Aon Risk Services, Inc. of Arkansas v. John Meadors

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DIVISION IV  CA06­1231  November 7,  2007  AON RISK SERVICES, INC., OF  ARKANSAS  APPELLANT  v.  AN APPEAL FROM PULASKI COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CIV05­193]  HONORABLE TIMOTHY FOX,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  JOHN MEADORS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND  REMANDED IN PART  A  Pulaski County jury awarded appellee John Meadors $2,509,127.60 on several  breach­of­contract  claims  against  his  employer,  appellant  Aon  Risk  Services,  Inc.,  of  Arkansas (“ARS Arkansas”). In post­trial proceedings, the circuit judge reduced the award  to $1,281,930.90. The judge also gave Meadors $150,000 in attorney fees, to be increased  to $320,482.72 in the event of an appeal, and declined Meadors’s request for prejudgment  interest.  ARS  Arkansas  appeals,  arguing  that  the  jury’s  verdict  was  not  supported  by  substantial evidence and that the trial judge erred in subjecting it to an enhanced attorney­fee  award should it decide to appeal. On cross­appeal, Meadors asks us to reinstate the jury’s  original  damage  award,  grant  him  prejudgment  interest,  and  reverse  several  summary  judgments that were entered prior to trial. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part  on both direct and cross­appeal. Background Facts  Meadors  is  a  veteran  of  the  insurance­brokerage  industry.  On  May  1,  1997,  he  executed  a  five­year  employment  contract  with  ARS  Arkansas,  a  Little  Rock  insurance  brokerage  firm  whose  parent  company  is  Aon  Corporation.  ARS  Arkansas’s  managing  director, Mark Brockington, described Meadors’s job as that of a producer, meaning that he  was responsible for attracting business and making sales. The contract provided that Meadors  would be compensated by a base salary plus an annual bonus calculated on a percentage of  new, first­year commissions earned and collected by ARS Arkansas.  For  twenty­five  to  thirty  years  prior  to  1997,  Meadors  cultivated  a  business  relationship with Dillard’s department stores in hopes of brokering insurance benefits for  Dillard’s employees. His patience was rewarded in the fall of 1999, while he was employed  at  ARS Arkansas.  In  August  and  September  of  that  year,  he  put  Dillard’s  in  touch  with  Combined Insurance Companies, another subsidiary of Aon Corporation. Combined offered  a package called Workplace Solutions in which Dillard’s employees could purchase life,  disability, and other types of insurance policies through workplace enrollment. Dillard’s and  Combined ultimately executed a five­year agreement on March 24, 2000, giving Combined  access to Dillard’s employees for that length of time.  Before  the  agreement  was  signed,  however,  Meadors  obtained  a  copy  of  what  is  referred to as the “Interdependency Memo.” This document, dated February 9, 2000, was  sent by Aon to all Aon Risk Services Managing Directors, including Mark Brockington at  ARS Arkansas. Its intent was to promote “interdependency” among Aon entities, that is, to 2  encourage ARS brokerage offices to place insurance business with Aon­affiliated companies.  The Memo recited the following:  [A]  financial  rewards  system  has  now  been  put  in  place  with  almost  all  Aon  companies. ARS Management has agreed with the various Aon companies listed on  the  following  page  that  it  will  receive  from  these  companies  bonus  pool  monies  representing the listed percentage of interdependence revenues generated on new fees  and commissions.  (Emphasis in original.) The following page was headlined “Interdependency Compensation  Agreements  for  2000,”  and  it  listed,  among  others,  Combined  Insurance  Companies.  Combined agreed to pay “30% of annualized premium on all life products over 15 year term  st  plus 15% 1  year for all other products to pool.” The Memo then explained how the bonus  pool would operate:  Such funds will be paid out in entirety to ARS staffers in the form of annual bonus  pool payments under the following conditions:  1. The Aon Company will credit these monies to the ARS office(s) practice group(s)  as appropriate to their involvement in the procurement of revenue.  2.  The  credit  is  made  as  the  income  is  booked  and,  if  not  booked  on  the  accrual  method, for 12 full months of income booking.  3. No formulaic bonus will be accrued to any individual ARS employee.  4. Each office/practice group will accumulate its “bonus pool” through year end at  which time each Managing Director will allocate 100% of the fund balance in the  pool to those employees who have been the most responsible for the professional  production  and/or  marketing,  servicing and/or  maintenance  of  the  client  accounts  generating the bonus pool funds and who have done so in a manner consistent with  Aon’s stated policies of professional excellence, cooperative behavior, and ethical  conduct.  5.  Shared  introduction  with  an  office/practice  or  between  and  office/practice  generates  a  single  payment  only.  Which  may  be  split  as  agreed  by  the  MDs  [Managing Directors]. 3  6. Each Managing Director’s recommendation as to the allocation of the bonus funds  in the pool is subject to sign off by the President or CEO of ARS Americas for audit  purposes, but the Managing Director’s recommendation will not be altered without  assumed “extreme prejudice.” In any case, the entire pool in each office or practice  will be paid.  On a quarterly basis we will share the bonus pool figures with ARS professional staff  so that employees are aware of the magnitude of the rewards accruing to them from  serving client needs via interdependence efforts.  (Emphasis  in  original.)  Additionally,  the  Memo  declared  that  “local/practice  group  management is now authorized to make the proper call ‘on the ground’ as to just how to  allocate bonus monies.” Managing Directors were asked to “carefully discuss this enhanced  compensation structure with all professional staff” and to “share this message as soon as  possible.”  According to Meadors, when he saw the Memo sometime in February 2000, he was  enthused  about  the  program  and  “absolutely”  believed  that  it  would  entitle  him  to  compensation over and above his basic employment contract compensation. However, after  the Dillard’s/Combined agreement was signed in March 2000, Combined placed no monies  in the bonus pool based on Dillard’s premiums. Mark Brockington explained that, in order  for Combined to acquire the Dillard’s account, it had to buy out another broker or insurance  company for $1.6 million. Thus, Combined told him, it could not pay normal commissions.  Following  negotiations  that  lasted  well  beyond  the  signing  of  the  Dillard’s  agreement,  Combined and ARS Arkansas agreed to a $240,000 commission, of which Meadors received  fifteen percent, or $36,000, as called for in his basic employment contract. 4  In 2005, Meadors sued ARS Arkansas, Combined, and several other Aon companies,  alleging that the Interdependency Memo was a unilateral contract, which was breached when  1  he did not receive bonus­pool monies generated by the Dillard’s agreement.  Combined and  the other Aon entities were dismissed by summary judgment, as were Meadors’s claims for  unjust enrichment, fraud, and breach of contract as a third­party beneficiary. However, the  case against ARS Arkansas went to trial. There, Meadors testified that, had the appropriate  monies  been  placed  in  the  bonus  pool,  he  would  have  received  $2,406,522.60  on  the  Dillard’s transaction. The jury awarded him that amount, plus additional damages based on  other claims. In post­trial proceedings, the trial judge reduced the Dillard’s award by almost  fifty percent. This appeal followed.  We begin our discussion of the issues with ARS Arkansas’s direct appeal from the  jury’s verdict pertaining to the Dillard’s transaction and Meadors’s cross­appeal from the  trial judge’s reduction of the damages on that same transaction.  I. Formation of Contract  ARS  Arkansas  argues  that  the  Interdependency  Memo  did  not  form  a  contract  because:  1)  it  was  not  sufficiently  definite  to  constitute  an  offer;  2)  if  it  was  an  offer,  Meadors did not accept it; 3) if a contract was created, it was not an agreement between ARS  Arkansas and Meadors. ARS presents these argument in the context of the trial court’s denial  of its motion for a directed verdict. Our standard of review is therefore whether the jury’s  verdict was supported by substantial evidence. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Am. Abstract & 1  Meadors first filed suit in 2002. He non­suited his case in 2004 and re­filed it in  2005.  5  Title Co., 363 Ark. 530, 215 S.W.3d 596 (2005). Substantial evidence is that which goes  beyond suspicion or conjecture and is sufficient to compel a conclusion one way or the other.  Id.  In  determining  whether  there  is  substantial  evidence,  we  view  the  evidence  and  all  reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the party on whose  behalf judgment was entered. Id.  Meadors’s theory at trial was that the Interdependency Memo formed a unilateral  contract. There are several instances where unilateral contracts commonly appear, such as  where a reward is offered, e.g., Ark. Bankers’ Ass’n v. Ligon, 174 Ark. 234, 295 S.W. 4  (1927), where a contest is announced, e.g., Mears v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 91 F.3d 1118  (8th Cir. 1996), or where changes are made and disseminated in an employee manual. See  Crain Indus., Inc. v. Cass, 305 Ark. 566, 810 S.W.2d 910 (1991). In those situations, the  offeree does not accept the offer by express agreement but by his performance. For example,  in the case of a reward, the offeree accepts by performing the particular task, such as the  capture  of  a  fugitive,  for  which  the  reward  is  offered.  Even  though  he  has  not  directly  communicated his acceptance, a contract is formed as the result of his performance. See  Ligon, supra. See also JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 1.23 (Rev. Ed. 1993);  17 C.J.S. Contracts § 9 (1999) (recognizing that a unilateral contract is composed of an offer  that invites acceptance in the form of actual performance); 17A AM. JUR. 2D  Contracts § 5  (2d ed. 1991) (stating that, if performance occurs, then the offer has been accepted, and a  contract is formed). The performance also constitutes consideration for the contract. 17A  AM. JUR. 2D  Contracts § 5. 6  A. Definiteness of offer  ARS  Arkansas  argues  first  that  the  Interdependency  Memo  was  not  sufficiently  definite  to  constitute  an  offer  for  a  unilateral  contract.  An  offer  is  the  manifestation  of  willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that  his assent to the bargain is invited and will conclude it. ERC Mtg. v. Luper, 32 Ark. App. 19,  795 S.W.2d 362 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Mosley Mach. Co. v. Gray  Supply Co., 310 Ark. 448, 837 S.W.2d 462 (1992). An offer cannot be accepted so as to form  a contract unless the terms are reasonably certain. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33  (1981); see also Luper, supra. Not every utterance of an employer is binding. Crain Indus.,  supra (quoting Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983)). To bind  the employer, an offer must be definite in form and must be communicated to the offeree.  See Hardie v. Cotter & Co., 849 F.2d 1097 (8th Cir. 1988); Dumas v. Kessler & Maguire  Funeral Home, Inc., 380 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Whether a proposal is meant  to be an offer for a unilateral contract is determined by the outward manifestations of the  parties, and not by their subjective intentions. Hardie, supra. The principal issue is whether  the  employer’s  statements  are  intended  as  an  offer  and  accepted  as  such  or  are  merely  statements of policy and practice. Id.  ARS  Arkansas  contends  first  that,  because  the  trial  court  determined  that  the  Interdependency Memo was ambiguous in some respects, it was too indefinite to constitute  an offer. We disagree that an ambiguous offer is necessarily indefinite. A writing that is  indefinite is incomprehensibly vague or incapable of being understood, see Barnes v. Barnes, 7  275  Ark.  117,  627  S.W.2d  552  (1982),  and  such  indefiniteness  is  an  impediment  to  the  formation of a contract. See Mgmt. Comp. Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie, & Co., 206  Wis. 2d 158, 557 N.W.2d 67 (1996). But, ambiguity does not prevent the formation of a  contract; rather, it calls for interpretation of a contract. See id. An ambiguous writing may  be understood and enforced by applying the rules of contract construction. See generally  Smith v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 88 Ark. App. 22, 194 S.W.3d 212 (2004); see also  Shibley v. White, 193 Ark. 1048, 104 S.W.2d 461 (1937) (recognizing that, while a contract  was ambiguous, it was not uncertain). We therefore see no error in the trial court’s refusal  to grant a directed verdict on this basis.  ARS  Arkansas  also  argues  that  the  Interdependency  Memo  lacked  definiteness,  because it merely expressed general concepts of teamwork and provided for judgment calls  in  the  allocation  of  bonus­pool  money.  ARS  cites  several  cases  in  which  statements  by  employers were deemed too indefinite to constitute an offer. See Hardie, supra (holding that  a  statement  by  the  employer’s  representatives  that,  if  workers  voted  out  the  union,  the  employer would treat them as if a union contract remained in effect, was too indefinite to  place restrictions on job terminations); Crawford v. Gen. Contract Corp., 174 F. Supp. 283  (W.D. Ark. 1959) (holding that a promise to “stick by” a person fell short of a promise to  finance him for an indefinite period of time without regard to conditions and circumstances);  Mettille, supra (holding that  statements in a company handbook that employment in the  banking industry was very stable and that job security was one reason why so many bank  employees had five or more years of service were general statements of policy rather than 8  promises  of  employment  for  a  particular  period  of  time);  Dumas,  supra  (holding  that  a  supervisor’s statement to an employee that they would “retire together” did not alter the  employee’s at­will employment status). We believe that the Memo contains terms far more  definite than these vague statements. The Memo expressly states that “a financial rewards  system has now been put in place.” It also sets out specific percentages of amounts to be  contributed to the bonus pool by each participating Aon entity, and it contains the precise  means by which those pool funds will be distributed to ARS staffers. It is therefore more  than a mere statement of policy or a vague promise regarding future events.  ARS also relies heavily on Martens v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 616  N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 2000), but it is also distinguishable. There, the Minnesota court held that  a brochure touting equal compensation for technical and administrative employees was too  indefinite  to  constitute  an  offer.  The  court  noted  that  there  was  no  suggestion  that  an  individual would be entitled to specific pay, benefit level, or condition of employment, nor  were there any criteria to  determine  when the rights to any benefits had been breached.  Further, the prerogative to make decisions as to individual employee promotions, salaries,  and so forth was clearly reserved to management based on an evaluation of the individual.  By contrast, the Interdependency Memo in this case does not merely set out general goals  and philosophies of compensation. It sets out specific percentages of premiums that will go  into  the  bonus  pool  as  part  of  an  “enhanced  compensation  structure.”  And,  while  no  employee is entitled to a “formulaic” bonus and Managing Directors may decide how to  allocate  the  bonus  pool  among  their  employees,  their  discretion  is  not  unfettered.  For 9  example, managers cannot withhold payment of the pool amount; the Memo provides that  the entire pool must be distributed annually. Thus, the mere inclusion of possible judgment  calls by management as to the manner of distribution among its employees does not, under  these circumstances, render the Memo too indefinite to operate as an offer for a unilateral  contract.  B. Acceptance of offer  ARS Arkansas claims that, even if the Memo constituted an offer, Meadors did not  accept it. ARS first cites MDH Builders, Inc. v. Nabholz Construction Corp., 70 Ark. App.  284, 17 S.W.3d 97 (2000), which states that, to create a binding contract, an acceptance must  unconditionally agree to all the material provisions of the offer. ARS contends that Meadors  did not unconditionally agree to the provisions of the offer because he testified as follows:  QUESTION:  When  you  received  this  document  [the  Memo],  did  you  ever  unconditionally agree to its terms?  MEADORS:  That was not a conscious thought that I had when I – the first time I  looked at that.  QUESTION:  And so whether it’s when you received it in February or whether you  received it in April, that’s never a decision you made to unconditionally  agree to the terms of [the Memo]?  MEADORS:  Not in that, no, I didn’t think about that.  ARS’s reliance on MDH is misplaced. The language in MDH does not lend itself to  a unilateral contract, which is accepted by performance rather than by express agreement.  Additionally, the point we were making in MDH was that an acceptance cannot vary the  terms of the offer. There is no claim that Meadors attempted to vary the terms of the Memo. 10  In any event, we believe that ARS reads too much into Meadors’s statement that when he  first saw the Memo, he simply did not think about whether he unconditionally agreed to its  terms.  We turn now to ARS’s contention that Meadors could not have accepted the offer in  the Interdependency Memo because, by the time he learned of the Memo, he had already  performed his brokerage task of referring Dillard’s to Combined as a client. A unilateral  contract is not formed where a party’s performance is not made “on the faith of” the offer  or “in consequence of” the offer. See Ligon, supra. However, unless the offeror manifests  a  contrary  intention,  an  offeree  who  learns  of  an  offer  after  he  has  rendered  part  of  the  performance requested by the offer may accept by completing the requested performance.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 51 (1981). Meadors contends that, even though he  began  brokering  the  deal  between  Dillard’s  and  Combined  before  the  Memo  was  in  existence,  he  did  not  complete  performance  until  after  he  received  the  Memo.  Thus,  he  claims, he accepted the Memo’s offer. We agree that substantial evidence supported the  jury’s verdict on this point.  There  was  evidence  at  trial  that  Meadors  was  aware  of  the  Memo  before  the  Dillard’s/Combined  deal  was  finalized  in  March  2000.  ARS  managing  director  Mark  Brockington testified that he assumed that he received the Memo on or about February 9,  2000, and he agreed that it directed him to share its message with his eligible professional  staff, which would have included Meadors. Meadors testified that he obtained a copy of the  Interdependency Memo from Combined Insurance Companies in February 2000, although 11  he did not receive a copy directly from ARS Arkansas until April or May 2000. There was  also  evidence  from  which  the  jury  could  have  concluded  that  Meadors  continued  or  completed his performance on the Dillard’s account after learning of the Interdependency  Memo. Combined Insurance Companies executive Heather Gardere said that Meadors played  a role in the Dillard’s transaction other than the initial referral. She also said that he was  involved in the coordination of the overall strategy, the sales process, and was ultimately  responsible  for  the  overall  relationship.  Neil  Mayfield,  who  worked  for  the  enrollment  division  of  Combined,  said  that  Meadors  called  him after  the  contract  had  been  signed,  asking how the enrollments were going. Moreover, the Interdependency Memo provided that  bonus­pool monies would go to employees who were responsible not only for production of  accounts but for servicing and maintaining accounts.  Though the evidence on this point is spare, it was the jurors’ prerogative to believe  or disbelieve it and to accord it whatever weight and value they deemed appropriate. See  generally  Stewart  Title,  supra.  Our  task  on  appeal  is  not  to  substitute  our  view  of  the  evidence  for  the  jury’s  but  to  determine  whether  the  jury’s  verdict  was  supported  by  substantial evidence. See Rathbun v. Ward, 315 Ark. 264, 866 S.W.2d 403 (1993). With that  standard to guide us, we cannot say that ARS Arkansas was entitled to a directed verdict on  this point.  C. Parties to the contract  Finally, ARS Arkansas argues that neither it nor Meadors is named in the Memo and,  therefore, the Memo  does not constitute a contract between them. However, the  Memo 12  imposed certain duties on ARS Arkansas, as it did on all ARS offices, such as accumulating  bonus­pool monies and distributing them to deserving employees. And, as already discussed,  the Memo was accepted as a unilateral contract by Meadors, thereby making him a party to  it.  There  was,  therefore,  substantial  evidence  from  which  the  jury  could  conclude  that  Meadors and ARS Arkansas had rights and obligations under the Memo.  II. Breach of Contract  ARS argues next that, assuming the Memo formed a contract, there was no substantial  evidence that ARS breached the contract. It points out that no bonus­pool money was sent  to it on the Combined/Dillard’s deal and, therefore, it had no money to distribute to Meadors.  Thus, it could not have committed a breach.  When  performance  of  a  duty  under  a  contract  is  due,  any  non­performance  is  a  breach. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 235(2) (1981). As the jury was instructed in this  case, every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its  performance and its enforcement. Cantrell­Waind & Assocs. v. Guillaume Motorsports, 62  Ark. App. 66, 968 S.W.2d 72 (1998) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts  § 205).  Moreover, a party has an implied obligation not to do anything that would prevent, hinder,  or delay performance. See generally Commerical Bank of N. Ark. v. Tri­State Propane, 89  Ark. App. 272, 203 S.W.3d 124 (2005).  We believe that there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that  a  breach  occurred.  ARS  Arkansas  knew  that  Meadors  was  eligible  to  participate  in  the  enhanced­compensation program described in the Memo. It was also aware, or should have 13  been  aware  from  reading  the  Memo,  that  Combined  had  agreed  to  deposit  a  certain  percentage of premiums into the bonus pool and that ARS Arkansas, as a local office, would  be obligated to distribute the pool money. Yet, ARS Arkansas negotiated with Combined  Insurance Companies to receive a reduced commission, and much of the negotiating process  took  place  long  after  the  Interdependency  Memo  was  issued,  into  2001  when  the  large  amount of revenue attributable to the Dillard’s account was known. The jury may well have  determined that ARS’s acceptance of a lesser commission from Combined was a bad­faith  hindrance of the bonus­pool process, which prevented money from being placed in the pool  and, thus, prevented it from being distributed to Meadors. Again, the presence of substantial  evidence means that we cannot say that the trial court was required to grant a directed verdict  on this point.  III. Damages—Dillard’s Transaction  The jury awarded Meadors $2,406,522.60 with respect to the Dillard’s transaction.  ARS Arkansas argues that, assuming that a contract was formed and that ARS Arkansas  breached the contract, Meadors did not produce competent evidence to support that damage  award. Meadors cross­appeals from the trial court’s reduction of his Dillard’s damages to  $1,255.825.90. Although damages other than those attributable to the Dillard’s transaction  are discussed in Meadors’s cross­appeal, for the moment we limit our consideration to the  Dillard’s award.  Meadors calculated his damages on the Dillard’s transaction by using information sent  to him by Neil Mayfield of Employee Benefit Services, the enrollment arm of Combined 14  Insurance Companies. Mayfield initially sent Meadors a summary of Dillard’s enrollment  numbers for 2000 and 2001, broken down by categories of insurance. Later, following a  deposition, Mayfield provided Meadors with the same type of calculations for 2002, 2003,  and  2004.  Using  Mayfield’s  charts,  Meadors  determined  which  premiums  fell  under  Combined’s thirty­percent obligation in the Interdependency Memo and which fell under the  fifteen­percent obligation. He then arrived at $2,406,522.60 as the amount he would have  received  over  the  five­year  life  of  the  Dillard’s/Combined  contract  had  the  money  been  placed into the bonus pool. Regarding the year 2000 in particular, which will be at issue  under this point, Meadors relied on Mayfield’s figure of $4,174,421 as total premiums for  that year and, applying the thirty­percent and fifteen­percent figures, came up with $831,873  owed him for that year.  ARS Arkansas  argues  first  that  Meadors  did  not  produce  reliable  evidence  of  his  damages for the year 2000. It cites Mayfield’s deposition testimony that, with regard to the  printed summary that he sent to Meadors for the year 2000, he did not know where he got  it, he did not know who generated it, and he did not verify its accuracy before sending it to  Meadors. The trial court, in a post­trial ruling, agreed with ARS that the 2000 summary sent  by Mayfield “should not have been submitted to the jury” and, using a different trial exhibit,  reduced Meadors’s 2000 damages from $831,873 to $622,694.  We believe that the trial court erred in reducing the damages. Two trial exhibits, other  than  the  chart  sent  by  Mayfield,  show  year  2000  revenues  for  Combined  (Worksite  Solutions) attributable to the Arkansas office in the amount of $4,178,888, which is very 15  close to the $4,174,421 figure contained in Mayfield’s chart. Further, Heather Gardere of  Combined Insurance Companies testified that the $4,178,888 figure represented the premium  written though the Arkansas office for Combined (Worksite Solutions) and that most of it  was  the  Dillard’s  deal.  Additionally,  Greg  Golden,  the  Chief  Operating  Officer  of  ARS  Arkansas, sent a letter to ARS of the Americas in 2002 in which he relied on Mayfield’s  report  to  state  that  year  2000  revenues  were  $4,174,000  and  that,  if  Meadors  were  compensated under the Interdependency Memo, he would receive  $834,800 for that year,  which is very close to the $831,873 calculated by Meadors. Finally, Mayfield, after testifying  that he did not know where he got the 2000 summary sheet, agreed that, at the time he sent  his communication to Meadors, he believed that everything he was communicating was true  and  accurate.  There  is  certainly  no  dispute  that  Mayfield  was,  at  the  time  he  sent  the  information to Meadors, an employee of the enrollment division of Combined. Based on  these  factors,  the  jury  was  within  its  province  in  determining that  Meadors’s  year  2000  damage calculation was accurate and reliable.  Further, even if, as ARS contends, Meadors produced only an approximate amount  of  his  damages  for  the  year  2000,  the  jury  obviously  believed  it  was  a  reasonably  good  approximation. Arkansas law has never required exactness of proof in determining damages,  and, if it is reasonably certain that some loss occurred, it is enough that damages can be  stated only approximately. Bank of Am. v. C.D. Smith Motor Co., 353 Ark. 228, 106 S.W.3d  425  (2003).  The  fact  that  a  party  can  state  the  amount  of  damages  he  suffered  only 16  approximately is not a sufficient reason for disallowing damages if, from the approximate  estimates, a satisfactory conclusion can be reached. Id.  We consequently conclude that the trial court erred in remitting Meadors’s damage  award for the year 2000. While remittitur is appropriate when the compensatory damage  award cannot be sustained by the evidence, United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Murphy, 331 Ark. 364,  961 S.W.2d 752 (1998), a trial court may not substitute its judgment for the jury’s when  there is a basis in the evidence for the award and when there is no evidence, appropriately  objected to, that tends to create passion or prejudice. Smith v. Hansen, 323 Ark. 188, 914  S.W.2d 285 (1996). See also McNair v. McNair, 316 Ark. 299, 870 S.W.2d 756 (1994).  ARS argues further that Meadors should have been awarded no damages for the years  2001 to 2004 because the Interdependency Memo states that its agreements apply “only to  New Revenue Generated in 2000.” There was no trial testimony regarding the meaning of  the  term  “generated,”  but  it  ordinarily  means  to  cause  to  be  or  to  bring  into  existence.  Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary at 945 (1993). Given that common­sense definition,  we cannot say that the jury’s damage award for the years 2001 to 2004 is unsustainable. The  Interdependency  Memo  could  be  interpreted  to  mean  that,  if  a  multi­year  contract  were  signed in 2000, then the entire amount of revenue produced over the life of the contract was  generated or “brought into existence” in 2000.  ARS’s next argument concerns the term “annualized premiums.” The Interdependency  Memo  provided  that  Combined  agreed  to  place  into  the  bonus  pool  thirty  percent  of  “  annualized premium on all life products over fifteen year term.” ARS claims that Meadors 17  produced no evidence that the premium figures on which he relied for his 2001 to 2004  damages were annualized premiums. We disagree. Meadors defined an annualized premium  as a “premium for a full year,” and the figures contained in Neil Mayfield’s 2001 to 2004  calculations refer to “annual premiums.” Although Meadors testified that he was “guessing”  that Mayfield’s calculations were based on annualized premiums, Mayfield’s numbers speak  for themselves, and the jury may have concluded that the 2001 to 2004 figures represented  2  premiums for a full year.  Additionally,  ARS argues  that  all  of  Meadors’s  damage  calculations  were  wrong  because they included premiums for a company that was not listed on the Interdependency  Memo  –  Provident  Unum.  While  ARS  is  correct  that  Provident­Unum  premiums  were  included, as Neil Mayfield explained, in states where certain products were not approved for  Combined to sell “we used Provident.” From this testimony, the jury may have concluded  that a Unum Provident product fell within the umbrella of Combined Insurance Companies.  Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm the jury’s verdict in favor of Meadors for  breach  of  a  unilateral  contract  and  reinstate  the  jury’s  damages  award  of  $2,406,522.60  pertaining to the Dillard’s account.  IV. Attorney Fees  After trial, Meadors’s attorneys presented fee petitions based on hourly rates totaling  approximately $200,000. They also provided the court with their employment contract with 2  Our disposition of this issue makes it unnecessary for us to reach Meadors’s  argument on cross­appeal that the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence regarding  annualized premiums.  18  Meadors, which called for them to receive forty percent of all sums recovered if the case  went to trial. The trial judge awarded Meadors fees of $177,500, although in a corrected  judgment filed later that same day, the amount was stated as $150,000. However, the judge  declared  that,  in  the  event  that  ARS  Arkansas  appealed,  the  fee  would  be  increased  to  $320,482.72.  ARS  now  argues  that  Arkansas  law  does  not  permit  a  trial  court  to  enhance  an  attorney­fee award based on the opposing party’s decision to appeal. It cites the factors to  be considered in making an award of attorney fees that our supreme court set out in Chrisco  v.  Sun  Industries,  Inc.,  304  Ark.  227,  800  S.W.2d  717  (1990),  and  notes  that  a  party’s  decision to appeal is not included among them. ARS also cites Roberts v. Roberts, 226 Ark.  194,  288  S.W.2d  948  (1956),  where  our  supreme  court  held  that  a  trial  court  cannot  condition a party’s right to appeal on his first paying an attorney fee.  We review a trial court’s award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Newcourt  Fin. v. Canal Ins., 67 Ark. App. 347, 1 S.W.3d 452 (1999). However, because we have  reinstated a substantial portion of the jury’s verdict, rather than review the trial court’s fee  award, we reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider the award. Upon remand, the  trial  court  may  take  into  account  the  time  and  effort  spent  on  appeal.  But  we  take  this  opportunity to voice our doubt that an enhanced fee award, employed as a prior restraint on  a party’s right to appeal, would lie within a trial court’s discretion.  V. Prejudgment Interest 19  The trial court refused to award Meadors prejudgment interest on his recovery, and  he cross­appeals from that ruling.  Prejudgment  interest  is  allowable  where  the  amount  of  damages  is  definitely  ascertainable by mathematical computation, or if the evidence furnishes data that makes it  possible  to  compute  the  amount  without  reliance  on  opinion  or  discretion.  Ray  &  Sons  Masonry Contr. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 353 Ark. 201, 114 S.W.3d 189 (2003). If a method  exists for fixing the exact value of a cause of action at the time the event that gives rise to  the cause of action occurs, prejudgment interest should be awarded. Nationsbanc Mtg. Corp.  v. Hopkins, 82 Ark. App. 91, 14 S.W.3d 757 (2003).  In this case, a five­year agreement was brokered between Dillard’s and Combined,  and the Interdependency Memo set forth specific percentages of Combined premiums that  were  to  be  placed  in  the  bonus  pool.  A  method  therefore  existed  by  which  Meadors’s  damages could be computed without reliance on opinion or discretion. ARS claims, however,  that  discretion  played  a  part  in  determining how  much  of  the  bonus  pool  it  would  have  distributed  to  Meadors,  given  that  the  Interdependency  Memo  vested  local  managing  directors with discretion in allocating the pool money. While that discretion may have proved  relevant  if  two  or  more  ARS  Arkansas  staffers  had  been  responsible  for  the  Dillard’s  transaction,  that  was  not  the  case  here.  Mark Brockington  agreed  that  Meadors  was  the  producer on the Dillard’s account. Further, there was no evidence that any other ARS office  or  any  other  ARS  Arkansas  employee  was  responsible  for  the  Dillard’s/Combined  transaction. Additionally, the Memo required the managing director to distribute one­hundred 20  percent  of  the  money  in  the  bonus  pool.  Thus,  Brockington  could  not  have  employed  discretion in allocating the bonus money to anyone other than Meadors. We therefore reverse  and remand to allow the trial court to calculate an award of prejudgment interest.  VI. Other Damage Awards  Meadors’s  complaint  also  sought  damages  against  ARS  Arkansas  for  breach  of  contract  concerning  a  JB  Hunt  account  and  for  unpaid  compensation  under  his  basic  employment contract. The jury awarded him $40,500 on his JB Hunt claim and $59,000 in  unpaid compensation. After trial, the circuit judge reduced the JB Hunt award to zero and  the  unpaid  compensation  award  to  $23,000.  Meadors  argues  on  cross­appeal  that  these  reductions were erroneous, but we affirm them. The jury also awarded Meadors $3105 under  the  Interdependency  Memo  for  business  he  placed  with  another  Aon  entity  listed  in  the  Memo, Cambridge. The trial judge refused to reduce that award, and ARS asserts error, but  we affirm that ruling as well.  Regarding the JB Hunt account, Meadors developed an arrangement in which Aon  entities reviewed Hunt’s employee­benefit plans and made recommendations in exchange  for  a  consulting  fee.  Hunt  eventually  paid  a  fee  of  $355,000.  However,  ARS  Arkansas  received only $85,000. According to Mark Brockington, the remaining money went to the  other Aon entities that participated in the consultation. Pursuant to his employment contract  with ARS, Meadors received fifteen percent of the $85,000 that ARS Arkansas collected, for  a total of $12,750. However, Meadors argued at trial that he was entitled to fifteen percent  of the entire $355,000, which would have totaled $53,250. He therefore asserted a claim for 21  the $40,500 difference. The jury awarded him $40,500, but the circuit judge reduced the  verdict to zero based on a finding that Meadors received all that was due him under  his  employment  contract.  The  trial  court’s  ruling  was  correct.  It  was  undisputed  that  ARS  Arkansas received $85,000 from the JB Hunt transaction. Meadors’s employment contract  provided  that  he  would  receive  fifteen  percent  of  first  year  commissions  “earned  and  collected”  by  ARS  Arkansas.  Because  ARS  collected  $85,000,  Meadors  was  fully  compensated by receiving fifteen percent of that amount, or $12,750.  Meadors  also  sought  compensation  of  $59,000  under  his  employment  contract,  separate  and  apart  from  the  Interdependency  Memo.  This  figure  was  based  on  a  2002  calculation by Chief Operating Officer Greg Golden concerning amounts owed to Meadors  as Meadors was nearing the end of his five­year employment period. Golden determined that  Meadors was due $59,000 in additional salary, based in part on revenues earned by ARS in  the Dillard’s transaction. The jury awarded Meadors $59,000, but the trial court correctly  reduced it to $23,000, based on undisputed testimony that Meadors received $36,000 as a  standard commission from ARS Arkansas on the Dillard’s deal.  Finally, ARS argues that there was no substantial evidence to support a damage award  on Meadors’s transaction with Cambridge. The jury awarded Meadors $3105 based on a  2002 memo in which Greg Golden stated that Meadors “did a deal with Cambridge in 2001  – it is not fully paid yet.” The memo further stated that Meadors was owed $3105. In light  of this memo, we find no error in the trial court’s refusal to remit that award.  VII. Summary Judgments Granted to Other Aon Entities 22  Meadors’s complaint named as defendants six Aon entities other than ARS Arkansas:  ARS of the Americas, ARS of Missouri, Aon Corporation, Combined Insurance Companies,  Aon Risk Management, and ARS Illinois. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor  3  of all defendants except ARS Arkansas and ARS Illinois.  Meadors now argues that these  grants of summary judgment were in error. We affirm the summary judgments against all  entities other than Combined Insurance Companies.  At various points, Meadors’s complaint refers to the entities other than Combined and  speculates on their involvement with the Interdependency Memo and other aspects of the  case. However, the complaint does not state facts that show that these entities participated  in any breach or other conduct that led to Meadors’s damages. Moreover, upon being faced  with summary judgments, Meadors was likewise unable to satisfactorily explain his inclusion  of these entities as defendants or create a material question of fact as to why they should  remain  in  the  case.  And  finally,  in  his  appellate  brief,  Meadors  makes  no  convincing  argument that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to these companies. He  therefore has not met his burden on appeal of demonstrating reversible error. See Arrow Int’l,  Inc. v. Sparks, 81 Ark. App. 42, 98 S.W.3d 48 (2003).  However, Meadors is more exact with regard to his case against Combined Insurance  Companies. His complaint asserts that Combined was an obligor on the Interdependency  Memo, which he described as a contract between him, ARS Arkansas, and Combined. He 3  Meadors’s case against ARS Illinois went to trial on one particular transaction.  He was awarded $45,500, and ARS Illinois satisfied that judgment. It is not at issue on  appeal.  23  further alleged that a breach occurred when Combined and ARS Arkansas failed to pay him  the amounts called for in the contract. Moreover, in his response to the defendants’ motions  for summary judgment, Meadors attached Combined’s responses to requests for admission,  in which Combined admitted that the Interdependency Memo accurately set out the terms  and  conditions  of  an  agreement  among  Aon  entities  identified  on  the  first  page  (which  included Combined), and that Combined was a participant in the Interdependency program.  The Memo itself was also attached, showing that Combined had agreed to deposit certain  amounts into a bonus pool. Further, it was undisputed that Combined did not place monies  from the Dillard’s transaction into the bonus pool. We need only decide if the trial court’s  grant of summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidence presented by the  moving party left a material question of fact unanswered. Doe v. Baum, 348 Ark. 259, 72  S.W.3d 476 (2002). Because the evidence showed that a material question of fact remained  with regard to whether Combined breached a contract with Meadors, summary judgment was  inappropriate as to Combined. See generally Newberg v. Next Level Events, Inc., 82 Ark.  App. 1, 110 S.W.3d 332 (2003).  Combined  argues  that  it  was  nevertheless  entitled  to  summary  judgment  because  Meadors testified at trial that his only contract was with ARS Arkansas. However, by the  time  of  trial,  Meadors’s  only  remaining  cause  of  action  was  against  ARS  Arkansas;  Combined had already been dismissed from the case. In any event, Meadors’s deposition  attached to his response to the motions for summary judgment and his complaint assert that 24  his contract was with ARS Arkansas and Combined. We therefore reverse and remand the  4  award of summary judgment to Combined.  VIII. Summary Judgment on Other Causes of Action  The trial court also granted summary judgment against Meadors on his claim that he  was a third­party beneficiary of the Interdependency Memo and on his claims of fraud and  unjust enrichment.  Meadors’s third­party beneficiary count was pled as an alternative to his allegation  that the Interdependency Memo created a unilateral contract. Because we hold today that a  unilateral contract was created by the Memo and that Meadors, by his acceptance, was an  obligee under the Memo, his alternative third­party beneficiary claim is no longer extant. We  therefore decline to address this moot point. See Davis v. Williamson, 359 Ark. 33,  194  S.W.3d 197 (2004).  Meadors’s  unjust­enrichment  claim  is  likewise  moot  because  it  was  not  asserted  against  either  ARS  Arkansas  or  Combined  Insurance  Companies  but  against  other  Aon  companies, which we have already determined were entitled to summary judgment.  This leaves the fraud count for our consideration. Meadors’s complaint essentially  alleged  that  Combined  and  ARS  Arkansas  committed  fraud  by  publicizing  the  Interdependency Memo with the intent of inducing the sale of products but with no intent of 4  Our reinstatement of Meadors’s damages on the Dillard’s transaction seemingly  renders his case against Combined on the same transaction moot. However, during oral  argument, Meadors asked that, if we reinstated his award, we nevertheless review the  entry of summary judgments in favor of other Aon entities, in the event that he is unable  to collect on his judgment against ARS Arkansas.  25  abiding by  agreement  and  by  not  allocating to  him what  was  earned  from  the  Dillard’s  transaction. As damages, he sought his full compensation under the Interdependency Memo.  In light of our decision that ARS Arkansas breached the contract created by the Memo and  our holding that a fact question remains as to whether Combined did the same, we see no  point in reversing a summary judgment on a fraud count that is, for all practical purposes,  based on a breach of contract and seeks the same damages that Meadors has already been  awarded. We therefore consider this point moot as well.  IX. Conclusion  We affirm the jury’s verdict for breach of a unilateral contract against ARS Arkansas  and reinstate  Meadors’s damages of $2,406,522.60 pertaining to the Dillard’s transaction.  We affirm the jury’s damages award of $3105 on the Cambridge transaction and affirm the  trial court’s reduction of damages on the JB Hunt account and on Meadors’s claim for unpaid  compensation. We also affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment against all other  Aon  entities  except  Combined  Insurance  Companies,  which  we  reverse.  We  decline  to  address the grant of summary judgment on Meadors’s three additional causes of action as  moot. Finally, we reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider the attorney­fee award  and to award prejudgment interest.  Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.  ROBBINS, J., agrees.  BAKER, J., concurs. 26 

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