Laura Graftenreed v. Karen Wood Seabaugh and Kaity Wood

 Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Judge Larry D. Vaught  Published  DIVISION IV  CA06­1289  November 28, 2007  LAURA GRAFTENREED  APPELLANT  AN APPEAL FROM CROSS COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [No. CV­02­40­2]  v.  KAREN WOOD SEABAUGH and  KAITY WOOD  APPELLEES  HONORABLE HARVEY LEE YATES,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  AFFIRMED  This is a personal­injury case. When she was fifteen years old, appellee Kaity Wood  was injured in a vehicle accident caused by appellant Laura Graftenreed. Ms. Graftenreed  appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for Ms. Wood and her mother, appellee  Karen Wood Seabaugh. On appeal, Ms. Graftenreed challenges some of the jury instructions,  the introduction of certain medical evidence, and the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm  on all points.  The  accident  occurred  in  January  2001.  Appellant’s  vehicle  struck the  vehicle  in  which Ms. Wood was a passenger from behind, causing it to hit the vehicle in front of it.  Four days later, Ms. Wood saw her family doctor for shoulder and neck pain. The x­rays he  took were normal, and he prescribed anti­inflammatories and muscle relaxers. A week later,  he  saw  no  reason  to  prescribe  further  treatment.  Her  symptoms,  however,  returned  and  worsened. Ten months later, Ms. Wood saw Dr. Kenneth George, a chiropractor, for neck and back pain. He saw Ms. Wood on nine occasions between November 2001 and January  2002. Mrs. Seabaugh filed this negligence lawsuit against appellant on Ms. Wood’s behalf  in  March  2002.  Ms.  Wood  joined  the  lawsuit  when  she  reached  the  age  of  majority.  In  February 2003, Ms. Wood saw Dr. George again for the same symptoms.  Ms. Wood was involved in another accident in October 2003. She was examined in  the  emergency  room,  complaining  of  pain  in  her  knee,  elbow,  neck,  and  chin  and  was  diagnosed with “ligamentous strain, right knee.” A neck x­ray taken at that time showed  straightening of  her  cervical  spine.  Ms.  Wood  did  not  tell  Dr.  George  about  the  second  accident  when  she  saw  him  for  subsequent  treatments.  Appellees  have  consistently  maintained that her primary complaint from the second accident was a knee injury and that  her neck and back problems resulted from the accident caused by appellant.  Dr. George referred Ms. Wood for digital motion x­rays (DMXs). DMXs, which are  a type of video fluoroscopy, are a relatively new use of an old technology (x­rays) and are  used  by  some  physicians  and  chiropractors  to  diagnose  a  ligamentous  injury.  A  DMX  machine uses a video camera to take thirty x­ray frames per second, for ninety seconds, as  the patient moves. These images are viewed on a computer. Dr. David Harshfield and Dr.  Kenneth  Ratajczak,  radiologists,  reviewed  Ms.  Wood’s  DMXs.  Using  their  reports,  Dr.  George was prepared to testify at trial that Ms. Wood had suffered permanent neck and low­  back injuries caused by the collision with appellant that would limit her activities and require  future medical treatment. 2  Appellant objected  to  the introduction of the DMX evidence by filing motions in  limine before trial. She asked the trial court to prohibit any testimony from Dr. George that  was not timely disclosed. She also argued that there was no basis for Dr. George to testify  about the radiology reports; that the second accident was an intervening cause of her injuries;  that DMX technology was not scientifically reliable; and that Dr. George was not qualified  to testify about radiology results reported by a medical doctor. The trial court denied these  motions  and  held  that,  assuming  that  the  DMX  evidence  was  subject  to  a  reliability  challenge,  Ms.  Wood  had  sufficiently  shown  that  it  is  reliable  and  accepted  by  the  chiropractic  and  medical  communities.  The  court  also  held  that  the  value  of  the  DMX  evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  At trial, the circuit court denied appellant’s motions for directed verdict on the issues  of negligence, liability, and damages. The case was submitted to the jury over appellant’s  objections to a damages instruction that included transportation costs related to medical care  and Ms. Wood’s loss of ability to earn in the future. On a general verdict, the jury awarded  Mrs. Seabaugh $1,485 (her requested out­of­pocket medical expenses) and $57,000 to Ms.  Wood.  I. The jury instructions  Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on Ms. Wood’s  transportation costs in seeking medical care and her loss of future earning ability. 3  A. Transportation costs  Appellant  argues  that  there  was  no  evidence  to  support  the  instruction  on  transportation costs as damages. Paragraph two of the damages instruction stated that, if the  jury found in favor of Ms. Wood on liability, it must fix the amount of money to reasonably  and fairly compensate her for “[t]he reasonable expenses of any necessary medical care,  treatment, and services received after Kaity Wood turned eighteen years of age, including  transportation  necessarily  incurred  in  securing  such  care,  treatment  or  services,  and  the  present value of such expenses reasonably certain to be required in the future.” Appellant  asked that the same instruction be given without the clause involving transportation costs  because there was no evidence of past expenses or of the present value of such expenses  reasonably certain to be required in the future. Appellees argued that their evidence that Ms.  Wood went to Little Rock for the DMXs and to Jonesboro for an MRI was sufficient to  submit this instruction. Ms. Wood testified about her out­of­town trips for these medical tests  but did not present any evidence of their monetary value. She testified that she now works  in Jonesboro and plans to seek future medical care there.  Appellant  also  argues  that  there  is  no  way  to  tell  how  much  of  the  verdict  was  intended as damages for past and future transportation costs. The supreme court has held  that, when an erroneous instruction has been given and a jury has rendered a general verdict  from which  prejudice  due  to  the  error  cannot  be  ascertained,  it  will  reverse.  England  v.  Costa, 364 Ark. 116, 216 S.W.3d 585 (2005). 4  A party is entitled to a jury instruction when it is a correct statement of the law and  when there is some basis in the evidence to support giving the instruction. Barnes v. Everett,  351 Ark. 479, 95 S.W.3d 740 (2003). We will not reverse a trial court’s decision to give an  instruction unless the court abused its discretion. See Marx v. Huron Little Rock, 88 Ark.  App. 284, 198 S.W.3d 127 (2004).  The trial court did not err in giving this instruction. It has long been held that judicial  notice may be taken of the locations and distances between towns. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v.  Taylor, 258 Ark. 417, 525 S.W.2d 450 (1975). Additionally, jurors are entitled to take into  the jury box their common sense and experience in the ordinary affairs of life. Fayetteville  Diagnostic  Clinic,  Ltd.  v.  Turner,  344  Ark.  490,  42  S.W.3d  420  (2001);  Palmer  v.  Myklebust, 244 Ark. 5, 424 S.W.2d 169 (1968). The jurors were competent to determine the  cost of such transportation from their common knowledge and experience. See St. Louis, I.M.  & S. Ry. Co. v. Stell, 87 Ark. 308, 112 S.W. 876 (1908).  B. Ms. Wood’s future earning ability  Appellant next argues that the jury should not have been instructed to consider Ms.  Wood’s loss of future earning ability because Ms. Wood testified that she had never missed  any work because of her injuries. At trial, Ms. Wood testified that she worked about two to  three days a week for IGA at the time of the accident and that, afterward, she continued to  work the same amount of time. She also testified that she never missed any work at  her  subsequent jobs. 5  Damage resulting from loss of earning capacity is the loss of the ability to earn in the  future.  Cates  v.  Brown,  278  Ark.  242,  645  S.W.2d  658  (1983).  The  impairment  of  the  capacity to earn is sometimes confused with permanency of the injury, but it is a separate  element. Id. A permanent injury is one that deprives the plaintiff of her right to live her life  in comfort and ease without added inconvenience or diminution of physical vigor. Wheeler  v. Bennett, 312 Ark. 411, 849 S.W.2d 952 (1993). It is well recognized that impairment of  earning capacity is recoverable only upon proof that an injury is permanent. Id. Although  whether a permanent injury exists is not to be left up to speculation and conjecture on the  part of the jury, proof of this element does not require the same specificity or detail as does  proof of loss of future wages. Cates v. Brown, 278 Ark. at 245. This is because a jury can  observe the appearance of the plaintiff, her age, and the nature of the injuries that will impair  her capacity to earn. Id. Proof of specific pecuniary loss is not indispensable to recovery for  this element. Id. It is to be determined by the application of the common knowledge and  experience of the jurors to the facts and circumstances of the case. Coleman v. Cathey, 263  Ark. 450, 565 S.W.2d 426 (1978).  By all accounts, Ms. Wood was a competitive athlete before the accident; afterward,  she had to push herself to continue participating in cheerleading and softball. She had to give  up playing basketball, and she was forced by her neck and back pain to severely restrict her  participation  in  the  other  activities.  Although  she  continued  to  appear  with  the  other  cheerleaders, she could not do any tumbling or “pyramid­building” and spent much of her  time sitting with their sponsor. She testified that, mostly, she just yelled and waved her arms 6  and even that hurt. Often, she was reduced to tears by her inability to keep up with the other  girls. Now, as an adult with a full­time job, she testified about the problems her injuries have  caused her at work. She said that she has to change positions frequently to avoid being in one  position too long and sometimes stands up while using the computer. She also cannot sit up  straight. She said that she cannot do housework without difficulty and pain, nor can she play  with her baby as she would like. In our view, this evidence was sufficient to take the issue  of her lost earning capacity to the jury.  II. The digital motion x­rays  Appellant next argues that the trial court should not have admitted the DMX evidence  on  four  grounds:  (1)  it  was  not  timely  disclosed;  (2)  it  was  not  admissible  through  Dr.  George; (3) it was not scientifically reliable; and (4) there was no proof that it reflected  injuries caused by the 2001 accident. We will not reverse the trial court’s decision to admit  or refuse evidence in the absence of an abuse of that discretion and a showing of prejudice.  Turner v. N.W. Ark. Neurosurgery Clinic, P.A., 84 Ark. App. 93, 133 S.W.3d 417 (2003).  A. Timely disclosure of the DMX  Appellant argues that appellees failed to timely disclose the DMX evidence as the  basis for Dr. George’s testimony. When his deposition was taken on March 3, 2003, trial was  scheduled for March 15, 2005. Appellees’ attorney supplemented their discovery responses  on February 3, 2005, with reports from the radiologists that would be used to support Dr.  George’s  opinion  that  Ms.  Wood  was  permanently  impaired.  On  February  14,  2005,  appellant filed a motion in limine objecting to the last­minute supplementation of appellees’ 7  discovery responses. She filed another motion in limine on March 3, 2005, to prohibit Dr.  George’s testimony. The court then rescheduled the trial for March 26, 2006. On March 21,  2006, appellees provided appellant with approximately 200 pages of documents to be used  to support Dr. George’s testimony. Appellant filed another motion in limine on March 23,  2006, asking the court to prohibit any testimony from Dr. George that was based on evidence  not timely disclosed. The court decided to admit the testimony. Appellant asks us to hold that  Dr.  George’s  testimony  should  have  been  limited  to  the  matters  that  he  disclosed  in  his  deposition over a year before trial. We decline to do so.  Arkansas  Rule  of  Civil  Procedure  26(e)(1)  requires  a  party  to  supplement  her  discovery responses in the case of expert witnesses, to identify the identity and location of  each person expected to be called as a witness at trial, and the subject matter and substance  of his testimony. It is within the trial court’s discretion whether to limit the testimony of  witnesses, and that discretion will not be second­guessed by the appellate court. Id.; see also  Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Frisby, 329 Ark. 506, 951 S.W.2d 305 (1997). Appellant  received a continuance of over a year in order to review the DMX reports. As for the 200 or  so  pages  of  documents  supplied  the  week  before  trial,  they  contained  no  surprises  and  primarily  illustrated  the  acceptance  and  reliability  of  the  DMX  evidence  already  in  appellant’s possession. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting  appellant’s untimeliness argument.  B. The admission of the DMX evidence through Dr. George’s testimony 8  Appellant argues that it was error to admit the DMX evidence through Dr. George  because he had no personal experience with DMX technology. Dr. George admittedly was  not an expert in performing digital motion x­rays or in interpreting them; in fact, he had  never ordered them for a patient before Ms. Wood.  Whether a witness qualifies as an expert in a particular field is a matter within the  trial  court’s  discretion,  and  we  will  not  reverse  such  a  decision  absent  an  abuse  of  that  discretion. Brunson v. State, 349 Ark. 300, 79 S.W.3d 304 (2002). If an opponent of the  expert testimony contends that the expert is not qualified, the opponent bears the burden of  showing that the testimony should be stricken. Arrow Int’l, Inc. v. Sparks, 81 Ark. App. 42,  98 S.W.3d 48 (2003). Experts may not offer opinions that range too far outside their area of  expertise.  Id.  An  expert  may,  however,  rely  on  information  provided  by  others  in  the  formulation of his opinion. Id. If some reasonable basis exists demonstrating that a witness  has knowledge of a subject beyond that of ordinary knowledge, the evidence is admissible  as expert testimony. Id. There is a decided tendency to permit the fact­finder to hear the  testimony of persons having superior knowledge in the given field, unless they are clearly  lacking in training and experience. Id. The fact that a medical expert is not a specialist in that  particular field does not necessarily exclude him from offering testimony. Hill v. Billups, 92  Ark. App. 259, 212 S.W.3d 53 (2005). Arkansas Rule of Evidence 702 expressly recognizes  that an expert’s testimony may be based on experience in addition to knowledge and training.  Absolute expertise concerning a particular subject is not required to qualify a witness as an  expert. Mearns v. Mearns, 58 Ark. App. 42, 946 S.W.2d 188 (1997). 9  Generally, a chiropractor is qualified to testify in a personal­injury action concerning  matters within the scope of the profession or practice and may testify as to the permanency  of an injury, as well as its probable cause. Stevens v. Smallman, 267 Ark. 786, 590 S.W.2d  674 (Ark. App. 1979). As long ago as 1927, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that there was  no error in the trial court’s permitting a chiropractor to testify as an expert witness about a  burn  injury  caused  by  the  administration  of  x­rays.  See  Dorr,  Gray  &  Johnston  v.  Headstream, 173 Ark. 1104, 295 S.W. 16 (1927). Dr. George, who routinely uses x­rays in  his practice, testified that he received extensive training in the use of x­rays when he was in  chiropractic school. If he had testified about his interpretation of the digital motion x­rays,  we would agree with appellant. See Hill v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 56 Ark. App. 67, 937  S.W.2d 684 (1997). However, he simply used the radiologists’ reports to supplement the x­  rays that he took of Ms. Wood and to verify his own diagnosis. A physician may base his  diagnosis on the reports of other medical sources. See Collins v. Hinton, 327 Ark. 159, 937  S.W.2d  164  (1997);  Ark.  R.  Evid.  703.  The  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion  in  permitting Dr. George to testify as an expert witness.  C. The scientific reliability of DMX evidence  The trial court found that, assuming that the DMX reports were subject to a reliability  challenge, Ms. Wood had sufficiently shown that DMX evidence is reliable and that it is  accepted by the chiropractic and medical communities. The court also found that the value  of the DMX evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion.  Appellant argues that Dr. George was not qualified to give expert testimony about the DMX 10  evidence pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  In a Daubert inquiry, the trial court must determine whether the evidence is relevant and  reliable and whether the reasoning behind the scientific evidence is scientifically valid and  can be applied to the facts of the case. Coca­Cola Bottling Co. v. Gill, 352 Ark. 240, 100  S.W.3d  715  (2003).  A  primary  factor  for  a  trial  court  to  consider  in  determining  the  admissibility of scientific evidence is whether the scientific theory can be or has been tested.  Arrow Int’l,  Inc.  v.  Sparks,  81  Ark.  App.  at  51,  98  S.W.3d  at  54.  Other  factors  include  whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication, the potential error rate,  and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation. Id. It  is also significant whether the scientific community has generally accepted the theory. Id.  The  Arkansas  Supreme  Court  adopted  the  Daubert  analysis  in  Farm  Bureau  Mutual  Insurance Co. of Arkansas, Inc. v. Foote, 341 Ark. 105, 14 S.W.3d 512 (2000).  In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), the United States Supreme  Court held that the trial judge’s basic gatekeeping function imposed in Daubert applies to  all, and not just scientific, expert testimony. The requirements of Ark. R. Evid. 702 have also  been held to apply equally to all types of expert testimony, not simply to scientific expert  testimony. See Turbyfill v. State, 92 Ark. App. 145, 211 S.W.3d 557 (2005).  Appellant argues that DMX technology does not meet the Daubert test because it has  not been proven to aid in diagnosing or treating any injury and that DMXs give no more  information than standard x­rays. Appellant also asserts that the scientific community has 11  not generally accepted the use of DMXs for diagnosing or treating any injury or ailment. We  disagree.  Because  the  Daubert  factors  are  applicable  only  to  “novel”  evidence,  theory,  or  methodology, see Regions Bank v. Hagaman, 79 Ark. App. 88,  84  S.W.3d 66 (2002), a  Daubert analysis is not appropriate in this case. As shown by Dr. George’s testimony and  the documents filed by appellees, DMX technology is not novel; it is simply a technological  advancement of established, reliable procedures, as are MRIs and CT scans. Appellees filed  the affidavit of Dr. David Harshfield, who stated that DMX technology has been accepted  by the chiropractic and medical communities and that it has government approval. Appellees  filed supporting documents showing that DMX technology was approved by the U.S. Food  and Drug Administration for patients with spinal and peripheral joint disorders and that the  Arkansas Department of Human Services gave its approval in 2003. They also showed that  DMX technology has received approval from the National Guideline Clearing House, the  Arkansas Board of Chiropractic Examiners, the American Chiropractic Association Council  on  Diagnostic  Imaging  Physicians,  the  Arkansas  Chiropractic  Society,  the  American  Academy  of  Pain  Management,  and  the  American  College  of  Occupational  and  Environmental Medicine.  Appellant further argues that, even if the DMXs were reliable, the evidence based  upon them should have been excluded because any probative value it had was significantly  outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Even though evidence is relevant, it may be  excludable under Ark. R. Evid. 403, which provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be 12  excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,  confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste  of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  The trial court has discretion in determining the relevance of evidence and in gauging  its probative value against unfair prejudice, and its decision will not be reversed absent a  manifest abuse of that discretion. Jackson v. Buchman, 338 Ark. 467, 996 S.W.2d 30 (1999).  The mere fact that evidence is prejudicial to a party, however, does not make it inadmissible;  it is only excludable if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative  value. See Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 353 Ark. 29, 111 S.W.3d 346, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1012  (2003). The prejudice referred to in Rule 403 denotes the effect of the evidence upon the  jury,  not  the  party  opposed  to  it.  Id.  Here,  there  is  no  question  that  this  evidence  was  prejudicial to appellant’s position; however, we cannot say that it was unfairly prejudicial.  D. The nexus between the digital motion x­rays and the original accident  Appellant  next  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  admitting  the  DMX  evidence  because there was no proof as to which accident caused the ligament damage referred to in  the radiologists’ reports. According to appellant, even if the DMXs indicated injury, there  was no proof that it was caused by the January 2001 accident.  To establish a prima facie case in tort, a plaintiff must  show that the defendant’s  negligence was a proximate cause of the damages. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc. v. Cooper,  345  Ark.  136,  44  S.W.3d  336  (2001).  Proximate  cause  is  that  which,  in  a  natural  and  continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and 13  without which the result would not have occurred. Chambers v. Stern, 347 Ark. 395, 64  S.W.3d 737 (2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 940 (2002). When there is evidence to establish  a causal connection between the negligence of the defendant and the damage, it is proper for  the case to go to the jury. Id. Proximate cause may be shown from circumstantial evidence,  and such evidence is sufficient to show proximate cause if the facts proved are of such a  nature  and  are  so  connected  and  related  to  each  other  that  the  conclusion  may  be  fairly  inferred. Arthur v. Zearley, 337 Ark. 125, 992 S.W.2d 67 (1999). The original act is not  eliminated as a proximate cause by an intervening act unless the latter is in itself sufficient  to stand as the cause of the injury, and the intervening cause must be such that the injury  would not have been suffered except for the act, conduct, or effect of the intervening cause  totally independent of the acts or omissions constituting the primary negligence. Ouachita  Wilderness Inst., Inc. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 947 S.W.2d 780 (1997).  There was more than sufficient evidence to let the jury decide whether Ms. Wood’s  injuries were caused by the 2001 accident. Appellees presented testimony that her symptoms  began immediately after this wreck; that they continued over several years; that the 2003  accident did not exacerbate them; and that the pain and problems she was experiencing at the  time of trial were the same as those that began right after the 2001 wreck.  III. Appellant’s motion for directed verdict  In her last point, appellant contends that the trial court should have granted her motion  for a directed verdict on the issues of negligence and liability. A directed­verdict motion is  a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. King v. Powell, 85 Ark. App. 212, 148 S.W.3d 14  792 (2004). When reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, we determine  whether the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is  evidence  that  is  of  sufficient  force  and  character  that  it  will,  with  reasonable  certainty,  compel  a  conclusion  one  way  or  the  other,  without  having  to  resort  to  speculation  or  conjecture. Id. When determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence  and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the party on  whose behalf judgment was entered. Id. A motion for a directed verdict should be denied  when there is a conflict in the evidence or when the evidence is such that fair­minded people  might  reach  different  conclusions.  Id.  Under  those  circumstances,  a  jury  question  is  presented and a directed verdict is inappropriate. Id. It is not our province to try issues of  fact; we simply examine the record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support  the jury verdict. Id.  To prove negligence, a party must show that the defendant has failed to use the care  that a reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by  the evidence in the case. Wagner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 370 Ark. 268, ___ S.W.3d ___  (2007). Although the evidence that appellant failed to keep a proper lookout and followed  too closely for conditions was not conclusive of negligence, it was sufficient to present a  question for the jury. See Dovers v. Stephenson Oil Co., 354 Ark. 695, 128 S.W.3d 805  (2003). This is especially true when one considers appellant’s statements immediately after  the crash that she was not paying attention and did not see that the vehicle ahead of her had  stopped. 15  Appellant also argues that the evidence was inadequate to support the jury’s verdict  as to damages because there was no proof that the injury was caused by the January 2001  accident. As discussed above, there was sufficient evidence to let the jury decide this issue.  Affirmed.  ROBBINS and BAKER, JJ., agree. 16 

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.