Sharon Morgan v. Terry Garrison
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, JUDGE
DIVISION II
CA07-577
APRIL 9, 2008
SHARON MORGAN
APPELLANT
V.
TERRY GARRISON
APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. E-98-614 (RV)]
HON. RICE VAN AUSDALL,
JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
Appellant Sharon Morgan appeals the order from the Craighead County Circuit Court
granting appellee Terry Garrison’s motion to transfer the case to North Carolina. The issue
on appeal is whether the circuit court erred by finding that a North Carolina court was the
more appropriate forum to hear custody and welfare actions in this case. Finding no abuse
of discretion, we affirm.
The parties were divorced on February 17, 1999. Twin children, a daughter, Alyssa
Garrison, and a son, Spencer Garrison, D/O/B: November 1, 1997, were born of the
marriage. Pursuant to an order filed May 4, 2001, appellee was awarded custody of the minor
children, subject to appellant’s visitation privileges as set out in the order.
On February 18, 2003, the parties entered into an agreed order that permitted appellee
to relocate to North Carolina with the children. That order reduced appellant’s child-support
obligation to forty-one dollars per week and relieved her of a child-support arrearage. That
order also provided that appellant was entitled to one weekend visitation per month and eight
weeks of summer visitation with the minor children.
On June 21, 2006, appellant filed a petition for contempt citation, alleging various
violations of the February 18, 2003 order related to her communication and visitation with
the children. She requested a modification to the order, specifically asking that the restriction
of overnight guests of the opposite sex allowed to stay in the home of appellee in the presence
of said minor children be changed to include any sexual partners of any gender. Appellee
filed a response to the petition on July 21, 2006, along with a motion to dismiss, or in the
alternative, a motion of inconvenient forum, and a motion for a continuance. An order was
entered on July 25, 2006, finding appellee in contempt of the February 18, 2003 order and
declining to remove the case to North Carolina.
On October 23, 2006, appellee filed a motion to stay and transfer due to inconvenient
forum with various supporting documents, letters, and affidavits attached in support. The
circuit court entered a ruling in favor of appellee on November 22, 2006, although the letter
ruling was dated October 31, 2006, and appellant admits to receiving a copy of it on
November 1 or 2, 2006, prior to her filing a response to appellee’s motion. Appellant then
filed a motion to reconsider and a response to the motion to stay and transfer due to
inconvenient forum on the same day, November 22, 2006. Appellant’s motion to reconsider
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was denied in an order filed by the circuit court on December 6, 2006. She filed a timely
notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.
Standard of Review and Applicable Statutory Law
The decision of whether to decline jurisdiction is left to the sound discretion of the
circuit court and is not to be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Gray v. Gray, 69
Ark. App. 277, 12 S.W.3d 648 (2000). Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-101 - 9-19-405, Arkansas has
jurisdiction in the present case. However, an Arkansas court that has jurisdiction may decline
to exercise jurisdiction upon findings that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances
and that a court of another jurisdiction is a more appropriate forum. See Ark. Code Ann. §
9-19-207(a). Arkansas Code Annotated sections 9-19-207(b) & (c) provide:
(b) Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this State shall
consider whether it is appropriate for a court of another State to exercise jurisdiction.
For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit information and shall
consider all relevant factors, including:
(1) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the
future and which State could best protect the parties and the child;
(2) the length of time the child has resided outside this State;
(3) the distance between the court in this State and the court in the State that
would assume jurisdiction;
(4) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(5) any agreement of the parties as to which State should assume jurisdiction;
(6) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending
litigation, including testimony of the child;
(7) the ability of the court of each State to decide the issue expeditiously and
the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
(8) the familiarity of the court of each State with the facts and issues in the
pending litigation.
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(c) If a court of this State determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court
of another State is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the proceedings upon
condition that a child-custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another
designated State and may impose any other condition the court considers just and
proper.
Discussion
In arguing that the circuit court erred in declining jurisdiction and transferring the case
to North Carolina, appellant asserts that had the circuit court properly considered the eight
factors it would have rendered Arkansas the continuing convenient forum for this case.
Appellant relies on the connections the children have to Arkansas, including that she has
always lived here, and that the children’s half sister, grandmother, and extended maternal
family live in Arkansas. She also points out that appellee lives approximately nine hundred
miles away, and her financial circumstances have never been favorable, which creates an
“additional road block” to her visitation with the children.
Appellant asserts that the most significant factor to be analyzed is the familiarity of the
Arkansas circuit court with the facts and issues of the case. It is undisputed that the circuit
judge was clearly familiar with the parties, and appellant claims that he recognized their
respective “propensities,” specifically referring to the circuit judge noting the “games” being
played by appellee in interfering with appellant’s visitation with the children. She contends
that this special knowledge of the parties and the history of the case is crucial to the fair
determination of the pending litigation. Appellant argues that there is no way that the court
in North Carolina can have as complete an understanding of the history of appellee’s
deliberate attempts to alienate the children from her and the many steps he has taken to deny
a meaningful relationship between them. She cites examples such as appellee: failing to bring
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the children with him for the hearing, which further delayed her visitation; anonymously
calling DHS to investigate appellant’s home prior to the hearing; and taking the children to
a psychiatrist just days before visitation to obtain an opinion that they cannot return to
Arkansas.1 She maintains that the Arkansas circuit court has special insight into all of
appellee’s games to which she has been subjected throughout her attempts to maintain a
relationship with her children since the parties’ divorce in 1999.
The circuit court noted in its decision to decline further jurisdiction in favor of the
District Court of Wayne County, North Carolina, that the children have lived there for the
past several years and that recent relationships touching on the children’s welfare are now
located in that state. The circuit court also made a finding that the majority of the pertinent
evidence regarding custody and visitation reposes in North Carolina.
While the circuit court set forth two of the factors to be considered under Ark. Code
Ann. § 9-19-207, appellant claims that the majority of the remaining factors would support
keeping the case in Arkansas. She contends that it is a gross miscarriage of justice to hold
otherwise. We disagree.
In Uttley v. Bobo, 97 Ark. App. 15, 242 S.W.3d 638 (2006), this court determined that
Arkansas was not an inconvenient forum where there were several occasions during the
litigation when it was acknowledged that Arkansas would maintain jurisdiction, where the
father remained in Arkansas, the children continued to travel to Arkansas for visitation, and
1
Appellee points out that the DHS investigation was initiated by the children’s
therapist and was conducted in October 2005, almost nine months prior to the July 2006
hearing; he also explains that the only time she was denied visitation was in the second
half of the summer of 2005, upon advice of the therapist.
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the Arkansas circuit court was familiar with the case because it had been ongoing for
approximately six years. In Uttley, the children had been living in the United Kingdom with
their mother for approximately five years. Appellee distinguishes Uttley, where the mother
had no argument to present that an English court would be an appropriate form to make a
child-custody determination. Conversely, in the instant case, appellee presented evidence that
he and the children had resided in North Carolina for almost three and one-half years, and
that substantial evidence concerning the children’s care, education, protection, health, and
personal relationships now exists in that state as well. Additionally, the judges from the
relevant courts in Arkansas and North Carolina conferred on the matter and came to the
conclusion that North Carolina could assume jurisdiction if the same was relinquished in
Arkansas and that North Carolina had the proper procedures in place to proceed with both
pending and future issues concerning the children.
Appellee also cites Mellinger v. Mellinger, 26 Ark. App. 233, 764 S.W.2d 52 (1989), for
the proposition that a circuit court may decline to exercise jurisdiction where it finds it to be
an inconvenient forum, taking into account whether another state is the children’s home state
or has a closer connection with the children and parent, or that evidence of present and future
care is more readily available in another state. Both Arkansas and North Carolina statutes
define “home state” to mean the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting
as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a
child-custody proceeding. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-102; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-102.
Additionally, North Carolina law provides that a North Carolina court may modify a childcustody determination made by a court of another state if the North Carolina court has
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jurisdiction to make an initial determination and a court of North Carolina would be a more
convenient forum. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-203. Accordingly, appellee asserts that North
Carolina would have jurisdiction to hear matters concerning the care and custody of the
parties’ minor children as a “home state” and would have jurisdiction to modify the childcustody determination if this court determines that it would be a more convenient forum.
Appellee argues that a North Carolina court would be able to expeditiously decide
future matters related to the care and custody of the parties’ children. On July 24, 2006,
appellee filed a complaint2 in the District Court of Wayne County, North Carolina, asking,
in part, for the North Carolina court to make inquiry of the State of Arkansas and accept
jurisdiction over the custody of the minor children. He also requested that the State of North
Carolina give full faith and credit to the previous Arkansas order. The Arkansas circuit judge
conferred with the North Carolina judge on the matter, and the North Carolina judge
responded that “North Carolina would only be allowed to assume jurisdiction if in fact
Arkansas were to relinquish same.” While appellee appears to be asking for this court to
affirm the circuit court’s decision so that he may proceed with previously filed litigation, the
analysis would apply to issues that subsequently arise as well.
There was significant evidence presented that definitely favored appellee’s position,
including the fact that since February 2003, the children have spent only approximately
eighteen weeks, or less than ten percent of their time, in Arkansas. In 2003, appellant ended
her eight-week visitation period two weeks early, asking appellee to pick the children up
2
This complaint was filed as case number 06 CVD 1660.
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because she was moving in with a boyfriend and she did not have a place for them to stay.
In 2004, she requested that appellee pick the children up after only five of their eight weeks
of visitation had expired. In 2005 and 2006, the children spent approximately four weeks in
Arkansas; however, appellee does not provide a reason for these shortfalls.
The contacts and relationships with their half-sister, grandmother, and extended
maternal family appear to be de minimis at best, especially the half-sister, with whom they
have no relationship and who is married with a child of her own. The children have
developed significant relationships with appellee’s extended family in North Carolina,
including attending church with their paternal grandmother there and celebrating holidays.
The children’s schools, extracurricular activities, and friends are all located in North Carolina,
as would be all evidence concerning those issues that might arise in future hearings. Critical
evidence concerning the mental health of the children is located in North Carolina, including
records of their treatment with Cindy May, a licensed psychological associate with whom the
children have sought treatment since 2005 related to alleged emotional abuse inflicted by
appellant.
Appellant fails to provide any support or authority for her proposition that the
familiarity of the Arkansas court with the facts and issues of the case should be the overriding
factor to be considered. In Snisky v. Whisenhunt, 44 Ark. App. 13, 864 S.W.2d 875 (1993),
this court affirmed an Arkansas trial court’s refusal to continue jurisdiction in a child-custody
case in favor of a Florida court fifteen months after the parties consented to jurisdiction
remaining in Arkansas. There the trial court, as later affirmed by this court, determined that
Florida was the child’s home state under the Parental Kidnapping Protection Act and the
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Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. In the instant case, over three years had passed since
the conclusion of the last action filed between the parties, which is twice as long as the time
period considered in Snisky. Appellee argues that in this situation the circuit court acted well
within its discretion in declining to retain jurisdiction, and he argues that the familiarity would
not be as strong as before because of the approximately forty months that had elapsed since
an order had been entered in the case.
Finally, appellee maintains that appellant’s assertions of financial hardship are
disingenuous, as her husband and his family have a very successful business, and she is
gainfully employed. He discusses the discrepancy between the size and amenities of her
residence versus her child-support obligation and emphasizes her poor history with respect
to that obligation. There is clearly a conflict between the parties’ perspectives in this matter;
however, credibility and the weight to be afforded to each of their testimony is a matter for
the circuit court. This court has often declared that we accord deference to the superior
position of trial judges in determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given
their testimony. See Downum v. Downum, __ Ark. App. __, __ S.W.3d __ (Feb. 6, 2008).
The statute outlines the factors that are to be considered, and while the circuit court
could have more thoroughly set out its analysis, nothing in the record indicates that the circuit
court clearly erred in the consideration of those factors. We hold that the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion in declining jurisdiction in favor of the North Carolina court;
accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
GLOVER and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.
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