Roger Williams v. Crockett Business Machines

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  BRIAN S. MILLER, JUDGE  DIVISION II  CA07­211  December 19, 2007  ROGER WILLIAMS  APPELLANT  v.  AN APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS  WORKERS’ COMPENSATION  COMMISSION  [F501842]  CROCKETT BUSINESS MACHINES  APPELLEE  REVERSED  Appellant Roger Williams appeals from the January 8, 2007, opinion of the Arkansas  Workers’  Compensation  Commission  finding  that  he  failed  to  prove  that  he  sustained  a  compensable injury.  Williams argues that: (1) the Commission impermissibly ignored all of  the credible evidence when it found that he did not sustain an injury identifiable by time and  place of occurrence; (2) the Commission relied on material misstatements of the evidence  when it found that he did not sustain  an aggravation of a preexisting injury; and (3) the  Commission contradicted all known  law in finding that there were no objective medical  findings supporting his claim.  We agree with Williams and reverse.  I.  Background Williams has a history of back pain, which began before he was employed by Crockett  Business Machines in 1998.  In 2000, Williams was given a physical examination and found  to be in good shape with no abnormalities. He, however, suffered a compensable back injury  in 2002 while un­boxing a machine.  An MRI taken on March 8, 2002, showed that he had  mild degenerative disc disease with (1) posterior protrusion of disc material; (2) diffusely  bulging annulus at L3­L4; (3) left paracentral disc herniation at L4­L5; and right paracentral  disc  herniation  at  L5­S1.    He  was  originally  given  conservative  treatment,  but  his  pain  persisted.  Several surgical procedures were performed on Williams on March 11, 2003,  including  lumbar  laminectomy,  facetectomy  and  nerve  root  decompression.    Following  surgery,  Williams  continued  to  complain  of  pain  in  his  lower  back;  however,  all  of  his  physical examinations and x­rays were negative. He was ultimately released to return to  work with no restrictions.  Williams was injured again on February 10, 2005, while helping one of Crockett’s  other employees move a 200­pound machine.  He filed a claim for workers’ compensation  benefits, which was denied by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After a hearing, the ALJ  found that Williams failed to prove that he suffered a compensable injury on February 10,  2005, because any pain he felt was  merely  a  continuation of his 2002 injury.  The ALJ  further held that there were no objective medical findings showing that Williams suffered an  injury  on  February  10,  2005.  On  appeal  to  the  Commission,  the  ALJ’s  findings  were  adopted, and its decision was affirmed.  This appeal followed.  II.  Standard of Review 2  We normally review only the decision of the Commission and not that of the ALJ.  Daniels v. Affiliated Foods S.W., 70 Ark. App. 319, 17 S.W.3d 817 (2000).  In this case, the  Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ’s opinion as its own, which it is permitted to do.  See Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust  Fund v. Branum, 82 Ark. App. 338, 107  S.W.3d 876 (2003).  In so doing, the Commission made the ALJ’s findings and conclusions  the findings and conclusions of the Commission. Id. Therefore, for purposes of our review,  we consider both the ALJ’s order and the Commission’s majority order.  Id.  In  reviewing  the  Commission’s  order,  we  view  the  evidence  and  all  reasonable  inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s decision and  affirm if that decision is supported by substantial evidence.  Smith v. City of Ft. Smith, 84  Ark. App. 430, 143 S.W.3d 593 (2004).  Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable  mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  Williams v. Prostaff Temps., 336  Ark. 510, 988 S.W.2d 1 (1999).  The issue is not whether the reviewing court might have  reached a different result from the Commission; if reasonable minds could reach the result  found by the Commission, this court must affirm. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Baker, 337  Ark.  94,  989  S.W.2d  151  (1999).  In  conducting  our  review,  we  recognize  that  it  is  the  function of the Commission to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be  given their testimony.  Wal­Mart Stores, Inc. v. Stotts, 74 Ark. App. 428, 49 S.W.3d 667  (2001).  The Commission has the duty of weighing medical evidence, and the resolution of  conflicting  evidence  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  Commission.  Stone  v.  Dollar  General  Stores, 91 Ark. App. 260, 209 S.W.3d 445 (2005).  While the Commission’s findings on 3  these matters are insulated to a certain degree, its decisions are not so insulated as to render  appellate review meaningless.  Lloyd v. United Parcel Service, 69 Ark. App. 92, 9 S.W.3d  564 (2000).  III.  Compensable Injury  A  close  review  of  the  record  reveals  that  the  Commission  erred  in  finding  that  Williams  failed  to  prove  he  suffered  a  compensable  injury  on  February  10,  2005.    A  compensable  injury  is  an  “accidental  injury  ...  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  employment....  An injury is ‘accidental’ only if it is caused by a specific incident and is  identifiable  by  time  and  place  of  occurrence.”  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11­9­102(4).    A  compensable injury must be supported by objective medical findings not under the voluntary  control  of  the  claimant.  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11­9­102(4)  and  (16).  The  claimant  has  the  burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his injury is compensable.  §  11­9­102(4).  The ALJ’s finding that Williams did not suffer a compensable injury was based on  its determination that Williams and his witness, Mario Sherrell, were not credible.  This  determination  was  based  on  the  ALJ’s  view  that  Williams  and  Sherrell  gave  conflicting  testimony  and  that  Williams’s  testimony  conflicted  with  the  statement  he  gave  at  the  emergency room on the day of the accident.  Indeed, the ALJ specifically held:  The only evidence offered by claimant to corroborate the on­the­job incident was the  testimony of Mario Sherrell, a disgruntled employee of the company.  Moreover, the  claimant’s own version of the facts surrounding his alleged injury is not consistent  with the description of the incident he gave to the emergency room personnel or with  the version as described by Sherrell.  Based on my review of the evidence in this case, 4  I do  not  find  that  the  testimony  of  the  claimant  or  Sherrell  that  the  claimant  was  injured on the job to be credible or compelling.  It is the duty of the Commission, and in this case, the ALJ, to  judge the credibility of the  witnesses  and in most cases, we would accept its credibility determinations.  Wal­Mart,  supra.  However, the ALJ’s finding that Williams’s testimony conflicted with Sherrell’s  testimony and with the statement Williams gave at the emergency room is simply inaccurate.  Sherrell’s testimony supported Williams’s version of the events causing his February  10, 2005, injury. Williams testified that he was injured while helping Sherrell retrieve a 200­  pound machine from a shelf.  He stated that the machine was too heavy for him and that he  stumbled, fell back, and was trapped against a rack by the machine.  Williams further stated  that he immediately knew that he was injured but that he helped Sherrell put the machine on  a gurney. Within five to ten minutes, his muscles tightened and his body was drawn to one  side.  Sherrell testified that Williams was helping him move a machine when Sherrell heard  a pop.  He said that Williams gave way and the machine slipped down toward the gurney.  He stated that Williams then helped him put the machine back on the shelf and that Williams  immediately began to show signs that he was hurting.  The record shows that Williams went to the emergency room on February 10, 2005,  immediately following the incident with the 200­pound machine.  The emergency room notes  show that he told the emergency room nurse that a machine fell, hitting him on his left thigh, 5  and that he was feeling pain in his hip, radiating down his left leg.  The emergency room  doctor noticed “inflammation secondary to recent injury.”  Williams’s testimony does not conflict with Sherrell’s testimony and does not conflict  with the statement he gave to the emergency room immediately following the accident.  All  of the evidence shows that Williams was helping Sherrell move a machine when the machine  fell on him, immediately causing him to feel pain in his back.  The fact that the witnesses did  not read from a prepared script does not make the evidence inconsistent.  Moreover, there  is no evidence of record to support the ALJ’s statement that Sherrell was a “disgruntled”  employee.  For these reasons, we reverse the Commission on this point.  IV.  Recurrence v. Aggravation  Williams argues that there was sufficient proof that the injury he suffered was an  aggravation of his pre­existing injury, not a recurrence as found by the Commission.  A  recurrence is not a new injury but merely another period of incapacitation resulting from a  previous injury.  Crudup  v.  Regal Ware, Inc., 341 Ark. 804, 20 S.W.3d 900 (2000).  A  recurrence exists when the second complication is a natural and probable consequence of a  prior injury. Id.  An aggravation is a new injury resulting from an independent incident.  Id.  An aggravation, being a new injury with an independent cause, must meet the requirements  for a compensable injury. Id.  The record shows that Williams suffered a new injury on February 10, 2005, which  was separate and distinct from his March 2002 injury.  The emergency room notes from  February 10, 2005, show that Williams told the emergency room nurse that a machine fell 6  on him causing pain in his hip, radiating down his left leg, and that there was “inflammation  secondary to recent injury.”  An MRI was conducted on March 8, 2005, confirming all of  the  findings  of  the  March  8,  2002  MRI,  but  which  contained  the  additional  finding  of  herniated nucleus pulposus with subligamentous extrusion inferiorly along the posterior body  of L5.  Williams’s  primary  care  physician,  Jose  Echeverria,  M.D.,  found  that  Williams’s  February 10, 2005, injury was different from the one he sustained in March 2002.  He wrote  that  the  most  recent  MRI  revealed  disc  herniation  accompanied  by  an  “inferior  subligamentous extrusion at the L4­L5 disc interspace.”  Dr. Echeverria pointed out that the  postoperative  reports  from  Williams’s  2002  back  surgery  did  not  show  subligamentous  extrusion.  Therefore, the subligamentous extrusion is a new and separate finding that was  not shown until after Williams’s February 2005 accident.  Based  on  the  medical  evidence,  reasonable  minds  could  not  have  reached  the  Commission’s conclusion that Williams’s injury was a recurrence of his March 2002 injury.  Therefore we reverse on this point.  V.  Objective Findings of Injury  Williams  finally  asserts  that  the  Commission  erred  in  finding  that  there  was  no  objective  medical  evidence  that  he  suffered  an  injury.  A  compensable  injury  must  be  established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.  Crudup, supra.  Objective  findings are those that cannot come under the voluntary control of the individual.  Ark. Code  Ann.  §  11­9­102(16)(A)(i).  Medical  opinions  addressing  compensability  must  be  stated 7  within  a  reasonable  degree  of  medical  certainty.  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11­9­102(16)(B);  Smith­Blair,  Inc.  v.  Jones,  77  Ark.  App.  273,  72  S.W.3d  560  (2002).    Speculation  and  conjecture cannot substitute for credible evidence.  Id.  We agree that the Commission erred on this point. The March 2005 MRI, finding that  Williams suffered a left paracentral disc protrusion or herniation with accompanying inferior  subligamentous  extrusion  at  the  L4­5  disc  interspace,  is  an  objective  finding.    Williams  cannot  voluntarily  control  a  subligamentous  extrusion  at  the  L4­L5  disc  interspace.  Moreover, there was substantial evidence that Williams’s work­related accident on February  10, 2005, was the cause of the injury shown in the March 2005 MRI.  Indeed, Dr. Echeverria  linked  the  injury to the accident and both Williams and Sherrell linked the injury to the  accident.  Therefore, we reverse on this point and instruct the Commission to award the  appropriate amount of benefits to Williams.  Reversed with instructions.  MARSHALL and VAUGHT, JJ., agree. 8 

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