James Mitchell v. Georgia Pacific Corporation and Sedgwick Claims Management Services

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  LARRY D. VAUGHT, JUDGE  DIVISION IV  CA07­453  November 14, 2007  JAMES MITCHELL  APPELLANT  V. GEORGIA PACIFIC CORPORATION  and SEDGWICK CLAIMS  MANAGEMENT SERVICES  APPELLEES  APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’  COMPENSATION COMMISSION  [NO. F408480]  AFFIRMED  Appellant  James  Mitchell  appeals  from  the  decision  of  the  Arkansas  Workers’  Compensation  Commission  denying  his  claim  for  compensation.  Mitchell  argues  that  substantial evidence fails to support the Commission’s decision. We affirm.  Mitchell  is  a  twenty­year  employee  of  appellee  Georgia  Pacific  Corporation.  Mitchell’s job as a deck operator required him to be stationed at a control panel and monitor  logs as they traveled down a conveyor belt and through a lathe, which stripped the bark from  the log. On August 10, 2004, a log jam occurred, which caused a moveable catwalk to loosen  and strike Mitchell in the back. Mitchell testified that the impact caused him to fall to the  floor on his hands and knees. Mitchell returned to work after the incident but was unable to  complete his shift due to pain. Before he left, he reported the incident to his supervisor. The following day, Mitchell called the safety director at work to report the incident and to request  medical treatment for pain in his back and neck.  On  August  12,  2004,  Mitchell  received  medical  treatment  from  Dr.  Edward  A.  Gresham, a physician selected by Georgia Pacific. Dr. Gresham reported that he observed  no abrasions, no ecchymosis or swelling, and no muscle spasms. Dr. Gresham diagnosed  Mitchell with a strain and released him to return  to work. Later that same day, Mitchell  sought  medical  treatment  at  the  local  emergency  room.  There,  the  physician  diagnosed  Mitchell with a low back contusion and acute thoracic and lumbar pain secondary to a direct  blow to the back.  Mitchell  continued  to  receive  medical  treatment  for  his  complaints  from  another  company physician, Dr. Benjamin Walsh. Dr. Walsh never identified any objective findings  of an injury but did note symptom magnification. However, due to Mitchell’s continued  complaints, Dr. Walsh referred Mitchell to Dr. Gregg Massanelli, an orthopedic surgeon.  On  September  28,  2004,  Dr.  Massenelli  stated  in  his  report  that  he  observed  no  obvious spasm, but that Mitchell did have significant limitations in both active and passive  range of motion in his cervical spine, which caused pain. Dr. Massenelli opined that Mitchell  suffered from significant degenerative­disc disease and recommended an MRI. An MRI was  performed on September 30, 2004, and confirmed degenerative­disc disease and also a small  left paracentral herniation at the C4­5 level, along with stenosis at the C3­4, C4­5, and C5­6  levels. Dr. Massenelli opined on October 5, 2004, that the changes on the MRI were chronic 2  and not caused by any work­related injury; however, he concluded that an injury could have  aggravated an arthritic neck.  Mitchell then sought medical treatment from another orthopedic surgeon, Dr. D’Orsay  Bryant,  III.  On  October  14,  2004,  Dr.  Bryant  noted  that  Mitchell’s  “neck  reveal[ed]  tenderness and spasm.” While Mitchell continued to see Dr. Bryant with complaints of neck  pain through January 2005, records showed that Dr. Bryant primarily treated Mitchell for  bilateral carpal­tunnel syndrome.  In February 2005, Mitchell was seen by Dr. Reza Shahim, a referral by Dr. Bryant.  Dr. Shahim reviewed the September 2005  MRI, noted the herniation, and recommended  another  MRI  due  to  the  poor  quality  of  the  image.  The  second  MRI,  according  to  Dr.  Shahim’s  February  24,  2005,  report  also  demonstrated  a  “broad  disc  herniation  at  C4­5  which result[ed] in severe canal stenosis.” Dr. Shahim recommended surgery, which was  performed March 25, 2005. During surgery Dr. Shahim discovered “a large paramedian disc  herniation in the epidural space causing significant thecal sac compression....” At the time  of the hearing, Mitchell remained under the care of Dr. Shahim.  While  the  ALJ  found  that  Mitchell  proved  that  he  was  struck  by  the  catwalk  on  August  10,  2004,  the  ALJ  also  found  that  Mitchell  failed  to  prove  that  he  suffered  compensable injuries as a result. Specifically, the ALJ found that Mitchell failed to establish  objective findings supporting injuries to his back and neck and a causal connection between  the  incident  and  Mitchell’s  disability  and  need  for  medical  treatment.  The  Commission  affirmed the ALJ opinion, and this appeal followed. 3  The  only  issue  on  appeal  is  whether  there  is  sufficient  evidence  to  support  the  Commission’s decision that Mitchell failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that  he  suffered  compensable  injuries  to  his  back  and  neck.  Typically,  we  review  only  the  decision of the Commission, not that of the ALJ. Southeast Ark. Hum. Dev. Ctr. v. Courtney,  99 Ark. App. 87, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007). However, in this case the Commission affirmed  and adopted the ALJ’s opinion as its own. Id. In so doing, the Commission makes the ALJ’s  findings and conclusions the findings and conclusions of the Commission. Id. Therefore, for  purposes of our review, we consider both the ALJ’s decision and the Commission’s majority  decision.  In reviewing a decision of the Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable  inferences in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission. Magnet Cove Sch.  Dist. v. Barnett, 81 Ark. App. 11, 97 S.W.3d 909 (2003). The Commission’s findings will  be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is such relevant  evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id.; see also  Wheeler Constr. Co. v. Armstrong, 73 Ark. App. 146, 41 S.W.3d 822 (2001). The issue on  appeal  is  not  whether  we  might  have  reached  a  different  result  or  whether  the  evidence  would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s  conclusion,  we  must  affirm.  Linton  v.  Ark.  Dep’t  of  Correction,  87  Ark.  App.  263,  190  S.W.3d 275 (2004).  The  ALJ  found,  and  the  Commission  affirmed,  that  Mitchell  failed  to  prove  the  existence of objective findings supporting his injuries. Mitchell argues on appeal that there 4  were  objective  findings  supporting  his  injuries.  He  lists  Dr.  Massenelli’s  September  28,  2004, report that stated that Mitchell had significant limitations in cervical passive range of  motion;  the  September  30,  2004,  MRI  that  showed  a  disc  herniation  at  C4­5;  and  Dr.  Bryant’s October 14, 2004, report that stated that Mitchell’s “neck reveal[ed] tenderness and  spasm.”  A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective  findings.  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11­9­102(4)(D)  (Supp.  2007).  Objective  findings  are  those  findings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient. Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­  102(16)(A)(i) (Supp. 2007). We disagree with the Commission and hold that Mitchell did  establish the existence of objective findings. The emergency room report, dated two days  following the incident, stated that Mitchell suffered a “contusion” to his low back, both MRIs  showed a disc herniation at the C4­5 level, and Dr. Bryant identified neck spasms. Each of  1  these  findings  are  objective,  i.e.,  could  not  come  under  the  voluntary  control  Mitchell.  Bryant  v.  Staffmark,  Inc.,  76  Ark.  App.  64,  61  S.W.3d  856  (2001)  (recognizing  that  a  contusion is an objective finding); Searcy Indus. Laundry Inc. v. Ferren, 82 Ark. App. 69, 1  While Mitchell argues that the cervical passive range­of­motion findings in his  case are objective findings, we disagree based on our holding in Mays v. Alumnitec, Inc.,  76 Ark. App. 274, 64 S.W.3d 772 (2001). In Mays, we held that where there was no  evidence establishing whether the passive range­of­motion tests were not under the  voluntary control of the claimant, the results of that testing were not objective findings  sufficient to support compensability. Mays, 76 Ark. App. at 278, 64 S.W.3d at 775. In the  instant case, there is likewise no evidence in the record demonstrating that the passive  range­of­motion tests employed by Dr. Massenelli were not subject to the voluntary  control of Mitchell.  5  110 S.W.3d 306 (2003) (acknowledging that a herniated disc is an objective finding); Univ.  of Ark. Med. Sci. v. Hart, 60 Ark. App. 13, 958 S.W.2d 546 (1997) (stating that muscle  spasms are objective findings).  While we disagree with the ALJ and the Commission and hold that objective findings  do  exist  in  this  case,  this  does  not  require  reversal  because  we  agree  with  the  ALJ  and  Commission  on  the  second  issue—that  Mitchell  failed  to  establish  a  causal  connection  between  the  work  incident  and  his  disability  and  need  for  treatment.  In  a  workers’  compensation case, a claimant must prove a causal connection between the work­related  accident and the disabling injury. Stephenson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 70 Ark. App. 265, 19  S.W.3d 36 (2000). The determination of whether a causal connection exists is a question of  fact for the Commission to determine. Jeter v. B.R. McGinty Mech., 62 Ark. App. 53, 968  S.W.2d 645 (1998).  There is substantial evidence in the record supporting the ALJ’s and Commission’s  finding  that  Mitchell’s  work  incident  was  not  the  cause  of  his  disability  and  need  for  treatment. For example, the only objective finding discovered contemporaneously with the  injury (two days later) was the contusion on Mitchell’s lower back. In actuality, this finding  is of little relevance because Mitchell’s complaints and medical treatment centered around  his neck—not his back. The only objective findings supporting a neck injury (the herniation  and neck spasms) were not discovered contemporaneously with the injury—the MRI was  taken more than one month after the incident and the neck spasms were noted more than two  months after the incident. Further, we note that Mitchell had been treated consistently from 6  the time of the injury until the MRI in late September 2004 and no objective findings had  been noted by any of his physicians at that time.  Mitchell’s  prior  existing degenerative­disc  disease  also  plays  a  significant  role  in  causing  a  disconnect  between  Mitchell’s  work  incident  and  his  disability  and  need  for  treatment.  Medical  records  clearly  showed  that  Mitchell  had  suffered  from  very  similar  complaints in his neck and back for years leading up to the August 2004 incident. Beginning  in February of 1999, Mitchell began complaining of shoulder pain, at which time his treating  physician recommended a cervical x­ray. The following month, Mitchell was diagnosed with  cervical degenerative­disc disease. In December 1999, Mitchell began complaining of low  back pain and was later diagnosed with lumbar degenerative­disc disease. He continued to  receive  medical  treatment  for  both  his  neck  and  back  until  June  2002.  He  was  seen  for  complaints of mid­back pain following a fall in June 2004—just two months prior to the  accident.  Finally, Dr. Shahim’s testimony was equivocal on the issue of causation. He testified  that if Mitchell was not suffering from symptoms prior to the work incident, then Dr. Shahim  would opine that the work incident was the cause of his current symptoms and need for  treatment. However, Dr. Shahim also testified that if Mitchell was symptomatic prior to the  work incident, then his opinion would be that Mitchell’s current condition was not caused  by  his  work incident  but  rather  by  his  pre­existing  degenerative  condition.  Because  Dr.  Shahim equivocated when giving his opinions, the ALJ and Commission found Dr. Shahim’s  testimony speculative and discounted it. It is the Commission’s function to weigh the medical  evidence  and  assess  the  credibility  and  weight  to  be  afforded  to  any  testimony.  King  v. 7  Peopleworks, 97 Ark. App. 105, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006). Once the Commission has made  its decision on issues of credibility, we are bound by that decision. Cottage Cafe, Inc. v.  Collette, 94 Ark. App. 72, 226 S.W.3d 27 (2006).  Therefore, based on our standard of review, we hold that fair­minded persons with  these same facts could have reached the same conclusion as the  Commission. For these  reasons we affirm the Commission’s decision denying benefits to Mitchell.  Affirmed.  ROBBINS and BAKER, JJ., agree. 8 

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