Charles Lee Liggett, Jr., M.D. v. Dora Sue Freeman

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, CHIEF JUDGE DIVISION III  CA07­210  October 31, 2007  CHARLES LEE LIGGETT, JR., M.D.  APPELLANT  APPEAL FROM  THE  POLK  COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT [NO. CV­2005­37]  V. HON.  JERRY W. LOONEY,  JUDGE  DORA SUE FREEMAN  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED  Appellant, Dr. Charles Liggett, Jr., appeals from an order dismissing without prejudice  a  medical  malpractice  complaint  filed  against  him  by  appellee,  Dora  Sue  Freeman.    He  contends that the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint with prejudice.  We agree  and modify the dismissal.  Ms. Freeman filed a lawsuit against Dr. Liggett on July 1, 2003, arising out of events  that occurred two years beforehand.  Ms. Freeman took a voluntary nonsuit on March 16,  2004, and refiled the action on March 15, 2005.  After obtaining extensions of time to serve  Dr. Liggett that allowed service up to March 10, 2006, Ms. Freeman attempted service on  appellant  on  November  16,  2005,  by  restricted­delivery  certified  mail,  return  receipt  requested.  The receipt was signed by Melanie Malcom.  There was a box on the receipt that  was to be checked if the person signing the receipt was acting as  the  addressee’s agent.  Malcom did not check it.  Ms. Freeman filed an affidavit of service on November 28, 2005.  Dr.  Liggett  answered,  expressly  asserting  the  defenses  of  insufficiency  of  process  and  insufficiency of service of process as set out in Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) and (5).  He then  proceeded  with  discovery,  including  interrogatories,  requests  for  production,  and  correspondence  regarding  scheduling  of  depositions.    On  April  25,  2006,  after  Ms.  Freeman’s extension of time for service had expired, Dr. Liggett filed a motion to dismiss  based on insufficient service.  The trial court granted the motion in part by dismissing the  complaint, but denied it in part by dismissing without prejudice pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P.  4(i).  Appellant  correctly  states  that  the  trial  court  had  no  authority  to  dismiss  without  prejudice because appellee had previously taken a nonsuit.  The provision in Ark. R. Civ. P.  4(i) that dismissal shall be “without prejudice” for failure to obtain service upon a defendant  within 120 days after filing the complaint is not applicable if a plaintiff had previously taken  a nonsuit.  Bakker v. Ralston, 326 Ark. 575, 932 S.W.2d 325 (1996).  Instead, a dismissal  for failure to serve a defendant shall be made with prejudice where  the  action  has been  previously dismissed.  Id; Ark. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Bodiford v. Bess, 330 Ark. 713, 956  S.W.2d 861 (1997); Smith v. Sidney Moncrief Pontiac, Buick, GMC Co., 353 Ark. 701, 120  S.W.3d 525 (2003); Henyan v. Peek, 359 Ark. 486, 199 S.W.3d 51 (2004).  Nor is there any merit to Ms. Freeman’s contention that Dr. Liggett waived defective  service  by  engaging  in  discovery  rather  than  immediately  moving  to  dismiss.  The  determinative factor in such a case is whether the defendant seeks affirmative relief, Farm ­2­  CA07­210  Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 315 Ark. 136, 865 S.W.2d 643 (1993), and the  supreme court has specifically held that a defendant does not waive the defense of defective  service  of  process  by  proceeding  with  discovery  procedures  and  amending  its  original  response without reasserting its defense.  Id.  That is all that happened in this case.  Although  Ms. Freeman cites several foreign and federal cases that reached a different result, those  cases involve situations where the defendant purposefully misled the plaintiff into believing  proper service had been made until the statute of limitations expired.  No such facts are  present here.  The restricted­delivery receipt plainly showed that service was not received  by Dr. Liggett and that the person who signed the receipt was not Dr. Liggett’s agent, yet Ms.  Freeman filed an affidavit of service.  Dr. Liggett’s answer expressly asserted the defenses  of insufficient process and insufficient service of process.  Under these circumstances, Ms.  Freeman  could  not  reasonably  have  believed  that  proper  service  had  been  made  simply  because Dr. Liggett subsequently engaged in an activity specifically held to not waive the  defense of defective service.  The dismissal in this case should have been granted with prejudice.  As is our practice  in such cases, we affirm the dismissal but modify to the extent that the dismissal is with  prejudice.  Bakker v. Ralston, supra.  Affirmed as modified.  GRIFFEN  and MARSHALL, JJ., agree. ­3­  CA07­210 

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