Bryan K. Smith v. Danny Thomas and Sandra Thomas

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DIVISION III  CA06­1343  BRYAN K. SMITH  October 31, 2007  APPELLANT  V. DANNY THOMAS and  SANDRA THOMAS  APPELLEES  APPEAL  FROM  THE  FAULKNER  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. PR­2003­457]  HON. LINDA P. COLLIER,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  AFFIRMED  Bryan K. Smith, the natural father of a minor child, BS, appeals from an order of the  Faulkner County Probate Court denying his petition to terminate the guardianship held by  the maternal grandparents, Danny and Sandra Thomas, over the child.  On appeal, Smith  argues that the trial court’s decision to deny his petition was clearly erroneous and violated  his due­process rights.  We affirm.  BS was born out of wedlock on July 31, 2003.  Apparently, Smith and BS’s mother,  Dandra Thomas, did not live together at the time of the child’s birth or at any time thereafter.  When  BS’s  mother  died  on  December  27,  2003,  Danny  and  Sandra  Thomas  almost  immediately petitioned to be appointed BS’s guardians.  The Thomases actually served Smith  with  the  guardianship  petition  at  their  daughter’s  funeral.  Smith  counter­petitioned  for  custody.  At the time, however, Smith was a college student who had availed himself of only limited contact with his child.  The Thomases were granted a permanent guardianship on  January 9, 2004. The trial court specifically found that Smith could not “provide the stability  which is needed for this child at this point in his life.”  The parties returned to court mere months later pursuant to the Thomases’ petition to  limit Smith’s visitation.  They based their petition on Smith’s failure to show them sufficient  “respect.”  Smith counter­petitioned to terminate the guardianship.  After a hearing, the trial  court again found that Smith could not provide BS with “stability,” noting that he was still  a full­time student while he was employed full­time.  The trial court ordered that Smith be  “ready next summer to do what you have to do.” The trial court also ordered that Smith  attend parenting classes as the Thomases had requested.  On March 9, 2006, Smith again petitioned to terminate the guardianship.  By this  time, he had married, established a household, was no longer a student, and had secured full­  time employment.  He also completed some parenting classes and had regularly visited his  child.  The child, however, was thriving in the care of his guardians.  Relying on Freeman  v. Rushton, 360 Ark. 445, 202 S.W.3d 485 (2005), the trial court found that, even though  Smith  was  “qualified”  to  parent  his  child,  best  interest  dictated  that  BS  remain  with  his  guardians.  Smith first argues that the trial court’s decision to deny his petition to terminate  the guardianship was clearly erroneous. Citing Arkansas Code Annotated section 28­65­204  (Repl. 2004), he notes that, having found him to be a person “qualified” to be BS’s guardian,  the trial court erred in failing to give him the statutory preference afforded natural parents. ­2­  CA06­1343  He notes further that, since the last hearing, he has “discharged his duties and obligations as  a  parent,”  driven  more  than  28,800  miles  to  exercise  his  visitation,  become  gainfully  employed with the Arkansas Department of Human Services as a family­support specialist,  and married, which would afford BS a two­parent household.  Furthermore, Smith contends  that this case is distinguishable from Freeman v. Rushton, supra, the authority relied on by  the trial court, in that Freeman did not have the same level of contact with his child that he  has had with BS.  Finally, citing Arkansas Code Annotated section 28­65­401 (Repl. 2004)  and Blunt v. Cartwright, 342 Ark. 662, 30 S.W.3d 737 (2000),  Smith acknowledges that the  best interest of the child standard applies to the termination of guardianships.  Nonetheless,  he argues, in essence, that  the  guardianship can also be terminated when it is no longer  necessary, as in this case.  We do not find these arguments persuasive.  This court reviews probate proceedings de novo, but we will not reverse a decision  of a trial court unless it is clearly erroneous.  Id.  The primary consideration in deciding  whether to terminate the guardianship of a minor child pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated  section  28­65­401,  is  best  interest  of  the  child.  Crosser  v.  Henson,  357  Ark.  635,  187  S.W.3d 848 (2004).  We are unwilling to say that the trial court’s refusal to terminate the guardianship was  clearly erroneous.  First, the instant case does not involve the initial selection of a guardian.  Accordingly, the natural­parent preference stated in Arkansas Code Annotated section 28­65­  204(a) is inapplicable.  Crosser v. Henson, supra.  Second, and more importantly, our case  law has equated the termination of a guardianship to a change of custody among natural ­3­  CA06­1343  parents.  See In re Guardianship of Markham, 32 Ark. App. 46, 795 S.W.2d 931 (1990); see  also Crosser v. Henson, supra.  Accordingly, we note that it is undisputed that BS has been  well  taken  care  of  by  his  guardians  and  has  thrived  in  that  environment.    Under  those  circumstances,  we  hold  that  it  was  not  clearly  erroneous  for  the  trial  court  to  refuse  to  terminate the guardianship.  We  are  mindful  that,  while  this  case  was  pending  but  before  we  took  it  under  submission, our supreme court handed down Devine v. Martens, ___ Ark. ___, ___S.W.3d  ___ (Sept. 27, 2007).  In Devine the supreme court stated that “it is not in a child’s best  interests to take custody from a natural parent who has rectified all issues relating to his or  her fitness.”  While this holding seems to equate best interest of the child with his or her  return to a natural parent who has rectified unfitness issues, we decline to apply this holding  to the case at bar.  In the first place, Devine involved the initial preference in establishing a  guardianship, not the termination of a guardianship of substantial duration as in the case at  bar.  Secondly, although the trial court pronounced Smith “qualified” to parent his child, at  the same time it expressed reservations about his credibility. Much of Smith’s case depended  upon his testimony concerning how he would be able to care for his child, which would  count for naught  without the trial court finding him credible.  For his second point, Smith argues that his due­process rights were violated when the  trial court refused to terminate the guardianship.  He asserts that giving custody of BS to  grandparents destroys “any pretense of a normal parent­child relationship and eliminates  nearly all of the natural incidents of parenthood.”  However, it is not apparent from Smith’s ­4­  CA06­1343  brief that he  actually raised this argument to the trial court.  Accordingly, we decline to  consider this point because it is settled law that we will not address arguments, even those  with a constitutional dimension, for the first time on appeal.  Hooks v. Pratte, 53 Ark. App.  161, 920 S.W.2d 24 (1996).  Affirmed.  BIRD  and GRIFFEN, JJ., agree. ­5­  CA06­1343 

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