Betty Bolding v. David Norsworthy, Executor of the Estate of Harold Deaton Norsworthy, Deceased

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DIVISION I  CA 07­469  December 19, 2007  BETTY BOLDING  APPELLANT  APPEAL  FROM  THE  UNION  COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CV­2006­263­6]  V. HONORABLE DAVID F. GUTHRIE,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  DAVID NORSWORTHY, Executor of the  EST AT E  OF  HAROLD  DEATON  NORSWORTHY, DECEASED  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Appellant  Betty  Bolding  appeals  the  trial  court’s  order  awarding  ownership  of  approximately  $50,000  in  bank  account  funds  to  her  late  brother’s  estate.  Appellant  contends that the trial court erred in its determination that she was not entitled to the funds  as a joint owner with right of survivorship. We find no error in the trial court’s judgment  and affirm.  The dispute in this case concerns a savings account opened on April 6, 1987, in the  name of Harold Deaton Norsworthy, appellant’s brother. The signature card on the account  contained the signatures of both Harold Norsworthy and appellant. On February 15, 2006,  Harold Norsworthy passed away, and appellant withdrew all of the funds in the account,  approximately $50,000, and placed them in her own personal account. On June 19, 2006, David  Norsworthy,  son  of  the  decedent  and  executor  of  the  decedent’s  estate,  filed  a  complaint in Union County Circuit Court, arguing that appellant was not a joint owner of  the account and that the money in the account should be returned to the estate. Appellant  answered the complaint and alleged that she was the rightful owner of the money as the  account was held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship.  A bench trial on the matter was held on February 23, 2007. Rodney Landes, Jr.,  president of the bank at which the account was held, testified that it was possible to have  a single owner of an account but have several people sign on the account. Mr. Landes also  read the language of the signature card at issue, which stated in pertinent part:  A,  Mr. Harold D. Norsworthy  and  B,  and  C,  as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common, and not  as tenants by the entirety, the undersigned hereby apply for a savings account in  First  Federal  Savings  and  Loan  Association  of  El  Dorado  [now  First  Financial  Bank] and for the issuance of evidence thereof in their joint names, described as  aforesaid. You are directed to act pursuant to any one or more of the joint tenant  signatures shown below in any manner in connection with this account and without  limiting the generality of the foregoing to pay without any liability for such payment  to anyone or the survivor or survivors at any time. This account may be pledged in  whole  or  in  part  as  security  for  a  loan  made  by  you  to  one  or  more  of  the  undersigned. Any such pledge shall not operate to sever or terminate either in whole  or in part the joint tenancy estate and relationship reflected in or established by this  contract. It is agreed by the signatory parties with each other and by the parties with  you that any funds placed in or added to the account by any one of the parties are  and shall be conclusively intended to be a gift and delivery at that time of such  funds to the other signatory party or parties to the extent of his or their pro rata  interest in the account.  *** ­2­  CA 07­469  A. /s/ Harold Norsworthy  P.O. Drawer C  Smackover, AR 71762  B. /s/ Betty Bolding  C.  (Emphasis added.) As the card illustrates, there was only one name that was “aforesaid,”  but there were two names as the “undersigned.” Mr. Landes explained that his impression  was that Harold Norsworthy was the owner of the account and appellant was an authorized  signer, meaning she had the authority to write checks on the account.  Appellant  testified  that  her  brother  added  her  name  to  the  account  in  order  to  compensate her for caring for him in his later years, and her brother had never told her that  she was to distribute the money to his children at his death. When questioned about the  creation of the account in 1987, appellant first asserted that she did not sign the signature  card  at  the  bank  and  did  not  accompany  her  brother  to  the  bank.  But  appellant  later  admitted  that  she  had  testified  in  an  earlier  deposition  that  she  had  been  cleaning  her  brother’s house one day and “I found this thing that had my name and his on the bank  deposit – I mean, on the deposit slip, so he had me sign the paper at the bank, which he  didn’t tell me exactly what it was then.”  In a judgment filed March 23, 2007, the trial court gave credence to Mr. Landes’s  testimony that the bank recognizes a distinction between ownership of an account and  access to an account. The trial court concluded that  the signature card that created the  account was ambiguous, as it makes reference to the “undersigned,” which would include ­3­  CA 07­469  appellant,  and  then  makes  a  contradictory  reference  to  the  joint  names  as  “aforesaid,”  which would refer only to the decedent. The court therefore considered other factors, such  as: (1) the social security number listed on the account was that of the decedent; (2) the  account was funded by the decedent; (3) appellant did not contribute to the account or pay  taxes on its interest earnings; (4) there is no other writing to indicate appellant’s ownership  of the funds or a gift to her through survivorship of the decedent. The court acknowledged  that appellant had the power to withdraw the funds in the account, but concluded “that  power does not equate to ownership of the funds.” The court found that ownership of the  funds rested with the estate and ordered appellant to remit the remaining funds to appellee.  Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal to this court.  In bench trials, the standard of review on appeal is not whether there is substantial  evidence to support the findings of the circuit court, but whether the circuit court’s findings  were clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Parker v.  BancorpSouth Bank, 369 Ark. 300, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007). A finding is clearly erroneous  when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence  is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. Disputed facts and  determinations of credibility are within the province of the fact­finder. Simmons v. Dixon2  96 Ark. App. 260, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006).  On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred because Ark. Code Ann. § 23­  37­502 (Repl. 2000) creates a conclusive presumption that opening a savings account in ­4­  CA 07­469  the name of two or more persons is evidence that both parties intended to vest title in the  account to the survivor upon the death of the other. Section 23­37­502 provides:  Savings accounts may be opened in any association or a federal association in the  names  of  two  (2)  or  more  persons  …  and  the  savings  accounts  may  be  held  as  follows:  (1)(A) If the person opening the savings account fails to designate in writing the  type of account intended, or if he designates in writing to the association that the  account  is  to  be  a  “joint  tenancy”  account  or  a  “joint  tenancy  with  right  of  survivorship” account, or that the account shall be payable to the survivors of the  persons named in the account, then the account and all additions thereto shall be the  property of those persons as joint tenants with right of survivorship.  ***  (C) The opening of the account in this form shall be conclusive evidence in any  action or proceeding to which either the association or the surviving parties is a  party, of the intention of all of the parties to the account to vest title to the account  and the additions thereto in the survivors.  Appellant argues that in this case, her signature and the decedent’s signature on the bottom  of the bank card is sufficient to satisfy the statute and create the presumption of right of  survivorship.  Appellant’s argument in this regard begs the question, however, of whether this  particular  writing  sufficiently  designated  the  account  as  a  joint  tenancy  with  right  of  survivorship. Appellant fails to address the trial court’s finding  that the document was  ambiguous,  and  instead  only  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  conducting  a  “factual  inquiry” into the ownership of the funds. But our case law has made clear that where there  is  uncertainty  of  meaning  in  a  written  instrument,  an  ambiguity  is  present,  and  parol ­5­  CA 07­469  evidence may be admitted to prove an independent, collateral fact about which the written  contract was silent. Alexander v. McEwen, 367 Ark. 241, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006). We find  that  the  trial  court’s  finding  of  ambiguity  and  subsequent  consideration  of  extraneous  evidence was not clearly erroneous.  Appellant also argues that there was not sufficient evidence presented to show that  the decedent intended the funds to pass to his estate and that the trial court improperly  imposed what amounts to a constructive trust without evidence to support such an action.  As to the sufficiency of the evidence, that argument has been addressed in the point above.  As to the imposition of a constructive trust, we agree with appellee that the argument is  without merit, as the trial court simply ordered the funds returned to the estate and made  no indication that it was creating a constructive trust. Overall, we find that the trial court’s  findings in this case were not clearly erroneous, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.  Affirmed.  GLOVER  and BAKER, JJ., agree. ­6­  CA 07­469 

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