Larry A. Bradshaw and Judith E. Bradshaw v. C.D. Stice and Mary Stice

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  SARAH J. HEFFLEY, JUDGE  DIVISION I  CA 07­462  LARRY A. BRADSHAW AND JUDITH E.  BRADSHAW  APPELLANTS  December 12, 2007  APPEAL  FROM  THE  STONE  COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CIV2005­67­4]  V. HONORABLE TIMOTHY M. WEAVER,  JUDGE  C.D. STICE AND MARY STICE  APPELLEES  AFFIRMED  Appellants Larry and Judith Bradshaw appeal from an order finding that appellees had an  easement that fully extended  to a road and that appellants were in contempt of a previous order for  blocking the easement.  Appellants contend on appeal that the trial court’s decision regarding the  extent of the easement was in error and that the trial court erred in its finding of contempt.  We  affirm.  In July of 2003, three couples from Crittenden County, Perry and Irene Morris, appellants  Larry and Judith Bradshaw, and appellees C.D. and Mary Stice, purchased from Patrick and Cheri  Stair Lot 1 of the Blue Cove Subdivision in Stone County.  The deed also conveyed a twenty­foot  wide easement that ran along the western border of the property that connected to a road called Blue Cove Loop, which ran along the northern boundary of the property.  Filed with the deed was  an attachment, which all three couples signed, and which provided that each couple could place  one mode of residence on the .65­acre lot and that each would have a permanent easement for  common drives, power, water, sewer and other shared amenities added to the property.  At the  outset, the couples shared utility services such as electricity, water, and a septic system.  Together,  they  also  constructed  a  ten­foot­wide,  gravel  driveway  on  the  eastern  border  of  the  lot  that  connected with and ran south from Blue Cove Loop to a shed that the couples shared.  The couples  used this drive for ingress and egress to their respective residences.  In January of 2005, the couples parted company and divided the property into three separate  lots. Appellants received the northernmost lot, appellees received the middle lot,  and the Morrises  received the southernmost lot.  The deed setting out appellants’ share of the property stated that  the conveyance was subject to “all existing easements, both public and private, including Blue  Cove Loop along North side and easements along East and West Sides.”  A survey done by Donald  Beckham was incorporated into the deed which laid out and described each couple’s newly­formed  lot.  At  the  time of the  division, the  couples  also entered into an agreement formalizing their  practice of  jointly owning one water service, one electrical service, and one septic system with  related lines and hook­ups, and equally dividing the bills for those services.  The couples, however, soon fell into dispute and amended their agreement in May 2005 to  make different arrangements regarding the utilities.  In particular, the couples continued to share  water service, but they obtained separate electrical services.  With respect to the sewage system,  the couples agreed that:  3.  Presently, the water/electric/sewer lines all run together in one  trench which runs across the  multiple  lots owned by the  parties  hereto. In the future, should the Bradshaw’s sewer line need repairs ­2­  CA 07­462  that cannot be accomplished without digging up the sewer line for  repair/replacement, the  parties  agree that the  Bradshaws will, at  their own expense, run a new sewer line from the west end of their  RV at a direct angle to the jointly owned septic tank/field line and  make connection to the hook­up at the septic tank.  The Stices and  Morrises agree that they will not build on or block the route needed  to run a new sewer line, if needed by the Bradshaws.  Appellees and the Morrises also purchased appellants’ interest in the storage shed.  In September 2005 appellants filed suit against appellees seeking a mandatory injunction,  alleging that appellees had violated the terms of the May 2005 agreement.  Appellants contended  that appellees had placed a mobile home, a privacy fence, an electrical cord, and a pipe across their  property  which  would  prevent  appellants  from  running  a  new  sewer  line  to  the  septic  tank.  Appellants asked for an injunction to require appellees to remove these alleged obstacles.  In their  response, appellees asserted that appellants had placed a metal post on the eastern easement (gravel  driveway) at the point where it met Blue Cove Loop, and they asked that appellants be ordered to  remove the post and leave the easement unobstructed.  After  a  hearing,  the  trial  court  entered  an  order  on  May  23,  2006,  ruling  in  favor  of  appellees.  The trial court found that appellants’ complaint was premature because the alleged  violations of the agreement were relevant only should it be necessary for appellants to run a new  sewer line, which had not yet occurred.  The trial court also found that appellants had agreed “as  a neighborly accommodation” to move the metal post, and the court ordered appellants to move  the metal post “so that it cannot be construed to be obstructing the easement.”  On September 25, 2006, appellees instituted the present action for contempt.  Appellees  alleged that appellants were  in violation of the  May 2006 order with respect to  the  easement  because  appellants  had  replaced  the  metal  post  with  a  piece  of  rebar,  then  metal  posts  with ­3­  CA 07­462  reflectors, and presently had placed a cross­tie over the easement, completely blocking access from  the easement to Blue Cove Loop.   At  the hearing, appellants took the position that they had the  right to obstruct the easement because it was on their property.  Appellants contended that their  deed gave them title to the middle of Blue Cove Loop and that the Beckham survey showed that  the easement stopped eight feet short of Blue Cove Loop. Appellees acknowledged that appellants’  deed gave the title to the middle of Blue Cove Loop, but they maintained that appellants’ deed  made the conveyance  subject to the easement all the way to Blue Cove Loop.  After hearing the  testimony of appellant Mr. Bradshaw and appellee Mr. Stice,  the trial court ruled as follows:  I’m going to find that the parties entered into ­ ­ well, first of all,  I remember this case from the first time. And seems to me you folks  don’t have enough to do; however, in spite of that I’m going to find  that the parties did enter into an ­ ­ the original agreement ­ ­it’s  obvious they did.  They bought this property as one piece and then  they subsequently had some sort of an agreement to split it up.  Mr.  Bradshaw got lot 1A.  I think the Stice’s got 1B.  And I forget ­ ­is  it  Morrises  got  1C.  And  its  particularly  based  upon  Plaintiff’s  Exhibit Number 4, the Beckham survey, which shows that the 10  foot easement goes up to what I find is the south side of Blue Cove  Loop.  And I find that those crossties are placed across that area.  And  Blue  Cove  Loop  is  obviously  –  and  there’s  nothing  that  indicates  otherwise,  is  a  ­  ­  either  a  county  or  city  road.    It’s  obviously a public thoroughfare.  And I’m going to find that the crosstie is an obstruction to the  easement.  Otherwise, there ­ ­ that easement would be an absurdity  if you were able to block it off for a foot or two.  But I find there’s  no proof that there  is a foot or two that is not part of either the  thoroughfare or part of the easement.  And that shall be removed,  immediately, and nothing else put there to obstruct the use ­ ­ to  gain  ingress  or  egress  from  Blue  Cove  Loop  to  the  10  foot  easement.  The trial court also found that appellants were in contempt of the previous order not to obstruct the  easement, and the court sentenced appellants to six months in jail, which was suspended on the ­4­  CA 07­462  condition that appellants engage in no further contemptuous conduct.  Appellants have appealed  from the order memorializing the trial court’s decision.  As  a  preliminary matter,  appellees  assert  in  their  brief  that  appellants’  claim  that  the  easement stopped eight feet short of Blue Cove Loop is barred because appellants failed to appeal  from the May 2006 order commanding them not to block the easement.  The May 2006 order,  however, stated that appellants had “agreed as a neighborly accommodation” to remove the stake  from the easement.  It is settled law that a party cannot agree with an order and then attack it on  appeal.  See Lawson v. Madar, 76 Ark. App. 23, 60 S.W.3d 497 (2001).  Therefore, we conclude  that appellants could not have successfully brought an appeal from the May 2006 order.  Appellants’ argument on appeal is that the survey prepared when the property was divided,  which was attached to appellants’ deed, shows that the easement on the east side (the driveway)  does not go all the way north to the northernmost boundary of their lot.  They contend that it begins  at  what  was  referred  to  as  the  sixteen­foot  offset  pin  and  travels  south  to  the  storage  shed.  Appellants thus argue that the easement stops some eight feet short of Blue Cove Loop and that  they had the right to place obstacles on that part of the drive which they consider their property.  Appellants further contend that the trial court stated no basis for its decision, and that there is no  evidence supporting the establishment of either an easement by implication or necessity.  In reviewing matters concerning easements, this court conducts a de novo review and will  not reverse a finding of fact by the circuit court unless it is clearly erroneous.  Sluyter v. Hale  Fireworks Partnership, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Sept. 13, 2007).  A finding of fact is clearly  erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence  is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.  Id. ­5­  CA 07­462  1  We have examined the deed and the survey drawing.  The deed unmistakably states that  the conveyance is subject to “all existing easements, both public and private, including Blue Cove  Loop along the North side and easement along East and West Sides.”  Although the survey shows  appellants’ north property line extending to the middle of Blue Cove Loop, the boundaries of both  Blue Cove Loop and the easement are clearly marked and those boundaries touch one another.  As  did the trial court, we see no evidence that the easement stopped short of Blue Cove Loop.  We are  thus not able to say that the trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous.  As  their  second  point,  appellants  contend  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  finding them  in  contempt of the May 2006 order.  We do not reach the merits of this argument because the trial  court suspended the sentence imposed for the contempt conditioned upon their future compliance  with the order.  A suspension of the punishment for contempt is in effect a complete remission.  Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Angell, 75 Ark. App. 325, 58 S.W.3d 396 (2001).  This renders the  contempt issue moot.  Id.  We do not decide cases that are moot, render advisory opinions, or  answer academic questions.  K.S. v. State, 343 Ark. 59, 31 S.W.3d 849 (2000).  Affirmed.  GLOVER and BAKER, JJ., agree. 1  To the extent that appellants are relying on a survey designated as “Lot # 1,” appellees  correctly point out that this survey was not admitted into evidence.  We have repeatedly and  consistently stated that matters outside of the record will not be considered on appeal, and it is the  appellant’s burden to bring up a record sufficient to demonstrate that the trial court was in error.  McDermott v. Sharp, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Nov. 8, 2007).  ­6­  CA 07­462 

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