Wael Abdin v. Delores Abdin

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Publish  Judge David M. Glover  DIVISION I  CA07­140  December 19, 2007  WAEL ABDIN  APPELLANT  AN APPEAL FROM PULASKI COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. PDE 2000­550]  v.  HONORABLE ALICE GRAY,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  DELORES ABDIN  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Appellant, Wael Abdin, appeals from an order refusing to award him expenses and  fees for attempting to probate a lost will. We find no error and affirm.  Mike Abdin died on March 15, 2000, shortly after returning home from a trip to his  native  Israel.  His  widow,  appellee  Delores  Abdin,  probated  a  1984  will  that  named  her  executrix and left most of Mike’s estate to her or the couple’s two daughters. Thereafter,  Mike’s  brother,  appellant  Wael  Abdin,  filed  a  petition  to  probate  a  lost  will  that  Mike  allegedly executed in the Arabic language while visiting Israel in January 2000. This will left  nothing to Mike’s wife and daughters. We described it in a prior appeal, Abdin v. Abdin, 94  Ark. App. 12, 223 S.W.3d 60 (2006) (Abdin I), as follows:  An English translation of the typed will shows it to be rather unusual by Western  standards. It is made “In The Name of Allah Most Gracious Most Merciful,” and it  makes no precise bequest of money or property to any person. Instead, it provides for  “the amount of money and property I have specified for my three sisters (and a Share for my family) according to the Islamic law of Allah and His Messenger,” with the  “biggest share” going to “my sister Hala.” It also contains several provisions stating  that the testator “would like” for the following to occur: 1) Wael to invest Hala’s  share for her; 2) Wael to buy a house and “make it an Islamic trust,” to be leased,  with the proceeds going to his other sisters; 3) “you to build a Mosque” in Jerusalem  named after Mike; 4) Wael to send someone to perform the Hajj obligation on behalf  of Mike and his mother; 5) his brothers and sisters to buy a new store for his younger  brother, Muhannad. Finally, the will states that the testator had:  left some signed checks with my brother Hani, so you may make use of them  after  I  pass  away.  .  .  .  From  the  family  share,  I  would  like  you  to  build  a  DeWan (Hall or a Family Center) and to name it after my father’s name. . . .  Abdin I, 94 Ark. App. at 13­14, 223 S.W.3d at 61­62.  Following a hearing on July 20 and 21, 2004, the circuit court found that Wael failed  to prove Mike’s signature on the Israeli will. The court refused to admit the will to probate,  and we affirmed in an opinion issued January 16, 2006. Abdin I, supra.  After our decision in Abdin I, Wael returned to circuit court and filed a petition to  recover over $100,000 in expenses and fees incurred in his unsuccessful attempt to probate  the lost will. He relied on Ark. Code Ann. § 28­48­109(a) (Repl. 2004), which provides:  When any person nominated in a will as executor or the administrator with the will  annexed, in good faith defends the will or prosecutes any proceedings for the purpose  of having it admitted to probate, whether successful or not, he or she shall be allowed  out  of  the  estate  his  or  her  necessary  expenses  and  disbursements  including  reasonable attorney’s fees in such proceedings.  This statute permits two classes of litigants to recover necessary expenses and attorney fees  incurred in the unsuccessful defense or probate of a will: 1) a person nominated in a will as  executor; or 2) an administrator with the will annexed. The trial court found that Wael fell  into neither of these categories and dismissed Wael’s petition. Wael appeals from that ruling. 2  Probate cases are reviewed de novo on appeal, and we do not reverse the trial court’s  decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Cloud v. Brandt, ___ Ark. App. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___  (June 21, 2007). A trial court’s conclusion on a question of law is given no deference on  appeal. N.W. Ark. Recovery, Inc. v. Davis, 89 Ark. App. 62, 200 S.W.3d 481 (2004).  We  first  address  Wael’s  argument  that  he  was  a  “person  nominated  in  a  will  as  executor.” He concedes that the lost will named no executor and did not expressly nominate  him as such. However, he claims that the will’s language manifested an intent that he act as  executor. He points to the will’s request that he secure his older sister’s share and invest it  for her; that he buy a house, place it in an “Islamic trust,” lease it, and have the rent paid to  two other sisters; and that he send someone to perform the Hajj obligation on behalf of Mike  and his mother. He also claims that the request that an unspecified person, “you,” build a  mosque, use the signed checks, and build a dewan, refers to him and manifests the same  intent. As authority, he cites In re Parker’s Estate, 202 Cal. 138, 259 P. 431 (1927), Des  Portes v. Des Portes, 157 S.C. 407, 154 S.E. 426 (1930), and Estate of Baird v. Baird, 196  Cal.  App.  3d  957,  242  Cal.  Rptr.  246  (1987),  for  the  proposition  that  a  person  may  be  deemed an executor if the testator asks him to perform duties normally associated with a  personal representative.  We  make  no  ruling  as  to  whether  section  28­48­109(a)  applies  when  a  person’s  nomination as executor is implied rather than expressed. Instead, we hold that, even if such  an interpretation were permitted under our strict construction of attorney­fee statutes, see  City of Little Rock v. Quinn, 35 Ark. App. 77, 811 S.W.2d 6 (1991), we are not persuaded 3  that the will in this case clothed Wael, even impliedly, with the status of an executor. While  the will asked Wael to perform several tasks that are in the nature of an executor’s duties,  it made similar requests of an unnamed person, “you.” The will’s overall language indicates  that “you” may well have included all of Mike Abdin’s brothers and sisters rather than Wael  alone. One provision asked that “you, brothers and sisters” buy a new store for a younger  brother “because you as you know my father and my mother used to love him very much. .  .  .”  Another  provision  stated  that  the  testator  “would  like  that  all  of  you  have  a  good  relationship with my wife and with my daughter[s].” A subsequent paragraph provided that  the testator “left some signed checks with my brother Hani, so you may make use of them.  . . .” Given these provisions, the trial court could reasonably have interpreted the will as a  series of requests to various family members without naming an executor. Thus, no clear  error occurred. See Metzgar v. Rodgers, 83 Ark. App. 354, 128 S.W.3d 5 (2003) (holding  that the trial court’s findings regarding ambiguous provisions of a will are not overturned  1  unless clearly erroneous).  We  likewise  agree  with  the  trial  court’s  finding  that  Wael  did  not  qualify  as  an  administrator with the will annexed. When a decedent leaves a will that does not nominate  an  executor,  or  the  person  named  as  executor  cannot  serve,  the  court  appoints  an  administrator with the will annexed to perform the duties connected with settlement of the  estate. See Whitlow v. Patterson, 195 Ark. 173, 112 S.W.2d 35 (1938); Gordon v. Greening, 1  Although the trial court did not elaborate on its basis for finding that Wael was  not nominated in the will as executor, we may uphold the court’s finding if it is correct  for any reason. Fritzinger v. Beene, 80 Ark. App. 416, 97 S.W.3d 440 (2003).  4  121 Ark. 617, 182 S.W. 272 (1916). See also 34 C.J.S. Wills § 947 (1998). In order to have  an administrator with the will annexed, the will must first have been deemed valid and duly  admitted to probate. See 34 C.J.S. Wills § 947 (1998); Luckey v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.  360, 287 P. 450 (1930).  The  lost  will  in  this  case  was  never  deemed  valid  and  duly  admitted  to  probate;  consequently, it is not possible for Wael to qualify as an administrator with the will annexed.  Wael recognizes this but argues that section 28­49­109(a) inconsistently permits recovery  of  expenses  and  fees  for  a  legal  impossibility:  the  unsuccessful  probate  of  a  will  by  an  administrator with the will annexed. In fact, no such inconsistency exists. The statute applies  not only to the unsuccessful probate of a will but to the unsuccessful defense of a will as  well. It reads: “When any person nominated in a will as executor or the administrator with  the  will  annexed,  in  good  faith  defends  the  will  or  prosecutes  any  proceedings  for  the  purpose of having it admitted to probate . . . .” (Emphasis added.) It is perfectly conceivable  that an administrator with the will annexed, properly appointed after probate, could be called  upon to defend the will. If his defense were unsuccessful, the statute would apply and allow  him to recover his necessary expenses and fees from the estate.  Based  on  the  foregoing,  we  affirm  the  trial  court’s  ruling  that  Wael  lacked  the  capacity  to  seek  fees  and  expenses  under  section  28­48­109(a).  Our  holding  makes  it  unnecessary to address Wael’s argument that he propounded the lost will in good faith and  Delores’s argument that Wael’s fee petition was untimely under Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(e).  Affirmed. 5  HEFFLEY and BAKER, JJ., agree. 6 

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