Leslie Toia v. HTI Logistics, Employer

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DIVISION I & II  CA07­234  NOVEMBER 14, 2007  LESLIE TOIA  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL  FROM  THE  ARKANSAS  W O R K E R S ’   C O M P E N S A T I O N  COMMISSION  [NO. F404310]  HTI LOGISTICS, EMPLOYER APPELLEE  REVERSED AND REMANDED  This appeal follows the December 13, 2006 decision of the Workers’ Compensation  Commission (Commission) that reversed the June 29, 2006 opinion of the Administrative  Law  Judge  (ALJ),  finding  specifically  that  appellant  Leslie  Toia  failed  to  prove  by  a  preponderance of the evidence that he was performing employment services at the time his  injuries occurred.  On appeal, appellant challenges the Commission’s decision on that single  issue.  We reverse and remand for an award of benefits.  Appellant picked up a load of newsprint in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and was scheduled  to deliver it in Burlington, Vermont, on May 10, 2002.  He arrived in Burlington on May 9,  2002, and proceeded to his drop­off location.  After he was informed that he would have to  wait until the following morning to unload, he parked his truck at a local shopping mall.  According to appellant, sometime after he parked the truck he left to get something to eat.  Appellant testified that he subsequently returned to his truck intending to retire for the night in the sleeper compartment of the truck.  He checked  the  seals on the truck and walked  around, generally checking the truck itself, then proceeded to climb back in the truck for the  evening.  Appellant lost his footing while climbing up into the cab of his truck, slipped off the  top step, fell backwards onto the ground, and landed on his back.  He stated that he lay  helpless on the ground for about forty­five minutes, with no one stopping to help, before  finally being able to get back up and into the cab of his truck.  Appellant stated that he rested  there for about an hour or two, then disconnected the trailer, and eventually drove himself  to the emergency room of a nearby hospital.  Appellant testified that he was examined at the  emergency room but that no x­rays were taken.  He further testified that he was released with  pain medication and ibuprofen.  Appellant  delivered  his  load  the  next  morning  as  scheduled,  then  contacted  Tim  Hogan, appellee’s dispatcher, to notify appellee of his injury.  He stated that he was told that  he  would  have  to  return  to  Jonesboro,  Arkansas,  for  further  medical  treatment.    First,  however, he was instructed to pick up a load approximately 300 miles away in up­state New  York.  Appellant eventually arrived at his destination in New York, where he again sought  treatment at the emergency room of a local hospital.  Appellant testified that surgery was  recommended at that time, which he refused because he preferred being treated in his home  state of Montana. He then flew home to Montana where he was examined by a neurosurgeon,  who allegedly performed surgery the same day.  There are no medical records to corroborate  appellant’s version of events surrounding his alleged injury.  Appellant stated that, after two ­2­  CA07­234  months of recovery time from this surgery, he returned to work for appellee.  He left his  employment  with  appellee  approximately  four  to  five  months  later  for  a  higher­paying  position with another trucking company.  Appellant admitted during the hearing before the ALJ on May 5, 2006, that he had  given false statements during his July 6, 2005 deposition.  These false statements related  primarily to the times at which events occurred on the date in question.  Appellant explained  that  he  had  been  untruthful  because  he  had  corrected  his  Department  of  Transportation  (DOT) logs, to which he had referred during his deposition, in order to avoid violations.  Appellant  further  explained  that  he  had  been  reprimanded  on  numerous  occasions  for  violating DOT regulations in reporting.  Notwithstanding these admitted indiscretions, both  the  ALJ  and  the  Commission  found  that  the  preponderance  of  the  credible  evidence  demonstrated that appellant was an employee of appellee at the time of his alleged accident.  Appellant’s employment status is not at issue for purposes of this appeal.  Appellant  also  admitted  that  he  had  three  beers  with  his  meal  but  denied  being  intoxicated  at  the  time  this  incident  allegedly  occurred.    There  is  no  toxicology  report  contained within the record to verify appellant’s level of blood alcohol at the time of this  incident.  Although aware of those admissions, the Commission did not appear to focus on  that issue, specifically pursuant to the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­102(4)(B)(iv)(a)  (Repl. 2002), when making findings regarding compensability.  With regard to the issue of employment services, as previously mentioned, appellant  was less than candid during his deposition regarding:  the time he arrived in Burlington; his ­3­  CA07­234  activities  immediately  following  his  arrival  there;  his  activities  immediately  prior  to  his  alleged  accident;  the  time  the  accident  occurred.    Although  he  admitted  that  he  had  essentially lied during  his deposition about the chronology of events on May 9, 2002, it  appears from his testimony at the hearing before the ALJ that he most likely did sustain a  legitimate injury on that date.  The Commission stated in its opinion that the truth appeared  to be that appellant was returning to his truck after taking a dinner break, with plans to sleep  there  before delivering his load the next morning.  The Commission also set forth in its  opinion  that  appellant  mis­stepped  while  he  was  climbing into  the  cab  of  his  truck,  and  landed  on  the  ground.  Therefore,  the  only  remaining  issue  to  be  resolved  is  whether  appellant was performing employment services at the time of his alleged accident.  Standard of Review  In appeals involving claims for workers’ compensation, our court views the evidence  in  a  light  most  favorable  to  the  Commission’s  decision  and  affirms  the  decision  if  it  is  supported by substantial evidence. Moncus v. Billingsley Logging, 366 Ark. 383, __ S.W.3d  __ (2006).  Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate  to support a conclusion.  Id.  The issue is not whether the appellate court might have reached  a different result from the Commission; if reasonable minds could reach the result found by  the Commission, the appellate court must affirm the decision.  Id.  Where the Commission  denies a claim because of the claimant’s failure to meet his burden of proof, the substantial  evidence standard of review requires that we affirm the Commission’s decision if its opinion  displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief.  Id. ­4­  CA07­234  It is well settled that questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight  to be given to their testimony are within the exclusive province of the Commission. See Mize  v. Resource Power, Inc., __ Ark. App. __, __ S.W.3d __ (Sept. 5, 2007).  Arkansas Code  Annotated section 11­9­704(b)(6)(A) (Repl. 2002) vests with the Commission the duty to  review the evidence and if deemed advisable to hear the parties, their representatives, and  witnesses.  The statute further requires the Commission to determine, on the basis of the  record as a whole, whether the party having the burden of proof on the issue has established  it  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence.  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11­9­704(c)(2).    Thus,  in  determining that the Commission’s authority and duty to conduct a de novo review of the  entire record, including issues of credibility, are constitutional, this court stated in Stiger v.  State Line Tire Serv., 72 Ark. App. 250, 261, 35 S.W.3d 335, 342 (2000):  When the Commission reviews a cold record, demeanor is merely one factor to be  considered in credibility determinations. Numerous other factors must be included in  the  Commission’s  analysis  of  a  case  and  reaching  its  decision,  including  the  plausibility of the witness’s testimony, the consistency of the witness’s testimony  with the other evidence and testimony, the interest of the witness in the outcome of  the case, and the witness’s bias, prejudice, or motives. The flexibility permitted the  Commission adequately protects the claimant’s right of due process of law.  Accordingly, when there are contradictions in the evidence, it is constitutionally within the  Commission’s exclusive province to reconcile the conflicting evidence and to determine the  true  facts.  In  addition,  the  Commission  is  not  required  to  believe  the  testimony  of  the  claimant or other witnesses, but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those  portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief.  Cottage Café, Inc. v. Collette, 94 Ark.  App. 72, 226 S.W.3d 27 (2006). ­5­  CA07­234  A compensable injury is “an accidental injury .... arising out of and in the course of  employment.”  Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­102(4)(A)(i) (Repl. 2002).  A compensable injury  does  not  include  injuries  suffered  at  a  time  when  employment  services  were  not  being  performed. Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­102(4)(B)(iii).  An employee is performing “employment  services”  when  he  or  she  is  doing  something  that  is  generally  required  by  his  or  her  employer. White v. Georgia­Pacific Corp., 339 Ark 474, 6 S.W.3d 98 (1999).  The same test  is used to determine whether an employee was performing “employment services” as when  determining whether an employee was acting within “the course of employment.”  Moncus,  supra.  The supreme court has stated that an employee is performing employment services  when he is doing something  that  is generally required by his employer.  Id.  The test is  whether the injury occurred within the time and space boundaries of the employment, when  the employee was carrying out the employer’s purpose or advancing the employer’s interest  directly or indirectly. White, supra. Furthermore, when the injury occurs outside of the time  and space boundaries of employment, the critical determination to be made is whether the  employee was directly or indirectly advancing the interests of the employer at the time of the  injury. Moncus, supra.  Whether a claimant was performing employment services depends on the particular  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.  The  following  factors  may  be  considered  in  determining  whether  the  claimant’s  conduct  falls  within  the  meaning  of  “employment  services”:  (1) whether  the accident occurs at a time, place, or under circumstances that  facilitate  or  advance  the  employer’s  interests;  (2)  whether  the  accident  occurs  when  the ­6­  CA07­234  employee is engaged in activity necessarily required in order to perform work; (3) whether  the activity engaged in when the accident occurs is an unexpected part of the employment;  (4) whether the activity constitutes an interruption or departure, known by or permitted by  the employer, either temporally or spatially from work activities; (5) whether the employee  is compensated during the time that the activity occurs; (6) whether the employer expects the  worker  to  stop  or  return  from  permitted  non­work  activity  in  order  to  advance  some  employment objective.  See Matlock v. Ark. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 74 Ark. App. 322, 49  S.W. 3d 126 (2001).  Discussion  Appellant  contends  that,  because  he  was  returning  to  the  truck  to  sleep,  he  was  advancing the employer’s interests by insuring the safety of the truck.  It is undisputed that  in the present case, appellee required employees to maintain control of their trucks and to  make sure the contents of the truck and the truck itself were safely secured.  Both appellant  and Ms. Jodie Israel, the former payroll and personnel employee for appellee, testified that  appellant would be required to secure his vehicle and the contents therein.  Appellant also  testified that there were facilities in the truck that were designed to allow drivers to sleep on  board.  More importantly, appellant testified that employees would rarely stay in a motel  room unless they were on a two­day layover.  Appellant was not on a two­day layover, and  he argued that he saved appellee money by staying in the truck.  Appellant also contends that he provided security by staying in the truck.  Appellant  specifically  testified  that  there  were  benefits  to  staying  in  the  truck,  including  that  it ­7­  CA07­234  prevented  theft.  When  asked  why  he  would  spend  the  night  in  the  truck,  he  answered,  “[b]ecause if anything’s going to happen to your trailer you can feel it rocking.  I mean, as  soon as you open the door, actually physically lift the handles and pull it open and when you  feel  the  doors  open  you  can  actually  feel  the  vibration  right  through  the  whole  truck.”  Appellant  testified  that,  one  time  in  the  past  when  he  was  in  New  York,  someone  was  attempting to break in his truck while he was sleeping and that he felt the vibrations and got  out of bed.  He started the truck and went around back, at which time he found that the trailer  door  was  open.  He  argues  that  by  sleeping  in  the  truck  he  was  able  to  stop  what  was  apparently an attempted robbery, which would clearly benefit appellee.  Appellant cites Jivan v. Economy Inn & Suites, __ Ark. App. __, __ S.W.3d __ (Dec.  6, 2006), as paralleling the facts of this case.  There, the claimant was the estate of Nimisha  Jivan, deceased, who was an assistant manager at the Economy Inn in Hope, Arkansas, and  whose husband, Jack Jivan, was a manager.  The Jivans lived in a room provided by the hotel  and carried out their work responsibilities on the premises.  On February 17, 2003, Nimisha,  who  was  off  duty,  was  changing  her  clothes  while  in  the  bathroom  of  her  hotel  room  preparing to go to the gym. A fire broke out, and Nimisha was not able to escape her hotel  room.  She died as a result of smoke inhalation from the fire.  In  its  opinion  reversing  this  court’s  decision  to  deny  benefits,  our  supreme  court  discussed the fact that Nimisha, like the claimant in Deffenbaugh Industries v. Angus, 313  Ark. 100, 852 S.W.2d 804 (1993), resided on the employer’s premises at the time of her fatal  injury.  Jivan v. Economy Inn & Suites, __ Ark. __, __ S.W.3d __ (June 28, 2007).  The ­8­  CA07­234  supreme court employed an increased­risk analysis, discussing that Nimisha was expected  to reside on the premises and, as a residential employee of the hotel, the condition of living  at  the  hotel  “intensified  the  risk  of  injury  due  to  extraordinary  natural  causes.”  See  Deffenbaugh,  313  Ark.  at  106,  852  S.W.2d  at  808.    The  supreme  court  stated  that  her  presence on the premises during the fire exposed her to a greater degree of risk than someone  who  did  not  live  on  the  premises.    The  parties  had  stipulated  that  Nimisha  was  on  call  twenty­four  hours  per  day,  and  while  on  the  premises,  she  was  to  carry  out  her  responsibilities as an assistant manager of the hotel by being available for work duties at all  times. Accordingly, the supreme court held that Nimisha indirectly advanced her employer’s  interests.  In Jivan, the supreme court pointed out that in our supplemental majority opinion, this  court cited Cook v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc., 88 Ark. App. 86, 194 S.W.3d 794 (2004)  (holding that a truck driver, who was on call, was not compensated for an injury in a motel  room provided by his employer), for the proposition that an injury is not compensable where  an employee performs an activity for the purpose of attending to his personal needs.  The  supreme court found Cook to be distinguishable from the Jivan case because the truck driver  was not a residential employee of the motel.  The driver spent the night in a motel room,  which, while paid for by the employer, was neither owned nor operated on the premises of  his employer. However, the supreme court specifically stated that “[t]he scenario might have  been different if the truck driver had sustained the injury while sleeping in his truck.”  Jivan,  __ Ark. at __, __ S.W.3d at __.  That is exactly the situation that occurred in the instant case. ­9­  CA07­234  The supreme court held that, under the increased­risk doctrine, Nimisha’s fatal injury  was  compensable as a residential employee who indirectly advanced the interests of her  employer.  Appellant points out that the claimant in Jivan was getting ready to leave her  employment  location  at  the  time  of  her  accident,  yet  the  injuries  were  found  to  be  compensable.  Here, appellant was doing just the opposite.  When he walked around the  truck to make certain that it and the contents were secure and proceeded to climb back into  the  truck  to  retire  for  the  evening,  appellant  had  returned  to  the  “premises”  of  his  employment.  He was remaining in the truck, his mobile “office” so to speak, in order to  prevent anything from happening to it or its contents prior to delivery to the customer the  following morning.  Appellant also cites Arkansas Department of Health v. Huntley, 12 Ark. App. 287,  675 S.W.2d 845 (1984), where this court held that activities of a personal nature, that are not  forbidden but reasonably expected, may be a material incident of employment and injuries  suffered  in  the  course  of  such  activities  are  compensable.  The  court  stated  that  the  controlling issue  is  whether the activity is one to be reasonably expected so as to be an  incident of the employment and thus in essence a part of it.  Id.  In the instant case, appellant  climbing into his truck is an activity that the employer should reasonably expect and is an  incident of his employment.  There are many activities directly related to his employment  that require him to get into and out of the truck, including, but not limited to, loading and  unloading, pumping gas, talking to customers upon pick­up or delivery, etc.  Here, he was ­10­  CA07­234  climbing into the truck after checking the seals and inspecting the truck itself in order to save  appellee money on lodging while also keeping his vehicle and the contents therein secure.  Appellee focuses on the lack of factual information known about the injury and the  inconsistencies  between  appellant’s  testimony  at  each  of  his  two  depositions  and  at  the  hearing, reminding us that appellant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the  evidence that his injury is compensable.  Appellee urges this court to decide this case based  on  the  principles  of  Ray  v.  University  of  Arkansas,  66  Ark.  App.  177,  990  S.W.2d  558  (1999), where a food­service worker was entitled to benefits for an injury that she sustained  while she was on break.  The determining factors regarding whether she was performing  employment duties at the time of the accident were that her breaks were paid and she was  required to assist diners, even during her break, should the need arise.  Appellee maintains that in the instant case, appellant was not performing employment  services either before, after, or during the injury.  Appellee contends that he was not required  to perform employment  services until 8:00 a.m. the following morning, when he was to  deliver the load. Appellee asserts that it could not benefit from appellant’s personal activities  such as shopping, eating, beer drinking, or going to the movies.  Kinnebrew v. Little John’s  Truck, Inc., 66 Ark. App. 90, 989 S.W.2d 541 (1999), is also cited as an example of this  court holding that a  truck  driver was not performing employment services when he was  injured  while  taking  a  shower  at  a  truck  stop.    As  previously  discussed,  Kinnebrew  is  distinguishable because appellant’s activities at the time of the injury are much more closely ­11­  CA07­234  tied to the truck, its contents, and appellant’s responsibility to make sure nothing happened  to either one prior to delivery.  The Commission found that appellant was off duty and free to do as he as he pleased  at the time of the alleged incident.  There was contradictory testimony about appellant’s  reporting of the accident, his initial handling of obtaining medical treatment, a potential delay  in giving notice of the claim, the lack of medical records substantiating the injury, and his  status as an employee.  The Commission did not focus on those issues, however, focusing  solely on whether appellant was performing employment services at the time of the injury.  Limiting our review to that one issue, under the analysis recently set forth in Jivan,  we hold that reasonable minds could not reach the result found by the Commission because  appellant’s activities related to returning to the “premises,” i.e., his truck, in preparation of  staying  overnight  in  the  truck  to  protect  it  and  the  cargo,  advanced  the  interests  of  his  employer.  Despite  the  allegations  of  falsified  statements,  DOT  records,  and  lack  of  credibility, even the Commission stated in its opinion that appellant was engaged in activities  related to his truck at the time he fell.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand for an award of  benefits.  Reversed and remanded.  HART, and GLOVER, JJ., agree.  MILLER, J., concurs.  BIRD  and HEFFLEY, JJ., dissent. ­12­  CA07­234  Judge Miller’s November 14 concurrence BRIAN S. MILLER, Judge, concurring. I concur with the decision to reverse and remand  this case for an award of benefits; and I write separately to reconcile this view with my  position in Economy Inn & Suites v. Jivan,  Ark. App.  ,  S.W.3d  (Mar. 14,  2007).  In Jivan, I voted with this court’s majority to deny benefits based on my view that  the claimant was not advancing the interests of her employer while changing clothes to attend  a work­out session.  The supreme court, however, reversed us in Jivan v. Economy Inn &  Suites,  Ark.  ,  S.W.3d  (June 28, 2007).  The majority opinion clearly articulates the similarities between Jivan and the present  case.  Although it is arguable that the claimant, Leslie Toia, was not advancing the interests  of his employer at the time of his injury, we are bound by the precedent of our supreme  court.  See Sanderson v. McCollum, 82 Ark. App. 111, 112 S.W.3d 363 (2003); Gause v.  Shelter Gen. Ins., 81 Ark. App. 133, 98 S.W.3d 854 (2003).  Therefore, I join the majority.  SAM  BIRD,  Judge,  dissenting.  This  court  has  reversed  the  Commission’s  opinion,  which found that appellant was not performing employment services  at  the time he was  allegedly injured and, therefore, denied him benefits. I respectfully dissent because I believe  that there is substantial evidence to support the Commission’s denial of benefits.  A recitation of our standard of review is critical to my opinion in this case.  We  review the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commission’s decision and affirm the  decision if it is supported by substantial evidence.  Moncus v. Billingsley Logging, 366 Ark.  383, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006).  Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might  ­13­  CA07­234  accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  Id.  The issue is not whether we might have  reached a different result from the Commission; unless we conclude that reasonable minds  could not reach the conclusion reached by the Commission, we are required to affirm its  decision.  Id.  In this case, the Commission specifically found that appellant was off­duty at  the time of the alleged injury and that he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence  that he was performing employment services.  In my view, the Commission’s decision is  supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed.  In support of its decision to reverse the Commission’s determination, the majority  relies upon appellant’s testimony that employees rarely stayed in a motel unless they were  on a two­day layover; that he saved money by staying in his truck; and that staying in the  truck benefitted his employer by providing security.  The majority then compared the facts  of this case to the facts in Jivan v. Economy Inn & Suites, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___  (Jun. 28, 2007), in which the supreme court affirmed an award of benefits for the family of  Nimisha Jivan, the assistant manager of a hotel, who died in a fire at the hotel while she was  off­duty but while she was changing her clothes in the bathroom of her hotel room.  In Jivan,  the supreme court relied on the parties’ stipulation that Mrs. Jivan was required to live at the  hotel and was always considered to be on­call to address any hotel­related issues.  The court  held that Mrs. Jivan’s injury was compensable  as  a residential employee who indirectly  advanced the interests of her employer.  However, the court noted that its holding would “not  extend workers’ compensation coverage to include every possible scenario, but rather in a  more narrow sense, it will cover those injuries, particularly those from extraordinary natural ­14­  CA07­234  causes, that residential employees sustain on their employers’ premises.”  Id. at ____, ____  S.W.3d at ____ (emphasis added).  I  disagree  with  the  majority  that  the  holding  in  Jivan  requires  reversal  of  the  Commission’s decision in this case.  The facts in this case are significantly different from  the facts that were critical to the court’s decision in Jivan.  Appellant was not a residential  employee  and  did  not  sustain  an  injury  on  his  employer’s  premises.    In  attempting  to  compare this case to Jivan, the majority refers to appellant’s truck as the “premises” and as  his “mobile office.”  In fact, to use the supreme court’s analysis in Jivan, we must assume  that appellant’s truck is the employer’s “premises.”  It is only when an employee resides on  the employer’s property that he is in fact a residential employee.  Residence means “the  place, esp. the house, in which a person lives or resides; dwelling place; home.”  Webster’s  College  Dictionary  1145  (1996).  A  company  vehicle—even  one  with  a  sleeping  compartment—is not a residence.  In fact, appellant testified that he “resided” in Billings,  Montana.  Unless we are going to extend the definition of a residential employee from those  employees required to live on the jobsite and remain on­call twenty­four hours per day to  truck drivers, or any other employee who spends a significant amount of time in a vehicle  owned by his or her employer, appellant was not a residential employee.  The  question  in  this  case  is  whether  there  is  substantial  evidence  to  support  the  Commission’s decision that an off­duty truck driver, who injured himself while allegedly  attempting to climb into his company­owned truck to sleep, was not performing employment  services. The Commission found that the credible testimony demonstrated that appellant was ­15­  CA07­234  off duty at the time he slipped and fell.  It also found that he was not returning to his truck  to perform any work­related activity, but to sleep. The Commission found that appellant was  “free to do as he pleased” at the time of the incident and the fact that he chose to sleep in his  truck  did  not  imply  that  he  was  advancing  his  employer’s  interests,  either  directly  or  indirectly, by doing so.  There was no testimony by appellant or anyone else that appellant  was required to sleep in his truck.  In fact, he testified that sometimes he would get a motel  room and “sometimes” he needed permission to get a motel room and “sometimes” he did  not need permission.  This testimony certainly did not establish that appellant was required  by his employer to sleep in his truck.  The  Commission also found that, even if inspecting the truck rose to the level of  employment services, appellant had completed the inspection before he decided to climb into  the truck to retire for the evening.  The Commission stated that the completed inspection did  not transform his decision to retire for the evening into an employment activity.  I believe  that reasonable minds could accept this evidence as adequate to support the Commission’s  decision.  The Commission found that appellant was off­duty. Where he chose to spend his off­  duty time—in his truck—does not change this critical fact.  Because he was off­duty when  he  was  allegedly  injured,  the  Commission  determined  that  he  was  not  performing  employment services.  We have affirmed the Commission’s denial of benefits for a truck  driver who was injured in the bathroom while “on­call” in a hotel room provided by his  employer.  Cook v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 88 Ark. App. 86, 194 S.W.3d 794 (2004).  We ­16­  CA07­234  also affirmed the denial of benefits for a truck driver who was injured while showering in  a truck stop during his required eight­hour break between deliveries.  Kinnebrew v. Little  John’s Truck, Inc., 66 Ark. App. 90, 989 S.W.2d 541 (1999).  Like the appellant in this case,  these truck drivers were off­duty.  One was in the bathroom of a hotel room provided by his  employer and one was in a truck­stop shower; appellant was getting into his truck to sleep.  However, all were off­duty and free to do as they pleased.  It is the function of the Commission to determine the credibility of the witnesses and  the weight to be given their testimony.  Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Angell, 75 Ark. App.  325, 58 S.W.3d 396 (2001).  The Commission did not believe appellant’s testimony that, by  getting  into  his  truck  to  sleep,  he  was  performing  employment  services.  While  acknowledging the proper standard of review, the majority nonetheless ignores it, disregards  the Commission’s conclusion, and concludes instead that appellant was injured while getting  into his “premises” to sleep.  Although there may be a case in which a truck driver should  be compensated for an injury received while sleeping in his truck, I do not believe that this  is that case.  There was no evidence that appellant’s employer either required or requested  that appellant sleep, eat, or otherwise remain in his truck during his free time.  Appellant  chose to go out to a restaurant, eat a steak, and drink some beers; he then chose to return to  his truck to sleep.  In my view, there is substantial evidence to support the Commission’s  decision that appellant was not performing employment services at the time of the incident  because he was off­duty and was, therefore, “free to do as he pleased.”  Therefore, I would  affirm. ­17­  CA07­234  HEFFLEY, J., joins this dissent. ­18­  CA07­234 

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