Mary Spaunhurst v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  SAM BIRD, JUDGE  DIVISION IV  CACR07­422  JANUARY  9, 2008  MARY SPAUNHURST  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL  FROM  THE  SEBASTIAN  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. MC­2006­57]  HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI,  JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Mary Louise Spaunhurst was convicted in a jury trial for driving while intoxicated,  first offense.  In accord with the jury’s recommendation, she was sentenced by the trial judge  to a $750 fine and to twelve months’ imprisonment in the county jail, with nine months  suspended.  She contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a  mistrial when the arresting officer referred to the occurrence of an aggravated assault, an  offense with which she was not charged.  She argues that the prejudicial effect of the remark  is reflected in the jury’s recommendation of sentencing her to the maximum sentence of  twelve months’ imprisonment, even though part of it was suspended.  We agree with the  State that her argument is not preserved for appellate review, and we affirm the conviction.  Sergeants Thomas Robinson and John Classen of the Fort Smith Police Department testified at trial about events that began around December 31, 2005, when they heard a be­  on­the­lookout broadcast for a red pickup truck being chased by a silver car on Highway 71.  Around 5:30 Robinson and Classen momentarily saw the red truck in the southbound traffic,  the silver car directly behind it.  The vehicles drove at a fairly high rate of speed through the  parking lot of a Pic­N­Tote Convenience Store, with customers and cars at the gas pumps and  other stores.  Robinson testified that it “seemed obvious” that the car was trying to catch the  truck as the vehicles proceeded westward on Grinnell.  Robinson and Classen followed the vehicles to the intersection of Grinnell and 35th  Terrace, where there was a stop sign.  The pickup stopped but was rear­ended by the car,  which hit hard and caused debris to fall from the point of impact.  The truck pulled away and  the car immediately followed.  Robinson testified that “it looked . . . like the car tried to hit  the truck again.”  Although Classen turned on the blue lights, the car sped up and continued  “to  go  after  the  truck.”  The  car  did  not  stop  until  its  hood  came  up  and  blocked  the  windshield.  Spaunhurst, the driver, was ordered out and was handcuffed.  Robinson  testified  that  it  was  “obvious”  that  Spaunhurst  had  been  drinking.  Her  speech was slurred and unintelligible, her eyes were glassy and bloodshot, her movements  were extremely uncoordinated, her hair and clothes were disheveled, and there was a strong  odor of alcoholic beverages about her. Classen testified that Spaunhurst was crying and very  upset, and that he could smell the odor of intoxicants on her.  She told him that she was  trying to catch her boyfriend, who was in the truck, and that she was mad at him about an  incident at a bar.  Classen observed heavy damage to the front of the car. ­2­  CACR07­422  Officer Carson  Addis, also of the Fort Smith Police Department, testified that he  transported Spaunhurst to the Sebastian County Detention Center after she was stopped by  Sergeants Robinson and Classen. Addis testified that her performance on field­sobriety tests  led  him to  believe  that  she  was  intoxicated.  The  written  report  of  a  breath  test  that  he  administered  to  her,  which  registered  a  .23  blood­alcohol  reading,  was  introduced  into  evidence through his testimony.  The following exchange occurred during cross­examination:  ADDIS:  When  I  arrived  on  the  scene,  Sergeant  Classon  and  Sergeant  Robinson  already  had  her  in  handcuffs  on  the  scene.    I  marked on the breath/blood alcohol report  form,  no  injury,  because  she  said  she  wasn’t injured.  DEFENSE COUNSEL:  And you marked it No. 1, no accident.  Why did  you mark that?  ADDIS:  Because  there  was  no  vehicle  accident,  just  an  aggravated assault.  Spaunhurst’s counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the response was unresponsive to the  question in “any form or fashion” and “came completely out of the blue.”  He expressed his  belief that Addis intentionally told the jury that Spaunhurst had committed an aggravated  assault.  The  trial  court  offered  to  admonish  the  jury  to  disregard  the  response  as  nonresponsive.  Counsel agreed, again stating that the answer was nonresponsive and had  nothing to do with the question.  The court admonished the jury to “disregard the . . . last  answer by the officer as being nonresponsive to the question as to why he didn’t mark the ­3­  CACR07­422  accident on the report.”  Counsel renewed his motion for a mistrial at the conclusion of the  State’s case.  He argued that the damage of Addis’s answer could not be undone by the  court’s admonishment, that the answer had nothing to do with the  question and was not  responsive at all, and that it was a purposeful “cheap shot.”  The motion was again denied.  Spaunhurst contends on appeal, as she did below, that the trial court erred in denying  her motion for a mistrial after Addis stated that she had committed crimes for which she was  not charged.  She now argues that proof of other crimes is inadmissible when 1) its purpose  is to persuade the jury that the accused is a criminal likely to commit the crime as charged  or 2) its only relevancy is to show that the prisoner is a person of bad character.  Spaunhurst  objected below, however, that Addis had intentionally informed the jury that Spaunhurst had  committed an aggravated assault. Parties are bound by the scope and nature of the objections  and  arguments  made  at  trial.  Tillman  v.  State,  364  Ark.  143,  217  S.W.3d  773  (2005).  Because Spaunhurst’s appellate arguments are not properly before us, we cannot address  them and we affirm the conviction.  Even if we were to address the merits of the argument, we would affirm.  A mistrial  is a drastic remedy and should be declared when there has been an error so prejudicial that  justice cannot be served by continuing the trial, or when it cannot be cured by an instruction  or admonition. See Holsombach v. State, 368 Ark. 415, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007).  The trial  court has wide discretion in granting or denying a motion for mistrial, and, absent an abuse  of that discretion, its decision will not be disturbed on appeal.  Id.  The trial court is in a ­4­  CACR07­422  superior position to determine the effect of the remark on the jury.  Ward v. State, 338 Ark.  619, 1 S.W.3d 1 (1999).  Here, Sergeants Robinson and Classen were on the lookout for a pickup truck being  chased  by  a  silver  car.  The  car,  driven  by  Spaunhurst,  chased  the  truck  through  a  convenience store parking lot, where there were gas pumps and people, and rammed the  truck when it approached a stop sign.  Spaunhurst continued to follow the truck after hitting  it and, even though officers turned on their overhead lights, she did not slow down until the  hood of her car came up and blocked her windshield.  She was arrested after she stopped her  car.  Spaunhurst registered a blood­alcohol level of .23 in the breathalyzer test.  Officer  Addis’s testimony that “there was no vehicle accident, just an aggravated assault,” was given  after her counsel asked why Addis had marked “no accident” on a form.  We agree with the  State that this evidence of another crime, under the res gestae exception, was admissible to  establish the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged offense.  See Gaines v. State,  340 Ark. 99, 8 S.W.3d 547 (2000).  It was also cumulative to the testimony of Sergeants  Robinson and Classen demonstrating that Spaunhurst’s behavior was purposeful, in that the  officers observed her intentionally use her car to hit the truck.  See id.  The  trial  court  was  in  the  best  position  to  witness  the  effects  of  this  allegedly  prejudicial remark, and it admonished the jury to disregard the statement as nonresponsive  and denied the motion for a mistrial.  We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in the  denial of the motion for mistrial.  The conviction is therefore affirmed. ­5­  CACR07­422  Affirmed.  PITTMAN, C.J., and ROBBINS, J., agree. ­6­  CACR07­422 

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