City of Little Rock and Risk Management Resources v. Ronnie C. Hudson
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
JUDGE DAVID M. GLOVER
DIVISION II
CA07405
November 7, 2007
CITY OF LITTLE ROCK and RISK
MANAGEMENT RESOURCES
APPELLANTS
V.
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION [F111738]
RONNIE C. HUDSON
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
This is a workers’ compensation case. On May 19, 2001, appellee, Ronnie
Hudson, a fireman with the Little Rock Fire Department, suffered a compensable injury
to his left shoulder. He was assessed at maximummedical improvement on July 10,
2002, and received attendant benefits. In July 2003, appellee saw Dr. William F. Hefley,
Jr., concerning problems with his left shoulder, and surgery was performed in August
2003. Appellants, the City of Little Rock and Risk Management Resources, denied
appellee’s claim for additional benefits associated with the August 2003 surgery.
At the time of the hearing on this matter, appellee had worked for the fire
department for thirtyfive years and served as a captain. He was fiftyeight years old.
Following the hearing, the administrative law judge determined that appellee had not
sustained his burden of proving that his original May 2001 compensable leftshoulder
injury was a factor in his need for additional treatment and temporarytotal disability
concerning his leftshoulder surgery in August 2003. Hudson appealed to the
Commission, which reversed the ALJ and determined that appellee had proved that his
treatment from Dr. Hefley in August 2003 was reasonably necessary and that he was
entitled to temporarytotal disability compensation from August 29, 2003 until March 22,
2004. Appellants now argue that the Commission’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.
Standard of Review
In considering appeals from Commission decisions, we view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s findings
and will affirm the decision if the findings are supported by substantial evidence. Murphy
v. Forsgren, Inc., ____ Ark. App. ____, ____ S.W.3d ____ (June 13, 2007). Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Id. If reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s decision, we
must affirm the decision. Id. It is the exclusive function of the Commission to determine
the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Id.
Additional Medical Treatment
In the first part of appellants’ argument, they contend that there was nothing in the
records to support a finding that the surgery and treatment appellee sought on his own
from Dr. Hefley was reasonably necessary and related to the May 2001 leftshoulder
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injury. In support of their position, they recount testimony and other evidence from the
case. However, in reviewing Commission decisions we must view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s findings.
In reversing the ALJ, the Commission explained:
The respondents initially accepted compensability for a workrelated accident
occurring May 19, 2001. The claimant credibly testified that he injured his left
shoulder while putting out a fire on that date. A subsequent MRI study of the
claimant’s left shoulder showed a tear in the supraspinatus tendon. Dr. Bowen’s
impression after reading the MRI was “symptomatic partial rotator cuff tear, left.”
Dr. Bowen planned surgery. Dr. Hefley saw the claimant in July 2001 and
planned procedures including a left shoulder arthroscopy, acromioplasty, distal
clavicle excision, and treatment of the rotator cuff tear.
The respondents sent the claimant to Dr. Collins. Dr. Collins performed a
repair of the left rotator cuff in October 2001. The record indicates that the
claimant’s shoulder afterward was at times reported to be symptomatic [sic];
however, the claimant credibly testified, “It never got any better. It just continued
to hurt.” The Full Commission recognizes the claimant’s testimony that the
claimant thought he presented to Dr. Hefley on his own, but the record indicates
that Dr. Roberts referred the claimant back to Dr. Hefley. Dr. Hefley’s reports in
July 2003 and following indicated that the claimant needed additional medical
treatment for his left shoulder. Dr. Hefley performed surgery on August 29, 2003.
Dr. Hefley informed Dr. Roberts that, during surgery, “I found a Type 2 SLAP
lesion. He had a small tear of the anterior edge of the supraspinatus. I could see
sutures from a previous rotator cuff repair through bone tunnels in the tuberosity....
I did an arthroscopy, SLAP repair, rotator cuff repair, subacromial decompression,
and distal clavicle excision and removed the previous suture knots that might have
been contributing to his impingement.”
The Full Commission finds that the claimant proved Dr. Hefley’s surgery
on August 29, 2003 was reasonably necessary in connection with the claimant’s
May 19, 2001 admitted injury. The evidence before us demonstrates that the
physical abnormalities reported by Dr. Hefley were the causal result of the
compensable injury. We note the claimant’s credible testimony that his pain was
gone following surgery from Dr. Hefley, and that Dr. Hefley “fixed my shoulder.”
This probative evidence of postsurgical improvement is a relevant consideration
in determining whether surgery was reasonably necessary. We reverse the
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administrative law judge’s finding that surgical treatment provided by Dr. Hefley
was not reasonably necessary.
We conclude that reasonable minds could accept the evidence laid out by the Commission
to support their conclusion, and that, therefore, substantial evidence supports the
Commission’s decision.
TTD Benefits
Having concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s
decision concerning the causal relationship between appellee’s original leftshoulder
injury and his August 2003 leftshoulder surgery, the temporarytotal disability benefits
issue is easily resolved.
Temporarytotal disability is that period within the healing period in which an
employee suffers a total incapacity to earn wages. Searcy Indus. Laundry, Inc. v. Ferren,
92 Ark. App. 65, 211 S.W.3d 11 (2005). When an injured employee is totally
incapacitated from earning wages and remains in his healing period, he is entitled to
temporarytotal disability. Id. The healing period ends when the employee is as far
restored as the permanent nature of his injury will permit, and if the underlying condition
causing the disability has become stable and if nothing in the way of treatment will
improve that condition, the healing period has ended. Id. The determination of when the
healing period has ended is a factual determination for the Commission and will be
affirmed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Id. These are matters of weight
and credibility, and thus lie within the exclusive province of the Commission. Id.
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Here, although appellee had earlier been assessed as reaching maximummedical
improvement in July 2002, he had the additional leftshoulder surgery on August 29,
2003. As previously discussed, the Commission concluded that the August 2003 surgery
was reasonably necessary and that it was causally related to appellee’s original
compensable leftshoulder injury. Dr. Hefley kept him off work until March 22, 2004,
and his absence from work was due to his August leftshoulder surgery. As cited above,
the determination of when the healing period has ended is a factual determination for the
Commission and will be affirmed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. We
conclude that the Commission’s finding in this regard is supported by substantial
evidence.
Affirmed.
HART and MILLER, JJ., agree.
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