Donna Courtney Turner v. Mark R. Brandt and Nanci Lynn Brandt

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DIVISION III  CA07­88  NOVEMBER  28, 2007  DONNA COURTNEY TURNER  APPELLANT  APPEAL  FROM  THE  BENTON  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CIV2006­356­1]  V. HON. JEFF CONNER, SPECIAL JUDGE  MARK  R.  BRANDT  AND  NANCI  LYNN BRANDT  APPELLEES  AFFIRMED  Donna Turner appeals an order of the Benton County Circuit Court that awarded  judgment,  costs,  and  attorney’s  fees  to  her  neighbors,  Mark  and  Nanci  Brandt,  in  their  boundary­line dispute with her.  Noting that Turner twice had been found in contempt of the  court’s  previous  rulings  in  this  case,  the  order  stated  that  the  court  would  tolerate  no  violations of its order and judgment.  Further, the order stated:  To  ensure  that  [Turner]  abides  by  this  ruling,  should  [she]  violate  ANY  element  or  provision  of  this  Judgment  and  Order,  the  [Brandts]  shall  immediately petition the Court for a hearing, and if it is found that [she] has,  in fact, violated this Order and Judgment, that upon a petition by [the Brandts]  and  a  finding  by  the  court  that  [she]  had  in  fact  violated  the  order  and  judgment, [she] shall immediately be sentenced to not less than one hundred  eighty (180) days in jail and shall be obligated to pay, in addition to any fine  deemed appropriate by the Court, any and all of [the Brandts’] attorney’s fees  associated with petitioning the Court and proving the elements of that petition. Turner raises three points on appeal.  First, she contends that the order should be set  aside and the case remanded for a new hearing because the court failed to make a record of  a  hearing  to  which  the  order  refers.  Second,  she  contends  that  the  award  of  costs  and  attorney’s fees was improper without a record to establish the basis of the award.  Third, she  contends that  the court erred in pre­setting “minimum punishments for all future acts of  contempt that include 180 days of incarceration.”  We find no merit to these points, and we  affirm the order of the circuit court.  The Missing Record  The circuit court’s written order, filed on October 5, 2006, states that this matter came  before the court for trial on August 29, 2006; that the Brandts, appearing in person and by  their attorney, announced ready for trial; and that Turner, after being called, was found not  to  be  present.  The  order  reflects  that  the  court  made  its  findings  “upon  review  of  the  pleadings and petitions filed herein and other matters before the Court.”  Turner contends on appeal that the circuit court’s failure to make a record is grounds  to set aside its order and that the case should be remanded so that a hearing can be held and  a record can be made.  She notes the statutory requirement that all circuit courts “shall keep  just and faithful records of their proceedings.”  Ark. Code Ann. § 16­10­104 (Repl. 1999).  She asserts that the court’s failure to make a record of the August 29 hearing, if it actually  took place, leaves her and the appellate court without the ability to review the basis of its  findings.  The Brandts respond that appealing a matter and seeking remand is not the correct ­2­  CA07­88  course to pursue for the creation of a record, and that Turner should have pursued other  options at the trial level.  We agree.  Rule 6(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil provides that, if no  record was made of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing, the appellant may prepare a  statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best means available, and the appellee  may respond with amendments or objections; the trial court then settles and approves the  record.  It is clear that the procedures outlined in Rule 6(d) are to be pursued in the trial court  and not in the appellate court.  Crafton v. State, 274  Ark. 319, 624 S.W.2d 440 (1981).  When there is no attempt to make a record in compliance with Rule 6(d), it is presumed that  the matters presented in the unrecorded hearing support the trial court’s findings.  Argo v.  Buck, 59 Ark. App. 182, 954 S.W.2d 949 (1997).  The appellant cannot demonstrate error  without the evidence and testimony, and it is well established that the abstract is the record  for purposes of appeal.  Id.  Here, because Turner did not attempt to reconstruct a record  under Rule 6(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil, she cannot demonstrate  error by the trial court concerning its failure to make a record.  The Award of Costs and Attorney’s Fees  As her second point on appeal, Turner contends that the award of costs and attorney’s  fees to the Brandts was improper without a record to establish a basis for the award.  Again,  Turner cannot demonstrate error because she has made no attempt to make a record in this  case.  See  Argo  v.  Buck,  supra.  Furthermore,  she  has  waived  this  argument  on  appeal  because she did not raise this issue to the circuit court.  Objections to the circuit court’s ­3­  CA07­88  award of costs and attorney’s fees must be raised in the trial court, perhaps via a motion to  amend  the  judgment  pursuant  to  Ark.  R.  Civ.  P.  52(b).  Farm  Bureau  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  of  Arkansas, Inc. v. David, 324 Ark. 387, 921 S.W.2d 930 (1996).  Punishment for Future Acts of Contempt  Turner contends as her third point that it was error for the circuit court “to pre­set  minimum punishments for all future acts of contempt that include 180 days of incarceration.”  As previously noted in our opinion,  the court warned Turner that she would receive the  sentence should the court find, upon a petition by the Brandts, that she had in fact violated  its order.  Turner raises arguments concerning civil versus criminal contempt, the length of  sentence allowed for contempt by statute, and due­process rights afforded a person charged  with indirect contempt.  She asserts that the court’s order pre­sets the sentence based on a  hearing at which no record was made and at which she was not present.  We agree with the Brandts that Turner has failed to show that she has been prejudiced  by the court’s threat to hold her in contempt should she not obey its order.  Only upon entry  of a final order granting a petition for contempt would an appeal of the “pre­set” 180­day  sentence be ripe for review.  Therefore, it is not proper for us to address the question of  whether or not the order prescribed or warned of inappropriate punishments.  Affirmed.  GRIFFEN, J., agrees.  HART, J., concurs. ­4­  CA07­88  HART, J., concurring. I agree that this case should be affirmed.  However, I write  separately because I wish to emphasize my belief that the appellant’s argument is unavailing.  If this were a case where the trial court neglected or refused to make a verbatim record  of a hearing, our case law is clear that the case must be reversed, even if an appellant failed  to  make  a  contemporaneous  objection.    In  Mattocks  v.  Mattocks,  66  Ark.  App.  77,  986  S.W.2d  890  (1999),  we  interpreted  the  supreme  court’s  Administrative  Order  No.  4  to  require that we reverse a case where the trial judge failed to make a record of in camera  proceedings despite  the  appellant’s apparent acquiescence to the practice at the hearing.  Likewise, in George v. State, 356 Ark. 345, 151 S.W.3d 770 (2004),  the  supreme court  remanded the case when no verbatim record of a proceeding was made.  Moreover, I do not  believe  that  Argo  v.  Buck,  59  Ark.  App.  182,  954  S.W.2d  949  (1997),  the  case  that  the  majority relies on, would compel a different result.  In Buck, the court of appeals affirmed  when the appellant failed to ensure that deficiencies in the transcript were rectified prior to  the case being submitted on appeal.  Certainly Mattocks and George do not annul the maxim  that it is the appellant’s duty to bring up a record that demonstrates error.  This  case  differs  from  Mattocks  and  George  because  appellant  is  unwilling  to  establish whether or not a hearing was even held.  From the record, it appears likely that  there was no hearing to record.  I believe that a fair reading of the transcript indicates that  this case  involved the entry of a default judgment, and apparently no effort was made to set  the  default  judgment  aside,  as  provided  for  in  Rule  55  of  the  Arkansas  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure.  Similarly,  I am troubled  by  the  fact  that  the  trial  court  awarded $5,000 in ­5­  CA07­88  attorney feees without the submission of a fee petition, as required by Rule 54(e) of the  Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.  However, I agree with the majority that this argument  was  not  presented  either  to  the  trial  court  or  to  this  court  on  appeal,  and  therefore  it  obviously cannot support reversal of this case.  Finally, regarding the trial judge’s threat to summarily impose a 180­day sentence for  future contempt, I believe this rare display of judicial intemperance communicates a bias on  the part of the trial judge that should support a recusal motion in the event that the appellant  is summoned to appear at some time in the future.  Nonetheless, I agree with the majority  that,  because  it  involves  only  a  possible  future  cause  of  action,  it  is  not  ripe  for  our  consideration. ­6­  CA07­88 

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