Vaccaro Lumber and Jamie Donerson v. Gayla Fesperman

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DIVISION I  CA07­233  NOVEMBER  7, 2007  VACCARO  LUMBER  AND  JAMIE  DONERSON  APPELLANTS  APPEAL  FROM  THE  LEE  COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CV200­134]  V. HON. HARVEY LEE YATES, JUDGE  GAYLA FESPERMAN  APPELLEE  REVERSED AND REMANDED  On  May  24,  2000,  Jamie  Donerson,  an  employee  of  Vaccaro  Lumber  Company,  accidentally backed a company flatbed delivery truck into Gayla Fesperman’s car at a stop  sign in Marianna in order to avoid oncoming traffic.  In December 2000, Ms. Fesperman  filed  a  complaint  against  Vaccaro  Lumber  Company  and  Jamie  Donerson,  alleging  negligence  and  requesting  $50,000  in  compensatory  damages  and  $50,000  in  punitive  1  damages.  The  case  went  to  trial  in  August  2006,  and  a  jury  found  that  Vaccaro  and  Donerson were negligent and awarded $50,000 in damages to Ms. Fesperman. Vaccaro filed  a post­judgment motion asking the circuit court to grant a new trial or, in the alternative, to  order a remittitur because the verdict was excessive.  The circuit court denied Vaccaro’s 1  The circuit court granted Vaccaro’s motion for directed verdict on the issue of  punitive damages at trial, finding no evidence to justify such an award.  motion.  Vaccaro and Donerson bring this appeal from the judgment of the court and from  the  court’s  order  denying Vaccaro’s  motion  for  new  trial  or  remittitur.  We  reverse  and  remand for a new trial.  After the accident, Ms. Fesperman left the scene to call the police.  Officer Walker  arrived minutes later and spoke with Mr. Donerson, Mr. Donerson’s passenger, and Ms.  Fesperman.  Officer Walker did not call emergency­medical personnel to the scene. Ms.  Fesperman told Officer Walker that she was not injured and then drove her car from the  scene.  On the day after the accident, a friend drove Ms. Fesperman to the emergency room,  where the treating doctor diagnosed her with “a lower back strain with muscle spasm” and  prescribed a muscle relaxant.  The emergency­room doctor suggested  a  heating pad and  restricted her to light­duty work for seventy­two hours.  Several days later, Ms. Fesperman  was treated by Dr. William M. Traylor at Traylor Chiropractic Clinic in Forrest City.  From  May 30, 2000, until August 14, 2000, Ms. Fesperman made twenty­five office visits to the  Traylor Chiropractic Clinic for treatment.  On August 14, 2000, the Clinic discharged Ms.  Fesperman, stating in its discharge cover sheet: “She’s reached maximum improvement, no  further scheduled treatment is anticipated.”  The Clinic did not assign a disability rating and  released  her  without  restrictions,  indicating  that  she  was  “allowed  normal  activity  with  continued care.”  There was no evidence presented at trial that any other doctor treated Ms.  Fesperman or prescribed any medication for her.  Her medical bills totaled $4,791.50. ­2­  CA07­233  While Ms. Fesperman testified that she was off work due to her lower­back problems  for about twelve weeks, according to the records of the Traylor Chiropractic Clinic, she was  advised not to work for three weeks.  Moreover, the evidence indicated that Ms. Fesperman  received checks for working three weeks in June 2000, the month after the accident.  Ms.  Fesperman could not explain the inconsistency.  On appeal, Vaccaro and Donerson do not challenge the jury’s finding of liability but  only the amount of damages that the jury awarded.  They argue that the jury’s award of  damages is excessive and is not supported by substantial evidence and that the circuit court  abused  its  discretion  in  refusing either  to  grant  Vaccaro’s  motion  for  new  trial  or  order  remittitur.  Ms. Fesperman argues that there was substantial evidence to support the verdict,  stating that she proved her case through the testimony of Dr. Hayde, a chiropractor employed  by the clinic where Ms. Fesperman was treated.  Where an award of damages is alleged to be excessive, this court reviews the proof  and all reasonable inferences most favorably to the appellee and determines whether the  verdict  is  so  great  as  to  shock  the  conscience  of  the  court  or  demonstrates  passion  or  prejudice on the part of the jury.  Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 353 Ark. 29, 43, 111 S.W.3d 346,  353 (2003); see also Mustang Elec. Servs., Inc. v. Nipper, 272 Ark. 263, 613 S.W.2d 397  (1981).  Remittitur is appropriate when the compensatory damages awarded are excessive  and cannot be sustained by the evidence.  Id.  The  standard  of  review in such a case is  whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict.  Id.  We will review a circuit ­3­  CA07­233  court’s denial of a motion for new trial or order of remittitur based on excessive damages for  abuse of discretion.  Id. at 48, 111 S.W.3d at 357.  In determining whether the amount of damages is so great as to shock the conscience  of this court, we consider such elements as past and future medical expenses, permanent  injury, loss of earning capacity, scars resulting in disfigurement, and pain, suffering, and  mental anguish.  Builder’s Transp., Inc. v. Wilson, 323 Ark. 327, 328, 914 S.W.2d 742, 743  (1996).  We make this determination on a case­by­case basis with little reliance on prior  decisions, as “precedents are of scant value in appeals of this kind.”  Id. (quoting Matthews  v. Rodgers, 279 Ark. 328, 335, 651 S.W.2d 453, 457 (1983)).  With these elements in mind,  we turn to the evidence presented in this case.  Ms. Fesperman contended at trial that, as a result of the accident, she suffered an  injury to her lower back.  On appeal, appellants argue that the evidence presented at trial  simply did not support the damages awarded by the jury for Ms. Fesperman’s injury.  First,  appellants claim that Ms. Fesperman did not suffer sufficient physical injury to justify the  damages awarded, arguing specifically that the award is more than ten times her medical  bills; Ms. Fesperman neither received nor requested medical attention at the  time  of the  accident; she felt well enough to drive away from the accident; she suffered no broken bones,  scrapes, bruises, scars, or abrasions in the accident; she has never been hospitalized because  of the accident; other than the seventy­two hour, light­duty restriction recommended by the  emergency room doctor the day after the accident, no medical restrictions have ever been  placed on her ability to enjoy daily life because of the accident; she is able to drive, work if ­4­  CA07­233  she chooses, play with her granddaughter, do housekeeping chores, and garden; and she  stopped receiving chiropractic treatments six years before the trial.  Moreover, they argue,  her medical bills totaled only $4,791.50.  They assert further that, aside from the muscle  relaxants  prescribed  by  the  emergency­room  doctor  immediately  after  the  accident,  Ms.  Fesperman has taken no prescription pain medication for any injury caused by the accident.  Indeed, appellants note, there was no evidence that she takes any medication at all for pain.  Second,  appellants  argue  that  Ms.  Fesperman  did  not  suffer  sufficient  mental  or  emotional anguish to justify the award.  While she did testify that the accident “scared her  to  death,”  there  was  no  evidence  that  Ms.  Fesperman  needed  psychological  or  pastoral  counseling  because  of  the  accident.    She  did  not  testify  that  the  accident  affected  her  enjoyment of life or that it changed her life in any significant manner.  Nor was there any  evidence that Ms. Fesperman suffered any permanent disability.  In addition,  appellants  contend that no evidence was presented regarding future medical expenses.  Ms. Fesperman  has no pending appointments; no medical provider has limited her ability to work or do other  activities in the future; she has not and does not take prescription medication; and she was  released from her chiropractor’s care over six years before the jury deliberated this case.  Finally,  appellants  claim  that,  while  Ms.  Fesperman  could  not  explain  why  her  former  employer paid her during a time that she said she had not worked, Ms. Fesperman testified  that  she  lost only $685 in wages because of the accident.  Therefore, even allowing for ­5­  CA07­233  deference to the jury’s findings of credibility, appellants claim that there simply was not  substantial evidence to support a verdict of $50,000.  Ms.  Fesperman  argues  only  that  she  proved  her  damages  through  Dr.  Hayde’s  testimony, although she does not point to anything specific in it.  Dr. Hayde testified that,  at the time of trial, he was a chiropractor employed by Traylor Chiropractic Clinic in Forrest  City—the  clinic  where  Ms.  Fesperman  received  treatments  from  Dr.  Traylor  after  the  accident—but  that  he  was  not  employed  by  the  clinic  when  Ms.  Fesperman  was  being  treated.  He stated that he reviewed Ms. Fesperman’s records, that she was treated at the  clinic between May 30, 2000, and August 14, 2000, for a lumbar sprain and neck pain.  Ms.  Fesperman  has  not  claimed  that  her  neck  pain  was  caused  by  the  accident.    Dr.  Hayde  testified that Dr. Traylor recommended that she remain off work for about three weeks.  He  also testified that the clinic discharged Ms. Fesperman on August 14, 2000, stating that she  had reached maximum improvement and that no additional treatment was anticipated.  He  did not testify about any permanent impairment or future medical expenses.  There was evidence presented in this case to support an award of medical expenses  in  the  amount  of  $4,791.50  and  lost  wages  in  the  amount  of  $685,  which  together  total  $5,476.50.  The only evidence presented to support an additional award of damages, for  either future medical expenses or pain and suffering, was Ms. Fesperman’s testimony.  She  testified that, while she still has pain sometimes and her back has hurt her “just about every  day” since the accident, depending upon the activity she is doing, she still carries on with her  normal  activities  and  does  everything  that  she  did  before  the  accident—that  is,  driving, ­6­  CA07­233  housecleaning, taking care of her three­year­old grandchild, and gardening.  She admitted  that she is not taking medication for her pain and has not seen a doctor for her pain since  August  2000.  Without  more,  Ms.  Fesperman’s  testimony  simply  does  not  constitute  substantial evidence sufficient to support an award of almost ten times the special damages  proved in this case.  Determining the proper amount of damages in a personal­injury case is difficult, but,  giving the evidence in this case its greatest probative value, as we must, we find that the  jury’s award of $50,000  was not supported by the evidence.  A damages award is not a  lottery ticket; the amount of damages must be supported by substantial evidence. If evidence  does not support the amount awarded, and the amount is sufficiently excessive in relation to  the evidence presented at trial that it shocks the conscience of the appellate court, then we  must order remittitur or remand for a new trial.  We hold that the circuit court abused its  discretion in failing either to grant Vaccaro’s motion for new trial or to order remittitur.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.  Reversed and remanded.  GLADWIN  and HEFFLEY, JJ., agree. ­7­  CA07­233 

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