Marcos Landaverde v. Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  SARAH J. HEFFLEY, JUDGE  DIVISION I  CA 07­699  December 5, 2007  MARCOS LANDAVERDE  APPELLANT  APPEAL  FROM  THE  WASHINGTON  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. JV­2005­1108­3]  V. HONORABLE STACEY ZIMMERMAN,  JUDGE  ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH  AND HUMAN SERVICES  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Appellant, Marcos Landaverde, appeals the order of the Washington County Circuit  Court that terminated his rights to his son, G.L., born November 19, 2004, after the court  found appellant was not the legal father of G.L. and had taken no steps to establish paternity.  On appeal, appellant raises three arguments: (1) his due process rights were violated when  he was not given notice of the first four hearings in this case; (2) he was improperly denied  his right to assistance of counsel; (3) there was not clear and convincing evidence to support  the termination of his parental rights. We find no error and affirm.  On  October  18,  2005,  the  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services  (DHHS)  received a report of allegations of physical abuse and threat of harm upon G.L. by appellant. DHHS workers visited Auralina Perez at Northwest Medical Center in Springdale, Arkansas,  along with her children S.F. and G.L. Mrs. Perez is married to Wilmer Figueroa, who is  S.F.’s biological father. Appellant is the putative father of G.L. G.L. had no visible injuries,  but Perez had sustained a broken eye socket and sinus cavity and had a severe black eye.  When  asked  how  she  was  hurt,  Perez  stated  that  appellant  had  hit  her  because  she  was  protecting their son, G.L., from appellant, who had kicked G.L.  DHHS placed Perez and the  children at the Salvation Army in Fayetteville to wait until there was an opening at a local  women’s shelter.  On November 2, 2005, a protective service case was opened on the family to offer  services and to ensure the health and safety of the children. Perez left the Salvation Army on  November  9  to  reside  with  a  friend  in  Springdale,  and  after  obtaining  the  family’s  new  address from S.F.’s school, DHHS workers visited the new address and found that Perez was  living with appellant. At that time, DHHS exercised a seventy­two hour emergency hold on  the children. In the petition for emergency custody filed December 19, 2005, appellant was  listed as the putative father of G.L.  An adjudication hearing was held on January 4, 2006, at which the court found that  the children were dependent/neglected due to abuse and parental unfitness. According to the  adjudication order, Perez was the only person served with notice of the proceedings. Perez  was allowed supervised visitation with the children, but appellant was to have no contact  with the children. A review hearing was held April 5, 2006, and the court found that Perez  had completed some parenting classes and attended some counseling, but still had unstable ­2­  CA 07­699  housing. The goal of the case remained reunification with a concurrent goal of adoption.  Appellant did not appear at either the adjudication hearing or the April 5 review hearing.  Appellant was in attendance, however, for the next review hearing, held August 30,  2006. At that hearing, the court found that Perez was not in compliance with the court orders,  in that she had not maintained contact with DHHS and had not exercised visitation with the  children.  The  court  also  indicated  that  she  continued  to  live  with  appellant,  who  had  physically abused her. Perez was ordered to obtain and maintain employment; maintain safe,  clean,  and  stable  housing;  and  attend  counseling.  While  noting  that  appellant  had  not  established  paternity,  the  court  ordered  appellant  to  complete  twelve  hours  of  parenting  classes, cooperate with DHHS, and undergo an anger­management assessment.  A permanency planning hearing was held on November 30, 2006, and extended into  December. At that hearing, the court found that both Perez and appellant had been untruthful  and had not complied with the case plan, and the permanency goal was changed to adoption.  At the termination hearing held March 16, 2007,  the  court heard testimony from DHHS  worker Molly Mashburn, who recommended terminating the parental rights of both Perez  and appellant and placing custody of the children with Figueroa, the legal father of both  children. Perez testified that the injuries she had sustained in October 2005 were the result  of  an  accident,  not  abuse  by  appellant,  although  she  did  admit  that  appellant  had  been  convicted of domestic battery as a result of the incident. She also testified that appellant had  been arrested again in April 2006 and convicted of disorderly conduct after arguing with her.  She testified that there had been no more incidents of domestic abuse, and that while she was ­3­  CA 07­699  still married to Figueroa, she had lived with appellant for the past four years and continued  to do so.  DHHS introduced  affidavits  of  service  for  Perez  and  appellant,  as  well  as  all  the  previous court orders entered in the case, and then rested its case. After hearing directed  verdict motions from both Figueroa and appellant, the court ruled that the State had made a  prima facie showing as to appellant and that appellant was properly served and had proper  notice of the termination hearing by being personally served with a summons and a petition  for termination of parental rights.  Appellant then testified and explained that he had commenced attending the court  proceedings  in  this  case  on  August  30,  2006,  because  he  was  interested  in  getting  the  children back. He testified that he had done everything the court asked of him, including  attending parenting and anger management classes. Appellant testified that his relationship  with Perez had improved greatly and that they had matured as a couple. He asked that the  children be returned to him and Perez. Appellant admitted he was only the putative father  of G.L. and had taken no steps to establish paternity, stating, “He’s my son. I don’t have any  doubts. I don’t need to take any steps.” When asked why he had not appeared in court until  August 2006, eight months after G.L. was taken into DHHS custody, appellant explained,  “I always asked Aurelina if it was necessary for me to appear or if I had to take any steps to  get the kids back. And she said that it was not necessary for me to appear in court and that  she would do everything.” Appellant stated that Perez had been hurt in October 2005 after  he pushed her and she fell during an argument, but he denied ever kicking G.L. ­4­  CA 07­699  In its ruling, the court found that with respect to appellant, he was not the legal father  to S.F. or G.L. and had no legal rights to G.L. Perez had G.L. while married to Figueroa, she  is still married to Figueroa, and appellant had taken no steps to establish paternity. The court  also found appellant’s explanation of Perez’s injury “totally unbelievable,” noting that while  appellant claimed it was an accident, he pled guilty to domestic battery. The court found it  was in the best interest of the children to terminate “all rights that Mr. Landaverde might  1  have claimed,” and the goal of the case remained reunification with Figueroa.  Appellant  then filed a timely notice of appeal to this court.  When the issue is one involving the termination of parental rights, there is a heavy  burden placed upon the party seeking to terminate the relationship. Johnson v. Ark. Dep’t of  Human Servs., 78 Ark. App. 112, 82 S.W.3d 183 (2002). The facts warranting termination  of parental rights must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and in reviewing the trial  court's evaluation of the evidence, we will not reverse unless the court's finding of clear and  convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. Baker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 340 Ark. 42,  8 S.W.3d 499 (2000). Clear and convincing  evidence is that degree of proof which will  produce in the fact finder a firm conviction regarding the allegation sought to be established.  Id. In resolving the clearly erroneous question, we must give due regard to the opportunity  of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. Additionally, we have noted that  in matters involving the welfare of young children, we will give great weight to the trial Perez’s parental rights were also terminated as to both children; however, she is  not a party to this appeal.  1  ­5­  CA 07­699  judge's  personal  observations.  Ullom  v.  Ark.  Dep't  of  Human  Servs.,  340  Ark.  615,  12  S.W.3d 204 (2000).  For his first point on appeal, appellant argues that he was denied due process in that  he was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard until the case against him had already  been developed through four hearings, namely the ex parte emergency hearing, the probable  cause hearing, the adjudication hearing, and the first review hearing. Appellant also argues  he did not receive notice of the termination hearing until four days before the hearing date.  Appellant argues that as a putative father whose rights were at stake, he should have been  a party to the case from the beginning. However, appellant’s arguments in this regard were  never raised to the trial court below, and even in a case involving termination of parental  rights in which constitutional issues are argued, we will not consider arguments made for the  first time on appeal. Myers v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 91 Ark. App. 53, 208 S.W.3d 241  (2005).  Also,  with  regard  to  appellant’s  argument  concerning  untimely  notice  of  the  termination hearing, we note that DHHS introduced an affidavit of service for appellant,  evidencing his notice of the termination hearing, without objection by appellant, and the trial  court found that appellant had been properly served, again without objection by appellant.  For his second point on appeal, appellant argues that he was improperly denied his  right  to  counsel  at  the  early  stages  of  the  case,  and  this  denial  was  not  cured  by  the  appointment of counsel on his behalf for the final two hearings. However, appellant failed  to raise this argument to the trial court below, and we therefore find it is not preserved for  our review. Myers, supra. Furthermore, we note that while Ark. Code Ann. § 9­27­316(h) ­6­  CA 07­699  (Supp. 2005) provides that a parent or guardian may be appointed counsel by the court, the  statute makes no such provision for a putative parent.  For his third point on appeal, appellant argues that there was not clear and convincing  evidence supporting the decision to terminate his parental rights. As a subpoint under this  argument, appellant first argues that the trial court erred in determining that he was not the  natural father of G.L. Appellant contends that the trial court’s conclusion that he had no legal  rights to G.L. was premised only on the testimony of Figueroa and Perez that they were still  married, and any presumption of legitimacy was rebutted by appellant’s own testimony that  he is G.L.’s father. Appellant argues that the evidence presented should have been sufficient  to prompt the trial court to order genetic testing pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16­43­901  (Repl. 1999) to determine G.L.’s biological father. But section 16­43­901 refers to genetic  testing in the context of a proceeding to establish paternity, and there is no evidence that  appellant ever filed a petition to establish paternity. The trial court was under no obligation  to sua sponte order genetic testing when appellant had made no effort to establish his rights  as G.L.’s putative father.  As his second subpoint, appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to show  that he had failed to remedy the conditions that caused the children’s removal. However, the  trial court found, both in its permanency planning order filed December 20, 2006, and its  termination order filed April 2, 2007, that appellant was not truthful  about the domestic  abuse that had occurred and continued to deny the abuse that caused the children to come  into DHHS custody. In its ruling from the bench, the court stated that appellant had done ­7­  CA 07­699  nothing to resolve the domestic­abuse cycle other  than go to anger­management classes,  citing another domestic dispute that had occurred between Perez and appellant after G.L. had  been taken into custody. As stated above, we give due regard to the opportunity of the trial  court to judge the credibility of witnesses and give great weight to the trial judge's personal  observations. We find that the trial court’s ruling in this regard was not clearly erroneous and  affirm the termination of appellant’s parental rights.  Affirmed.  GLOVER  and BAKER, JJ., agree. ­8­  CA 07­699 

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