John Edward Aubrey v. Laurie Leigh Aubrey

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION DIVISION III  CA06­1299  7 November 2007  JOHN EDWARD AUBREY,  APPELLANT  AN APPEAL FROM THE POPE  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [DR­04­861]  v.  LAURIE LEIGH AUBREY,  APPELLEE  THE HONORABLE GORDON WILLIAM  MCCAIN JR., CIRCUIT JUDGE  AFFIRMED  This  divorce  case  has  boiled  down to  a  dispute  over  $12,975.02  that  Laurie  Aubrey inherited in 2004.  Shortly after she inherited the money, it was deposited into  a checking account.  Within two months, all of the inheritance had been spent, and her  husband John filed for divorce.  The circuit court found that the money was not marital  property, and ordered John to repay Laurie the entire amount.  The court also refused  to  re­open  the  record  after  the  divorce  hearing  to  allow  John  to  present  additional  evidence about the account.  John appeals both rulings.  At the hearing, the parties agreed that the inheritance started out as Laurie’s  separate property. The dispute was about the nature of the account into which the money  was deposited.  The proof about this bank account was mostly testimonial.  John said  that he and Laurie agreed to deposit the money into what he called their joint account.  He claimed they agreed to use the money to pay bills and household expenses.  The  evidence presented at the hearing showed that only John spent the inheritance money,  not Laurie.  Laurie said that John handled all of their finances.  She said she made it  clear to John that she intended the inheritance to be held separately for her daughter’s  (John’s stepdaughter) education.  If the money was deposited into a “joint account,” then that act created a legal  presumption that John and Laurie owned the money as tenants by the entirety.  Lofton  v. Lofton, 23 Ark. App. 203, 204–05, 745 S.W.2d 635, 636–37 (1988).  Laurie could  overcome  this  presumption  only  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence  that  she  did  not  intend to make a gift of a one­half interest to John.  Lofton, 23 Ark. App. at 206, 745  S.W.2d at 637.  After hearing testimony from both sides, the circuit judge ruled from the bench  that there was no evidence of a joint account other than John’s testimony and that he did  not believe John.  The judge described John’s attitude about money as: “what was his,  was his, what was theirs was his, and what was hers was his.”  Because the court found  that  “[the  account]  was  not  a  real  joint  account,”  Laurie  did  not  have  to  rebut  the  presumption that she intended to make a gift.  The court further found that:  [T]he $12,975.02 was to be the separate property of [Laurie] which was 2  to be deposited into the bank account and was to be held for the use and  benefit of [Laurie’s] daughter.  The Court finds [Laurie’s] testimony to be  credible on this issue and the Court finds this to be [Laurie’s] $12,975.02  separate property.  The circuit court then ordered John to repay Laurie the $12,975.02.  The first question for us is whether the court’s credibility­based ruling was clearly  erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  Cuzick v. Lesly, 16  Ark. App. 237, 240, 700 S.W.2d 63, 65 (1985).  It was not.  There is evidence in the  record to support the court’s decision.  Both parties  testified about their version of  events.  The judge based his decision on the witnesses’ credibility—a matter on which  we defer to the circuit court’s judgment.  Meinholz v. Meinholz, 283 Ark. 509, 512, 678  S.W.2d 348, 350 (1984).  When there are two permissible views of the evidence, the  circuit court’s choice between them is not clearly erroneous. Rymor Builders, Inc. v.  Tanglewood Plumbing Co., __ Ark. App. __, __, __ S.W.3d __, __ (October 10, 2007).  Two weeks after trial, but before the circuit court entered its final order, John  moved to re­open the record so that he could introduce bank records and a letter from  Laurie.  The records showed that the account was a joint account.  They also showed  that Laurie knew it was a joint account and even withdrew money from it.  The second  question before us is whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it refused to  re­open the record.  Sugarloaf Development Co. v. Heber Springs Sewer Imp. Dist., 34 3  Ark. App. 28, 34, 805 S.W.2d 88, 92 (1991).  The belated evidence was certainly relevant.  Though we cannot be sure what  impact it would have had on the circuit court’s ultimate decision about the nature of the  account, the evidence seems weighty.  John would have had grounds for his motion or  for a new trial if these documents had been newly discovered evidence that he could not,  with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the hearing.  Ark. R. Civ.  P. 59(a).  But that is not what happened.  The parties knew long before the hearing that the bank account would be at issue.  And the documentary evidence was as readily available for the year and a half before  the hearing as it was two weeks afterward.  That this evidence now seems so important  from the vantage point of the circuit court’s ruling does not trump John’s failure to  timely produce it.  Instead, the circumstances presented an occasion for discretionary  judgment.  Whether achieving a more perfect justice between these parties outweighed  the law’s preference for finality after the trial was for the circuit court to decide—by  exercising its sound discretion informed by all the circumstances of the case.  We see  no  abuse  of that  discretion in the  court’s  refusal to  re­open  this  record.  Sugarloaf  Development Co., supra.  Affirmed.  PITTMAN, C.J., and GRIFFEN, J., agree. 4  5

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