Willie Bell v. Razorback Concrete Co. and Wausau Business Insurance Co.

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  PER CURIAM  DIVISION I & II  CA07­392  WILLIE BELL  JANUARY 30, 2008  APPELLANT  v.  APPEAL  FROM  THE  ARKANSAS  W O R K E R S ’   C O M P E N S A T I O N  COMMISSION  [F501809]  RAZORBACK  CONCRETE  CO.  and  WAUSAU BUSINESS INSURANCE CO.  APPELLEES  SUBSTITUTED OPINION UPON DENIAL  OF REHEARING; AFFIRMED ON DIRECT  APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON CROSS­APPEAL  Appellant, Willie Bell, appeals from a decision by the Workers’ Compensation Commission,  affirming  the  ALJ’s  finding  that  appellant  proved  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  he  sustained a compensable injury, but reversing the ALJ’s finding that he was entitled to temporary­  total­disability benefits.  On appeal, Bell argues that the Commission erred in denying him an award  of temporary total disability because he was forced to return to work when he was denied medical  treatment by appellee.  On cross­appeal, appellees/cross­appellants Razorback Concrete Company  and  Wausau  Business  Insurance  Company  assert  that  the  Commission’s  decision  that  appellant  sustained a compensable injury for which he was entitled to reasonably necessary medical expenses  is  erroneous  and  not  supported  by the  evidence.  We  affirm on direct  appeal  and  cross  appeal.  On December 28, 2004, Willie Bell was climbing back into the seat of a front­end loader  when he hit his right knee on a tool box.  He explained that, as he climbed on to the front­end loader, it was necessary to pivot on his right foot in order to get into the seat.  He stated that, after striking  his knee on the tool box, he felt a type of heat sensation in his knee.  Nevertheless, he continued to  perform his job duties after the incident.  As the day progressed, he began to have pain and swelling  in his knee.  When he noticed these symptoms, he notified dispatcher Chad McCullar of his injury.  The pain and swelling continued in his knee, and he began experiencing difficulty when walking.  He testified that  he continued to  report  his symptoms to  the dispatcher  every other day until he  finally told the dispatcher that he needed to go to the emergency room.  Bell was seen at the emergency room on January 17, 2005, for his right­knee complaints and  relayed a history of the December 2004 work accident.  The emergency­room physician referred him  to orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Yao.  Bell relayed this information to his supervisor, and an appointment  was made for an examination by Dr. Yao.  Bell saw Dr. Yao on January 18, 2005, and Dr. Yao  directed Bell to remain off work from January 19, 2005, until January 27, 2005.  Bell had a follow­  up visit with Dr. Yao on January 26, 2005, at which time an MRI scan of the right knee was ordered.  After the follow­up visit, Bell was released to light­duty work.  Bell testified that while on light­duty  work, he walked with a pair of crutches and wore a knee brace; however, he still experienced pain  and swelling in his right knee.  At  another  follow­up  visit  to  Dr.  Yao  on  February  14,  2005,  Bell  stated  that  Dr.  Yao  explained that the recommended surgery relative to the right knee was being denied.  Bell testified  that after the denial, he was unable to obtain further medical treatment.  On February 17, 2005, Bell  called Dr. Yao’s office and requested to be released to return to full­duty work.  He explained that  he did so because of his financial obligations (child support for four children) and the fact that he  had  no  other  means  of support.    Per  his  request,  Dr.  Yao  released  him  to  full­duty  work  from  February 18, 2005, through April 22, 2005.  Bell testified that, even though he was able to perform ­2­  full­duty work, he continued to experience symptoms in his right knee.  On April 22, 2005, appellant was driving from West Memphis when he encountered a road  block.  As he progressed through the road block, he was arrested when it was discovered that he had  an  outstanding  warrant  in  that  county and  that  his  automobile  insurance  had  lapsed.    Upon  his  release from jail, he discovered that  his position at  Razorback Concrete had been filled.  A few  weeks later, Bell became employed at City Electric.  However, he was only there one month, as he  was unable to perform the physical labor because of the pain he still experienced in his knee.   Bell  testified  that  because  of  the  present  condition  of  his  right  knee,  he  was  unable  to  find  further  employment.  The ALJ found that Bell sustained an injury to his right knee arising out of and in the course  of his employment; that Bell was temporarily totally disabled and within his healing period from the  December 28, 2004 scheduled right knee injury, and not working from approximately May 4, 2005,  and continuing, exclusive of a one­month period when he was employed, through the end of his  healing period or return to gainful employment; and that respondent shall pay all reasonable hospital  and medical expenses arising out of the December 28, 2004 right­knee injury.  The Full Commission  found  that  Bell had  proved  that  he  sustained  a  compensable  injury for  which he  was  entitled  to  additional medical treatment; however, the Commission also found that Bell did not prove that he  was entitled to temporary­total­disability compensation, thereby reversing that portion of the ALJ’s  decision.  From that decision, comes this appeal.  In reviewing decisions from the Workers’ Compensation Commission, we view the evidence  and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s  findings, and we affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.  Wal­Mart Stores, Inc.  v. Sands, 80 Ark. App. 51, 91 S.W.3d 93 (2002).  Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable ­3­  person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey,  328  Ark.  381,  944  S.W.2d  524  (1997).  The  question  is  not  whether  the  evidence  would  have  supported findings contrary to the ones made by the Commission; there may be substantial evidence  to support the Commission’s decision even though we might have reached a different conclusion  if we sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo.  CDI Contractors v. McHale, 41 Ark. App.  57,  848  S.W.2d  941  (1993).    We  will  not  reverse  the  Commission’s  decision  unless  we  are  convinced that  fair­minded persons with the same facts  before them could not have reached the  conclusions arrived at by the Commission.  White v. Georgia­Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d  98  (1999).    Questions  concerning  credibility  of  witnesses  and  the  weight  to  be  given  to  their  testimony are within the exclusive province of the Commission.  Ark. Dep’t of Health v. Williams,  43 Ark. App. 169, 863 S.W.2d 583 (1993).  The only issue presented to this court by Mr. Bell is whether sufficient evidence supports  the Commission’s denial of temporary total disability.  We find that it does.  The Commission made the following findings in the opinion:  The claimant’s testimony indicated that he returned to full work duty on or about February  18, 2005.  The claimant was therefore not entitled to temporary total disability after that  date.  See, Armstrong, supra.  The record indicates that the claimant worked until April 22,  2005.  The claimant was then incarcerated as the result of an arrest warrant detected during  a traffic stop.  The claimant testified that he was in jail for 12 days.  The Full Commission  does not find that the respondents were obligated to hold open the claimant’s job until he  was released from jail.  The claimant has previously returned to work for a little over two  months, performing his regular duties.  The claimant on appeal cites Farmers Cooperative  v. Biles, 77 Ark. App. 1, 69 S.W.3d 899 (2002) for the proposition that he was entitled to  continued  temporary  disability,  because  he  “unsuccessfully  attempted  to  return  to  the  workforce.”  Nevertheless, we note the following language from Biles, citing Pyles v. Triple  F. Feeds of Texas, 270 Ark. 729, 606 S.W.2d 146 (Ark. App. 1980): “If, during the period  while  the  body  is  healing,  the  employee  is  unable  to  perform  remunerative  labor  with  reasonable consistency and without pain and discomfort, his temporary disability is deemed  total.”  We  again  note,  however,  that  the  instant  claimant  had  returned  to  full  duty  and  was ­4­  performing renumrative [sic] labor before his arrest and incarceration beginning April 22,  2005.  The  claimant  does  not  cite  any  authority  holding  that  a  respondent­employer  is  required to pay temporary disability when an employee has returned to remunerative labor  but is subsequently absent from the workplace for reasons unrelated to a compensable injury.  The Full Commission therefore reverses the administrative law judge’s award of temporary  total disability.  Temporary­total  disability  is  that  period  within  the  healing  period  in  which  an  employee  suffers a total or partial incapacity to earn wages.  Breakfield v. In & Out, Inc., 79 Ark. App. 402,  88, S.W.3d 861 (2002).  As applied to scheduled injuries, a claimant is entitled to receive temporary  total or temporary partial disability benefits during the healing period or until he returns to work  regardless of whether he has demonstrated that he is actually incapacitated from earning wages. See  Wheeler Const. Co. v. Armstrong, 73 Ark. App. 146, 41 S.W.3d 822 (2001) (emphasis added).  In  this case, it is clear that Bell had returned to full­duty work on February 18, 2005, and remained on  full­duty work until April 22, 2005.  Bell did not return to work after April 22, 2005, and ultimately  his  employment  was  terminated.    However,  he  was  not  terminated  because  of  his  inability  to  complete the assigned work duties; rather, it was because he was incarcerated on an outstanding  warrant on April 22, 2005, and remained incarcerated for twelve days.  Because Bell had returned  to full­duty work for more than two full months and was terminated for reasons unrelated to his  injury, we find that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s determination that  Bell was not entitled to an award of temporary­total disability.  Appellees  argue  on  cross­appeal  that  the  Commission  erred  in  finding  that  appellant  sustained a compensable injury for which he was entitled to reasonably necessary medical expenses.  Appellees assert that the Commission’s determination of compensability was error for two reasons.  First, the medical records in evidence were not sufficient to support a finding of compensability, and  second,  Bell’s  right  knee  injury  problems  and  need  for  treatment,  if  any,  existed  prior  to  his ­5­  employment with appellee employer.  To receive workers’ compensation benefits, a claimant must  establish (1) that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment, (2) that the injury  caused internal or external harm to the body that required medical services, (3) that there is medical  evidence supported by objective findings establishing the injury, and (4) that the injury was caused  by a specific incident and identifiable by the time and place of the occurrence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11­  9­102(4) (Supp. 2007).  As the claimant, appellant bears the burden of proving a compensable injury  by a preponderance of the credible evidence. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­102(4)(E)(i) (Supp. 2007).  A  compensable  injury  must  be  established  by  medical  evidence  supported  by  objective  findings.  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11­9­102(4)(D)  (Supp.  2007);  Crawford  v.  Single  Source  Transp.  Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 87 Ark. App. 216, 189 S.W.3d 507 (2004). Objective findings are those  findings which cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient, Crawford, supra, and are  only  necessary  to  establish  the  existence  and  extent  of  an  injury,  Wal­Mart  Stores,  Inc.  v.  VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999).  Appellee asserts that Mr. Bell relied on his own testimony as proof of his knee ailments and  that he offered little, if any, medical proof linking his ailments to his alleged December 28, 2004  accident.  We disagree.  In order to prove a compensable injury the claimant must prove, among  other things, a causal relationship between his employment and the injury, Wal­Mart Stores, Inc.  v.  Westbrook,  77  Ark.  App.  167,  171,  72  S.W.3d  889,  892  (2002),  and  it  is  the  Commission’s  function to  determine  the  weight  to  be  afforded  to  the  testimony  and  medical  evidence.  Searcy  Indus. Laundry, Inc. v. Ferren, 82 Ark. App. 69, 110 S.W.3d 306 (2003).  Medical opinions must  be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.  Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­102(16)(B); Wal­  Mart Assocs., Inc. v. Davis, 98 Ark. App. 422, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007).  In this case, the Commission’s opinion acknowledged  that  the record showed a “host of ­6­  chronic and acute problems involving claimant’s right knee,” and even stated that “[f]rom November  1996 until June 1999, the record details a near­constant series of medical treatment and mishaps  involving claimant’s knee.”  However, the Commission also determined from the medical evidence,  or lack thereof, that there was generally no treatment of record for Mr. Bell’s right knee after June  1999 until the December 28, 2004 incident.  From that point forward, the record contained numerous  objective medical findings, particularly from Dr. Yao, from which the Commission could determine  compensability.  Specifically, Dr. Yao noted on February 15, 2005, that Mr. Bell had a “new medial  meniscus  defect  which diagnostic  testing  had  not  revealed  prior  to  the  December  2004  injury.”  Further, Dr. Yao noted that “[Mr. Bell] stated that his right knee had been doing well without any  pain until the 12/28/2004 injury.”  The Commission has the duty of weighing the medical evidence  as it does any other evidence. Liaromatis v. Baxter Co. Regional Hosp., 95 Ark. App. 296, 236  S.W.3d 524 (2006) (citing Roberson v. Waste Mgmt., 58 Ark. App. 11, 944 S.W.2d 858 (1997)). The  Commission has the authority to accept or reject medical opinions, and its resolution of the medical  evidence has the force and effect of a jury verdict. Poulan Weed Eater v. Marshall, 79 Ark. App.  129, 84 S.W.3d 878 (2002).  Based on the evidence presented, we find that there was sufficient  evidence to  support  the Commission’s decision that  Mr. Bell sustained a compensable injury for  which he was entitled to reasonably necessary medical expenses.  Affirmed on direct appeal; affirmed on cross­appeal.  GLOVER, MARSHALL, VAUGHT, HEFFLEY and MILLER,  JJ., agree. ­7­ 

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