Reggie Joe Patterson v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
JUDGE DAVID M. GLOVER
DIVISION I
CACR06-736
May 30, 2007
REGGIE JOE PATTERSON
APPELLANT
V.
APPEAL FROM THE LINCOLN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[CR-02-55-5]
HONORABLE ROBERT H. WYATT,
JR., JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
Appellant, Reggie Patterson, appeals from the revocation of his probation. For his
sole point of appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in finding that he willfully
refused to comply with his probation requirements, arguing in particular that the State did
not produce a signed acknowledgment from him that he had received the written terms of
his probation. We affirm.
Because of the limited nature of appellant’s argument on appeal, it is unnecessary to
recount the testimony from the revocation hearing beyond that which deals with the issue
on appeal, which can be done within the argument itself. Briefly, we note that evidence
was presented at the hearing that appellant had committed several criminal offenses,
including aggravated robbery, first-degree battery, residential burglary, theft of property,
and aggravated assault. In addition, there was testimony that he had not performed his
community service nor paid certain fees and restitution.
Standard of Review
In Jones v. State, 355 Ark. 630, 633, 144 S.W.3d 254, 255-56 (2004), our supreme
court explained:
We note at the outset our well-settled law regarding revocation of probation
or suspended sentence. To revoke probation or a suspended sentence, the burden is
on the State to prove the violation of a condition of the probation or suspended
sentence by a preponderance of the evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-309(d) (Supp.
2003). See also Williams v. State, 351 Ark. 229, 91 S.W.3d 68 (2002); Bradley v.
State, 347 Ark. 518, 65 S.W.3d 874 (2002). On appellate review, the trial court’s
findings will be upheld unless they are clearly against the preponderance of the
evidence. Id. Because the burdens are different, evidence that is insufficient for a
criminal conviction may be sufficient for revocation of probation or suspended
sentence. Id. Thus, the burden on the State is not as great in a revocation hearing.
Id. Furthermore, because the determination of a preponderance of the evidence
turns on questions of credibility and weight to be given to the testimony, we defer
to the trial judge’s superior position. Id.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-303(g) (Repl. 2006) provides:
(g) If the court suspends imposition of sentence on a defendant or places him
or her on probation, the defendant shall be given a written statement explicitly setting forth
the conditions under which he or she is being released.
(Emphasis added.)
In addition, Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-303(b) (Repl.
2006), requires that “[t]he court shall provide as an express condition of every suspension
or probation that the defendant not commit an offense punishable by imprisonment
during the period of suspension or probation.”
Appellant contends that the “State did not produce a signed paper showing Mr.
Patterson was in receipt of any terms.” The State acknowledges the statutory requirement
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to provide a defendant with a written statement explicitly setting forth the conditions
under which he or she is being released. It is the State’s position, however, that “there is
no corollary requirement that the defendant sign a written acknowledgment when he
receives this written statement or that one be introduced at a revocation hearing.” We
agree with the State’s position, and appellant has cited no legal authority nor developed
any argument that convinces us of his assertion that the State must introduce a signed
acknowledgment of his receipt of the terms and conditions of probation.
The judgment and disposition order by which appellant was placed on probation in
Case No. LCR-2002-55-5 (theft by receiving) provided in pertinent part:
Defendant was advised of the conditions of the sentence and/or placement on
probation and understands the consequences of violating those conditions. The
Court retains jurisdiction during the period of probation/suspension and may
change or set aside the conditions of probation/suspension for violations or failure
to satisfy Department of Community Punishment rules and regulations.
....
Conditions of disposition or probation are attached/included. __XX__ Yes _____
No.
In addition, several of the terms and conditions of appellant’s probation were set out in the
body of this order:
THE DEFENDANT SHALL KEEP IN CONTACT WITH THE ADULT
PROBATION
OFFICE
AND
NOTICE
OF
ANY
CO URT
APPEARANCE UPON THE ADULT PROBATION OFFICER
C O N S T IT U T E S
N O T IC E
TO
DEFENDAN T
OF
SUCH
APPEARANCE.
The defendant shall pay the above-stated court cost, fine, attorney fee, user’s fee,
DNA fee, and restitution to the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office at the rate of $
_75.00__ per month.
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The defendant shall pay the above-stated probation fee of _25.00__ per month to
the Department of Community Punishment Adult Probation.
....
Restitution in the amount of: _$3,500.00__ is to be paid to: [Although shown in
the judgment, we purposely omit the name of the recipient in this opinion.]
Ms. Pearce-Lewis testified that she was employed by the Department of
Community Corrections, Probation/Parole in Lincoln County and that she is charged
with the supervision of the probationers/parolees in that county.
She described her
office’s practices in informing probationers of what is expected of them. Appellant argues
that Ms. Pearce-Lewis’s “opinion that [appellant] received written notice because that’s
‘usually’ what happens, is nothing but sheer speculation” because she did not have
personal knowledge of the matter. We disagree. Not only did appellant not object to her
testimony on that basis at the hearing, it is clear that in discussing the regular business
practices of the Lincoln County probation office, she did have personal knowledge of
those practices as a representative of that office.
Appellant testified at the revocation hearing and did not refute Ms. Pearce-Lewis’s
testimony. He acknowledged that he was placed on probation with an agreement that he
was to pay restitution and other fines and that he had not done so, and he acknowledged
that he was expected to perform community service and that he had not done so. Thus,
by his testimony alone, appellant demonstrated his knowledge of at least some of the
conditions of his probation, and the violation of one condition of probation is sufficient to
support a revocation. Sisk v. State, 81 Ark. App. 276, 101 S.W.3d 248 (2003).
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Affirmed.
B AKER and M ILLER, JJ., agree.
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