Patricia Avery v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, JUDGE
DIVISION I
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PATRICIA AVERY
APPELLANT
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
June 4, 2008
APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR2005-55]
HON. MICHAEL MEDLOCK,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
Patricia Avery was convicted in a Crawford County jury trial of possession of more
than 100 pounds of marijuana with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia,
and she was sentenced to imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction for
consecutive terms of thirty years and eight years, respectively. On appeal, Avery argues that
the trial court erred by 1) failing to suppress evidence seized after a traffic stop where there
was an illegal detention and arrest; and 2) not allowing her to introduce mitigation evidence
during the sentencing phase of the trial. We affirm.
We first consider Avery’s suppression argument. Most of the facts are uncontested;
the stop and detention was captured on video tape. On the night of January 30, 2005, Avery
was driving east on I-40 in a pick-up truck with a camper top. At approximately the two-
mile point, she was stopped by Trooper Oleg Craig. Avery does not dispute that she was
driving 75 miles per hour in a 70 mile-per-hour zone. Upon the trooper’s request, Avery
presented an expired driver’s license and could not find her registration or proof of insurance.
Avery stated that she was en route to her home in Virginia Beach, Virginia. She claimed that
she was helping her daughter and child to move back to Virginia and that the truck she was
driving was loaded with her daughter’s belongings. She denied having any illegal drugs or
weapons in her vehicle. Avery admitted that she had been arrested previously for altering a
prescription. She gave her verbal consent for Trooper Craig to search her truck after he
made it clear that she had the right to refuse.
In the cab of the truck, Trooper Craig observed a receipt from a business in California
that was dated six days earlier. He then went around to the back of the truck and used
Avery’s keys to unlock the camper top. In addition to a small piece of luggage inside the
covered and locked back compartment of the pick-up truck were several large, sealed boxes.
Trooper Craig gave a cursory look at the items in the truck bed, then called Corporal Mike
Bowman of the Van Buren Police Department and asked him to bring his drug dog to the
scene. When he was making his request to Corporal Bowman, he opined that there was a
“bunch of dope” in the back of the truck. He told Corporal Bowman that he based his
conclusion on his having found a California business receipt dated January 26, 2005, which
he believed was not consistent with Avery’s story that she was coming from Oklahoma City.
He also noted that Avery had turned around and looked at the vehicle when he asked her
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if she was carrying any illegal drugs. Trooper Craig stated that he intended to wait for the
drug dog, and he would use the time to go over the consent form.
Before going over the consent form, Trooper Craig engaged Avery in conversation,
at one point asking about whether she was a horse enthusiast. While going over the
consent-to-search form, Trooper Craig emphasized to Avery that she had the right to refuse
to let him search her vehicle. She then decided to withdraw her consent. By this time,
more than sixteen minutes had elapsed since Trooper Craig stopped Avery’s vehicle. At that
point, Trooper Craig informed Avery that he intended to write a warning and citation. He
also informed Avery that his “friend” was going to “run” a drug dog around Avery’s truck.
Less than a minute and a half later, the Van Buren drug dog Nero alerted on Avery’s vehicle.
While Trooper Craig fiddled, Nero roamed and ultimately burned Avery.
Avery argues that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the illegal narcotics in this
case because Trooper Craig unreasonably detained her without reasonable suspicion in
violation of Rule 3.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. While she does not
contest the validity of the traffic stop, she asserts that the detention was unlawful because it
exceeded the fifteen minutes specified by Rule 3.1, without a reasonable excuse. Avery
contends that Trooper Craig lacked a reasonable articulable basis for the investigatory
detention. She argues that Trooper Craig’s reasons—she appeared nervous, he observed a
receipt from a California business, which was dated six days earlier, and she looked at her
vehicle when she denied having contraband in the vehicle—were not sufficient. Under the
supreme court’s holding in Sims v. State, 356 Ark. 507, 157 S.W.3d 530 (2004), and Lilley
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v. State, 362 Ark. 436, 208 S.W.3d 785 (2005), she contends that because Trooper Craig
lacked “reasonably articulable suspicion for believing that criminal activity is afoot,”
continuing the detention past the time required to write the warning was unreasonable.
Avery asserts that it was not necessary for Trooper Craig to wait for the drug dog, and the
delay extended the stop beyond the time allowed under Rule 3.1. Finally, she acknowledges
that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), stated that use of
a drug dog in a lawful traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment, but emphasized
that it further required that use of the dog did not permit extending the stop “beyond the
time necessary to complete the criminal history check and issue the warning ticket.” Here,
she argues, Trooper Craig “intentionally delayed” his activities to allow the canine unit to
arrive. We find this argument unpersuasive.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we conduct a de novo
review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical facts for
clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable
cause, giving due weight to inferences drawn by the trial court. Simmons v. State, 83 Ark.
App. 87, 118 S.W.3d 136 (2003). In our review, we defer to the superior position of the
trial judge to pass upon the credibility of witnesses. Davis v. State, 351 Ark. 406, 94 S.W.3d
892 (2003).
Rule 3.1 permits a detention without arrest under certain circumstances:
A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place may, in the
performance of his duties, stop and detain any person who he reasonably
suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit (1) a felony, or
(2) a misdemeanor involving danger of forcible injury to persons or of
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appropriation of or damage to property, if such action is reasonably necessary
either to obtain or verify the identification of the person or to determine the
lawfulness of his conduct. An officer acting under this rule may require the
person to remain in or near such place in the officer’s presence for a period of
not more than fifteen (15) minutes or for such time as is reasonable under the
circumstances. At the end of such period the person detained shall be released
without further restraint, or arrested and charged with an offense.
We note that there is some merit to Avery’s argument. We agree that prior to the
drug dog alerting on her vehicle, Trooper Craig did not have reasonable suspicion to
continue the detention. “Reasonable suspicion” is defined as “a suspicion based on facts or
circumstances which of themselves do not give rise to the probable cause requisite to justify
a lawful arrest, but which give rise to more than a bare suspicion; that is, a suspicion that is
reasonable as opposed to an imaginary or purely conjectural suspicion.” Dowty v. State, 363
Ark. 1, 210 S.W.3d 850 (2005). Whether there is reasonable suspicion depends on whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, the police have specific, particularized, and articulable
reasons indicating the person may be involved in criminal activity. Id. The three reasons
Trooper Craig was able to articulate, that she appeared nervous, that he observed a receipt
from a California business dated six days earlier, and that she looked at her vehicle when she
denied having contraband in it, were not sufficient, as they all could reasonably be
interpreted as innocent behavior. Lilley v. State, supra (holding that “it is impossible for a
combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless
there are concrete reasons for such an interpretation”). However, the fact that Trooper
Craig did not have reasonable suspicion prior to the time that the drug dog alerted on
Avery’s vehicle is not dispositive of this case.
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Our holding rests on the fact that ten minutes into the stop, Avery gave Trooper
Craig consent to search her vehicle. We know from the video that her consent was freely
given. In fact, Trooper Craig did look into the rear compartment of Avery’s vehicle.
Rather than tearing into the large cartons that were found there, however, Trooper Craig
requested a much less intrusive means of inspecting the cargo, when he requested Corporal
Bowman to bring his drug dog. As our supreme court stated in Yarbrough v. State, 370 Ark.
31, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007), the fifteen-minute time limit for detention specified in Rule 3.1
is qualified by the phrase “or for such time as is reasonable under the circumstances.” The
question then is whether the detention was reasonable. Given that Avery initially consented
to the search, that she did not withdraw her consent until 85 seconds past the fifteen-minute
limit, that the drug dog was already on the scene, and that the dog alerted only 90 seconds
later, we cannot say that the delay was unreasonable. We note that Avery does not assert,
nor can we conclude that after Avery withdrew her consent, Trooper Craig further delayed
writing the warning ticket for driving on an expired driver’s license.
As far as the presence of the drug dog outside Avery’s vehicle while Trooper Craig
was writing the warning ticket, our supreme court has held that a canine sniff of the exterior
of a vehicle is not a Fourth Amendment search. See Dowty, supra (citing Sims v. State, supra).
Where there is no “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, no reasonable
suspicion is necessary to justify having a dog smell appellant’s vehicle. Id. Where Avery had
expressly consented to the search of her vehicle, we cannot say that the brief delay caused
by the wait for the drug dog, which was clearly the least-intrusive invasion into Avery’s
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belongings available to Trooper Craig, was unreasonable under the circumstances.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the physical
evidence in this case.
For her second point, Avery argues that the trial court erred when it did not allow
her to introduce mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial. The items
excluded were 1) hand-written notes and cards from Avery’s grandchildren; 2) information
pertaining to her history of taking medication for depression; 3) testimony from family
members concerning Avery’s remorse over accepting $20,000 to pick up and deliver the
drugs and that she could not reveal to the trooper that someone was following her the night
she was stopped because of the fear she or her family member would be killed. Avery
acknowledges that the evidence she sought to admit was hearsay but cites Adkins v. State, 371
Ark. 159, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007), for the proposition that it was proper to allow hearsay
evidence in the sentencing phase where it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted,
but rather to demonstrate that she had a “close family relationship with her grandchildren
and the consequence in their lives of incarcerating their grandmother for any length of time.”
Likewise, she asserts that evidence of her feelings of guilt and fear for her life and the life of
her family members should not have been excluded as hearsay. She further argues that the
trial court’s conclusion that the evidence was not relevant because neither the courts nor the
legislature have provided a definitive definition of “mitigating evidence.” Finally, she asserts
that the evidence of her taking medication should not have been excluded as irrelevant given
the length of the sentence that she faced.
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We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence in the penalty phase
of a trial for an abuse of discretion. Id. The Arkansas Rules of Evidence governs the
admission of evidence during this phase of the trial. Id.
We note first that the handwritten cards and notes were clearly hearsay, and without
the messages contained on them being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., the
grandchildren’s affection for Avery, they could not prove the fact for which they were
offered. We hold that the trial court did not err in excluding these materials as hearsay.
Perry v. State, 371 Ark. 170, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007). Likewise, we hold that the testimony
concerning what Avery contends are feelings of guilt and fear for her life and the lives of
family members is also hearsay. We note further that the trial court found not only that it
was hearsay, but also not relevant. Avery did not challenge the latter ruling at the trial, and
indeed, the argument on this point is markedly different from the argument that she made
to the trial court. Accordingly, we hold that this argument is not preserved for appeal.1 We
do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and a party is bound on appeal
by the nature and scope of the objections and arguments presented at trial. Thomas v. State,
92 Ark. App. 425, 214 S.W.3d 863 (2005).
Finally, concerning the evidence of her taking medication, we note that it was only
objected to after the testimony was presented, and the State did not move to strike. Nothing
further was proffered. In order to challenge a ruling excluding evidence, an appellant must
1
We do not mean to suggest that, during the penalty phase of a trial, evidence of
remorse would not be “relevant,” particularly in light of the fact that lack of remorse is
routinely acknowledged to be an aggravating factor.
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proffer the excluded evidence so that we can review the decision, unless the substance of the
evidence is apparent from the context. Arnett v. State, 353 Ark. 165, 122 S.W.3d 484
(2003). The substance of whatever else Avery was attempting to introduce on this subject
is not apparent here. Accordingly, the failure to proffer specific evidence renders a relevancy
determination impossible, Turner v. State, 355 Ark. 541, 141 S.W.3d 352 (2004), and without
a proffer we cannot ascertain whether appellant was prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling.
Rollins v. State, 362 Ark. 279, 208 S.W.3d 215 (2005).
Affirmed.
MARSHALL, J., agrees;
GLADWIN, J., concurs.
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