Tavarus Montgomery v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, JUDGE  DIVISION II  CACR07­693  TAVARUS MONTGOMERY January 30, 2008  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL  FROM  THE  PULASKI  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CR2005­3134]  STATE OF ARKANSAS  HON. CHRISTOPHER CHARLES PIAZZA,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Tavarus Montgomery was convicted in a Pulaski  County jury trial of first­degree  murder  stemming  from  the  death  of  three­year­old  Eudre  Broadway.  Pursuant  to  his  conviction,  Montgomery  was  sentenced  to  forty  years  in  the  Arkansas  Department  of  Correction.  On appeal, Montgomery argues that the evidence does not support the verdict.  We affirm.  When a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we  view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.  Howard v. State, 348 Ark. 471,  79 S.W.2d 273 (2002).  The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether  the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial.  Id.  Substantial  evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture.  Id.  Only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered.  Id.  Circumstantial evidence provides the basis to support a conviction if it is consistent with the  defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion.  Id.  Montgomery  argues  that  the  medical  evidence  and  his  “rather  mild  admission  to  police” falls “woefully short” of being sufficient as a matter of law.  He cites evidence of  prior  abuse,  including  treatment  of  the  child­victim’s  head  trauma  the  week  before  and  asserts that “most of the evidence of injury to this child has no relationship” to him.  Further,  Montgomery characterizes his admissions as insubstantial because, in his statement to police,  he only admitted to a “backhanded slap to the shoulder blade” of the victim, and earlier in  the day he described it as “more a push than a slap.” We find this argument unpersuasive.  From the testimony of the victim’s mother, Edwina Barnes, and Montgomery’s own  statement to police, it was established that Montgomery was alone with the child on the  morning that the victim sustained his life­ending injuries.  Barnes testified that, when she  bathed the  child the day before, she did not observe “anything unusual or hurting” him.  Furthermore, we know from Montgomery’s statement that Eudre did not appear to be injured  earlier that morning when the child asked him for a glass of water.  Barnes testified that she heard the water running and moments later, she went into the  kitchen and discovered Montgomery trying to move the child’s arms because he was not  breathing.  According to Barnes, Montgomery told her that Eudre slipped and fell, which  “knocked  the  air  out  of  him.”  Dr.  Charles  Kokes,  the  chief  medical  examiner  with  the  Arkansas State Crime Lab, performed an autopsy on the victim.  Dr. Kokes testified that the ­2­  CACR07­693  child’s death was the result of head trauma and liver laceration.  According to Dr. Kokes, the  child’s symptoms, including probable loss of consciousness, would probably have started  immediately after he sustained the injuries.  Dr. Ashley Gonzales, a third­year pediatric resident at Arkansas Children’s Hospital  testified that when Eudre was brought to the emergency room, he was not breathing on his  own and was “completely rigid,” a symptom that she frequently observed with bad head  injuries.  Further, Dr. Gonzales stated that she had treated Eudre the week before for a bruise  on his forehead, and she asserted that none of the life­ending injuries that she noted at the  morning of the child’s death were present.  Accordingly, the foregoing testimony concerning  the severity of Eudre’s injuries, along with the time of the onset of his symptoms, establishes  that the victim sustained his life­ending injuries at a time when Montgomery was alone with  the victim.  The opportunity to commit murder can be substantial circumstantial evidence to  prove the identity of the perpetrator.  See Brunson v. State, 368 Ark. 313, ___ S.W.3d ___  (2006).  Likewise, the testimony of Dr. Kokes, along with that of Dr. Karen Farst, an instructor  in pediatrics at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences and member of the Arkansas  Children’s Hospital Children At Risk Team, established that the injuries that Eudre sustained  were the result of significant blunt­force trauma. Both experts discounted the possibility that  the child’s injuries could have been caused by simply slipping and falling on the kitchen  floor and being nudged by Montgomery’s foot. While it is true that Montgomery’s statement  to police suggests otherwise, it is settled law that the credibility of witnesses is an issue for ­3­  CACR07­693  the jury and not the court, and the jury is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony  and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence.  Phillips v.  State, 344 Ark. 453, 40 S.W.3d 778 (2001).  Furthermore, our supreme court has held that  a defendant’s improbable explanation of suspicious circumstances may be admissible as  proof of guilt.  Goff v. State, 329 Ark. 513, 953 S.W.2d 38 (1997).  Here, not only were  Montgomery’s statements improbable, they evolved over time as the severity of Eudre’s  injuries  became  manifest.    Thus,  contrary  to  his  assertion  on  appeal,  his  “rather  mild  admission to the police” did not actually provide a reasonable explanation of how the child  sustained his injuries, but rather provided proof of his guilt.  Affirmed.  HEFFLEY  and  MILLER, JJ., agree. ­4­  CACR07­693 

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