Michelle Logan Jones v. State of Arkansas

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DIVISION IV  CACR07­352  FEBRUARY  6, 2008  MICHELLE LOGAN JONES APPELLANT  APPEAL  FROM  THE  PULASKI  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CR05­4719]  V. HON. WILLARD PROCTOR JR.,  JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Michelle Logan Jones was convicted in a bench trial of possession of marijuana with  intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use while in the course  of and in furtherance of a felony drug offense.  The court fined appellant $300, ordered her  to  pay  court  costs,  ordered  her  to  perform  thirty  hours  of  community  service  within  six  months, suspended her driver’s license for six months, and placed her on probation for five  years.  Appellant’s sole point on appeal is that the circuit court erred in denying her motion  to suppress.  We affirm.  On November 21, 2005, appellant was charged with felony possession of marijuana  with intent to deliver and felony possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use while  in the course of and in furtherance of a felony drug offense.  On June 2, 2006, appellant filed  a motion to suppress her statement and physical evidence.  On September 11, 2006, the circuit court simultaneously held a bench trial on the felony charges against appellant and  a hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress.  At the hearing, Michael Blevins, a North Little Rock  police officer, testified that on  the night of October 1, 2005, he was dispatched to investigate an anonymous call regarding  loud music at the 2500 block of North Berkley.  He said that he arrived at the location in his  police car and saw two cars  parked on the side of the street.  He made contact with the  occupants of the rear car and then made contact with those in the second car.  Appellant was  in the driver’s seat of the second car with the windows down; there was also a passenger in  the  front  seat.    Officer  Blevins  testified  that  he  asked  appellant  if  she  was  playing  loud  music,  to  which  she responded, “No.”  Officer Blevins testified that he then asked both  appellant  and  her  passenger  if  they  “had  anything  illegal  inside  the  car.”    Appellant  responded, “Yes, sir, I have marijuana in my car.”  Officer Blevins asked them to step out  of the car.  He then asked appellant where the marijuana was, and she said it was in the  passenger­side door.  Officer Blevins testified that appellant then told him to look in the  glove compartment, where he found another bag of marijuana.  At that point appellant told  Officer Blevins that there was more marijuana under the driver’s seat.  When he found a  plastic baggie with marijuana, appellant said, “That’s not all.  Look in the brown paper bag.”  Officer Blevins found the majority of the marijuana with some scales and a marijuana pipe  in  a  paper  bag  under  the  driver’s  seat.    He  arrested  appellant  and  took  her  to  the  Levy  substation where Detective John Nannen took her statement.  In her statement, appellant  admitted purchasing marijuana and possessing it with the intent to deliver. ­2­  CACR07­352  Appellant argued in her motion to dismiss, after the State’s presentation of its case,  and  at the close of all of the evidence that the marijuana and drug parapernalia seized from  appellant’s car as well as appellant’s statement to Detective Nannen should be suppressed  because  Officer  Blevins’s  question  regarding  whether  she  had  “anything  illegal”  was  impermissible under the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure and the U.S. Constitution.  The circuit court denied appellant’s motions to suppress, finding that appellant was not  being  detained  when  Officer  Blevins  was  questioning  her  and  that  his  questions  were  permissible under Rule 2.2(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure because he was  investigating a call about loud music.  Appellant filed this appeal, arguing that the circuit  court’s holding regarding Rule 2.2(a) was erroneous.  In reviewing a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we conduct a  de novo review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical  facts for clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or  probable  cause,  giving  due  weight  to  inferences  drawn  by  the  circuit  court  and  proper  deference to the circuit court’s findings.  Yarbrough v. State, 370 Ark 31, ___ S.W.3d ___  (2007).  We reverse only if the circuit court’s ruling is clearly against the preponderance of  the evidence.  Id.  The supreme court has explained that there are three types of encounters between  police and private citizens.  The first and least intrusive category is when an officer merely approaches an  individual  on  a  street  and  asks  if  he  is  willing  to  answer  some  questions.  Because  the  encounter  is  in  a  public  place  and  is  consensual,  it  does  not ­3­  CACR07­352  constitute  a  “seizure”  within  the  meaning  of  the  fourth  amendment.  The  second  police  encounter  is  when  the  officer  may  justifiably  restrain  an  individual for a short period of time if they have an “articulable suspicion” that  the  person  has  committed  or  is  about  to  commit  a  crime.  The  initially  consensual encounter is transformed into a seizure when, considering all the  circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that he is not free to leave.  The final category is the full­scale arrest, which must be based on probable  cause.  Stewart v. State, 332 Ark. 138, 144, 964 S.W.2d 793, 797 (1998)(citing Frette v. City of  Springdale,  331  Ark.  103,  959  S.W.2d  734  (1998)).    The  State  does  not  argue  that  the  encounter  in  this  case  was  justified  by  either  articulable  suspicion  or  probable  cause.  Moreover,  appellant  does  not  dispute  that  the  initial  encounter  between  her  and  Officer  Blevins  to  investigate  the  loud  music  was  permissible  under  Rule  2.2.    The  dispute  is  whether Officer Blevins’s additional question, concerning whether appellant “had anything  illegal,” was permissible under Rule 2.2.  Appellant argues that an encounter under Rule 2.2  is limited by the purpose for which the encounter is permitted—in this case, a report of loud  music—and  that  further  questioning  about  unrelated  potential  criminal  activity  is  not  permissible absent reasonable suspicion.  See Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1.  The State contends that  an encounter under Rule 2.2 is not so limited and that Officer Blevins’s general inquiry did  not present an additional intrusion upon appellant and was therefore permissible under Rule  2.2, which authorizes the officer “to request any person to furnish information.”  Rule 2.2(a) provides that “[a] law enforcement officer may request any person to  furnish information or otherwise cooperate in the investigation or prevention of crime.  The  officer may request the person to respond to questions, to appear at a police station, or to ­4­  CACR07­352  comply with any other reasonable request.” Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.2(a).  The supreme court has  clarified  that  an  encounter  under  this  rule  is  permissible  “only  if  the  information  or  cooperation sought is in aid of an investigation or the prevention of a particular crime.”  Stewart v. State, 332 Ark. 138, 146, 964 S.W.2d 793, 797 (1998); see also Stevens v. State,  91 Ark. App. 114, 208 S.W.3d 843 (2005), and Jennings v. State, 69 Ark. App. 50, 10  S.W.3d 105 (2000).  In  determining  the  extent  of  permissible  interruption  that  a  citizen  must  bear  to  accommodate a law enforcement officer who is investigating a crime under Rule 2.2, the  supreme  court  has  stated  that  the  approach  of  a  citizen  pursuant  to  a  policeman’s  investigative law enforcement function must be reasonable under the existent circumstances  and  requires  a  weighing  of  the  government’s  interest  for  the  intrusion  against  the  individual’s right to privacy and personal freedom.  Baxter v. State, 274 Ark. 539, 543, 626  S.W.2d 935, 937 (1982).  To be considered are the manner and intensity of the interference,  the gravity of the crime involved, and the circumstances attending the encounter. Id.  Our  case law has consistently held that Rule 2.2 authorizes an officer to request information or  cooperation from citizens where the approach of the citizen does not rise to the level of  being a seizure and where the information or cooperation sought is in aid of an investigation  or  the  prevention  of  crime.  Wilson  v.  State,  364  Ark.  550,  559,  222  S.W.3d  171,  179  (2006).  Here, Officer Blevins had authority under Rule 2.2 to approach appellant’s car to  investigate a particular crime, a complaint of loud music.  After approaching her car, he ­5­  CACR07­352  asked her if she was playing loud music to which she responded, “No,” and then asked her  and her passenger if they “had anything illegal inside the car.”  There is no evidence that  Officer Blevins was any more overbearing or intimidating when he asked this particular  question than when he asked his first question about the music.  Indeed, he testified that it  was merely a routine question that he always asked.  Accordingly, we do not find Officer  Blevins’s  additional  inquiry  to  be  outside  the  scope  of  Rule  2.2  or  to  have  caused  the  encounter to rise to the level of a seizure.  Therefore, we hold that the circuit court’s ruling  denying  appellant’s  motion  to  suppress  is  not  clearly  against  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence, and we affirm.  GLOVER and VAUGHT, JJ., agree. ­6­  CACR07­352 

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