Donna White v. Bennie O"Neil

 Annotate this Case
Download PDF
DIVISION II  CA06­1322  November 7, 2007  DONNA WHITE  APPELLANT  AN APPEAL FROM PULASKI COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [No. PDE­05­574]  v.  HONORABLE VANN SMITH,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  BENNIE O’NEIL  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART  In this appeal, Donna White asserts that the Pulaski County Circuit Court committed  ten reversible errors when it imposed a constructive trust on funds held by White. We affirm  in part and reverse in part.  In  August  2002,  Mary  Long  executed  a  will  naming  her  niece,  Donna  White,  as  executrix. The will devised Long’s home to her two daughters, Rosalyn Grind and Felicia  Long. Long’s car was devised to Rosalyn. The residuary estate was left equally to Rosalyn  and Felicia.  In October 2002, Long provided $20,000 to White for the purpose of opening a joint  banking account with  the right of survivorship. On November 3, 2004, Long executed a  durable power of attorney in favor of White. Long died on November 5, 2004. A petition to probate Long’s will was filed and a hearing was held. The evidence  taken at the hearing revealed that White had taken title to Long’s vehicle instead of ensuring  that it passed to Rosalyn. In addition to taking ownership of Long’s car, White convinced  Long’s  daughters  to  execute  a  quitclaim  deed  conveying  ownership  of  Long’s  home  to  White. Upon receiving this evidence, the court appointed Bennie O’Neil as administrator  CTA of Long’s estate. O’Neal then petitioned the court to create a constructive trust to hold  the  $20,000  that  Long  provided  to  White  for  the  purpose  of  opening  up  the  joint  bank  account and to hold the $10,000 that White received in order to pay Long’s medical bills and  home mortgage, with the remainder to be divided between Rosalyn and Felicia.  At trial, White asserted that the $20,000 was a gift from Long. She further testified  that after Long’s death, she spent most of the money, but that she gave some of it to Rosalyn  and Felicia. White paid $1,925.96 to her bankruptcy trustee and spent $8,555.91 to buy a car,  a roof for her home, and gifts for family and friends. White said that she did not use the  funds in the joint account until after Long’s death because she did not need the funds. She  acknowledged that, in her deposition, she had testified that the $20,000 was not a gift, but  that  Long  provided  her  with  the  funds  so  that  White  could  transact  business  on  Long’s  behalf.  White said that the house had been reconveyed to Long’s daughters and that Long’s  car had been conveyed to Rosalyn. White explained that Long had given her the vehicle  shortly before her death, instead of leaving it to Rosalyn, because Long was concerned about  Rosalyn’s drug use. 2  Lee Berta Keith, Long’s longtime friend, testified that Long felt her daughters were  not  responsible  enough  to  handle  money.  Consequently,  Long  gave  Keith  $10,000  to  purchase a joint certificate of deposit with instructions that, upon her death, Keith was to  deliver the funds to White for payment of Long’s expenses. Once Long’s expenses were  paid, the remaining funds were to be distributed to Long’s daughters. Keith testified that she  delivered the funds to White with Long’s instructions.  Annie Robinson, Long’s sister and one of White’s aunts, testified that she visited  Long in the hospital shortly before her death. During that visit, she heard Long tell White  that the $20,000 was to be divided equally between Long’s daughters. Robinson also testified  that White gave the daughters only $7,000 of the $10,000 Long had left with Lee Berta Keith  and that White kept the remaining $3,000 for herself.  Rosalyn testified that she and her sister quitclaimed their mother’s house to White two  or  three  days  after  their  mother’s  death  because  White  told  them  that  it  was  for  their  protection. White told Rosalyn that her stepfather was still married to Long and that he might  attempt to take the property when he was released from prison. Rosalyn said she did not  understand that she was conveying title to the property when she executed the quitclaim. She  also said her mother owed only about $2,000 on the home at the time of her death.  White’s mother, Barbara Taylor, testified that the $20,000 was a gift from Long to  White. She asserted that Long told White to sell the house and divide the proceeds equally  between  Long’s  daughters.  Taylor  also  testified  that  Long  told  White  to  give  her  car  to  Felicia  only  if  Felicia  graduated  but  that  White  was  to  sell  the  car  if  Felicia  failed  to 3  graduate. Taylor admitted, on cross­examination, that White had given her gifts of $2,000  and $3,000.  The circuit court found that White and Long shared a confidential relationship; that  White  breached  her  fiduciary  duty  to  Long;  and  that  White  committed  fraud  and  misrepresentation.  The  court,  therefore,  considered  extrinsic  evidence  regarding  Long’s  intentions when she opened the joint account with White. After considering those intentions,  the circuit court imposed a constructive trust on the funds in the joint account held by White.  The  court  entered  a  judgment  against  White  for  $22,000  plus  $2,500  in  attorney’s  fees.  White filed a timely notice of appeal.  White’s first point on appeal is that the circuit court lacked subject­matter jurisdiction  because the “probate court” is a court of limited jurisdiction. White characterizes the issue  as one of subject­matter jurisdiction that can be raised at any time, even for the first time on  appeal. We addressed this issue in Smith v. McCracken, 96 Ark. App. 270, ___ S.W.3d ___  (2006). In Smith, we held that:  Amendment 80 merged in Arkansas what were once chancery and circuit courts into  circuit courts, so that any circuit court would thereafter have jurisdiction “over all  matters previously cognizable by Circuit, Chancery, Probate, and Juvenile Courts.”  See Amend. 80 § 19(B)(1) (emphasis added). Amendment 80 § 6(A) provides that  circuit courts are established as the trial courts of original jurisdiction of all justiciable  matters not otherwise assigned pursuant to the Arkansas Constitution. Section 6(B)  of this same amendment allows the division of the circuit court into subject­matter  divisions and provides that any judge within the circuit may sit in any division.  In turn, Administrative Order Number 14 regulates the administration of circuit  courts and established the following subject matter divisions: criminal, civil, juvenile,  probate, and domestic relations. See Admin. Order No. 14(1)(a). This order defines  “probate” to include adoptions and defines “domestic relations” to include custody.  See id. However, Order 14(1)(a) also states: 4  the designation of divisions is for the purpose of judicial administration and  caseload management and is not for the purpose of subject­matter jurisdiction.  The creation of divisions shall in no way limit the powers and duties of the  judges to hear all matters within the jurisdiction of the circuit court.  (Emphasis added.)  We are convinced that the purpose of Amendment 80 was to eliminate the  artificial distinctions regarding a circuit court’s jurisdiction that Smith would have us  reimpose.  Pursuant  to  Amendment  80,  circuit  courts  simply  have  added  to  their  already existing jurisdiction as courts of law the equitable jurisdiction that chancery  courts held prior to adoption of the amendment. See [First Nat’l Bank v. Cruthis, 360  Ark. 528, 203 S.W.3d 88 (2005)]. As the Arkansas Supreme Court stated in regard  to the passage of Amendment 80: “Jurisdictional lines that previously forced cases to  be  divided  artificially  and  litigated  separately  in  different  courts  have  been  eliminated.” In Re: Imp. of Amend. 80, 345 Ark. Appx. 664, 665, 345 Ark. 577, 47  S.W.3d 262 (2001).  In other words, a circuit court may now exercise any act of jurisdiction that  either a court of law or  equity could have exercised prior to Amendment 80, and  further, the designation of an action as a specific type of action does not prevent a  circuit court from hearing any matter within the court’s jurisdiction that is properly  raised  to  the  court.  In  this  case,  the  issue  of  custody  was  before  the  circuit  court  because the McCrackens requested custody of K.E.E., as well as the right to adopt  her. Accordingly, the circuit court had the power to determine custody of K.E.E. after  it dismissed the adoption petitions.  96 Ark. App. at 274­75, ___ S.W.3d at ___. For the reasons set forth in Smith, we affirm on  this point.  White’s second point is that the circuit court erred in denying her a jury trial. In a  letter opinion, the circuit court noted that the case involved both equitable and legal issues  and  concluded  that  the  clean­up  doctrine  permitted  it  to  try  the  entire  case  without  the  intervention of a jury. The clean­up doctrine provides that once a court of equity acquires  jurisdiction  over  a  case,  it  may  decide  all  other  issues,  legal  or  equitable.  Colclasure  v.  Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 290 Ark. 585, 720 S.W.2d 916 (1986). White does not address the 5  circuit court’s reliance on the clean­up doctrine to deny the parties a jury trial. Where an  appellant fails to address the basis for the trial court’s ruling, this court will not reverse. See  Dongieux’s v. Shoaf, 271 Ark. 197, 608 S.W.2d 33 (Ark. App. 1980). Moreover, the circuit  court could properly rely on the clean­up doctrine. Prior to the adoption of Amendment 80,  our supreme court held that application of the clean­up doctrine did not impinge upon the  constitutional right to trial by jury. Colclasure, supra.  In her third, fourth, and sixth points on appeal, White argues that the funds in the two  joint accounts are outside of the circuit court’s jurisdiction. She relies on Ark. Code Ann. §  23­47­204(b)(2) (Repl. 2000), which makes the designation of the ownership interest in the  account  documents  “conclusive  evidence”  of  the  intention  of  all  depositors.  Therefore,  ownership in these funds are vested in the manner specified in the account documents.  We disagree with White’s argument. The circuit court was permitted to look beyond  the account documents to determine Long’s intent because it found that White committed  fraud and misrepresentation. See Nichols v. Wray, 325 Ark. 326, 925 S.W.2d 785 (1996). In  Nichols, our supreme court reaffirmed that Ark. Code Ann. § 23­32­1005 made the creation  of a joint bank account with right of survivorship “conclusive evidence” of the parties’ intent  that the account was to pass to the survivor upon the death of the other and that it was error  1  for the trial court to consider other evidence of the decedent’s intent.  This rule, however,  applies to cases in which there is no showing of fraud or other impropriety. The circuit court 1  Section 23­32­1005 was repealed by Act 89 of 1997, which also enacted what is now  section 23­47­204.  6  specifically found that White committed fraud and misrepresentation. Therefore, it did not  err in looking beyond the account documents.  White  asserts  as  her  fifth  point  that  the  circuit  court  erred  in  admitting  hearsay  evidence  by  Annie  Robinson  to  establish  that  Long  intended  for  her  daughters  to  share  equally in the funds from her joint account with Long. White argues that this was the only  evidence to show an intention contrary to the account documents. As noted above, Robinson  testified that she overheard a conversation between Long and White, shortly before Long’s  death, in which Long and White discussed how the proceeds from the joint account were to  be divided. This court reviews evidentiary errors under an abuse­of­discretion standard. Hunt  v. Perry, 357 Ark. 224, 162 S.W.3d 891 (2004). We hold that any error in the admission of  this  testimony  is  harmless  because  the  substance  of  this  testimony  had  already  been  introduced by Geneva Williamson, who testified without objection that White told her that  Long had given White the $20,000 with instructions that it be used to pay Long’s expenses.  It  has  long been  the  rule  that  there  is  no  prejudice  in  admitting  evidence  that  is  merely  cumulative or repetitious of other evidence admitted without objection. JAG Consulting v.  Eubanks, 77 Ark. App. 232, 72 S.W.3d 549 (2002).  White’s seventh point is that the circuit court erred in finding that she converted the  funds. We will not address this point because the circuit court made no such finding. See  Parkerson v. Arthur, 83 Ark. App. 240, 125 S.W.3d 825 (2003). Although the complaint  contained an allegation of conversion, the circuit court did not reach that issue. 7  White’s  eighth  point  is  that  the  parol  evidence  rule  bars  the  testimony  that  Long  intended that White use the funds in the joint account for the benefit of her daughters. We  disagree because White is making the same argument that our supreme court rejected in Hall  v. Superior Federal Bank, 303 Ark. 125, 794 S.W.2d 611 (1990). In Hall, the court held as  follows:  Appellant  contends  the  signature  cards  for  the  respective  accounts  represented  a  written contract between the parties and the bank. Thus, she maintains the trial court  erred in admitting parol evidence to alter the terms of the written contract, i.e., joint  tenancy. Strictly speaking, the trial court did not admit parol evidence to alter the  signature cards. The extrinsic evidence admitted by the court proved facts sufficient  for  her  to  find  that  a  constructive  trust  existed,  concluding  therefrom  that  Mrs.  Edwards never intended for appellant to receive her money. A constructive trust is not  within the statute of frauds and may be proved by parol evidence. Thus, the trial court  properly admitted extrinsic evidence as to the Merrill Lynch account.  303 Ark. at 135­36, 794 S.W.2d at 616 (citation omitted).  In White’s ninth point, she asserts that the circuit court erred in considering evidence  concerning her bankruptcy case because it was irrelevant and inadmissible. The standard of  review on admission of evidence is abuse of discretion. FMC Corp., Inc. v. Helton, 360 Ark.  465, 202 S.W.3d 490 (2005). Abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply  require error in the trial court’s decision but requires that the trial court act improvidently,  thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Id.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence regarding White’s  bankruptcy case. White introduced evidence to prove that the $20,000 in the joint account  was  a  gift  from  Long.  White’s  bankruptcy  records,  however,  show  that  she  was  in  bankruptcy before Long’s death and was threatened with dismissal of her case, but that she 8  did not use the funds in the joint account to bring her bankruptcy payments current until after  Long died. The circuit court admitted the testimony to show that White knew the funds in  the joint account were not hers because she did not use those funds until after Long’s death.  The  evidence  regarding  White’s  bankruptcy  case  was  admissible  to  impeach  White’s  credibility and to show her motive for acting as she did because a matter is not collateral if  it is relevant to show bias, intent, or knowledge. Balentine v. Sparkman, 327 Ark. 180, 937  S.W.2d 647 (1997).  White’s  tenth  and  final  point  is  that  the  circuit  court  erred  in  awarding  O’Neil  attorney’s fees. White asserts that the court lacked authority to award fees. We have noted  that,  as  a  general  rule,  attorney’s  fees  are  not  allowed  in  Arkansas  unless  expressly  authorized by statute. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 347 Ark. 184, 60 S.W.3d 458 (2001).  Neither  O’Neil  nor  the  circuit  court  cite  any  authority  for  an  award  of  fees  under  these  2  circumstances.  Therefore, we reverse on this point.  Affirmed in part; reversed in part.  HART and GLOVER, JJ., agree. 2  This is not to preclude O’Neil from receiving a fee to be paid by the estate. See Ark.  Code Ann. §§ 28­48­108, ­109.  9 

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.