Don Hendrickson v. Arkansas State Highway Commission

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  ROBERT J. GLADWIN, JUDGE  DIVISION III  CA06­1062  DECEMBER 12, 2007  DON HENDRICKSON  APPELLANT  APPEAL  FROM  THE  FAULKNER  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CV­2001­69]  V. ARKANSAS  STATE  HIGHWAY  COMMISSION  APPELLEE  HON. DAVID L. REYNOLDS,  JUDGE  AFFIRMED  Appellant Don Hendrickson appeals the Faulkner County Circuit Court’s grant of the  motion  in  limine  filed  by  appellee  Arkansas  State  Highway  Commission  regarding  the  limitation of testimony related to the permanent easement on his land and impairment of  public access to his business interests.  We affirm.  In 1983, appellant purchased two tracts of land, the north boundary of which abutted  State Highway 286.  At the time of purchase, the highway was a two­lane road without  curbs.  Appellant’s tracts were separated by Duwayne Lane, a public dead­end street, with  ingress and egress existing only by way of the highway.  On the east tract stood a frame dwelling, while on the west tract stood a brick residence and a combined self­service gas  station and convenience store.  In 2001, appellee filed an eminent domain complaint condemning the north portion  of each of appellant’s tracts of land to widen the highway to two lanes running both east and  west with a median separating the lanes.  An eight to ten­inch curb was built on the edge of  the new right of way along the entire north line of appellant’s property, with a green­space  area left between the new curb and the curb marking the outside line of the eastward­traveled  portion.  Appellant filed a timely answer seeking just compensation for the land taken and  severance  damage  to  his  residual  lands,  particularly  as  related  to  the  business  property  located on his land.  Prior to appellee’s action, appellant had three means of ingress and  egress from his two tracts of land, all of which afforded unimpaired and direct access from  the highway to his convenience­store business, gas station, and parking area, irrespective of  whether motorists were traveling east bound or west bound.  Subsequent  to  the  new  construction,  appellant’s  previous  access  was  diminished  except for the entrance to Duwayne Lane and the substituted cut in the median at the west  end  of  the  property.  Appellant  contends  that  this  route  requires  vehicles  traveling  west  bound to drive into the cut in the median, turn left across both east­bound lanes of traffic and  enter the permanent construction easement on the property of appellant’s neighbor and make  a  sharper­than­ninety­degrees  turn  to  the  left  onto  the  easement  imposed  on  appellant’s  property. ­2­  CA06­1062  On the day of the jury trial, April 11, 2006, appellee filed a five­page motion in limine  just prior to the beginning of the trial.  The circuit court held three in camera hearings to  discuss the motion, focusing primarily on appellee’s attempt to prevent appellant and his  expert witness from discussing or testifying concerning the use of the permanent easement  imposed by appellee on the land and testimony relating to the impairment of public access  to appellant’s business and land.  Appellant argued against any such limitation of evidence  and explained that the construction  of  the median and the limited and dangerous access  through the crossover was a gross inconvenience and seriously impaired the public access  to his business.  The circuit court granted the motion in limine with respect to these two points, after  which the trial proceeded with the jury granting a judgment in  favor  of  appellant in the  amount of $50,000.  The judgment was filed on May 30, 2006, and appellant filed a timely  notice of appeal on June 22,  2006.    He specifically challenged the circuit court’s ruling  granting the motion in limine, paragraph No. 7, whereby the circuit court denied his attempts  to introduce evidence regarding the use of the permanent easement impressed upon his land.  He  also  appealed  the  ruling  related  to  paragraph  No.  8,  which  denied  his  attempts  to  introduce evidence, the proffer of which was made, to prove compensation for the loss of  access to his remaining property which resulted from the configuration and construction of  Dave Ward Road in front of appellant’s property.  A. Limitation of Evidence Regarding Permanent Easement Imposed by Appellee ­3­  CA06­1062  Appellant  asserts  that  by  granting  appellee’s  motion,  which  prevented  him  from  introducing evidence in any form concerning the use of the permanent easement imposed on  the property by appellee, the circuit court erroneously prohibited him from explaining to the  jury the means of access to his land by his customers, his renters, and his family.  He claims  that the ruling, itself, constituted a taking of the limited access appellee had left him.  Article  2, Section 22, of the Arkansas Constitution states that “The right of property is before and  higher than any constitutional sanction; and private property shall not be taken, appropriated  or damaged for public use, without just compensation therefore.”  Appellant cites Arkansas  State Highway Commission v. Kesner, 239 Ark. 270, 388 S.W.2d 905 (1965), as an example  of when the supreme court has acknowledged, even in the absence of an actual loss of land,  “a basic right of an abutting property owner, for the right of access to a street or highway [as]  one of the incidents of ownership or occupancy of land abutting thereon.”  See also Ark.  State Hwy. Comm’n v. Billingsley, 247 Ark. 49, 444 S.W.2d 259 (1969) (finding that there  was substantial evidence establishing considerable damage of ingress or egress despite a  technical ability to access seventy­feet of usable frontage). Accordingly, appellant requested  compensation not only for the actual taking, but also for the damage done to the property not  taken but nonetheless substantially impaired or damaged.  Appellant acknowledges that in Wright v. Monticello, 345 Ark. 420, 47 S.W.3d 851  (2001), the supreme court referred to language from Campbell v. Arkansas State Highway  Commission, 183 Ark. 780, 38 S.W.2d 753 (1931), reiterating that in order for a property  owner to challenge a governmental action that is not an actual taking of his property, he must ­4­  CA06­1062  suffer damages that are distinct from those suffered by the general public.  However, the  supreme court went on to specifically explain that a property owner whose land abuts the  land  being taken  by  the  government  and  who  has  a  property  right  of  egress  and  ingress  through such land suffers a distinct injury not suffered by the general public.  See Wright,  supra.  Accordingly, appellant maintains that the circuit court’s ruling prohibited him from  offering proper testimony regarding the damage to his tracts of land and wrongfully denied  him the use of the supporting information that the state constitution and case law afford him.  Appellant points out that, because of the circuit court’s ruling, he did not attempt to  introduce  testimony  regarding  the  loss  of  and/or  extreme  limitation  of  his  access  to  his  property.  He  and  his  primary  witness  regarding  the  value  of  the  property,  Ms.  Diana  Thompson, were both aware of the circuit court’s admonition and attempted to comply with  those terms.  He claims the circuit court erroneously denied his right to go forward with  evidence needed to prove his damages, which prejudiced his case, and that such error is  reversible error warranting a new trial.  Appellee  counters  that  appellant  did,  in  fact,  testify  regarding  the  permanent  easement, and the record contains approximately twenty­seven pages of direct testimony and  four additional pages of cross­examination and re­direct testimony.  Appellant was able to  provide details regarding the physical changes to the property and the resulting alterations  to the entrances to his property, as well as specific testimony regarding monetary damages  he claims to have suffered  as  a result.  Appellee points out that appellant addressed the  easement, his complaints against those individuals and government entities involved in the ­5­  CA06­1062  process of planning the improvements, the effect the improvements had on traffic patterns  related  to  his  property,  and  his  resulting damages.  Appellee  asserts,  and  we  agree,  that  appellant was able to present a substantial amount of information on this issue to the jury.  Appellant himself acknowledges that appellee allowed him to testify to such an extent  that, “upon proper objection by [a]ppellee, much of [appellant’s] testimony might have been  denied.”  He simply contends that there was much more that he would have said absent the  circuit court’s ruling.  Appellant has failed to show how he was prejudiced by the ruling,  what the other testimony would have been, or how the result would have  differed if the  additional information had been allowed.  Moreover, it appears that the real focus of the  potential testimony that was excluded was hearsay testimony about appellant’s employees’  difficulties using the road in its new condition, and that limitation certainly was not error.  We affirm on this point.  B.  Limitation of Evidence Related to the Construction of the Median  Appellant asserts that the circuit court erroneously  required proof of an absolute,  complete  denial  of  all  access  to  appellant’s  property  before  any  testimony  would  be  permitted regarding damages to the remainder of his property.  He explains that, as opposed  to the previously unfettered  access  he enjoyed, the one remaining point of access to his  property requires a person desiring to use the access to pull up into a space in the median,  watch for east­bound traffic in a fifty­mile­per­hour posted speed zone, and when clear, drive  across  the  east­bound  lanes  and  onto  a  permanent  construction  easement  on  the  land  of  appellant’s neighbor to the west, then make an acute­angle turn and proceed eastward along ­6­  CA06­1062  a narrow easement on appellant’s land to the convenience store, or continue west on the  highway some 800 or more feet to Salem Road and make a U­turn to come back to that  easement.  Appellee argued at the hearing that the taking of access may be an impairment but  does not constitute a denial of access, and that in a partial taking of land, the landowner is  not entitled to compensation for the impairment of access if any access whatsoever remains  for  the  landowner.  Again, appellant cites Campbell, supra, for the proposition that any  damage  to  such  an  easement,  whether  by  destruction  or  impairment,  is  a  damage  to  the  property owner and independent of any damage sustained by the general public.  Likewise,  in Kesner, supra, the supreme court stated that a landowner must show that a property right  has been invaded, and direct and substantial damage peculiar to him must be sustained, in  order to establish special compensatory damages.  The fact that the value of the lot has been  diminished is not sufficient to sustain an award.  Appellant cites Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Bowers, 248 Ark. 388, 451  S.W.2d 728 (1970), in which the supreme court allowed witnesses to testify as to the loss of  access as an element of damage.  See also Ark. State Hwy. Comm’n v. Cottrell, 9 Ark. App.  359, 660 S.W.2d 179 (1983) (finding that the rule that circuitry of travel is not compensable  when a land owner whose land is not being taken claims that he is entitled to damages); Ark.  State Hwy. Comm’n v. Coffman, 251 Ark. 590, 473 S.W.2d 873 (1971) (allowing evidence  of  the  inconvenience  of  a  partial  taking  to  be  considered  in  assessing  a  landowner’s  damages). ­7­  CA06­1062  Appellant asserts that his efforts to establish the severance damages to the remainder  of his property, which consisted of a service station, meat market, convenience store, his  dwelling, and rental property, was thwarted by the hearing and resulting ruling on the motion  in limine. He claims that his severance damages materially exceeded the jury award, and that  access  of  west­bound  traffic  is  substantially  hampered  in  the  effort  to  patronize  his  businesses.    Appellant  argues  that  it  was  clear  error  for  the  circuit  court  to  restrict,  or  essentially deny, testimony regarding the new limitations imposed on his ingress and egress  to the property. While acknowledging that access to the property was not completely denied,  appellant asserts that the only new way to reach his property is dangerous, restrictive, and  inconvenient.  Appellee again alleges, and we agree, that appellant freely testified about this issue  at trial.  Alternatively, appellee contends that the circuit court’s ruling excluding evidence  that the median strip down the center of the new road was an element of damages that must  be considered was not error.  Appellee asserts that it is well settled that public authorities  may erect a median strip down the center of a thoroughfare or may in some other manner  prohibit left turns or two­way traffic without compensating the abutting landowner for his  inconvenience or for the loss of business that results from the flow of traffic.  See Ark. State  Hwy. Comm’n v. Bingham, 231 Ark. 934, 333 S.W.2d 738 (1960); City of Ft. Smith v. Van  Zandt, 197 Ark. 91, 122 S.W.2d 187 (1938).  Although the rulings in these cases dealt with  the factual considerations of those specific cases, which appellant claims differ “vastly” from  the facts in the instant case, we find merit in appellee’s argument on this point.  Appellant ­8­  CA06­1062  was ultimately allowed to present a significant amount of testimony on these issues, and we  hold  that  he  has  failed  to  demonstrate  prejudice  in  not  being  allowed  to  present  more  evidence, what that additional evidence would have entailed, or that it would have changed  the outcome of the case.  Accordingly, we affirm on this point as well.  Affirmed.  GRIFFEN, J., agrees.  HART, J., concurs.  HART, J., concurring. I agree that this case must be affirmed; however, I disagree that  we should dispose of this case simply because Mr. Hendrickson was able to present evidence  that appeared to circumvent the Highway Commission’s motion in limine.  The majority is  correct when it states that Hendrickson was not prejudiced by the paucity of the evidence that  he was allowed to present at trial.  There was enough evidence  presented to warrant an  instruction on the loss of access, had the trial court not found in granting the motion in limine  1  that it was not compensable.  Mr. Hendrickson was, however, prejudiced by what I believe was an improper use of  a motion in limine to preclude him from asserting a theory of recovery based on the loss of  access to his property.  It is settled law that it is impermissible to use motions in limine as 1  I believe that Mr. Hendrickson’s second point would be unavailing under any  circumstance.  In Arkansas Highway Commission v. Bingham, 231 Ark. 934, 333 S.W.2d  728 (1960), the supreme court decided that as a matter of public policy that the  diminution in access to a business by the creation of a divided highway would not be  compensable in condemnation actions.  ­9­  CA06­1062  a sweeping means of testing issues of law. Turner v. Northwest Ark. Neurosurgery Clinic,  P.A., 84 Ark. App. 93, 133 S.W.3d 417 (2003) (citing Schichtl v. Slack, 293 Ark. 281, 737  S.W.2d 628 (1987)). Nonetheless, I must acknowledge that Mr. Hendrickson’s argument on  appeal  did not assail the propriety of granting the motion in limine as a means of foreclosing  one theory of recovery.  Accordingly, this case must be affirmed. ­10­  CA06­1062 

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