Freda Ann Quarles Owen v. Gerald W. Quarles
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
D. P. MARSHALL JR., Judge
DIVISION II
CA06-485
May 30, 2007
FREDA ANN QUARLES OWEN,
APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[No. DR 2004-1161-4]
v.
GERALD W. QUARLES,
HONORABLE LEON N. JAMISON,
CIRCUIT JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
This divorce case turns on the circuit court’s division of the Quarleses’ property and
debts after their brief marriage. Freda Quarles Owen appeals. We discern no clear error and,
with a minor modification, affirm the circuit court.
Freda and Gerald married in the fall of 2000 and separated in the summer of 2004. This
was a later-in-life union. Freda testified that before the marriage, she owned her own home
and had a retirement account containing almost $300,000.00. She operated a business out of
her home. Freda also testified that she inherited a home from her mother during the brief
marriage. She borrowed against her retirement account and her separate home to help build
the parties’ marital home.
The circuit court awarded Freda her separate property and the property she inherited
from her mother. The court also made Freda responsible for the debt on all this property.
Gerald claimed that he was entitled to an interest in all this property because the parties had
used marital funds to pay the mortgage debts and make improvements, but the court rejected
that claim. (Gerald does not cross appeal that ruling.) The court directed the parties to sell
the marital home and divide the net proceeds equally. The court then classified the parties’
personal property as marital or separate and distributed it.
I. Personal Property. Freda argues the circuit court erred in finding that a grandfather
clock, a china cabinet, and two leather recliners were marital property. She testified that
Gerald bought these items as gifts for her. She also argues that a grandmother clock was hers
before the marriage. In his brief on appeal, Gerald says that he made no claim for these items
at trial and Freda can have them. We therefore modify the circuit court’s decree, award Freda
all these items as her separate property, and affirm on this issue as modified.
Freda also contends that the circuit court erred in classifying a Troy-Bilt lawn mower
and a Polaris four-wheeler as Gerald’s separate property. The parties offered conflicting
testimony about these items. But disinterested third parties testified that the mower and fourwheeler were gifts from Freda to Gerald. The circuit court’s resolution of these disputed facts
was not clearly erroneous. Johnson v. Cotton-Johnson, 88 Ark. App. 67, 77, 194 S.W.3d 806,
812 (2004).
II. The Marital Home Proceeds. Relying on Potter v. Potter, 280 Ark. 38, 655 S.W.2d
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382 (1983), Freda next argues that she should be allowed to recover the money from her IRA
and other separate funds that went into the marital home. She seeks the first $80,000.00 of
the sale proceeds to make herself whole. Freda bore the burden of tracing her separate
property into the marital property. Davis v. Davis, 79 Ark. App. 178, 184, 84 S.W.3d 447,
450 (2002).
The parties gave conflicting accounts about how much money Freda put in the house
and where her contributions came from. Freda testified about various amounts that she
withdrew from her IRA during the marriage, including $40,000.00 for constructing the home.
She also testified that she contributed proceeds from mortgages on her separate property to
the purchase of the land for the marital home and the building project. She also tried to link
various deposits into the parties’ joint account to specific withdrawals from her IRA. The
circuit court found, however, that Freda’s testimony about the deposits was general and, in
some cases, the deposits predated the IRA withdrawals. Gerald denied that Freda put
$80,000.00 into the marital home. He testified that he provided the $20,000.00 used to buy
the land for it and paid a contractor another $64,000.00 to build the house in part. He said the
home cost him $162,000.00 total. Freda testified she had complained that Gerald was
spending more than they could afford to build the house.
We affirm the circuit court’s decision about the parties’ marital home. Because the
parties’ transactions made tracing so difficult, the court was justified in declaring the house to
be marital property. Boggs v. Boggs, 26 Ark. App. 188, 192, 761 S.W.2d 956, 958 (1988).
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Moreover, one spouse’s unequal contributions to marital property need not be recognized upon
divorce. McKay v. McKay, 340 Ark. 171, 177, 8 S.W.3d 525, 529 (2000). No clear error
occurred when the circuit court rejected Freda’s request for $80,000.00 as the first fruits of
the home sale.
III. Debts. Freda argues, finally, that the circuit court should have divided equally the
debt for the four-wheeler and the two mortgages on her separate real estate. As the circuit
court noted in its decision, however, Freda volunteered at trial to pay all these debts. The court
did not err by accepting Freda’s invitation. Narup v. Narup, 75 Ark. App. 217, 222, 57
S.W.3d 224, 227 (2001).
Affirmed as modified.
V AUGHT and H EFFLEY, JJ., agree.
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