Brenna Keesee v. David Keesee

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  SARAH J. HEFFLEY, JUDGE  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  DIVISION I  CA 06­1022  November 14, 2007  BRENNA KEESEE  APPELLANT  APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. E­2000­806]  V. HONORABLE DAVID REYNOLDS,  JUDGE  DAVID KEESEE  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  On March 9, 2006, the Faulkner County Circuit Court entered an order changing  custody of the parties’ minor child from the mother, appellant Brenna Keesee, to the father,  appellee David Keesee. Appellant now appeals this order, arguing that the trial court’s  decision was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence and should be reversed. We  affirm the change of custody.  Appellant and appellee were divorced on June 3, 2003. Custody of their son, B.K.,  born June 19, 1997, was granted to appellant, subject to reasonable visitation by appellee,  and appellee was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $68 per week. Over the  next  fifteen  months,  the  parties  returned  to  court  several  times  to  address  the  issue  of  appellee being in arrears on his child support payments. On December 3, 2004, appellee filed a motion for contempt, alleging that appellant had willfully disregarded the court’s  order that he be given visitation and that he had not seen his son since January 5, 2004.  Appellee asked the court to award custody of B.K. to him, and he also asked the court to  postpone his obligation to make child support payments due to the fact that he was unable  to work and was awaiting the outcome of a claim filed with social security disability.  A hearing was held on the matter, at which appellee testified that appellant was  intentionally interfering with his visitation. He also testified that he was not able to drive  long distances due to a back injury, and appellant would not allow his parents to pick up  B.K. for him. In contrast, appellant testified that she had never kept appellee from seeing  their son and that she had encouraged appellee to visit their son, but he did not do so.  Another hearing was held on March 2, 2005, at which appellee testified that appellant had  consented  to  visitation  and  then  withdrawn  consent  on  numerous  occasions,  including  several times that appellee or his parents had driven to the child’s home only to be denied  the right to leave with the child. Appellant testified and denied preventing appellee from  exercising visitation, and she explained that she had only denied overnight visitation due  to medical issues with the child, including depression and separation anxiety, for which he  was given prescription medication. Appellant testified that B.K. was currently under the  care  of  Dr.  David  Blaske,  a  clinical  psychologist,  and  Dr.  Teresa  Cisneros,  a  child  psychiatrist. At the conclusion of the testimony, the court set another hearing date for April  6,  2005, and instructed appellant to have B.K.’s doctor there to testify. The court also ­2­  CA 06­1022  granted appellee’s motion to reduce child support to the minimum ($24 per week) and  reiterated that appellee was entitled to visitation. The order memorializing this decision,  filed March 14, 2005, stated that appellee was to have overnight visitation “every weekend  he is physically able to travel to Truman, Arkansas.” The order also noted that appellee had  orally withdrawn his motion for change of custody.  On  March  15,  2005,  appellee  again  filed  a  motion  for  contempt,  alleging  that  appellant had failed to follow the court’s directive from the March 2 hearing and had not  allowed him visitation every weekend as ordered. The court ordered appellant to show  cause at a hearing scheduled for April 6. At the hearing, the court heard testimony from  Dr.  David  Blaske,  who  testified  that  he  had  been  treating  B.K.  since  February  2004.  Dr. Blaske testified that both he and Dr. Cisneros recommended that: (1) the court appoint  an attorney ad litem for B.K.; (2) visits with appellee should continue, with day visits on  the weekends progressing to overnight visits as soon as possible; (3) individual and family  therapy should continue to address concerns about B.K. and how to alleviate his anxiety.  Dr. Blaske stated that although B.K. had a high level of anxiety over spending time with  his dad, the anxiety would decrease as the time spent with his dad “becomes predictable  and safe.” Dr. Blaske explained that B.K. had been diagnosed with some mixed anxiety  depression and ADHD, and his belief was that the parents’ conduct may be contributing  to B.K.’s problems. Dr. Blaske testified that he felt B.K. “would do fine if the chaos of  these  visitation  issues  were  gone.”  Dr.  Blaske  stated  that  if  both  parents  were  loving, ­3­  CA 06­1022  consistent, and involved, B.K. would be fine, and “the goal … [is] to make that happen;  get mom and dad working together better, communicating in [B.K.]’s best interest, not  fighting over him, not playing games.”  Appellee testified that the  first weekend after the March 2 hearing, he had seen  B.K., although his visitation hours were shortened at appellant’s request, and appellee said  he agreed because he wanted to avoid any confrontation with her. Appellee testified that  when he called to schedule his visitation for the next weekend, appellant  told  him the  visitation was supposed to be every other weekend. Appellee disagreed and told her the  court order stated every weekend, but appellant contended that she had not gotten a copy  of the court order and refused to let appellee bring her a copy of it. Appellee was able to  exercise his visitation the third weekend after the March 2 hearing, although again for a  shorter  amount  of  time  than  ordered  by  the  court.  Appellee  testified  he  had  not  had  visitation since then, and he had visitation only two weekends out of the five weekends  since the March 2 hearing.  Appellant  testified  that  it  was  her  understanding  that  visitation  would  be  in  accordance  with  the  recommendation  of  Dr.  Cisneros,  B.K.’s  psychiatrist,  and  that  Dr. Cisneros’s recommendation was that visitation occur every other weekend as opposed  to the every­weekend visitation ordered by the court. Although appellant had been at the  March 2 hearing, she stated that  she  was very distraught that day and could not recall  exactly what the court had ordered. Appellant testified that she had not received a copy of ­4­  CA 06­1022  the court order, and she told appellee not to bring her a copy of the order because she was  going out of town. She also testified that she had not heard from appellee from the time of  his last visitation until the hearing that day.  At the close of the hearing, the court held a brief recess and typed out an order so  the court could give the parties a copy before they left. The court ordered that visitation  would commence the following weekend and would occur every other weekend,  from  10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on Saturday and 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. The court also  appointed  Fran  Scroggins  as  attorney  ad  litem  for  B.K.  and  continued  the  hearing  on  appellee’s motion for contempt until May 3, 2005.  For reasons not clear from the record, a hearing was not held on May 3, but on May  18,  a  brief  hearing was  held  at  which  an  agreed  order  was  entered  allowing overnight  visitation to commence. The order, filed May 20, stated that overnight visitation was to  begin Saturday, May 21, from 10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday, May 22. Overnight  visitation was to occur every other weekend.  On  July  25,  2005,  appellee  filed  a  petition  for  contempt,  alleging  that  Fran  Scroggins,  the  attorney  ad  litem,  had  worked  out  an  agreement  between  the  parties  concerning summer visitation. The agreement stated  that appellee would have primary  custody  of  B.K.  during  the  summer,  and  appellant  would  have  visitation  every  other  weekend. Appellee alleged that appellant had picked up B.K. on July 8 and was supposed  to return him two days later, but had never done so. Appellee had been unable to exercise ­5­  CA 06­1022  any visitation, including the weekend visitation ordered by the court on May 20. Appellee  also filed a motion for change of custody, alleging that there had been a material change  in circumstances in that appellant had refused to allow visitation and had tried to destroy  any attempt by appellee to maintain a relationship with his son.  In her response to appellee’s petition for contempt, appellant denied that she had  agreed  to  the  summer  visitation  schedule  and  argued  that  Scroggins  had  attempted  to  impose full summer visitation in favor of appellee without the approval of the court and  contrary to the recommendations of B.K.’s therapists. Appellant also filed a response to  appellee’s motion for change of custody in which she denied interfering with visitation or  attempting to harm appellee’s relationship with B.K.  A hearing was held on the matter on September 7, 2005. Dr. Blaske testified that  although visitation had been discontinued, he had never recommended that visitation be  suspended, terminated, or modified in any way. Dr. Blaske also testified that he had not  specifically recommended that the overnight visitation turn into a full summer visitation.  Under  cross­examination  by  Scroggins,  Dr.  Blaske  stated  that  he  had  sensed  from  the  beginning of the case that B.K. was “trapped in the middle of two parents that despise each  other.” Dr. Blaske testified that he could not point to anything specific indicating that B.K.  had any problems staying overnight with his father during the summer, except for one  bizarre story about his grandmother trying to poison him, which Dr. Blaske dismissed,  noting that B.K. did have “some tall tales he’ll tell occasionally.” Dr. Blaske reiterated his ­6­  CA 06­1022  concern  that  B.K.’s  anxiety  stemmed  from  being  in  the  middle  of  this  “unfortunate  situation.”  Appellee testified that he had not seen his son since July 8, and between July 8 and  July 23, he had called appellant between twenty and forty times and attempted to set up  visitation. Appellee testified that appellant had told him she was not going to let him have  visitation, and other times she just hung up the phone. According to appellee, appellant told  him that B.K. was “having problems” and that she would call him back, but she never did.  After some dispute over what visitation the previous order had established, the court  clarified  that  the  overnight,  every­other­weekend  visitation  was  the  minimum,  and  as  contemplated  in  the  order,  the  parties  could  agree  otherwise.  Regarding  the  plan  for  extended summer visitation, appellant testified that she did allow some additional visitation  for a while, but that it was contingent on B.K.’s mental capacity and how he was dealing  with it, and she felt like B.K. was regressing. Appellant testified that she tried to work out  an alternate arrangement, with appellant having custody one week, appellee having custody  the next week, and so on, but appellee did not agree. Appellant testified that appellee did  not exercise his weekend visitation after July 8. Appellant stated that the only messages she  received from appellee were requests for B.K. to call him, and there  had  been  several  instances where B.K. repeatedly attempted to reach his dad by phone but was unable to do  so. Appellant also testified that Scroggins had told her that if she did not give appellee  summer visitation, she would lose custody of her son. ­7­  CA 06­1022  Scroggins then called appellee back to testify, and he testified that at the meeting  of himself, appellant, and Scroggins to plan the summer visitation, Scroggins had never  said  that  custody  would  be  taken  away  from  appellant.  Appellee  also  testified  that  according to phone bills placed into evidence, he had called appellant thirty­four times  between July 8 and the present date.  As the final witness, the court heard testimony in­camera from B.K., who was eight  years old at the time.  B.K. testified that his dad was a good guy, but he was not sure if he  had visited his dad this summer. B.K. told the court he had been trying to call his dad to  ask him to visit, but he had been unable to get his dad on the phone. B.K. stated that the  last time he went to see his dad, he was scared to go back, because his dad had “whooped”  him with a belt with metal on it when he was five.  After hearing all the testimony, the court made the following ruling from the bench:  I don’t like many of the things that both of these parties have done throughout this  case. I don’t like the fact that they did things at the very beginning that were aimed  at hurting each other and nothing else … if there was a place in a decent foster  home to put these children, that’s where – what I would do with [B.K.], but there’s  not. I’m disappointed in the way both of them have handled this. They have just  practically ruined their child. And they are not going to get any better apparently.  Now, the last times we’ve been here, I have made it clear that [B.K.] was to have  visitation  with  his  dad  to  reestablish  their  relationship  and  that’s  been  thwarted  again.  So  what  I  am  going  to  do  today  is  I’m  going  to  change  custody  today.  Visitation with Brenna will be what Mr. Keesee had before.  The court specifically noted that this was a temporary order, and the parties would have  a final hearing on the matter at a later date. Appellant objected to the court’s ruling and ­8­  CA 06­1022  argued  that  the  court  did  not  have  jurisdiction  to  do  what  it  had  done.  An  order  memorializing the court’s decision was entered on September 15, 2005.  On December 15, 2005, appellant filed a motion for ex parte relief, alleging that she  had received information that appellee was not providing appropriate care for their child.  Specifically,  appellant  alleged  that  appellee  had  taken  the  child  off  of  his  prescription  medication without medical advice or supervision. Appellant also stated that appellee was  unemployed and that he and the child were living in an “attic” in appellee’s parent’s home  that  had  no  running  water  or  bathroom  facilities.  In  his  response,  appellee  denied  appellant’s allegations and explained that the home where he and B.K. resided does have  running water and bathroom facilities, but the room in which they reside does not have its  own bathroom.  At  a  hearing  held  February  10,  2006,  the  court  heard  testimony  from  Kristy  Kennedy, a licensed social worker who had been seeing B.K. since October 2005. Appellee  took B.K. to Kennedy over concerns that he may have trouble adjusting to his new home.  Kennedy testified that based on reports from appellee and B.K.’s teacher, her office had  confirmed that B.K. probably did not need to be on medication. Kennedy testified she had  conducted several family sessions with appellee and B.K., and one of the issues B.K. had  to work out was his feeling that his father had a bad temper, which stemmed from the  spanking B.K. had received when he was five years old. Regarding an eight­year­old’s  ability to remember an incident that occurred when he was five, Kennedy testified that it ­9­  CA 06­1022  was possible, but she was not sure that the incident had actually occurred. She stated that  when she asked B.K. details about the incident, he could not give her details, and it was  possible he was remembering the event because he was told that it happened.  Kennedy  also  reported  that  B.K.  continued  to  express  a  desire  to  live  with  his  mother, but that was normal when  a  child had formerly been in his mother’s care and  custody.  Kennedy  explained  that  her  office  had  diagnosed  B.K.  with  an  adjustment  disorder, which is usually a short­term diagnosis, but that this case had dragged on and on  so that B.K. had been unable to put the past behind him, and he was “kind of in a limbo.”  Based on her observations of B.K.’s behavior, Kennedy stated that she did not believe that  B.K. needed antidepressant medication or that he suffered from ADHD.  Appellee testified that B.K. missed his mom when he came to live with him after  the September hearing, and appellee had complied with the court order for visitation and  also granted extra visitation because he knew B.K. needed to see his mother. Appellee  testified that since living with him, B.K. had made the honor roll in school and received  a  citizenship  award  for  his  conduct.  B.K.  was  also  participating  in  Cub  Scouts,  and  appellee was the den leader. Appellee also planned to sign B.K. up for soccer the coming  weekend. Appellee testified that he loved his son, and he felt it was in B.K.’s best interest  to remain with him.  Appellant testified that she had not disobeyed any orders regarding visitation and  that she had facilitated visitation to the best that she understood. Appellant reiterated that ­10­  CA 06­1022  she felt she had no choice but to agree to the summer visitation agreement and that she had  stopped the summer visitation on her own initiative after B.K. returned home with a bad  case of impetigo. Appellant denied stopping or attempting to stop the weekend visits that  were  ordered  by  the  court.  Appellant  expressed  her  desire  to  retain  custody  of  B.K.  and testified that she would comply with the visitation order. Under cross­examination by  Ms. Scroggins, appellant read an excerpt from a letter to the court, dated April 28, 2005,  written by Drs. Blaske and Cisneros:  During these sessions and through written communication the mother has indicated  some anxiety related to the visits with the father. The mother’s communication has  indicated concerns related to [B.K.]’s ability to cope well with these visits. In a  recent meeting with the father, he expressed the desire to initiate overnight visits  and  reported  being  pleased  with  how  the  day  visits  had  gone  to  this  point.  He  reported enjoying these visits and his time spent with [B.K.]. Within the individual  therapy sessions, [B.K.] has not self­reported any anxiousness.  The  court’s  final  witness  was  B.K.,  who  was  again  questioned  by  the  court  in­  camera. B.K. indicated that he needed to go with his mom, but when asked why, he only  responded, “Because.” B.K. told the court he was making good grades and had received  first place in his pack and second place overall in the Pinewood Derby. He also told the  court he was able to visit his mom often, although he had not been to her new home in  Malvern.  In its ruling from the bench, the court found that there had been a material change  of circumstances and that custody should remain with appellee. The court stated that it was  clear which parent would foster a relationship for the child with both parents, and it was ­11­  CA 06­1022  not appellant.  I’m having to look at the way it would be better for [B.K.] to be in a home with a  dad who is disabled and stays home twenty­four/seven practically or a mom, while  [B.K.] was in her custody, was constantly ill, not ill but having all these anxiety  problems, going to the doctor, counselors because of them, disregarded the Court’s  order when – it seemed to be at a whim, whenever she would decide [B.K.] didn’t  need to go see dad and then it would be months before any relationship was restored  again.  In  conclusion,  the  court  granted  custody  to  appellee  and  awarded  appellant  liberal  visitation.  The  order  memorializing  this  decision,  filed  March  9,  2006,  explained  that  appellant’s repeated failure to comply with the court’s orders constituted a material change  of circumstances sufficient to warrant a change of custody. Appellant then filed a timely  notice of appeal to this court.  In child­custody cases, the primary consideration is the welfare and best interests  of the child involved; all other considerations are secondary. Dansby v. Dansby, 87 Ark.  App. 156, 189 S.W.3d 473 (2004). Custody will not be modified unless it is shown that  there are changed conditions demonstrating that a modification is in the best interest of the  child. Id. In cases involving child custody and related matters, we review the case de novo,  but we will not reverse a trial judge's findings in this regard unless they are clearly contrary  to the preponderance of the evidence. Henley v. Medlock, 97 Ark. App. 45, ___ S.W.3d  ___ (2006). A finding is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence when, although  there  is  evidence  to  support  it,  the  reviewing  court  is  left  with  the  definite  and  firm  conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. Because the question of whether the trial ­12­  CA 06­1022  court's findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence turns largely on the  credibility of the witnesses, we give special deference to the superior position of the trial  judge  to  evaluate  the  witnesses,  their  testimony,  and  the  child's  best  interest.  Sharp  v.  Keeler, 99 Ark. App. 42, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007). There are no cases in which the superior  position, ability, and opportunity of the trial judge to observe the parties carry as great a  weight as those involving minor children. Id.  For her first point on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in changing  custody rather than using its power of contempt because there was no evidence of any  material change of circumstance, and violation of court orders is not sufficient as the sole  justification  of  a  change  in  custody.  It  is  true  that  this  court  has  stated  a  trial  court’s  contempt power should be used prior to the more drastic measure of changing custody, see  Hepp v. Hepp, 61 Ark. App. 240, 968 S.W.2d 62 (1998); however, the trial court is not  required to hold a party in contempt prior to a change of custody. Moreover, it is clear from  the record that the court expressed its displeasure at appellant’s failure to abide by the  visitation order on multiple occasions.  We also agree with appellant’s assertion that a violation of the court’s previous  directives alone does not warrant a change of custody. Bernal v. Shirley, 96 Ark. App. 148,  ___  S.W.3d  ___  (2006).  The  trial  court  must  first  determine  that  a  material  change  in  circumstances  has  occurred  since  the  last  order  of  custody,  and  if  that  threshold  requirement  is  met,  it  must  then  determine  who  should  have  custody  with  the  sole ­13­  CA 06­1022  consideration  being the  best  interest  of  the  child.  Id.  In  this  case,  the  court  found  that  appellant’s repeated failure to comply with the court’s orders for visitation was a material  change of circumstance, and the court made clear that it was placing B.K. in the care of the  parent who would foster a relationship for B.K. with both parents, which was certainly in  B.K.’s best interest. We find that this decision was not clearly against the preponderance  of the evidence. See Sharp v. Keeler, supra (holding that mother’s repeated refusal to allow  father visitation when she decided it was in the child’s best interest, and her refusal to  follow the trial court’s directives, constituted a record of continued alienation that was a  material change of circumstances).  For  her  second  point  on  appeal,  appellant  argues  that  the  trial  court’s  decision  should be reversed because the issue of custody was not before the bench at the September  2005 hearing, and therefore appellant was not aware of the nature of the hearing and did  not have the opportunity to present evidence against a modification of custody. To support  this argument, appellant cites Estes v. Masner, 244 Ark. 797, 427 S.W.2d 161 (1968). In  Estes, the supreme court reversed a change of custody from the mother to the father after  the  mother  did  not  receive  valid  notice  of  a  contempt  hearing,  and  upon  the  mother’s  failure to appear, the court found the mother in contempt and modified custody. Estes,  however, involved both the contempt hearing and the modification occurring on the same  day,  without the mother in attendance; in this case, the modification of custody at the  September hearing was only a temporary order, and appellant had several months before ­14­  CA 06­1022  the final hearing in which to prepare an argument against a modification of custody. We  also note that while appellant did object at the September hearing, arguing that the trial  court lacked jurisdiction, appellant never raised a lack­of­notice argument to the court, and  it is well­settled that this court will not consider arguments, even constitutional ones, raised  for  the  first  time  on  appeal.  Young  v.  State,  370  Ark.  147,  ___  S.W.3d  ___  (2007).  Accordingly, we find no merit in this argument and affirm.  Affirmed.  GLADWIN  and BIRD, JJ., agree. ­15­  CA 06­1022 

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