contends that the court erred in
convicting him of these crimes because the State failed to prove that he possessed any of the
items. We reverse and dismiss.
At trial, Randy Rhodes testified that on December 20, 2005, in his capacity as a patrol
officer with the North Little Rock Police Department, he assisted in the execution of a search
1
While appellant also urges that the evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia, the State correctly observes that the
judgment and commitment order does not show that he was convicted of that offense.
warrant at a residence in North Little Rock. Four persons were found in the residence: Angel
Elmore, Phyllis Beard, LaTanya Jones, and appellant. Elmore was found in the kitchen
doorway, Beard in the northwest bedroom, and appellant and Jones in the northeast bedroom.
Rhodes searched the northeast bedroom and found a glass smoking device with burnt ends
in an ashtray, two small bags of crack cocaine in an entertainment center, a bag of marijuana
in a nightstand drawer, two glass smoking devices with burnt ends also in the nightstand, and
a loaded .38 caliber Rossi revolver under a mattress. Rhodes also testified that one bag of
cocaine was not in plain view because it was “behind some tapes.” The other, he testified,
was “in the entertainment center.”
Investigator John Nannen of the North Little Rock Police Department testified that
he served the search warrant at the residence. He testified that the glass smoking devices were
typically used to inhale crack cocaine and that the burn marks indicated that they had been
used for that purpose. He also testified that two bags contained .7314 grams and .5644 grams
of cocaine base, respectively, and the third bag contained 15.7 grams of marijuana. Nannen
also noted that he found mail in the northwest bedroom of residence addressed to Beard and
to another person and that the utilities were in Beard’s name.
Further, Nannen testified that when they searched the residence, they secured the
residence and all of the persons. When appellant was outside, he appeared to faint. Appellant
indicated he was a diabetic and having problems. Nannen contacted the fire department and
an ambulance service to assist. Appellant was placed in an ambulance for transport to a local
hospital, and while he was in the ambulance, Nannen attempted to obtain appellant’s name
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and personal information. Appellant identified himself as “Andre Freeman.” Through
subsequent investigation, however, Nannen determined that appellant was not Andre
Freeman and instead was Phillip Jones.
Appellant argued at trial and now argues on appeal that the State failed to prove that
he possessed the cocaine, the marijuana, and the firearm. He asserts that because the bedroom
was jointly occupied and because there were no other facts and circumstances from which his
possession could be inferred, the State failed to prove that he possessed the contraband.
The State need not prove that the accused physically possessed the contraband in order
to sustain a conviction for possession if the location of the contraband was such that it could
be said to be under the dominion and control of the accused, that is, constructively possessed.
Walley v. State, 353 Ark. 586, 112 S.W.3d 349 (2003). But while constructive possession can
be implied when the contraband is in the joint control of the accused and another, joint
occupancy is not sufficient in itself to establish possession or joint possession. Id. Rather,
there must be some additional factor linking the accused to the contraband, and the State must
show additional facts and circumstances indicating the accused’s knowledge and control of the
contraband. Id. But when the State’s case is made entirely of circumstantial evidence and
leaves the factfinder to speculation and conjecture, then the evidence is insufficient as a matter
of law. King v. State, ___ Ark. App. __, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Oct. 31, 2007).
For reversal, appellant relies in part on Mayo v. State, 70 Ark. App. 453, 20 S.W.3d 419
(2000), and we agree that this case controls. There, the trial court found the defendant guilty
of possession of marijuana. We noted that when the police arrived, the defendant was seated
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on a couch near a coffee table where marijuana was in plain view. While the defendant
admitted that he was aware of the presence of contraband, he had no connection with the
residence, and another person was in the room. We concluded that the evidence presented
the trial court with a choice so evenly balanced that the finding of guilt necessarily rested on
conjecture, and accordingly, we reversed the conviction.
Here, not only was the residence jointly occupied by three other persons, the bedroom
was jointly occupied by appellant and Jones. The firearm under the mattress and the
controlled substances were not in plain view, and there was no evidence indicating that
appellant resided at or owned the residence. Given that the evidence in Mayo was insufficient
to establish possession when the contraband was in plain view, we must conclude that the
evidence was insufficient when the contraband was hidden, the room jointly occupied, and
there was no evidence that appellant resided there.
We are mindful that there are two additional facts and circumstances that arguably
indicate appellant’s knowledge and control of the contraband. First, we note that a glass
smoking device was in an ashtray. It is equally plausible, however, that the other occupant
of the room possessed the pipe. Second, appellant also gave a false name to police, and the
State asserts that the giving of a false name is evidence of consciousness of guilt. The question
before us then is whether the giving of a false name linked appellant to the contraband. We
conclude that it does not.
We rely in part on Wortham v. State, 5 Ark. App. 161, 634 S.W.2d 141 (1982). There,
the defendant had been convicted of burglary, which required proof that the defendant
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entered the residence with the purpose of committing an offense punishable by imprisonment.
We noted that the defendant fled from the residence when a young girl in the residence
screamed and that flight from a crime scene “has long been regarded as a circumstance
corroborative of ‘other proof’ of guilt.” 5 Ark. App. at 165, 634 S.W.2d at 143 (citing Cassell v.
State, 273 Ark. 59, 616 S.W.2d 485 (1981)). This court concluded, however, that the “‘other
proof’” was “dismally missing and can only be supplied by pure guesswork.” Id. We held in
that case that the evidence was insufficient to support the burglary conviction.
Similarly, in Avett v. State, 325 Ark. 320, 928 S.W.2d 326 (1996), the defendant was
convicted of two counts of theft by receiving where he was a passenger in a stolen van that
contained stolen toys and clothing. The police stopped the van, and the defendant became
violent and belligerent when the police confronted him. The Arkansas Supreme Court
concluded that the defendant’s brief presence as a passenger in a van that was in poor
condition along with his violent outburst upon being taken into custody did not establish that
he committed the crime of theft by receiving.
Thus, in both Wortham and Avett, the additional circumstance was not conclusive
without other proof of guilt. And as we noted above, joint occupancy is not sufficient in itself
to establish possession—there must be some additional factor linking the accused to the
contraband. Here, and similarly to Wortham and Avett, while the giving of a false name would
be corroborative of other proof of guilt, there simply was no other proof of possession, as the
contraband was not in plain view, there was no proof that appellant was connected with the
residence, and the room was jointly occupied.
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Furthermore, appellant gave a false name only after he had been secured by the police
and placed in an ambulance. Given that he had been secured by the police, his reasons for
giving a false name may not have been for the purpose of evading the police, as there was
nothing to indicate that evading the police was even possible at the time he gave a false name.
Thus, we must conclude that there was insufficient evidence that appellant possessed the
contraband, as only speculation and conjecture could support the missing proof. We reverse
and dismiss.
Reversed and dismissed.
BIRD and MARSHALL, JJ., agree.
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