Brandy Kopp v. Danny Kopp

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION DIVISION II  CA07­175  BRANDY KOPP  OCTOBER 31, 2007  APPELLANT  V. DANNY KOPP  APPEAL  FROM  THE  LAWRENCE  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. DR 2003­200]  HON. KEVIN NEIL KING,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Brandy Kopp appeals from an order of the Lawrence County Circuit Court changing  custody of the parties’ minor child, CK, to appellee Danny Kopp and ordering that Brandy’s  other child from a previous marriage, ZM, not be present when she exercised her visitation  with CK.  On appeal, Brandy argues that the trial court’s findings that there  had been a  material change of circumstances and that it was in the best interest of CK to change custody  was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  She also argues that the restriction  on visitation should be lifted because there was insufficient evidence to “warrant indefinitely  isolating the two siblings.”  We affirm.  Brandy and Danny were divorced on July 21, 2004.  Pursuant to an agreement by the  parties, Brandy was awarded custody of CK, whose date of birth is January 28, 2002.  On  June 5, 2006, Danny filed an ex parte  petition to change custody, alleging that CK had been  repeatedly injured by his half­brother, ZM.  ZM is approximately five years older than CK.  The petition also alleged that Brandy had been inattentive to CK’s medical needs, refused  to provide Danny with her current residential address and phone number so that he could  contact the minor child, and was residing with a man to whom she was not married.  The trial  court granted the petition.  Hearings on a petition for a permanent change of custody were conducted on August  7,  2006,  and  September  11,  2006.  Danny  testified  that  ZM  had  displayed  aggressive  behavior that dated back to a time when he was still married to Brandy.  He recalled one  incident when ZM was “sitting out in a swarm of bees, cutting stingers off them.”  He noted  that at that time, ZM had behavioral problems at school.  However, rather than have ZM  submit to psychological testing, Brandy withdrew the child from school and went to live with  her mother.  The marriage ended shortly thereafter.  Danny  stated  that  although  he  had  agreed  to  give  Brandy  custody  of  CK  in  their  divorce, he recently had concluded that custody had to be changed. The watershed event was  his discovery on May 26, 2006,  that CK had sustained an injury to his penis that he believed  was caused by ZM.  The injury was first discovered by Danny’s mother, Susan Kopp, when  she took the child to the bathroom just before Danny, who was employed as a pilot, flew to  Illinois with CK and his parents.  Susan informed Danny about the injury, and he asked the  child what had happened.  According to Danny, CK told him that ZM hit his penis with a  “blue board.”  Danny noted that CK also claimed that his penis injury was a “mosquito bite,”  but he rejected that explanation.  Danny took pictures of the injury, and the pictures were  admitted into evidence.  Danny attempted to contact CK’s regular physician, but when he ­2­  CA07­175  was  unable  to  do  so,  he  had  the  child  examined  by  Dr.  Mark  Brown,  who  prescribed  antibiotics.  Danny stated that CK was a small child, so he expected him to have “cuts and  bruises,” but he opined that they seemed to be getting worse in the six months prior to his  discovery of the penis injury.  A series of pictures that depicted bruises and abrasions to the  child’s extremities, face, and torso were also admitted into evidence.  Danny further alleged  that Brandy was negligent in attending to CK’s vision problems, and he had encountered  repeated problems with making sure that CK had functional glasses.  After the Memorial Day visit, Danny returned CK to his mother’s custody at the usual  exchange location, the Randolph County Sheriff’s Office. Danny attempted to give Brandy’s  mother, Ann Hedge, a letter for Brandy asking her for information about what happened to  CK.  He also attempted to give her the medication that Dr. Brown had prescribed.  Hedge  refused to accept the letter and the medication.  Danny then called the child maltreatment  hotline.  According to Danny, since he was given custody pursuant to the ex parte order, CK  has not had any further injuries.  Dr. Brown confirmed that CK told him that his penis injury was caused by ZM when  he hit him with a blue board.  Dr. Brown opined that the injury he observed was consistent  with  being  struck  with  an  object.  Susan  Kopp  also  corroborated  Danny’s  testimony  regarding  the discovery of CK’s penis injury.  Stan Rogers of the Arkansas State Police  Crimes Against Children Division investigated the penis­injury incident, and CK also told  him that  ZM  hit  his  penis  with  a  board.    Rogers  noted  that  CK  also  stated  that  another ­3­  CA07­175  individual named Kendall “pinched his penis.”  Additionally, Rogers testified that CK told  him that ZM “hits him.”  Danny also presented the testimony of several witnesses who testified about ZM’s  aggressive behavior.  Tina Hoggard, ZM’s kindergarten teacher, testified that ZM had been  a discipline problem when he was in her class, and she recalled a specific incident where he  stabbed a bug with a stick and placed the bug in his pocket.  Brenda Ray, a counselor in  Imboden, testified that she treated ZM in 2002 pursuant to a referral from his school due to  his “aggression towards other children.”  Ray stated that ZM’s behavior initially improved,  but then he regressed.  According to Ray, Brandy rejected her recommendation that ZM  undergo psychological testing and discontinued Ray’s treatment of the child.  Phyllis Cook,  ZM’s school counselor, confirmed the story of ZM “hurting” other children before Brandy  took the child out of school.  She expressed concern with ZM living in the same household  with CK “if [ZM] continues to exhibit the behaviors that he was exhibiting at the time that  [she] knew him.”  Katrina Casteel, a therapist in Northeast Arkansas, stated that she began treating CK  and ZM in March 2006.  ZM was referred to her from his school for “anger issues.”  She  recalled from her intake session that Brandy acknowledged that ZM “had some anger, anger  outbursts,  distractibility,  and  some  oppositional  behavior”  and  that  she  first  noted  these  behaviors “at a very young age.”  ZM related that interaction in his mother’s household was  “mostly yelling at each other.”  Casteel also noted that ZM lied during the sessions and that  she had noted “some concerns about physical mistreatment” in her records.  Regarding the ­4­  CA07­175  penis issue, Casteel stated that Brandy told her that CK attributed the injury to a bee sting  or that “maybe his cousin did it.”  She stated that CK related the same story to her.  Casteel  stated that she did not “see any threat of [ZM] hurting [CK].”  Bobby Main, ZM’s father, testified that he was previously married to Brandy, and  they remarried after Brandy was served with Danny’s petition to change custody.  Main  admitted  that  he  cohabitated  with  Brandy  in  the  presence  of  CK  prior  to  their  current  marriage.  He stated that he was a self­employed carpenter who was building a house for his  father  “when  the  pain  allows  [him]  to  work.”    He  explained  that  he  was  injured  in  an  automobile accident some years before.  Main  admitted that he was convicted of felony  methamphetamine possession and currently had a DUI conviction on appeal.  Main claimed that he was in a position to observe ZM and CK together, and he had  never seen ZM injure CK.  He doubted that ZM would hurt CK and stated that it was usually  CK “picking” at ZM.  He claimed that Brandy was a “wonderful mother” and that she is able  to “control” ZM and CK “very well.”  He acknowledged that ZM was four years older than  CK and that CK had a “big weight disadvantage.”  Paula Hedge, Brandy’s sister­in­law, testified that she heard CK tell Brandy that a  cousin on Danny’s side of the family, not ZM, hit his penis with a board.  She claimed that  CK also stated that he was stung on his penis by a bee.  She opined that ZM was “a complete  and  total  boy,”  and  the  only  time  she  had  ever  seen  ZM  “be  aggressive  is  when  he  is  aggressed [sic] upon and needed to protect himself.” ­5­  CA07­175  Ann Hedge testified that she did not observe the penis injury when she made CK  change his underwear just prior to the Memorial Day weekend visit.  Furthermore, she did  not believe that ZM was a “danger or threat” to CK.  She conceded that CK and ZM “rough­  house and argue and wrestle,” but denied that they get into “anything volatile.”  She further  stated that, “if anything, ZM would be more likely to be injured by CK.”  She admitted that  she had filed harassment charges against Danny and was aware that he was ordered not to  have  contact  with  her.  Nonetheless,  she  was  the  primary  person  who  conducted  the  exchange of CK for visitation.  Brandy testified that CK told her that his penis injury came from a bee sting.  She  claimed that the injury was not as bad as the pictures showed.  She also claimed that had her  son had the injury to his penis prior to the Memorial Day visit with his father, either she or  her mother would have noticed when she dressed him.  She asserted that CK and ZM have  “good  relationship”  although  she  admitted  that  “they  fuss  and  feud  sometimes.”    She  accused Danny of trying to frame her by putting drugs and money in her van.  Brandy did,  however, admit that she cohabitated with  Main before she remarried him, and she conceded  that it violated the court order when she did.  The trial court permanently changed custody of CK to Danny and restricted Brandy’s  visitation to times when ZM was not present in the home.  The order contained extensive  findings  of  fact,  including  a  determinations  that  ZM’s  behavior  had  become  “severe,”  “[ZM’s] conduct with [CK] places [CK] in danger unless closely supervised by [Brandy]”  and that “[Brandy] has failed to closely supervise the conduct of [ZM] with [CK].” ­6­  CA07­175  Before we consider Brandy’s three points on appeal we note our standard of review.  In child­custody cases, the primary consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child  involved; all other considerations are secondary.  Walker v. Torres, 83 Ark. App. 135, 118  S.W.3d 148 (2003).  We review the case de novo, but we will not reverse a trial judge’s  findings in this regard unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  A finding is clearly erroneous  when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite  and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.  Id.  Because the question of whether the  trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous turns largely on the credibility of the witnesses,  we give special deference to the superior position of the trial judge to evaluate the witnesses,  their testimony, and the child’s best interests.  Id.  Brandy first argues that the trial court’s finding that there has been a material change  of circumstances since the entry of the divorce decree is clearly against the preponderance  of the evidence. Specifically, she asserts that the trial court’s finding that ZM’s behavior had  deteriorated to the point that it alone constituted a material change  of circumstance was  erroneous “because the court should not have relied on the evidence of ZM’s past behavioral  problems  because  such  evidence  predates  the  original  divorce  decree.”  Brandy  further  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  when  it  found  that  ZM  injured  CK  because  CK  gave  conflicting explanations as to the etiology of his penis injury, and therefore the trial court  “arbitrarily chose one explanation over the other.”  We disagree.  Brandy’s argument that the trial court erred in its finding the deterioration of ZM’s  behavior a change in circumstances mischaracterizes the proof in this case.  We interpret the ­7­  CA07­175  testimony of Tina Hoggard, Brenda Ray, and Phyllis Cook as merely establishing that ZM  had  long­standing  and  well­documented  proclivity  for  aggressive  behavior  against  other  children.  This proof provided a baseline for the trial court’s finding that ZM’s aggressive  behavior had worsened.  Moreover, there was also a changed circumstance in that Brandy  was failing to protect CK from a known threat to CK’s health and well­being.  Additionally,  we note that Danny presented proof in the form of photographs that established that CK had  been injured in the six months prior to the filing of his ex parte motion to change custody,  which was well after the entry of the divorce decree.  We also find no merit in Brandy’s contention that the trial court’s finding that ZM  injured CK was “clear error.”  As noted previously, CK’s statements as well as Danny’s  photographic evidence proved that CK was being injured during the six months prior to the  entry of the ex parte order. There was also proof that established ZM’s proclivity for hurting  other  children  and  this  problem  had  not  been  adequately  addressed  by  psychological  counseling or other treatment, save for Brandy’s claim that ZM was now taking medication  for attention deficit disorder.  Finally, testimony by Main and others established that ZM  had the size and age advantage to overpower CK.  Under these circumstances, we cannot say  that the trial court clearly erred in finding that ZM had injured CK.  Finally,  we  acknowledge  that  Brandy  is  correct  when  she  asserts  that  CK  gave  alternative explanations for how his penis was injured. However, the bee sting and mosquito  bite explanations were rejected by Dr. Brown, and indeed all of the witnesses who gave  opinions in this case.  This left the trial court with the choice between whether to believe that ­8­  CA07­175  CK’s penis was injured by ZM or by some other individual.  The testimony revealed that CK  had implicated ZM in statements made to Danny, Dr. Brown, and Steve Rogers. While CK’s  statements may also have implicated a child named KP, who is CK’s and ZM’s third cousin,  the trial court heard testimony from KP’s mother, Scarlet Prince, who vehemently denied that  KP had any contact with CK prior to Memorial Day.  Conversely, CK’s attribution of his  injury to contact with a member of Danny’s side of the family was purportedly made to Ann  Hedge, Paula Hedge, and Brandy, and to Katrina Casteel, but only after Brandy told her that  CK told her that his cousin was the perpetrator.  In situations like this, it is well­settled law  that we defer to the trial court to resolve inconsistencies in the testimony.  Id.  Brandy next argues that the trial court’s finding that the best interest of the child  warrants a change in custody is against the preponderance of the evidence.  She again asserts  that “no real evidence ties [ZM] to [CK’s] injury.”  Furthermore, citing Freshour v. West,  334 Ark. 100, 971 S.W.2d 263 (1998), Brandy asserts that Arkansas law favors keeping  siblings together “unless exceptional circumstances are involved.”  She also asserts that the  trial court made a best interest determination based on the relative financial condition of the  parties, which she claims violates the holding in Taylor v. Taylor, 353 Ark. 69, 110 S.W.3d  731 (2003).  We find no merit in these arguments.  We have previously addressed Brandy’s contention that there was “no real evidence”  that ZM was harming CK.  Although much of the proof was circumstantial, we cannot hold  that the trial court’s findings were clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  Given  the finding that one sibling was injuring another, we hold that it is precisely the exceptional ­9­  CA07­175  circumstances  that  warrant  separating  siblings.    Best  interest  of  the  child  is  always  the  paramount  concern  in  making  custody  determinations.  Walker  v.  Torres,  supra.  As  to  Brandy’s  argument  that  the  change  in  custody  was  made  because  Danny  had  superior  financial means, we can find no support in the record that the trial court changed custody for  this reason.  Lastly, Brandy argues that the no­contact provision between ZM and CK should be  lifted because the evidence presented is insufficient to warrant “indefinitely isolating the two  siblings.”  She asserts that Danny never requested this “extreme relief” in his pleadings, and  while Danny did make such a request on the witness stand, he failed to give her proper notice  to pursue this remedy.  We also find this argument unpersuasive.  Setting visitation rights is a matter that lies within the sound discretion of the trial  court.  Crosby  v.  Crosby,  97  Ark.  App.  316,  ___  S.W.3d  ___  (2007).    The  main  consideration is the best interest of the child.  Id.  In Crosby, we affirmed a trial court’s  decision to exclude step­siblings from the place where visitation was being exercised after  allegations of sexual abuse that had not been thoroughly investigated were lodged against  them.  We held that the best interest of the child dictated that the child not be subjected to  sexual abuse by other children in the non­custodial parent’s home.  Likewise, in the instant  case, we hold that best interest of the child dictates that CK not be subjected to physical  abuse by ZM when Brandy exercised visitation.  As in Crosby, we believe that the restriction  on visitation was sound exercise of the trial judge’s discretion. ­10­  CA07­175  Finally, regarding Brandy’s inadequate notice argument, we are unable to find in the  abstract where Brandy has raised that argument to the trial court.  On appellate review, issues  of even constitutional dimension are waived if not first presented to the trial court and a  ruling  is  obtained.  See  Warnock  v.  Warnock,  336  Ark.  506,  988  S.W.2d  7  (1999).  Accordingly, we decline to consider this argument.  Affirmed.  GLOVER  and MILLER, JJ., agree. ­11­  CA07­175 

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