Linda Baird v. Raymond Culp

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Not designated for publication. DIVISION I  CA07­273  November 14, 2007  LINDA BAIRD  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL  FROM  THE  JEFFERSON  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CV­2004­365­1]  HON. BERLIN C. JONES,  JUDGE  RAYMOND CULP  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Appellant Linda Baird brings this one­brief appeal from a January 12, 2007 order of  the Jefferson County Circuit Court finding that she failed to prove that she sustained any  damages arising from her tort complaint against appellee Raymond Culp.  The January 12,  1  2007 order was issued in accordance with this court’s opinion dated April 12, 2006,  which  reversed and remanded the trial court’s initial order due to the failure of the trial court to  limit its focus to the issue of what, if any, damages appellant sustained.  Now, on appeal,  appellant alleges that the trial court erred in failing to award her any damages after default  judgment was entered against appellee.  We affirm.  The facts, as set forth in this court’s previous opinion, are as follows.  Appellant met  appellee in February 2001.  They married in July 2001 only to separate in December 2002.  1  See Baird v. Culp, CA 05­1086, slip op. at __ (Ark. App. Apr. 12, 2006).  In June or July 2003, the parties divorced.  Around the same time as their divorce, appellee  began  harassing  and  stalking  appellant.    Appellee  threatened  to  kill  appellant  and  made  several menacing phone calls to her.  As a result, appellant filed numerous complaints with  the Pine Bluff Police Department.  On June 23, 2003, appellant was granted an ex parte  temporary  order  of  protection.    The  existence  of  the  order  of  protection  failed  to  deter  appellee, and on July 11, 2003, the State filed stalking and protection­order­violation charges  against appellee.  That same day, the Jefferson County Circuit Court entered another order  directing appellee to have no contact with appellant.  Despite that order, appellee continued  to harass and stalk appellant.  On May 18, 2004, appellant filed a complaint in tort against appellee, alleging that  he  had  committed  an  assault  against  her  when  he  threatened  to  kill  her.  She  said  that  appellee intended to cause her apprehension and that in fact she was put in apprehension of  physical harm.  She also alleged that appellee had committed the tort of outrage.  Appellant  asked for compensatory damages in the amount of  $50,000 and punitive damages in the  amount of $100,000.  She also asked for a permanent injunction and restraining order.  Appellee did not file an answer, and the trial court held a hearing on September 15,  2004. Appellee did not appear at the hearing.  At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court  announced, “We are here primarily on proof of damages and that the [appellee] is in default.”  Appellant testified that since June 2003 appellee had threatened her life and would often call  her fifty times a day.  She stated that appellee would call her at home and at work.  During  her testimony, appellant described an incident where appellee managed to obtain her pajama ­2­  CA07­273  top, called and directed her to look on her porch, and when she did, she found her pajama  top.  She also described an incident where she had gone to meet a repairman at her former  home, and while she was there with the repairman, appellee kicked in the door.  Appellant testified that, as a result of appellee’s behavior, she changed residences.  She said that, despite efforts to ensure that appellee could not locate her, appellee managed  to locate her new home and also obtained her new phone number.  Appellant testified that  she works full time for Delta Counseling and also works under contract as a clinical therapist  for Pine Bluff Psychological Associates.  She explained that appellee’s behavior caused her  to suffer a financial hardship.  She testified that, because she did not feel safe in her home,  she had a security system installed and had stayed in a hotel.  Appellant also testified that,  as  a  result  of  appellee’s  behavior,  she  began  to  shake  constantly  and  had  a  hard  time  focusing.  She also stated that she spent a lot of time in bed.  Appellant sought treatment  from her family physician and a “residential” psychiatrist and said that she was prescribed  medication.  Appellant explained that she was seeking $50,000 in compensatory damages because,  “My whole life turned  upside down.  I was scared to death and I don’t really scare that  easily.  I had to take on different jobs.  I had to charge most of my way through the summer,  because I did not have any money.”  She also believed that appellee’s behavior justified an  award of punitive damages.  Pam Cooney, testing administrator at Pine Bluff Psychological Associates, testified  that, prior to the summer of 2003, appellant was a hard worker, but during that summer ­3­  CA07­273  appellant began making mistakes and was unable to work.  Ms. Cooney said that appellant  worked  on  a  part­time  basis  and  was  assigned  tasks  that  did  not  require  a  lot  of  concentration.  She stated that, when working full­time, appellant would earn $800 to $900  per week.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement.  On September 23, 2004, appellee filed an answer to appellant’s complaint along with  a motion to set aside default judgment.  Appellee’s answer was untimely; however, at that  time, default judgment had yet to be entered.  That same day, appellant’s counsel, Maxie G.  2  Kizer,  filed  a  motion  for  the  trial  judge  to  recuse.  On  October  7,  2004,  the  trial  court  entered an order denying the recusal motion, but an amended recusal motion was filed on  3  October 19, 2004.  Subsequently, attorney F. Wilson Bynum, Jr. was hired by appellant to  pursue the recusal matter.  Mr. Bynum later filed a motion for the trial court to recuse from  hearing the motion for recusal.  In an order entered April 12, 2005, that was prepared by Mr.  Bynum, the trial court allowed appellant to withdraw her motion for the trial court to recuse  and the motion for the court to recuse from hearing the motion for recusal.  On June 24, 2005, the trial court entered an order addressing the matters raised in  appellant’s complaint.  In the first paragraph of the order the trial court stated, “Defendant 2  Attorney Kizer alleged that, based upon comments the trial court had made to the  district’s prosecuting attorney regarding Kizer’s representation of appellant, the trial court  could not be fair and impartial.  In addition to his private practice, attorney Kizer also  worked as a part­time prosecutor.  3  In the amended motion, attorney Kizer alleged that, in an unrelated matter, he had  been granted summary judgment in a case against the court’s case coordinator, and due to  the court’s close working relationship with the case coordinator, the court should recuse  to avoid a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict.  ­4­  CA07­273  declared to be in default for failing to answer in a timely manner after proper service.  The  matter proceeded to trial on damages only.”  However, the trial court then addressed the  merits of the liability claims and entered an order that appeared to decide the case on the  issue of liability.  On appeal this court found that appellant was only required to present  proof of her damages and that the trial court erred when it looked to the merits of appellant’s  liability claim instead of limiting its focus to the issue of damages.  In an opinion dated April  12, 2006, we reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the matter back to the trial  court for an order consistent with the opinion.  Based upon our review of the record before  us, it appears that no additional hearing was held subsequent to this court’s initial opinion,  and the only additional order from the trial court was filed on January 12, 2007.  Appellant  filed a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.  When a civil case is  tried by a circuit court sitting without a jury, our inquiry on  appeal is not whether there is substantial evidence to support the factual findings of the court,  but whether the findings are clearly erroneous, or clearly against the preponderance of the  evidence.  Tygart v. Kohler, 82 Ark. App. 380, 109 S.W.3d 147 (2003).  A finding is clearly  erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a  definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.  Id.  On appeal appellant argues that the trial court erred in not awarding her any damages  after default judgment was entered against appellee.  Our supreme court has stated that a  default judgment establishes liability but not the extent of damages.  See B & F Engineering,  Inc. v. Cotroneo, 309 Ark. 175, 830 S.W.2d 835 (1992).  Proof is still required to establish ­5­  CA07­273  the amount of damages unless a verified amount has been submitted to the court.  Id.; see  also Byrd v. Dark, 322 Ark. 640, 911 S.W.2d 572 (1995).  Appellant abstracts a fair amount of the testimony from the original hearing before  the  trial  court,  including  her  daughter’s  observation  that  appellant  was  “completely  distraught,” shaking, staying in bed, and unable to eat or work.  There was also testimony  from appellant’s employer, Pam Cooney, that, prior to appellee’s  harassing and stalking  behavior,  appellant  had  been  a  hard  worker,  but  afterward,  she  was  in  no  condition  to  accomplish her work responsibilities.  Appellant contends that she proved that she suffered  mental  anguish,  she  lost  wages  of  $800  ­  $900  per  week,  and  had  to  obtain  medical  treatment; accordingly, she was entitled to judgment against appellee in some reasonable  amount, which she deemed to be $50,000.  She cites National Bank of Commerce v. McNeill Trucking, 309 Ark. 80, 828 S.W.2d  584 (1992), for the prospect that, under Rule 59 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure,  the inadequacy of a recovery is a ground for a new trial even in the absence of other error.  Likewise, in the same case, our supreme court held that punitive damages are only justified  when a defendant acts wantonly or with such conscious indifference to the consequences of  his  acts  that  malice  may  be  inferred.  Id.  She  asserts  that  mental  anguish  and  pain  and  suffering are elements of damage for both assault and outrage claims and that she has clearly  proven that she endured just that.  Appellant also maintains that there is no other explanation  of appellee’s behavior than that he acted “wantonly.” Aside from the evidence she presented  regarding her lost earnings, she asserts that she has proven that she suffered insult, indignity, ­6­  CA07­273  humiliation, and was required to endure conduct by appellee that was so outrageous that  society  has  deemed  that  conduct  to  be  illegal  and  punishable  by  imprisonment.    She  maintains  that  she  was  in  mortal  fear  for  her  safety,  was  unable  to  sleep  or  eat,  had  nightmares, and literally hid in her home hoping that appellee would not come and do her  harm.  The trial court’s order of January 12, 2007, sets forth many of appellant’s allegations  in its findings, but also states that she did not submit any documents, testimony, exhibits, or  anything to verify what her losses or expenses were, nor did she submit testimony or exhibits  to verify any lost days, time, or contracts related to her work.  She also failed to submit any  medical  statements,  bills,  invoices,  reports,  or  receipts  relating  to  any  of  the  services  procured or for damages caused when appellee allegedly kicked in her door.  While it is true  that the trial court did not specifically address those less objective damages that might have  been suffered by appellant and focused more on the objective, out­of­pocket expenses, we  hold that the trial court simply did not believe that appellant’s suffering and anguish rose to  such a level that an award of damages was appropriate.  As the finder of fact, it is within the  trial  court’s  province  to  believe  or  disbelieve  the  testimony  of  any  witness.  Taylor  v.  George, 92 Ark. App. 264, 212 S.W.3d 17 (2005).  In the trial court’s original order from June 24, 2005, which was referred to in this  court’s  previous  opinion  in  the  case,  the  issue  of  damages  was,  at  least  to  some  extent,  addressed.  In summary, the trial court found, as related to damages, with respect to the  various counts in the complaint: ­7­  CA07­273  1.  Count  One­Tort  of  Assault  ­  [Appellant]  failed  to  present  credible,  persuasive  evidence that [appellee’s] conduct was in any way calculated to cause [appellant] to  be in fear for her bodily safety.  [Appellant] failed to present any medical evidence  that established any relationships between any of [appellee’s] conduct and any alleged  trauma or distress experienced by [appellant].  Moreover, the vast majority of the  evidence presented by [appellant], demonstrated the contrary, i.e., [appellee] was in  love  with  [appellant],  wanted  to  be  with  her,  wanted  to  provide  and  protect  her.  [Appellant] failed to establish any of [appellee’s] conduct with any injury, illness,  pain or suffering on the part of [appellant].  That [appellant] failed to establish that  [appellee’s] conduct would cause a reasonable person to be in fear of their bodily  safety.  2.  Count  Two­Tort  of  Outrage  ­  [Appellant]  failed  to  present  evidence  that  [appellee’s]  conduct  was  so  outrageous  that  it  would  shock  the  conscience  of  a  reasonable person or was beyond the comprehension of members of society.  3. Count Three­Injunction ­ [Appellant] presented much evidence that [appellee] has  interfered  in  her  life  to  the  extent  [appellant]  desires  assistance  from  the  law  enforcement,  judicial  authorities  or  the  other  agencies  to  correct  the  problem  or  punish [appellant] for his conduct.  The criminal action is pending and a temporary  restraining order is presently in effect, with a court date to make the same permanent.  This could result in [appellee] being incarcerated, thus the petition is premature and  is hereby denied.  4. Count Four­Punitive Damages  ­  [Appellant] failed to succeed on her claim for  compensatory damages.  The Court further finds [appellant] has not presented any  credible  evidence  that  rises  to  the  level  that  [appellee’s]  conduct  was  such  that  [appellee] should be punished for engaging in said conduct, nor that [appellee] should  be so punished as to cause [appellee] and others similarly situated, to not engage in  same or similar conduct against [appellant] or other members of society similarly  situated.  The problem appears to be the trial court’s specific comments regarding the denial of  appellant’s  claims  of  assault  and  outrage  because  a  default  had  already  been  declared.  Although there was a default judgment, which settles the issue of liability, appellant failed  to meet her burden of proof with respect to proving damages.  See Baker v. Rogers, 368 Ark. ­8­  CA07­273  134, __ S.W. 3d __ (2006).  We hold that the findings of the trial court are neither clearly  erroneous nor clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  Accordingly, we affirm.  Affirmed.  BIRD  and HEFFLEY, JJ., agree. ­9­  CA07­273 

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