Dawn Harter v. Wonderview School District

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  LARRY D. VAUGHT, JUDGE  DIVISION IV  CA06­1254  November 7, 2007  DAWN HARTER  APPELLANT  APPEAL FROM THE CONWAY  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [CV­2003­109]  V. WONDERVIEW SCHOOL DISTRICT  APPELLEE  HON. PAUL E. DANIELSON,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  AFFIRMED  This is a pro se appeal from Dawn Harter, who was terminated from her teaching  position with the Wonderview School District after being arrested. On appeal, she claims that  the  school  district  violated  the  Arkansas  Fair  Teacher  Dismissal  Act.  She  makes  two  arguments—first she argues that she did not receive proper notice prior to her termination  hearing, and second she argues that the school district failed to show reasonable cause for  her termination. Neither claim is meritorious, and we affirm.  Although the police report, which presumably outlines the circumstances of Harter’s  arrest, was omitted from the one brief we received in this case, we know the termination  decision was based on Harter’s arrest after being discovered in a car in the driveway of her  former boyfriend. She was accompanied by her minor child and was alleged to have been under the influence (and in possession) of chemical substances. The school board, based on  the recommendation of the district’s superintendent, determined that Harter was a person  whose  “continued  presence  on  campus,  as  a  teacher  of  children  and  a  role  model,  was  extremely undesirable.”  The  school  district  claims  that  Harter  was  then  “properly”  notified  of  the  superintendent’s intention to recommend that Harter’s contract be terminated and that she  timely requested a hearing before the board. Harter did not appear at the hearing. Claiming  that they assumed Harter had abandoned her claim for relief, the board went into executive  session to consider the superintendent’s basis for the termination recommendation. Upon  returning  to  public  session,  the  superintendent  made  a  recommendation—without  explanation—that Harter’s contract be terminated. The school board then voted to accept the  recommendation.  When Harter was informed of the board’s decision, she claimed to have been denied  proper notice of the hearing. In response to her charge of faulty notice, the district rescinded  the previous vote and gave Harter a new hearing. The board was instructed to ignore the  previous vote, and any information previously provided, and to base their decision only on  the information provided during the second hearing. After the second hearing, the board  again  voted  to  terminate  Harter’s  contract.  The  record  provides  us  with  no  insight  into  Harter’s testimony—if any—at the second hearing.  On appeal, we first consider Harter’s claim that she was not provided proper notice  of the first hearing and suffered prejudice at the second hearing. The record establishes that  Harter was aware of the subsequent hearing and does not contend otherwise. Her argument 2  is that the second hearing was merely a “rubber stamping” of the first, and as such the second  hearing failed  to  cure  the  irregularities  of  the  first  hearing.  However,  our  law  states  the  contrary. See Murray v. Altheimer­Sherrill Sch. Dist., 294 Ark. 403, 743 S.W.2d 789 (1998)  (using a “substantial compliance” standard to find a subsequent hearing cures notice defect  1  in  initial  hearing).  The  board  was  instructed  to  base  its  decision  only  on  information  provided during the second hearing. Harter had ample opportunity to deny or explain the  charges  against  her  and  to  address  her  claim  that  she  had  been  a  victim  of  prejudicial  deliberation.  Harter’s second claim of error relates to the merits of the decision not to renew her  contract. On appeal, we must uphold the decision of a school board unless its decision is  shown to be in error by clear and convincing evidence. Lee v. Big Flat Pub. Schs., 280 Ark.  377, 658 S.W.2d 389 (1983). She claims that the decision is not supported by the evidence  because she “always had good evaluations as a teacher.” She further asserts, but without  corroboration, that the charges stemming from her arrest were ultimately resolved without  conviction.  At  trial,  the  district  conceded  that  she  had  carried  out  her  classroom  duties  in  a  competent manner. However, the district alleged that “her performance in the classroom was 1  The FTDA standard of procedural compliance was changed from “strict  compliance” to “substantial compliance” by Act 1739 of 2001. This returned the  compliance standard to its 1998 form. In addition, Act 1739 raised the standard for  deciding whether the reasons for dismissal are adequate to “any just and reasonable  cause.” Ark. Code Ann. § 6­17­1503 (Supp. 2001).  3  not in issue.” Instead, they asserted that the board should consider whether a person that  exercised such poor judgment should “be in the classroom in the first place.” The district  superintendent stated that his non­renewal recommendation was based entirely on the content  of the police report following Harter’s December 29, 2002, arrest.  The termination letter that Harter received from the district was included in her brief  to our court. The letter explicitly outlined the grounds for her termination: a police report  following her arrest. According to the letter, Harter was “discovered, in a lethargic condition,  hiding in a vehicle, not [her] own, on private property [she] had previously been warned to  avoid, and [was] believed by the police to have abandoned a glass pipe in the squad car, and  [was] charged with criminal trespass and possessing the instruments of the crime.”  After careful review, we are satisfied that the district’s decision to terminate Harter’s  contract is supported by clear and convincing evidence. The fact that she was arrested with  a child in her car, in a non­sober condition, stalking an ex­boyfriend is sufficient to support  her firing.  Affirmed.  ROBBINS  and BAKER, JJ., agree. 4 

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