Ronnie Dayberry v. State of Arkansas
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
No.
DIVISION III
CACR 07-1302
Opinion Delivered
RONNIE DAYBERRY
APPELLANT
AUGUST 27, 2008
APPEAL FROM THE STONE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CR2005-83, CR2005-92, CR2006-3]
V.
HONORABLE JOHN DAN KEMP,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
Appellant Ronnie Dayberry entered negotiated guilty pleas to two counts of Class A
arson, and one count each of Class D felony arson, Class C felony theft of property, Class B
felony theft by receiving, and second-degree domestic battery and false imprisonment, both
of which are Class C felonies. Pursuant to a judgment entered on August 14, 2006,
Mr. Dayberry was fined $3000 and placed on ten years’ probation, with the first five years
to be supervised. The conditions of appellant’s probation included not committing any
offense punishable by imprisonment, not drinking alcohol, and not using any controlled
substance.
On September 13, 2006, the State filed a petition to revoke appellant’s probation on
the grounds that he committed two counts of harassing communications on September 2,
2006. On January 22, 2007, the State filed an amended petition to revoke alleging that
Mr. Dayberry committed additional violations by consuming alcohol, and by testing positive
for marijuana on January 1, 2007, and January 15, 2007.
After a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Mr. Dayberry’s probation based on
its finding that he violated his conditions as alleged by the State. On May 24, 2007, the trial
court entered a judgment sentencing appellant to concurrent prison terms of thirty, thirty,
and three years for the arson convictions. The trial court also sentenced appellant to three
years for theft of property, five years for theft by receiving, three years for domestic battery,
and three years for false imprisonment, with each of these sentences to run concurrently.
The trial court ordered the arson sentences to be served consecutive to the remaining
sentences, for a total of thirty-five years in prison. Mr. Dayberry now appeals, arguing that
his sentence imposed after revocation was grossly excessive and represented a clear and
manifest abuse of the trial court’s sentencing discretion. We affirm.
Appellant’s probation officer, Kenny Kendrick, testified for the State. Mr. Kendrick
stated that on the day of January 1, 2007, he received a report from the police that there had
been an altercation between Mr. Dayberry and a woman. Later that evening, there was a
report of an altercation between Mr. Dayberry and a man. Mr. Kendrick testified that he
made contact with appellant that night and that Mr. Dayberry submitted to a drug test at the
probation office. That test was positive for marijuana. According to Mr. Kendrick, appellant
made a scheduled office visit on January 3, 2007, where he admitted to drinking a beer and
a half two days earlier. Mr. Kendrick performed another drug test on January 15, 2007, and
Mr. Dayberry again tested positive for marijuana.
-2-
Officer Jackie McCool testified that he responded to the disturbance involving
Mr. Dayberry on January 1, 2007, and that when he arrived a woman advised him that
appellant had threatened her. Officer McCool entered a residence and found Mr. Dayberry
hiding in a closet. According to Officer McCool, there was a lot of alcohol being consumed
in the residence and upon being questioned Mr. Dayberry admitted he had drank alcohol
earlier that day.
Lindsey Wilson at one time had a relationship with Mr. Dayberry, and she was the
victim of one of the arsons for which he pleaded guilty. She testified that at about 1:00 a.m.
on September 2, 2006, her telephone rang and because Mr. Dayberry’s name was on the
caller-ID, she did not answer. Ms. Wilson stated that Mr. Dayberry left a message on her
answering machine, and that, “I was scared tremendously about this phone call based on the
fact that he had already been convicted of burning down my house.”
Chuck Melton testified about the other harassing communication that occurred on
September 2, 2006. He stated that his ex-wife and Mr. Dayberry had a relationship at
some point, and that Mr. Dayberry called him that night making threats. According to
Mr. Melton, Mr. Dayberry was intoxicated and was taunting him about having sexual
relations with Mr. Melton’s ex-wife while she was pregnant with Mr. Melton’s son.
Mr. Dayberry said he was going to “whip his ass,” and also told Mr. Melton to sleep with
a bucket of water beside his bed, which Mr. Melton interpreted as a threat to burn his house.
Brandy Patrick was a recent girlfriend of appellant’s, and she testified on his behalf.
Ms. Patrick stated that prior to trial, Mr. Melton told her he would tell the truth on the
-3-
witness stand in exchange for $1000, and that the truth was that he was drunk on the night
of the phone call and was not sure whether or not it was Mr. Dayberry he was speaking with.
Mr. Dayberry testified on his own behalf, and he denied placing a call to Mr. Melton.
He stated that Mr. Melton asked him for a $1000 bribe to tell the truth prior to trial, but that
he could not afford to pay Mr. Melton. Mr. Dayberry denied using marijuana since being
placed on probation, and contested the two positive test results. Mr. Dayberry did admit that
on January 1, 2007, he drank “maybe half a beer.” Mr. Dayberry stated that he has
completed a substance abuse program and continues to attend AA meetings. Although he
previously pleaded guilty to seven felony offenses, Mr. Dayberry denied that he committed
any of those offenses at the revocation hearing.
On appeal, Mr. Dayberry challenges his thirty-five-year sentence as being grossly
excessive and an abuse of the trial court’s sentencing discretion. He contends that his
probation violations were very minor, and that his sentence was “unbelievably
disproportionate” to the seriousness of the violations. He submits that his “technical
violations” were not of the kind and character to justify a thirty-five-year sentence.
Mr. Dayberry suggests that the State’s case against him on the seven felonies for which he
pleaded guilty must not have been very strong or the State would not have agreed to nothing
more than probation and a fine. He further directs us to testimony in this case that his
alcohol consumption was merely a half can of beer; that he consistently visited his probation
officer and paid probation fees, and on multiple occasions tested negative for drugs; that his
-4-
telephone message to his ex-girlfriend contained no explicit threat; and that Mr. Melton
asked for money to change his testimony about their alleged telephone communication.
Mr. Dayberry primarily takes issue with the thirty-year sentence for Class A felony
arson, which is the maximum penalty permitted for that offense. He notes that under the
sentencing guidelines his presumptive sentence for that offense was fifty-four months.
Mr. Dayberry also cites numerous Arkansas cases where persons convicted of arson received
significantly lighter sentences than thirty years. He asserts that had the trial court properly
exercised its discretion, his sentence would have been far less than what was actually
imposed. Mr. Dayberry requests that this case be remanded for resentencing with directions
to the trial court to sentence him in conformity with the presumptive sentencing guidelines.
We hold that the argument appellant raises in this appeal is not preserved for review.
When the trial court announced appellant’s thirty-five-year sentence at the conclusion of the
revocation hearing, Mr. Dayberry made no objection, nor did he file a post-trial motion
challenging the sentence. We will not consider an argument contesting the sentence if the
appellant, even though present during the sentencing phase, failed to voice to the trial court
his objection to the sentence. Barnett v. State, 328 Ark. 246, 943 S.W.2d 571 (1997); see
Williams v. State, 320 Ark. 498, 898 S.W.2d 38 (1995). We have steadfastly refused to review
issues that were not preserved at trial. Williams, supra.
Mr. Dayberry argues in his reply brief that he preserved his challenge to the length of
his sentence because, before his sentence was imposed, he asked the trial court for leniency
including confinement in either a treatment facility or county jail. Appellant further asked
-5-
that if he is incarcerated, that “he can come out and try to help his mother with her physical
problems” within a reasonable period of time. However, when his sentence was imposed
Mr. Dayberry did not make any objection or claim that the sentence was grossly excessive
or an abuse of discretion as he now asserts on appeal. Nor did he ask the trial court to
sentence him in conformity with the presumptive sentencing guidelines. Because appellant
failed to contest the thirty-five-year sentence after it was imposed and raises arguments for
the first time on appeal, we need not reach the merits.
Furthermore, we would affirm even if the merits of appellant’s argument were
preserved. Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-309(f)(1)(A) (Repl. 2006), if a trial court
revokes probation it may impose any sentence that might have been imposed originally. The
maximum aggregate prison time for Mr. Dayberry’s seven felony convictions is 116 years.
Mr. Dayberry seems to suggest that he was sentenced to thirty-five years for drinking a beer
and failing drug tests when, in fact, he was sentenced for his original felonies. While the trial
court did deviate from the presumptive sentence for appellant’s Class A arson convictions,
this deviation was authorized pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-804 (Repl. 2006), and
the trial court made written findings to justify the departure, including the fact that many of
the offenses exposed a risk of injury to others, and that multiple sentences (including the two
thirty-year arson sentences) were ordered to run concurrently. If the sentence fixed by the
trial court is within the limits set by the legislature, absent exceptions not present in this case,
-6-
we are not at liberty to reduce it even if we thought it unduly harsh. See Williams, supra.1
There are no legal grounds to reverse the thirty-five-year sentence imposed by the trial court.
Affirmed.
GRIFFEN and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.
1
In his reply brief, appellant argues that the precedent in Williams, supra, violates
public policy. However, this court lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the
supreme court. See Flores v. State, 87 Ark. App. 327, 194 S.W.3d 207 (2004).
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.