Stephanie R. Coker v. Director, Department of Workforce Services, and James Law Firm
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DIVISIONS III & IV
E07-50
September 12, 2007
STEPHANIE R. COKER
APPELLANT
V.
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES, AND
JAMES LAW FIRM
APPELLEES
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
BOARD OF REVIEW
[2006-BR-01987]
AFFIRMED
In this unbriefed unemployment case, appellant, Stephanie Coker, was initially
denied unemployment benefits at the department level, but the Appeal Tribunal reversed
that decision and awarded her benefits.
Coker’s employer, the James Law Firm, then
appealed the appeal-tribunal decision to the Board of Review, which reversed the Appeal
Tribunal and denied her application for unemployment benefits on the basis that she was
discharged from her last work for misconduct in connection with the work. Coker now
appeals to this court, arguing that there was not substantial evidence to support the Board
of Review’s finding. We affirm the Board of Review’s denial of benefits.
A person will be disqualified for unemployment benefits if it is found that she was
discharged from her employment on the basis of misconduct in connection with the work.
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-514(a)(1) (Repl. 2002). In Johnson v. Director, 84 Ark. App. 349,
351-52, 141 S.W.3d 1, 2-3 (2004), this court set forth both the definition of
“misconduct” as well as the well-settled standard of review in unemployment cases:
“Misconduct,” for purposes of unemployment compensation, involves: (1)
disregard of the employer’s interest; (2) violation of the employer’s rules; (3)
disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect; and
(4) disregard of the employee’s duties and obligations to his employer. Rossini v.
Director, 81 Ark. App. 286, 101 S.W.3d 266 (2003). To constitute misconduct,
however, the definitions require more than mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory
conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity,
inadvertencies, ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good-faith errors in
judgment or discretion. Id. Instead, there is an element of intent associated with a
determination of misconduct. Blackford v. Director, 55 Ark. App. 418, 935 S.W.2d
311 (1996). There must be an intentional and deliberate violation, a willful and
wanton disregard, or carelessness or negligence of such a degree or recurrence as to
manifest wrongful intent or evil design. Rossini v. Director, supra. Misconduct
contemplates a willful or wanton disregard of an employer’s interest as is manifested
in the deliberate violation or disregard of those standards of behavior which the
employer has a right to expect from its employees. Blackford v. Director, supra.
Whether an employee’s actions constitute misconduct in connection with the work
sufficient to deny unemployment benefits is a question of fact for the Board.
Thomas v. Director, 55 Ark. App. 101, 931 S.W.2d 146 (1996). Our standard of
review of the Board’s findings of fact is well-settled:
We do not conduct a de novo review in appeals from the Board of Review.
In appeals of unemployment compensation cases we instead review the
evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most
favorable to the Board of Review’s findings. The findings of fact made by
the Board of Review are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence;
even when there is evidence upon which the Board might have reached a
different decision, the scope of judicial review is limited to a determination
of whether the Board could have reasonably reached its decision based on
the evidence before it. Substantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Snyder v. Director, 81 Ark. App. 262, 263, 101 S.W.3d 270, 271 (2003).
Additionally, the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their
testimony are matters to be resolved by the Board of Review. W illiams v. Director,
79 Ark. App. 407, 88 S.W.2d 427 (2002).
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Here, Coker was employed at the James Law Firm as a receptionist/secretary for
approximately two weeks before being fired. At the hearing, Toni Coleman, a paralegal at
the law firm, testified that on the morning in question, the firm was busy and there were
numerous motions that needed to be filed at the courthouse. Coleman said that Coker
had told her on several prior occasions that she needed to go to Office Depot, and that
Coker had told her again that morning, to which Coleman had responded that Coker did
not have time for Office Depot that day. Coleman testified that she later learned that
Coker procured the office credit card from another firm employee, went to the
courthouse, went to Office Depot, picked up her lunch, and arrived back at the office
three hours later.
Coker testified that she was a receptionist/secretary for the law firm from October
2 until October 12, 2006, when she was fired by Bill James, an owner of the firm. Coker
explained that she got the company credit card from Joe Barraza, another paralegal at the
firm, and that he told her to go to Office Depot because she had to return a keyboard and
purchase some office supplies. She explained that she was gone for three or four hours
because she had to take motions to the courthouse and because Barraza sent her on other
errands, including Office Depot. Coker stated that she told Barraza that Coleman did not
want her to go to Office Depot that day, but that Barraza told her to go ahead and to go
then because James was out of the office and it was better to go at that time. Coker said
that she purchased the office supplies on her list, including the cheapest calendar she could
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find so that she could keep track of when to send out letters to clients regarding their
court dates.
When questioned by the hearing officer about whether she went back to Coleman
and told her that Barraza had told her to go to Office Depot after Coleman had told
Coker not to go, Coker said that she did not let Coleman know. However, Coker said
that she asked Barraza to let Coleman know that he had told Coker to go to Office Depot
if Coleman asked where she was and that Barraza said that he would take care of it.
Coker testified that she did not check with Coleman to see if Barraza had spoken with her
and that she just assumed that he had “covered it.” Coker also said that she used her debit
card to pay for an office key to be made for her because Barraza told her that James
wanted her to have a key.
Under questioning by James, Coker said that Coleman had told her not to go to
Office Depot on the day she was dismissed, but that Barraza had told her to go because
James was out of the office. James asked Coker if she would agree that she got an office
key made without authorization, and Coker told him that she did not have authorization
from him, but that Barraza had told her that James wanted a key made for her. Coker
admitted that she was gone for four hours that day, but she said that she went to the
courthouse, to city hall, to the sheriff’s office, back to the office and to Office Depot, and
then she took her one-hour lunch.
Joe Barraza testified that Coker was terminated for taking too long running errands
and for unauthorized credit-card purchases. Barraza said that Coker asked him if she could
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go to Office Depot and that he told her “yes.” However, he stated that Coker did not tell
him that Coleman had told her earlier not to go to Office Depot when he gave her
permission to go. Barraza said that he told Coker to buy a calendar and that he gave her
an office key. Barraza said that he did not recall that there was a deadline for returning the
keyboard to Office Depot. He also denied that Coker told him that Coleman did not
want her to go to Office Depot and that he said to go anyway.
In denying Coker’s claim on the basis of misconduct connected with the work, the
Board of Review found that Coker “had been directed by one supervisor not to go to
Office Depot but circumvented that supervisor’s authority by seeking permission from a
second supervisor without informing him what the first supervisor had directed.” We
hold that there is substantial evidence to support the Board of Review’s decision.
Although Coker testified that she told Barraza that Coleman had told her not to go to
Office Depot but Barraza told her to go anyway, Barraza flatly denied that Coker had told
him that Coleman did not want her to go. The Board of Review believed Barraza’s
version, which it was entitled to do, and his testimony constitutes substantial evidence that
Coker did not tell him that Coleman had already told her not to go to Office Depot
before Coker came to him and received permission to go. Viewing the evidence and all
reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board of
Review’s findings, we hold that Coker’s actions constituted misconduct in connection
with the work. We therefore affirm the denial of unemployment benefits.
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Affirmed.
P ITTMAN, C. J., H ART, R OBBINS, and H EFFLEY, JJ., agree.
G RIFFEN, J., dissents.
Wendell Griffen, J., dissenting. I would reverse and hold that the Board’s decision
on misconduct is not supported by substantial evidence.
The claimant failed to get
clarification concerning the conflicting instructions she was given. However, her actions
were in no way detrimental to the employer’s interest. Although Coleman and Barraza
gave the claimant conflicting instructions, the claimant’s purchases with the firm credit
card were authorized by Barraza, and the claimant filed the pleadings that Coleman
directed her to file.
I do not see how the claimant’s conduct involved disregard of her employment
duties and obligations, disregard of the standards of behavior for her workplace, violation
of the employer’s rules, or disregard for the employer’s interest so as to constitute
misconduct as that term is defined by Grigsby v. Everett, 8 Ark. App. 188, 649 S.W.2d 404
(1983). Instead, the evidence in this case does not demonstrate the intent required for
misconduct. In that sense, this case warrants reversal even more than was true in Greenberg
v. Director, 53 Ark. App. 295, 922 S.W.2d 5 (1996), where we reversed the Board of
Review for denying benefits to a legal secretary who was rather inept.
Here, the claimant received conflicting instructions, and appears to have been fired
for trying to accomplish the tasks she was assigned by Coleman and Barraza. She might
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have exercised better judgment, but I do not see how she intentionally acted contrary to
the law firm’s interests. Consequently, I vote to reverse and remand for benefits.
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