Dee Kankey and Virginia Kankey, his wife v. Bill Kankey and Charlotte Kankey, his wife, and Dale Kankey

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  JOHN B. ROBBINS, JUDGE  DIVISION IV  CA 07­230  DEE KANKEY and VIRGINIA  KANKEY, his wife  APPELLANTS  V. BILL KANKEY and CHARLOTTE  KANKEY, his wife, and DALE KANKEY  APPELLEES  DECEMBER 19, 2007  APPEAL FROM THE IZARD  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. E­01­204]  HONORABLE STEPHEN CHOATE,  JUDGE  AFFIRMED  This  appeal  arises  out  of  a  dispute  among  three  brothers  regarding  ownership  of  certain acreage in Izard County.  After a partition suit, a court­ordered public sale, and the  confirmation of that sale, one brother sought to set the sale aside and have a new trial based  upon his contention that their grandmother had deeded many of those acres solely to him.  The trial court disagreed, denied a new trial, and this appeal resulted.  We affirm.  The  material facts leading to this appeal are not in dispute.  Lola Kankey owned  nearly 900 acres in Izard County, which she deeded to her three sons, appellant Dee Kankey,  and appellees Bill and Dale Kankey, as tenants in common.  After Lola died in 2000, the  brothers could not agree on a division of the property, so in 2001 appellees Bill and Dale  filed a petition to partition the land in Izard County Circuit Court.  Appellant Dee and his wife Virginia resisted the action to partition.  The trial court appointed the circuit clerk as  commissioner and ordered the property sold at a public sale. On August 16, 2006, the circuit  clerk filed a Report of Sale, reporting that the subject property was sold to the highest bidder  at a price of $1,500,000.  On August 24, 2006, the trial court signed an order confirming the  commissioner’s sale, which was filed in the circuit court on August 28, 2006.  On September 1, 2006, appellant Dee filed a motion seeking to set aside the order  confirming the commissioner’s sale on the basis that he had found in his mother’s effects  a  long  lost  deed  from  his  grandmother,  Neaily  Hammond,  to  him  dated  March  1,  1973,  granting  him  sole  ownership  of  approximately  214  acres  of  the  acreage  at  issue.  Mrs. Hammond died in 1976. On the basis of “newly discovered evidence,” appellant sought  to invalidate the public sale and reopen the case.  The trial court held a hearing on September  11, 2006. At the hearing, appellant testified that he had been looking for this deed for a long  time but had just run across it days ago in his mother’s chest of drawers.  Appellant testified  that he had lived with and assisted his grandmother back in the 1970s, and Mrs. Hammond  executed this deed to give him her part of the land.  Appellant said that his grandmother sent  the deed to his mother (Mrs. Hammond’s daughter).  He said he had seen it once, but his  mother put it away somewhere and it was lost.  Appellant admitted that he never alleged the  existence of the lost deed in the litigation leading up to the public sale.  Appellant admitted  that his mother paid the taxes on this land and kept possession of the land until her death.  Appellant did not dispute that his grandmother spent significant portions of each year visiting ­2­  her daughter (appellant’s mother) in the house where the deed was located and would have  done  so  in  the  years  between  1973  and  her  death  in  1976.    While  the  deed  recites  a  consideration of $1000, appellant did not testify to having paid this to his grandmother and  admittedly did not have the deed recorded.  Appellant stated that he acquired other lands by  deed that he purchased, and those deeds were in a lock box and had been recorded.  He  stated that the reason this deed was not recorded was because his mother did not want him  to do so.  The motion for a new trial was denied, and in the order, the judge made the following  findings:  Dee Kankey never had delivery of the deed nor possession of the deed.  That there  was no intent to deliver the deed and that the property in question was possessed for  a number of years by [Dee’s] mother who paid the taxes on it, and that control was  lacking and that the deed was not valid.  It is from this order that appellant appeals.  While appellant’s counsel at times mentioned Ark. R. Civ. P. 60, it is clear that the  substance of the relief sought was pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7), which specifically  provides for a new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence.  Moreover, this motion  was  filed  within  ten  days  of  the  judgment  confirming  the  sale,  consistent  with  the  requirements of Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(b).  A motion for new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the circuit court, and  the  circuit  court’s  refusal  to  grant  it  will  not  be  reversed  on  appeal  unless  an  abuse  of  discretion is shown.  See Jones v. Double “D” Props., Inc., 352 Ark. 39, 98 S.W.3d 405 ­3­  (2003).  A new trial based on newly discovered evidence is not favored. St. Louis S.W. Ry.  Co. v. White, 302 Ark. 193, 788 S.W.2d 483 (1990).  The decision whether to grant a new  trial based on newly discovered evidence is a decision within the sound discretion of the trial  court  and  will  not  be  reversed  absent  an  abuse  of  that  discretion.  Liggett  v.  Church  of  Nazarene, 291 Ark. 298, 724 S.W.2d 170 (1987).  In addition, we will not reverse the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly  erroneous.  Snowden v. Riggins, 70 Ark. App. 1, 13 S.W.3d 598 (2000).  We will also not  reverse  a  trial  court's  confirmation  of  a  judicial  sale  if  the  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion.  Kellett v. Pocahontas Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 25 Ark. App. 243, 756 S.W.2d  926 (1988).  Appellant contended that he was the rightful owner, since 1973, of approximately 214  of the acres at issue.  A delivered deed passes title as between the parties even though it has  not  been  recorded.  See  Ferguson  v.  Haynes,  224  Ark.  342,  273  S.W.2d  23  (1954).  Ordinarily,  for  there  to  be  a  delivery  of  a  deed,  the  grantor  must  intend  to  pass  title  immediately,  and  the  grantor  must  lose  dominion  and  control  over  the  deed.  See,  e.g.,  Crowder v. Crowder, 303 Ark. 562, 798 S.W.2d 425 (1990); Broomfield v. Broomfield, 242  Ark. 355, 413 S.W.2d 657 (1967); Smith v. Van Dusen, 235 Ark. 79, 357 S.W.2d 22 (1962).  In the Broomfield and Smith decisions, our supreme court held that the intention to convey  title must be manifested by what is said and done by the grantor and grantee.  The question  of  delivery  of  a  deed  is  one  of  intention.  See  Cribbs  v.  Walker,  74  Ark.  104  (1905).  Compare Adams v. Dopieralla, 272 Ark. 30, 611 S.W.2d 750 (1981).  Where the deposit of ­4­  a deed is with a third person, it must be irrevocable, and, if it is subject to the control of the  grantor, its delivery has no binding effect.  Rogers v. Snow Bros. Hardware Co., 186 Ark.  183, 52 S.W.2d 969 (1932).  In this instance, we  are  not  convinced that the trial court abused its discretion or  clearly  erred.    Appellant’s  testimony  about  this  lost  deed  was  less  than  clear  regarding  conveyance and acceptance of the deed.  Moreover, there was evidence from which the trial  court could conclude that appellant failed to exhibit behavior consistent with ownership,  particularly  in  light  of  the  litigation  that  ensued  between  him and  his  brothers  for  years  following their mother’s death in 2000.  In addition, Mrs. Hammond retained some access  to the deed during her lifetime.  Any decisions regarding the truth of appellant’s version of  the facts are left to the fact finder, the trial court herein.  We conclude that appellant has  failed to demonstrate reversible error.  Therefore, we affirm.  PITTMAN, C.J., and BIRD, J., agree. ­5­ 

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