Teena L. Draper v. Dub Clenney Construction, Inc. and Bituminous Casualty Insurance Co.
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
KAREN R. BAKER
DIVISION I
CA06-728
TEENA L. DRAPER
MAY 23, 2007
APPELLANT
v.
DUB CLENNEY CONSTRUCTION, INC.
and BIT UMINOUS CASUALT Y
INSURANCE CO.
APPELLEES
A PP E A L F R O M T H E W O R K E R S ’
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
[E904378]
AFFIRMED
Appellant, Teena L. Draper, appeals from a decision by the Workers’ Compensation
Commission, affirming the ALJ and finding that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence both that she was entitled to temporary total disability or temporary partial disability for
the periods requested and that she was entitled to additional medical treatment.1 On appeal, she
argues that the medical testimony shows that her current injury is a recurrence, rather than a new
injury or an aggravation, and that the evidence before the ALJ shows that she is entitled to
temporary total disability or temporary partial disability and additional medical treatment. We find
no error and affirm.
In reviewing decisions from the Workers’ Compensation Commission, we view the evidence
1
This was the second hearing before the ALJ in this case, and the only issues before the
ALJ were appellant’s entitlement to temporary total disability or temporary partial disability and
additional medical treatment.
and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s
findings, and we affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Sands, 80 Ark. App. 51, 91 S.W.3d 93 (2002). Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable
person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey,
328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997). The question is not whether the evidence would have
supported findings contrary to the ones made by the Commission; there may be substantial evidence
to support the Commission’s decision even though we might have reached a different conclusion
if we sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo. CDI Contractors v. McHale, 41 Ark. App.
57, 848 S.W.2d 941 (1993). We will not reverse the Commission’s decision unless we are convinced
that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusions
arrived at by the Commission. White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d 98 (1999).
Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony are
within the exclusive province of the Commission. Ark. Dep’t. of Health v. Williams, 43 Ark. App.
169, 863 S.W.2d 583 (1993).
The only issue in this appeal is whether sufficient evidence supports the Commission’s
denial of temporary total disability or temporary partial disability for the periods requested and the
Commission’s denial of additional medical treatment.
The Commission’s findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and opinion adequately explain the decision. Having determined that the
Commission’s findings are in fact supported by substantial evidence, we affirm by memorandum
opinion. See In re Memorandum Opinions, 16 Ark. App. 301, 700 S.W.2d 63 (1985).
Affirmed.
G LOVER and M ILLER, JJ., agree.
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