Craig Williams v. State of Arkansas

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Not for publication  Judge Brian S. Miller  DIVISION II  CA06­1395  December 5, 2007  CRAIG WILLIAMS  APPELLANT  AN APPEAL FROM UNION COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [No. CV2005­296]  v.  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  HONORABLE DAVID F. GUTHRIE,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  APPEAL DISMISSED  This appeal involves $41,880 in currency and two vehicles that the State sought to  forfeit in connection with a criminal case. Appellant Craig Williams brings this appeal from  an  agreed  order  resolving  the  forfeiture  action,  asserting  that  the  circuit  court  lacked  jurisdiction to enter the agreed order because the court had dismissed the action more than  ninety days prior to the entry of the agreed order. Williams also challenges the circuit court’s  settlement of the record. We dismiss the appeal because a party cannot appeal from an agreed  order. Under these circumstances, we need not decide whether the circuit court’s settlement  of the record was proper.  Background  On July 20, 2005, the State filed a complaint against Williams and Laquita Palmer  seeking to forfeit $41,880 in currency, a 1997 Chevrolet Tahoe, and a 1997 Nissan Altima  seized  by  the  State  following  the  arrest  of  Williams  and  Palmer  on  drug  and  weapons 1  charges.  Williams  and  Palmer  answered  and  denied  the  material  allegations  of  the  complaint.  Williams and Palmer filed a motion for sanctions on December 22, 2005, alleging that  the State had failed to comply with an earlier order compelling the State to respond to certain  discovery requests. The circuit court entered an order on January 11, 2006, granting the  motion for sanctions, dismissing the forfeiture action, and ordering the return of the seized  property to Williams and Palmer.  Before being retained to represent Williams, his present counsel was the attorney for  a third party, who claimed ownership of one of the seized vehicles.  On July 5, 2006, counsel  sent  a  letter  to  the  Union  County  Prosecuting  Attorney  demanding  to  know  why  the  prosecutor agreed to return the property to Williams and why the prosecutor did not fight  against returning the property. Counsel was so outraged at the prospect of the property being  returned to Williams that he was prompted to ask: “What the hell is going on?”  Less than two weeks after counsel’s letter to the prosecutor, the circuit court set a  hearing on possession of the property for August 3, 2006.  There is no indication that the  hearing was held on August 3; however, on August 9, 2006, the court entered an agreed  ordered, signed by Williams, his former attorney, and the attorney for the State. That order  provided  that  $14,000  of  the  currency  would  be  returned  to  Williams,  one­half  of  the  remaining balance would be paid to his former attorney, and the remaining funds would be 1  This court recently affirmed Williams’s conviction on the drug and weapons  charges. Williams v. State, No. CACR06­1184 (Ark. App. Sept. 26, 2007) (not designated  for publication). Williams has a petition for review pending before the supreme court.  ­2­  “forfeited” to the State to be distributed to the El Dorado Police Department pursuant to Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  5­64­505(i)(1)(B).  Finally,  the  order  provided  that  the  vehicles  would  be  returned to their  titled owners. Williams filed a timely notice of appeal from the agreed  order. Williams asserts five points on appeal. We, however, address only the entry of the  agreed order.  The Agreed Order  Williams first argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction under Ark. R. Civ. P.  60(a)  to  enter  the  agreed  order.  We  need  not  decide  that  question  because  it  would  not  change the result of the case given the contractual nature of the agreed order. Nor can we  agree with Williams’s argument that the circuit court erred in distributing the currency and  the two vehicles because the court made no such distribution. Instead, the parties entered into  an agreement that effectively implemented the earlier January 11 order. An agreed order is  not a judicial determination of any litigated right and is not the judgment of the court except  in the sense that the court allows it to be made a part of the record and have the force and  effect of a judgment. Selig v. Barnett, 233 Ark. 900, 350 S.W.2d 176 (1961). Here, Williams,  his former attorney, and the State agreed to the distribution of the currency between the three  and the return of the vehicles to the registered owner of each vehicle. The court simply made  the agreement a part of the record. Likewise, the court did not make an award of attorney’s  fees, as Williams argues. Because the parties clearly agreed to the resolution of the forfeiture  action and the distribution of the currency and the vehicles, the August 9 agreed order is one ­3­  from  which an appeal does not lie. Lawson v. Madar, 76 Ark. App. 23, 60 S.W.3d  497  (2001).  We next turn to Williams’s argument that the January 11, 2006, order of dismissal  was  res  judicata  and  prevented  the  circuit  court  from  reopening  the  case.  We  disagree  because  an  order  of  dismissal  as  a  sanction  for  noncompliance  with  a  court’s  order  is  generally without prejudice. Ark. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Croney v. Lane, ___ Ark. App. ___, ___  S.W.3d ___ (June 27, 2007). A dismissal without prejudice is not an adjudication on the  merits and will not bar a subsequent suit on the same cause of action. Middleton v. Lockhart,  344 Ark. 572, 43 S.W.3d 113 (2001). Therefore, the circuit court’s January 11 order did not  bar the State from seeking the forfeiture of the currency and vehicles.  Appeal dismissed.  MARSHALL and VAUGHT, JJ., agree. ­4­ 

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