Phillip Andre Milner v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  LARRY D. VAUGHT, JUDGE  DIVISION II  CACR07­691  December 19, 2007  PHILLIP ANDRE MILNER  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [CR2006­1149, CR2006­4474]  HON. JOHN W. LANGSTON,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Appellant Phillip Milner appeals from orders entered by the trial court finding him  guilty  of  theft  by  receiving,  a  Class  C  felony,  and  revoking  his  probation  based  on  the  conviction. He argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motions for directed  verdict. We disagree and affirm.  At Milner’s bench trial on the theft­by­receiving charge, Little Rock Police Officer  Matthew Hoyle testified that in October 2006 he was on patrol with another officer when he  observed a man on an orange scooter run a stop sign. Officer Hoyle testified that after the  man  on  the  scooter  saw  Hoyle’s  patrol  car,  the  man  drove  between  two  closely  parked  construction  vehicles,  preventing  the  patrol  car  from  following  him.  After  asking  a  construction worker to move one of the vehicles, Officer Hoyle was able to catch up with the man on the scooter, at which time Officer Hoyle witnessed the man run a second stop sign.  At that point, Officer Hoyle conducted a traffic stop.  Officer  Hoyle  identified  the  man  on  the  scooter  as  Milner.  Officer  Hoyle  also  observed that the ignition of the scooter was damaged and had no key in  it.  The  officer  conducted a pat­down for safety and discovered a bill of sale for the scooter in Milner’s  pocket. The bill of sale did not list Milner as the owner. Officer Hoyle asked Milner if he  knew who the owner of the vehicle was, and Milner responded that he did not. Officer Hoyle  then contacted the owner listed on the bill of sale, Joseph Brown, who confirmed that his  scooter had been stolen the day before.  Brown testified that he purchased the orange scooter in August 2006. He paid $1600  for it and was still making payments in October 2006 when it was stolen. Brown testified that  when the scooter was stolen from him it was in “mint condition.” However, when the scooter  was returned to him the head light was broken, the ignition switch was destroyed, and the  seat  was  damaged.  Brown  explained  that  he  stored  the  bill  of  sale  in  a  compartment  underneath the seat. Brown testified that the seat compartment was locked when the scooter  was stolen. Finally, Brown testified that he did not know Milner and did not give permission  to him to operate the scooter.  Milner moved for directed verdict at trial, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.  The trial court denied Milner’s motions and found Milner guilty of theft by receiving. Three  days  later,  the  parties  appeared  before  the  trial  court  on  the  State’s  petition  to  revoke 2  1  Milner’s probation.  The State offered the testimony of two of Milner’s probation officers.  These probation officers testified that they, on separate occasions, read the conditions of  probation  to  Milner  and  that  Milner,  in  July  2006  and  August  2006,  signed  different  statements verifying that he understood the conditions. Thereafter, the parties stipulated to  the  admission  of  the  testimony  that  was  taken  during the  theft­by­receiving trial.  At  the  conclusion of the revocation hearing, the trial court found that Milner wilfully violated the  conditions  of  his  probation  by  committing  the  offense  of  theft  of  property,  and  revoked  Milner’s probation. On appeal, Milner challenges the trial court’s denial of his motions for  directed verdicts on the theft­by­receiving conviction and the trial court’s revocation of his  probation based upon the conviction.  Regarding Milner’s first point on appeal, a directed­verdict motion is a challenge to  the sufficiency of the evidence. Slater v. State, 76 Ark. App. 365, 65 S.W.3d 481 (2002).  When  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  is  challenged,  we  consider  only  the  evidence  that  supports the verdict, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Slater, 76  Ark. App. at 369, 65 S.W.3d at 484. The test is whether there is substantial evidence to  support the verdict, which is evidence that is of sufficient force and character that it will,  with  reasonable  certainty,  compel  a  conclusion  one  way  or  another.  Id.  Resolution  of  conflicts in testimony and assessment of witness credibility is for the fact­finder. Id. 1  Milner was on probation after pleading guilty to burglary and theft­of­property  charges that arose on September 27, 2005.  3  A person commits the offense of theft by receiving if he receives, retains, or disposes  of stolen property of another person, knowing that it was stolen or having good reason to  believe  it  was  stolen.  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  5­36­106(a)  (Repl.  1997).  The  unexplained  possession or control by a person of recently stolen property or the acquisition by a person  of property for a consideration known to be far below its reasonable value shall give rise to  a presumption that he knows or believes that the property was stolen. Ark. Code Ann. §  5­36­106(c).  Milner argues that because the State failed to offer into evidence photographs of the  scooter, it was impossible to determine whether the condition of the scooter would have  revealed that Milner “[knew] that it was stolen or [had] good reason to believe it was stolen.”  Accordingly, argues Milner, the trial court had to resort to speculation and conjecture to find  Milner guilty.  In response, the State contends that there was sufficient evidence demonstrating that  Milner  knew  or  should  have  known  that  the  scooter  he  was  operating  was  stolen.  For  example, there was testimony from Officer Hoyle that Milner, once he knew he was being  observed by the police, acted suspiciously by trying to evade the officers. Officer Hoyle  testified that upon viewing the scooter, he immediately noticed that the ignition switch was  damaged and that there was no key in the ignition, but that the scooter’s engine was running.  Although Milner had the bill of sale in his pocket, it did not list his name as the owner, and  Milner had no idea who the owner was. The owner of the scooter, Brown, testified that the  scooter had been stolen from him the day before and that he did not give Milner permission 4  to operate it. Brown further testified that the scooter was in mint condition prior to the theft,  but after it was returned to him there were multiple items on the scooter that were obviously  damaged. Finally, according to Brown, the only way for anyone to have obtained the bill of  sale was to break open the locked seat compartment.  Based on our review of the record, we agree with the State that there was sufficient  evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Milner knew or should have known that the  scooter was stolen. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Milner was guilty  of Class C felony theft by receiving.  Milner’s second point on appeal is that the trial court erred in revoking his probation  based upon the conviction. Milner makes the same argument he made for his first point on  appeal—that there was insufficient evidence supporting the theft­of­property conviction, and  therefore revocation based on that conviction was error.  To revoke probation, the burden is on the State to prove the violation of a condition  of probation by a preponderance of the evidence. Cheshire v. State, 80 Ark. App. 327, 95  S.W.3d  820  (2003).  On  appeal,  the  trial  court’s  findings  will  be  upheld  unless  they  are  clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Cheshire, 80 Ark. App. at 330, 94 S.W.3d  at 822. Because the determination turns on questions of credibility and weight to be given  testimony, we defer to the trial judge’s superior position. Id.  The burden of proof in a probation­revocation case—proof by a preponderance of the  evidence—is less than the State’s burden of proof required in a criminal case—proof beyond  a reasonable doubt. See Jones v. State, 355 Ark. 630, 144 S.W.3d 254 (2004) (recognizing 5  that  the  burdens  of  proof  are  different  in  criminal  and  probation­revocation  cases,  and  therefore,  evidence  that  is  insufficient  for  a  criminal  conviction  may  be  sufficient  for  revocation  of  probation  or  suspended  sentence).  Because  we  hold  that  the  State  met  its  burden in the theft­by­receiving case, we necessarily hold that the State met its burden of  proof in the probation­revocation case and affirm.  Affirmed.  MARSHALL  and MILLER, JJ., agree. 6 

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