Carl Bagley v. Michelle Bagley Williamson

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DIVISION IV  CA07­359  DECEMBER 12, 2007  CARL BAGLEY  APPELLANT  APPEAL  FROM  THE  CRAWFORD  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. E­96­361 II]  V. HON. MICHAEL MEDLOCK, JUDGE  MICHELLE BAGLEY WILLIAMSON  APPELLEE  REVERSED AND REMANDED  This  case  arises  from  an  order  of  the  Crawford  County  Circuit  Court  denying  appellant Carl Bagley’s motion to terminate his child­support obligation for his adult son,  Shawn Bagley, who is mentally retarded.  On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court  erred in concluding that no material change in circumstances had occurred and in requiring  him to continue paying child support for Shawn.  We agree and reverse the trial court’s  order.  Appellant and appellee, Michelle Bagley Williamson, were divorced in 1996, and  appellee was awarded custody of Shawn, then a minor.  Appellant was ordered to pay child  1  support.  In March 2003, when Shawn was seventeen years old, appellee filed a motion to  modify the divorce decree increasing the amount of child support owed by appellant and 1  Another child was born of the marriage but is now an adult and not the subject of  this appeal.  extending his obligation to pay child support beyond Shawn’s eighteenth birthday because  Shawn was a “special needs” child.  On June 16, 2003, the trial court granted the motion,  finding that Shawn was a “special needs” child, which the court held justified extending the  child­support obligation beyond his eighteenth birthday and increasing appellant’s obligation  to pay child support to $90 per week.  On February 22, 2005, the trial court entered an order denying appellant’s request to  terminate child support but granted appellant’s motion to modify, finding that Shawn had  begun receiving SSI benefits of $560 per month since the June 2003 order.  Accordingly, the  trial court reduced appellant’s child­support obligation to $41.50 per week.  On April 12,  2006,  appellant filed another motion to terminate child support, claiming that a material  change in circumstances had occurred since the February 2005 order in that Shawn was no  longer living in appellee’s home but in a group home for people with special needs.  At a hearing on the matter, appellee testified that Shawn’s  SSI check covered his  group­home housing expenses, transportation, phone bill, and pharmacy expenses.  She also  testified that the group home gave Shawn about $10 cash every week or every other week.  She stated that there was about $50 or $100 a month left from the SSI check after the group­  home expenses were paid, although it was unclear from her testimony if this amount was  used  to  pay  for  Shawn’s  phone  and  pharmacy  expenses.  She  then  testified  that  Shawn  worked part­time at Braum’s and received approximately $150 every two weeks, which went  directly  into  his  personal  checking  account.    She  testified  that  this  money  was  Shawn’s  discretionary spending money.  The bank records and appellee’s testimony indicated that ­2­  CA07­359  appellee withdrew various amounts from Shawn’s checking account between June and the  end of September for Shawn’s expenses: $80; $40; $100; $20; $60; $30; $30; $30; $40; $40.  She  could  not  remember  exactly  for  what  purpose  these  cash  withdrawals  were  spent;  however, she said that she did not give all of the money withdrawn directly to Shawn but  gave him “maybe 10/20 dollars at a time.”  She stated that Shawn spent about $100 a week  on  his  personal  needs,  which  included  shoes,  clothes,  paper,  and  CDs.    The  balance  in  Shawn’s checking account at the time of the hearing was $1300.  The trial court found that the fact that Shawn had moved to a group home was not  “sufficient to show a change in circumstances to terminate the support.”  While the trial  judge noted that it was “a hard question to answer that—that Mr. Bagley’s paying and Ms.  Bagley’s not,” he indicated that Ms. Bagley started with custody and care of Shawn and that  the previous judge and the parties “apparently . . .  reviewed or went over this before, entered  an order that found that all of this was justified” because Shawn, although eighteen years old,  was “not an adult mentally.”  The trial judge then stated that it was “obvious [Shawn] has  more expenses,” but the judge also noted that he did not know what Shawn’s expenses were  for.  He suggested that the cash transactions were a problem and that there might be a better  way for appellee to keep track of Shawn’s actual expenses.  Nevertheless, the trial court  entered an order on January 17, 2007, denying appellant’s petition to terminate child support,  finding that the fact that Shawn had moved from appellee’s home to a group home was not  sufficient to show a change in circumstances to terminate appellant’s support. ­3­  CA07­359  On appeal, appellant argues that Shawn’s move into a group home from appellee’s  home constitutes a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant termination of appellant’s  child­support obligation and that the trial court clearly erred in holding otherwise.  Our law  puts the burden on a party seeking modification of a child­support obligation  to  show a  material  change  of  circumstances  sufficient  to  warrant  the  modification.  Morehouse  v.  Lawson, 94 Ark. App. 374, 376, 231 S.W.3d 86, 87 (2006).  A trial court’s determination as  to  whether  there  is  a  sufficient  change  in  circumstances  to  warrant  a  modification  or  termination of child support is a finding of fact, and we will not reverse its decision unless  it is clearly erroneous.  Roland v. Roland, 43 Ark. App. 60, 859 S.W.2d 654 (1993).  It is unclear from the trial court’s order whether it found that Shawn’s move from  appellee’s home to a group home was not a change in circumstances, or whether it found that  this was in fact a change in circumstances but that the change was not sufficient to warrant  termination of appellant’s child­support obligation.  Therefore, in order to review the trial  court’s decision, we first hold that Shawn’s move to a group home from appellee’s home was  a change in circumstances and, if the trial court found otherwise, its finding on this issue is  clearly erroneous.  Having made this preliminary holding, we turn to the trial court’s finding  that this change of circumstances was not sufficient to warrant termination of appellant’s  child­support obligation.  The general rule in Arkansas is that a parent is legally obligated to support his or her  child at least until the time the child reaches majority.  Rogers v. Rogers, 83 Ark. App. 206,  210,  121  S.W.3d  510,  512  (2003).  Indeed,  an  obligor’s  duty  to  pay  child  support ­4­  CA07­359  automatically terminates by operation of law on the later of the date that the child reaches  eighteen years of age or should have graduated from high school.  Ark. Code Ann. § 9­14­  237 (Supp. 2005).  However, the duty to support a child does not cease at majority if the  child  is  mentally  or  physically  disabled  in  any  way  at  majority  and  needs  support.  Id.  (citations omitted).  A determination of whether continued support is proper must be made  on the basis of the facts of the particular case.  See Petty v. Petty, 252 Ark. 1032, 1036, 482  S.W.2d 119, 121 (1972).  In Petty, the supreme court reversed the trial court’s finding that the parties’ eighteen­  year­old daughter, Kay, was not disabled. Kay had suffered from grand mal epilepsy from  the age of two.  Kay took medication twice daily to prevent convulsions, could not drive a  car, lived with her mother while attending college, and was admittedly in need of specialized  training in order to obtain employment.  The court concluded that, at the time of trial, Kay  was unable to  earn a livelihood and was in more need of a specialized education than a  normal student for her to maintain herself in the future.  The court noted, however, that,  when she became “financially capable of taking care of herself, a different situation will  exist.”  Id. at 1037, 482 S.W.2d at 121.  Neither the supreme court nor this court has held that a parent is obligated to support  a disabled or special­needs child for life.  Case law makes clear that the determination of  whether continued support is proper must be made on the basis of the facts of the particular  case and that such an obligation will be imposed only if the adult child needs the continued  support.  Id.; Rogers, supra (holding that child who maintained a 3.8 GPA in first two years ­5­  CA07­359  of  college, lived independently, had been employed, and was able to travel did not need  support in spite of possible scholastic limitations following a car accident that occurred when  child was in high school).  It is undisputed that Shawn is a “special needs” individual.  It is also undisputed that  Shawn no longer lives with appellee—as he did when the court last modified appellant’s  support  obligation—but  in  a  group  home.    Thus,  appellee  is  no  longer  responsible  for  Shawn’s housing, utilities, food, transportation, or phone bills.  All of these expenses are  now  paid  to  the  group  home  by  Shawn’s  SSI  check.    Appellee  admitted  that  Shawn’s  pharmacy bills were also covered expenses.  Indeed, she admitted that, between his part­time  job and the remaining money left from his SSI check after his expenses were paid, Shawn  had approximately $400 per month to use for personal expenses.  She guessed that he spent  about $100 per week on personal expenses, although she could not document these expenses.  While Shawn is admittedly a special­needs person, there has been no showing that he  needs continuing financial support from his parents.  When the trial court ordered appellant  to pay $41.50 in child support in February 2005, Shawn was living at home with appellee,  who was providing his housing, utilities, food, and transportation.  However, appellee is no  longer incurring expenses for any of these items on Shawn’s behalf because Shawn is now  living in a group home with other special­needs children and adults.  All of his needs, except  for personal­spending items, are covered by his SSI check, which is sent directly to the group  home.  He has approximately $300 in earned income and a small amount left from his SSI ­6­  CA07­359  check after his other expenses are paid for personal items.  Under the present record, we hold  that the trial court erred in finding that Shawn’s move into a group home from appellee’s  home  did  not  constitute  a  sufficient  change  in  circumstances  to  warrant  termination  of  appellant’s child­support obligation.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision and  remand with directions to terminate appellant’s child­support obligation.  Reversed and remanded.  PITTMAN, C.J., and ROBBINS, J., agree. ­7­  CA07­359 

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