Arkansas Department of Health & Human Services v. C.M., minor child

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JUDGE KAREN R. BAKER  DIVISION IV  CA06­434  ARKANSAS  DEPT.  OF  HEALTH  &  HUMAN SERVICES  DECEMBER 5, 2007  APPELLANT  APPEAL  FROM  THE  WASHINGTON  COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. J­01­997­3]  APPELLEE  HONORABLE STACEY A. ZIMMERMAN,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  v.  C.M., MINOR CHILD  AFFIRMED  The Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services appeals from an order appointing  Dale Casto to represent the minor child in an administrative appeal and for the Department to pay  Mr.  Casto’s  attorney  fees  because  the  child  was  in  the  Department’s  custody.    On  appeal,  the  Department argues that the circuit court abused its discretion when it ordered the Department to pay  for an attorney for the minor child in an unrelated case.  We disagree and affirm.  The facts of this case are as follows.  Two minor children, C.M. and A.P., have been in the  custody of the Department of Health and Human Services since 2001.  Since that time, the parent’s  rights  have  been terminated.  At  a  post­termination  review  hearing  on  November  30,  2005,  the  children’s attorney ad litem, Teresa McLemore, informed the court that, as a result of alleged sexual  misconduct on the part of C.M. against his sister A.P., he had been given notice that he had the right  to an administrative hearing.  At this time, C.M. was nine years old.  Ms. McLemore requested that  C.M. be appointed an attorney to represent him at the administrative hearing.  The trial judge entered  an order stating that Dale Casto was to represent C.M. at the administrative hearing.  In a second order, the trial judge stated that, because C.M. was a juvenile in the care of the Department and was  unable to pay for an attorney, the Department was financially responsible for Mr. Casto’s attorney  fees.  From this order, the Department brings this appeal.  In equity matters, such as juvenile proceedings, the standard of review on appeal is de novo,  although we do not reverse unless the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. See Moiser v. Ark.  Dep’t of Human Servs., 95 Ark. App. 32, 233 S.W.3d 172 (2006).  “A finding is clearly erroneous  when,  although there  is  evidence  to  support  the  finding,  after  reviewing  all of the  evidence,  the  reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Brewer  v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 71 Ark. App. 364, 368, 43 S.W.3d 196, 199 (2001).  DHS contends that the circuit court did not have subject­matter jurisdiction to enter this order  because  DHS,  as  a  state  entity,  enjoys  sovereign  immunity  from  suit.  Article  5,  §  20,  of  the  Arkansas Constitution provides that “[t]he State of Arkansas shall never be made a defendant in any  of her courts.”  Suits against the State are expressly forbidden by this provision.  Ark. Dep’t. of  Human Servs. v. T.B., 347 Ark. 593, 67 S.W.3d 539 (2002).  The Department of Human Services  is  a  State  agency,  and  it  maintains  that  when  the  trial  court  ordered  that  DHS  was  financially  responsible for C.M.’s attorney fees for the administrative hearing, it made DHS a defendant and,  thus, violated the Sovereign Immunity clause of the Arkansas Constitution. We disagree.  DHS cites to Arkansas Department of Human Services v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 850 S.W.2d  847  (1993),  in  support  of  its  sovereign  immunity  argument.    That  case  seems  to  indicate  that  sovereign  immunity  shelters  DHS  from  suit;  however,  that  case  dealt  with  probation  fees  and  restitution.  Arkansas Code Annotated section 16­13­326(a) (Supp. 2007) provides for a juvenile  court’s authority to assess a probation fee; however, this statute is silent on assessing a probation  fee against a custodian.  However, the supreme court in Arkansas Department of Human Services ­2­  v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998), found that Ark. Code Ann. § 9­27­332(1) (Repl.  1993), which authorizes the court to order “family services” when a family is found to be in need  of services, was, in effect, a waiver of DHS’s sovereign immunity.  Unlike the statutes at issue in  the State case, the Juvenile Code expressly empowers the court to order cash assistance.  See R.P.,  333 Ark. at 531, 970 S.W.2d at 233.  Arkansas Code Annotated section 9­27­334(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 2002) states that, “[i]f a juvenile  is found to be dependent­neglected, the circuit court may enter an order making any of the following  dispositions . . . Order family services . . .”  “Family services” means relevant services, including,  but not limited to: child care; homemaker services; crisis counseling; cash assistance; transportation;  family  therapy;  physical,  psychiatric,  or  psychological  evaluation;  counseling;  or  treatment,  provided to a juvenile or his family.  Ark. Code Ann. § 9­27­303(23)(A) (Repl. 2002); R.P., 333  Ark. at 532, 970 S.W.2d at 233.  Family services are provided in order to: (i) Prevent a juvenile from  being  removed  from a  parent,  guardian,  or  custodian;  (ii)  Reunite  the  juvenile  with  the  parent,  guardian, or custodian from whom the juvenile has been removed; or (iii) Implement a permanent  plan of adoption, guardianship, or rehabilitation of the juvenile.  Ark. Code Ann. § 9­27­303(23)(B).  Every six months the court shall review a case of dependency neglect or families in need of services.  Ark. Code Ann. § 9­27­337(a) (Repl. 2002).  In each case in which a juvenile has been placed in an  out­of­home placement, the court shall conduct a hearing to review the case sufficiently to determine  the future status of the juvenile.   Ark. Code Ann. § 9­27­337(b)(1)(A).  The court shall determine  and shall include in its orders the following: whether the case plan, services, and placement meet  the special needs and best interest of the juvenile, with the juvenile’s health and safety specifically  addressed; and whether the state has made reasonable efforts to provide family services.  Ark. Code  Ann. § 9­27­337(b)(1)(B).  The court shall also project a date for the juvenile to return home or, if ­3­  there is no projected date for return home, the projected dates for other alternatives and what those  alternatives  are.  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  9­27­337(b)(1)(C)(i).    As  in  State  and  R.P.,  the  General  Assembly clearly intended to waive sovereign immunity in a situation, such as the one before us,  where assistance was needed to pay for an attorney to represent a child who was in the custody of  the Department in an unrelated adjudication hearing.  In the case at hand, the circuit judge recognized that if C.M., at the age of nine, is adjudicated  and placed on the sex offender list, his chances of adoption will be greatly diminished.  Providing  him with the proper representation at the administrative hearing, in order to keep him off the sex  offender list, will greatly assist in C.M.’s adoption and permanency planning.  Furthermore, C.M.  is entitled to an attorney at the hearing.  See Ark. Code Ann. § 25­15­213(1) (Repl. 2002) (stating  that “[a]ny person compelled to appear before any agency or representative thereof shall have the  right to be accompanied and advised by counsel.  Every party shall have the right to appear in person  or by counsel.”).  Based on the foregoing, we affirm the court’s order finding DHS responsible for  attorney fees for a child in the Department’s custody.  Affirmed.  ROBBINS  and VAUGHT,  JJ., agree. ­4­ 

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