City of Van Buren Municipal League WC Trust v. Heath Spears

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  BRIAN S. MILLER, JUDGE  DIVISION II  CA07­0596  December 12, 2007  CITY OF VAN BUREN  MUNICIPAL LEAGUE WC TRUST  APPELLANTS  v.  AN APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS  WORKERS’ COMPENSATION  COMMISSION  [F509842]  HEATH SPEARS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  In an April 18, 2007 opinion, the Arkansas Workers’  Compensation Commission  awarded  appellee  Heath  Spears  additional  workers’  compensation  benefits.    Spears’s  employer, the City of Van Buren, argues that the Commission committed substantial error  when it found Spears was entitled to additional benefits.  We affirm.  Spears sustained a compensable back injury in August 2005 when he fell backward  into a wheelbarrow.  His fall occurred when a rat ran up his right arm as he was moving a  wood pile for his employer.  MRI testing revealed a herniated disc at L5­S1.  Spears returned  to light duty in October 2005.  He worked light duty for several weeks before returning to  full duty, although he was still experiencing pain and numbness in his leg. Spears reinjured his back at home on January 29, 2006, while pulling “16 duplex”  nails from a piece of 1­by­4.  The following day he was treated by a chiropractor whom he  told  about  the  incident  with  the  nails.  On  February  2,  2006,  Spears  sought  additional  treatment with Dr. Terry Lewelling whom he also told about the incident with the nails.  Dr.  Lewelling suggested that Spears remain active and prescribed medication.  In March 2006, while leaning over to pick up a container of milk, Spears experienced  increased pain in his back.  Dr. Robert Thompson placed Spears on bed rest and prescribed  additional pain medication and muscle relaxers. Spears also continued his treatment with Dr.  Lewelling and returned to work on April 17, 2006.  The ALJ found that Spears proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was  entitled to additional temporary­total disability benefits from March 15, 2006 through April  16,  2006,  and  ordered  the  City  to  pay  all  reasonably  necessary  medical  expenses.    The  Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ’s decision.  The City now appeals.  In reviewing decisions of the Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable  inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s findings and  affirm the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence.  DeQueen Sand & Gravel Co.  v. Cox, 95 Ark. App. 234,  S.W.3d  (2006).  Substantial evidence is such relevant  evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  Id.  The  issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would  have  supported  a  contrary  finding;  if  reasonable  minds  could  reach  the  Commission’s  conclusion, we must affirm its decision.  Clairday v. The Lilly Co., 95 Ark. App. 94, 234 2  S.W.3d 347 (2006).  When the Commission affirms and adopts the ALJ’s opinion as the  decision of the Commission, the Commission makes the ALJ’s findings and conclusions the  findings and conclusions of the Commission.  Rodriguez v. M. McDaniel Co., 98 Ark. App.  138,  S.W.3d  (2007).  The City argues that Spears’s need for additional treatment was caused by his pulling  nails from the board, which was an independent intervening cause.  When the primary injury  is  shown  to  have  arisen  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment,  the  employer  is  responsible for any natural consequence that flows from that injury, and the basic test is  whether there is a causal connection between the injury and the consequences of such.  K II  Constr. Co. v. Crabtree, 78 Ark. App. 222, 79 S.W.3d 414 (2002); see also Guidry v. J &  R  Eads  Constr.  Co.,  11  Ark.  App.  219,  669  S.W.2d  483  (1984).  A  non­work­related  independent  intervening  cause  does  not  require  negligence  or  recklessness,  but  if  the  claimant is engaged in unreasonable conduct, the result may be an independent intervening  cause.  K II Constr., supra.  Whether there is a causal connection between the injury and a  disability and whether there is an independent intervening cause are questions of fact for the  Commission to determine.  Smith­Blair, Inc. v. Jones, 77 Ark. App. 273, 72 S.W.3d 560  (2002).  In its order finding that Spears was entitled to additional benefits, the Commission  wrote:  The  record  sets  forth  that  following  the  claimant’s  injury  he  was  treated  conservatively but continued to have complaints of pain, burning and numbness as  well as limping as a result of his compensable injury.  The claimant did and was 3  released to return to work but has testified that he has continued to have problems  which have been exacerbated by his work and just general activities of living.  The  claimant’s testimony and the medical records set forth that the claimant’s complaints  are very much similar  to those he initially had following his compensable injury.  [We]  find,  therefore,  that  he  is  entitled  to  medical  treatment  for  his  continuing  compensable problems.  Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commission, we hold that the  City  failed  to  prove  that  Spears’s  need  for  additional  treatment  was  the  result  of  an  independent intervening cause.  Therefore, we affirm because reasonable minds could have  arrived at the conclusions reached by the Commission.  Affirmed.  MARSHALL  and VAUGHT, JJ., agree. 4 

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