Connie Bell v. Merrie Hutchins, In the Matter of the Estate of Alvin R. Hutchins, Deceased

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DIVISION I  CA07­78  CONNIE BELL  NOVEMBER 14, 2007  APPELLANT  APPEAL FROM THE UNION COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. PR­2005­277­6]  V. MERRIE HUTCHINS, IN THE MATTER  OF  THE  ESTATE  OF  ALVIN  R.  HUTCHINS, Deceased  APPELLEE  HON. DAVID F. GUTHRIE,  JUDGE  REVERSED AND REMANDED  Appellant Connie Bell appeals the June 28, 2006 judgment, of the Union County  Circuit Court, finding that the last will and testament of decedent Alvin R. Hutchins, dated  September 15, 2005, is invalid and setting aside the order admitting it to probate.  Appellant  contends that the circuit court erred in finding that she procured the will and that she had  unduly influenced Alvin R. Hutchins to make the will.  We reverse the circuit court’s finding  of procurement and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Mr. Alvin R. Hutchins lived in Arkansas for fifteen years prior to his death.  During  that time, his daughter, who lives out of state, did not visit him, but Mr. Hutchins made it  known that his daughter would inherit all that belonged to him upon his death.  Mr. Hutchins  hired appellant Connie Bell to be his housekeeper in early 2005 after he had suffered some  falls and had become too feeble to care for himself and his home.  Mr. Hutchins did not own  a washing machine or dryer prior to his hiring appellant, but bought a set and had them installed in appellant’s home in order that she might wash his clothes.  Mr. Hutchins did not  drive,  but  after  he  hired  appellant,  he  bought  a  brand  new  GMC  pick­up  truck,  which  appellant drove.  Mr. Hutchins also loaned appellant money for a deposit and first­month’s  rent on a house.  According to trial testimony, these purchases and financial transactions were out of  the ordinary for Mr. Hutchins, who was said to have been frugal.  His small house had no  running hot water and no toilet facilities indoors.  A wood­burning stove provided heat for  the house.  However, it was established at trial that Mr. Hutchins was generous with his  church  and  helped  people  in  need.    Friends  became  concerned  about  Mr.  Hutchins’s  spending when the washing machine, dryer, and truck were purchased.  Appellant made an appointment for Mr. Hutchins with attorney Teresa Wineland for  September 15, 2005.  On that date, appellant drove Mr. Hutchins to Ms. Wineland’s law  office and waited in the truck.  Mr. Hutchins asked Ms. Wineland to draft a new will, leaving  the washing machine, dryer, truck, and half of the remainder of his estate to appellant, with  the other half of the estate going to his daughter.  After Mr. Hutchins executed the will,  appellant kept it in her possession.  Friends who picked Mr. Hutchins up for church on Sunday mornings testified that  appellant would help him get dressed for church.  However, the last few Sundays of his life,  appellant did not help Mr. Hutchins get ready for church.  On Sunday, October 2, 2005, Mr.  Hutchins was found on the floor of his home by a friend.  He had apparently fallen and had  lain on the floor for several days.  He was taken to the hospital where he died a week later. ­2­  CA07­78  Three days after his death, appellant filed a petition to probate the September 15, 2005 will.  The will was admitted to probate on October 12, 2005, and a motion to contest the will’s  admission was filed on November 28, 2005, by Merrie Hutchins, Mr. Hutchins’s daughter.  After a hearing, the trial court found that appellant had procured the will, effectively  shifting the burden from the will challenger, Merrie Hutchins, to the proponent of the will,  appellant.  Because of the finding of procurement, the trial court found that a rebuttable  presumption of undue influence arose and that the burden of proof was on the appellant to  prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the testator had both the testamentary capacity and the  freedom  from  undue  influence  to  execute  a  valid  will.    The  trial  court  found  that  Mr.  Hutchins had the mental capacity to execute the will on September 15, 2005.  However, the  trial court found that, based upon the facts, appellant failed to rebut the presumption  of  undue influence and declared the will invalid.  This appeal follows.  We review probate proceedings de novo, but we will not  reverse the trial court’s  decision unless it is clearly erroneous.  Moore v. Sipes, 85 Ark. App. 15, 146 S.W.3d 903  (2004).  A decision is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with a definite and  firm conviction that a mistake has been made.  Walker v. Torres, 83 Ark. App. 135, 118  S.W.3d 148 (2003).  When reviewing the proceedings, we give due regard to the opportunity  and superior position of the trial judge to determine the credibility of the witnesses.  Moore,  supra.  In a typical will contest, the party contesting the validity of the will has the burden  of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator lacked mental capacity at the ­3­  CA07­78  time the will was executed or that the testator acted under undue influence.  Looney v. Estate  of Wade, 310 Ark. 708, 839 S.W.2d 531 (1992).  However, where a beneficiary under the  will actually drafts or procures the will, a higher burden of proof is applied under Arkansas  law:  In  Greenwood  v.  Wilson,  267  Ark.  68,  588  S.W.2d  701  (1979),  we  held  that  the  proponent of a will who is a beneficiary and who drafted the will or caused it to be  drafted has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was not the result  of undue influence and that the testator had the mental capacity to make the will. We  again held in Smith v. Welch, 268 Ark. 510, 597 S.W.2d 593 (1980), that where a  beneficiary procures the making of a will, “it is incumbent upon those who, in such  a case, seek to establish the will, to show beyond reasonable doubt, that the testator  had both such mental capacity, and such freedom of will and actions as are requisite  to render a will legally valid.”  Park  v.  George,  282  Ark.  155,  159,  667  S.W.2d  644,  647  (1984).  See  also  Short  v.  Stephenson, 238 Ark. 1048, 386 S.W.2d 501 (1965).  Appellant contends that the circuit court erred when it found that she procured the will  and  thereafter  shifted  to  her  the  burden  to  prove  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  on  September 15, 2005, Alvin Hutchins had both the testamentary capacity to execute a valid  will and freedom from undue influence.  She argues that under Looney, supra, she did not  procure  the  will,  as  procurement  requires  actually  drafting  the  will  for  the  testator  or  planning the testator’s will and causing him to execute it.  She maintains that there was no  evidence that she actually drafted the will or that she planned it or caused Mr. Hutchins to  execute it.  Appellee  contends  that  the  instant  case  is  similar  to Looney, wherein the  procurer of the will, Ms. Looney, was the administrator of the nursing home wherein the  elderly Ms. Wade resided.  Ms. Wade feared that no one would care for her in her declining ­4­  CA07­78  years.  The court noted that the proponent of the will was Ms. Wade’s caregiver and that she  had a fiduciary duty to protect Ms. Wade and not to gain financially from her advanced age  and weakened  physical condition.  Appellee argues that, here, Mr. Hutchins relied upon  appellant as a cook and housekeeper, and rather than protect him, appellant took advantage  of him financially by helping him secure a will that favored her in derogation of all prior  representations as to what his natural disposition of his property to his daughter would have  been.  The  circuit  court  found  that  appellant’s  acts  of  procurement  were  that  she  was  a  beneficiary under the will who called the lawyer’s office to make the appointment for Mr.  Hutchins, drove Mr. Hutchins to the appointment, and waited in the truck for him while he  kept  the  appointment.  Further,  appellant  kept  the  will  in  her  possession  following  the  appointment.  The trial court did not find credible her testimony that she did not know the  content of the will or why the decedent went to the lawyer’s office.  Rose v. Dunn, 284 Ark. 42, 679 S.W.2d 180 (1984), is similar to the instant case, but  has  a  different  result.  There,  Mr.  Dunn  drove  the  testator  to  the  lawyer’s  office  and  participated in the initial discussions concerning making a will. However, the court held that  the testator freely and voluntarily executed his own will, and that Mr. Dunn did not procure  the making of the will.  The court relied upon the case of Park, supra, in determining what  it means to procure a will, and stated as follows:  In the case of Park v. George, Pers. Rep., 282 Ark. 155, 667 S.W.2d 644 (1984), an  attorney who named himself as a beneficiary in the amount of $10,000.00 drew a will  for an 88 year old woman who had been hospitalized and sedated and who appeared  confused and upset. In the case at bar, Delma Dunn merely drove Mr. Pierce to the ­5­  CA07­78  attorney’s office and participated in the initial discussions concerning making a will.  The court found that Mr. Pierce was possessed of both testamentary capacity and  freedom of will. Where a competent individual freely and voluntarily executes his  own will, it cannot be said that another procured the making of that will.  Rose, 284 Ark. at 47, 679 S.W.2d at 183.  Here, appellant merely called the lawyer’s office to make the appointment for Mr.  Hutchins.  Subsequently Ms. Wineland, the attorney, contacted Mr. Hutchins personally to  make sure he wanted the appointment.  Appellant was not present in the office when the will  was  executed.  Further,  Ms.  Wineland  testified  that  Mr.  Hutchins  explained  to  her  the  reasoning behind dividing his estate between his daughter and appellant.  Ms. Wineland  stated that she was convinced that Mr. Hutchins had the proper mental capacity to do what  he  did.  Therefore,  based  upon  Rose,  we  hold  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  finding  that  appellant procured the will and shifting the burden of proof to her.  Further, we hold that the trial court made a proper finding of testamentary capacity  as follows:  As to testamentary capacity, the testimony of Teresa Wineland, who prepared and  witnessed the Will, and Martha Kellum, the second witness, clearly established that  Alvin  Hutchins  possessed  the  capacity  to  execute  the  Will  on  September  15.  Decedent knew what he wanted to do, appeared coherent, and answered counsel’s  questions in a manner that indicated sufficient capacity on that day.  The testimony  of Martha Kellum confirmed the observations and conclusions of counsel.  Once testamentary capacity is established, the question of whether the testator was unduly  influenced must be answered.  We do not find error in the trial court’s finding  that Mr.  Hutchins had the testamentary capacity to execute a will; however, because the trial court ­6­  CA07­78  erroneously shifted the burden of proof to appellant, we reverse and remand for the trial  court to act consistently with this opinion.  Reversed and remanded.  BIRD  and HEFFLEY, JJ., agree. ­7­  CA07­78 

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