Demarco Blackmon v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  WENDELL L. GRIFFEN, JUDGE  DIVISION III  CACR07­535  DEMARCO BLACKMON  APPELLANT  December 19, 2007  AN APPEAL FROM GARLAND  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [CR2006­425 I]  V.  HON. JOHN HOMER WRIGHT, JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Demarco Blackmon appeals from his conviction for first­degree battery.  He argues  that  his  conviction  should  be  reversed  because  the  State  failed  to  prove  that  he  acted  purposely.    He  also  argues  that  the  trial  court  failed  to  give  “due  consideration”  to  his  imperfect justification defense, which he claims would have entitled him to a lesser charge  of second­degree battery.  We hold that appellant’s argument that the State failed to prove  he acted purposely is procedurally barred.  We further hold that the  trial  court properly  rejected appellant’s justification defense.  Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s conviction.  I.  Facts  Appellant was charged with the first­degree battery of Corey Webb pursuant to Ark.  Code Ann. § 5­13­201(a)(8) (Supp. 2007), which defines the offense as purposely causing  physical injury to another person by means of a firearm.  The incident took place on July 9,  2006,  in  Hot  Springs.  The  basic  facts  are  undisputed:    an  argument  involving  racial  comments preceded the shooting.  Appellant admits that he shot Webb but asserts that he did so in self­defense and did not act purposely to harm Webb.  The State’s case­in­chief was presented through the testimony of Webb, Neva Webb  (Webb’s mother), Kristen Webb (his sister), and Carmen Owen (his girlfriend), who each  lived in Apartment 8 at 2314 Lakeshore Drive.  On the day of the incident, Webb, Owen,  Kristen, Webb’s brother, Kevin, and a friend, Jordan (referred to herein as “the Webbs”),  returned to the apartment complex from Lake Ouachita.  Webb’s witnesses said that they  pulled  into  the  apartment  complex  with  their  windows  down,  listening  to  loud  music,  singing, and laughing.  Jonese  Richie,  appellant’s  girlfriend,  had  driven  appellant  and  Phyllis  Blackmon  (appellant’s  mother)  to  the  apartment  complex  to  drop  off  appellant’s  son  to  the  boy’s  mother.  Appellant got out of the car and walked his son to the apartment.  Appellant was  still  standing outside  of  that  apartment  when  the  Webbs  arrived.    Appellant’s  witnesses  testified that the people inside of the Webb vehicle were using profanity, including the word  “nigger.”  Appellant approached the Webb vehicle and asked if they were talking about him.  Kevin got out of the car and he and appellant engaged in a “heated argument” that involved  Kevin  and  appellant  yelling  and  pushing  each  other.  Kristen  admitted  that  during  the  argument, she heard her brothers use the word, “nigger.”  Conflicting testimony was adduced regarding whether the incident defused at that  point and whether the Webbs thereafter went into the Webb apartment. Appellant and Richie  said that the fight never broke up and that the Webbs never went inside of the apartment.  Webb’s mother said that one person (Webb) ran inside the apartment and came “right back”  outside.  The Webb witnesses testified that the fight broke up and that they all went inside the  apartment.  They then heard a sound at the front door.  Kristen said she opened the door and  saw foam running down the door where someone had apparently hit the door with a beer can. 2  According to the Webb witnesses, appellant was standing outside of the apartment and called  Kristen a “bitch”; Webb called appellant a “nigger” and further argument ensued.  Webb  admittedly ran toward  appellant with the intent to fight him.  While backing away from  Webb, appellant shot Webb in the stomach, using Richie’s 380 semi­automatic pistol that  he pulled from his pocket.  Appellant and his companions then fled in Richie’s vehicle.  Appellant denied that he ever stood in front of the Webb apartment.  Yet, LeeAnn  Clem, the responding officer, testified that there was a trail of blood in the kitchen area,  which was the apartment’s entry point.  She further said that a beverage had been spilled in  the very front of the kitchen area and that the bullet casing was found in the parking space  in front of the apartment.  Whether Webb had a weapon was also disputed.  Webb’s witnesses testified that he  had no weapon; Richie and appellant testified that Richie called to appellant that Webb had  a knife.  She inconsistently testified that after the shot was fired, they ran back to her car and  that appellant shot as they were all “scrambling” back to the car.  Richie said that appellant  shot at the ground.  She also said that they were only “a few steps away” from her car, and  that appellant “didn’t have to run far at all.”  Appellant  testified  that  Webb  was  approximately  fifteen­to­twenty  feet  from  him  when Webb ran at him; that he “shot low” to scare Webb; and that he never intended to shoot  anyone.  Appellant’s witnesses said that three or four people rushed toward them; appellant  said that he did not think they could get back to the car and leave.  He further said that his  family  was outnumbered, that they did not know the Webbs, that the Webbs were “real  drunk,” and that he did not know what they were going to do to his family.  Appellant’s mother and Richie testified that they were concerned for their safety;  however, appellant’s mother said that “a minute or two” passed between the time Webb went  into the house and when he came out.  She said this was not enough time to allow her to get 3  into  Richie’s  two­door  Honda  because  she  was  tall  and  the  front  seat  had  to  be  pushed  forward.  None of appellant’s witnesses telephoned the police.  Although appellant and Richie  testified that as they left someone called “Shoot me, nigger,” each of appellant’s witnesses  claimed that they were not certain whether appellant had shot anyone.  Appellant admitted  that he called local hospitals but did not call the police.  He also admitted that he initially  told the police he did not know anything about the shooting and denied to the police that he  shot anyone.  During the bench trial, appellant requested that the trial court dismiss the first­degree  battery charge, but failed to challenge the proof of any specific elements of that charge.  He  also argued that he acted in self­defense.  Additionally, he asserted that his conduct would  conform with second­degree battery in recklessly causing serious physical injury by means  1  of a deadly weapon.  The trial  court denied appellant’s directed verdict motion and the  renewal thereof; rejected appellant’s justification defense; and determined that he was not  entitled to the lesser charge.  It found appellant guilty of first­degree battery and sentenced  him to serve eight years in the Arkansas Department of Correction.  II.  Motion for a Directed Verdict  Appellant first challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for a directed verdict.  We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.  In  reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most  favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict.  See Coggin  v.  State,  356  Ark.  424,  156  S.W.3d  712  (2004).    We  affirm  a  conviction  if  substantial  evidence exists to support it.  Id.  Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and 1  See Ark. Code Ann. § 5­13­202(a)(3) (Supp. 2007).  4  character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other,  without resorting to speculation or conjecture.  Id.  Appellant was convicted of first­degree battery under § 5­13­201(a)(8), which defines  battery  as  purposely  causing  physical  injury  to  another  person  by  means  of  a  firearm.  Appellant  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying  his  motion  for  a  directed  verdict  because the State failed to make a prima facie case that he acted purposely.  We summarily  affirm appellant’s conviction without reaching the merits of his argument because he failed  to assert below that the State failed to prove that he acted purposely.  A directed­verdict motion shall state the specific grounds therefor, and must specify  the respect in which the evidence is deficient.  See Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(a),(c).  A general  motion  merely  stating  that  the  evidence  is  insufficient  does  not  preserve  for  appeal  a  challenge  to  a  specific  deficiency  in  the  evidence.  See  Ark.  R.  Crim.  P.  33.1(c).    A  defendant’s failure to state the specific grounds for his directed­verdict motion or to state the  manner in which the evidence is deficient waives any question pertaining to the sufficiency  of the evidence to support the verdict.  See Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c).  Here, appellant requested that the court dismiss the first­degree battery charge but he  failed to specifically challenge the proof of any elements of that charge.  He further asserted  that if he committed first­degree battery, then he was justified because he  acted  in  self­  defense.  He  also  asserted  that  the  charge  should  be  reduced  to  second­degree  battery.  Clearly, appellant did not argue below, as he does now, that the State failed to prove he acted  purposely.  Accordingly, we affirm because appellant failed to preserve his challenge to the  sufficiency of the evidence.  IV.  Justification Defense  We  further  affirm  because  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  rejecting  appellant’s  justification  defense.  Appellant  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  failing  to  give  “due 5  2  consideration”  to  his  justification  theory.  Appellant  cites  no  authority  for  his  apparent  proposition that “due consideration” is a legal standard that a trial court must meet when  ruling on the applicability of a justification defense.  In any event, that is not the proper legal  standard.  Rather,  we  examine  whether  substantial  evidence  supports  the  trier­of­fact’s  conclusion that the justification defense was inapplicable.  See Gilliam v. State, 294 Ark.  115, 741 S.W.2d 631 (1987); Graham v. State, 2 Ark. App. 266, 621 S.W.2d 4 (1981).  In short, simply because the court ruled against appellant does not mean that it did not  give his argument “due consideration” or that it erred in rejecting appellant’s justification  defense. No justification defense was available to appellant, either because he failed to show  that he could not have safely retreated or because he provoked the situation in which he  purposely used deadly force.  Appellant does not deny that, in shooting Webb, he used deadly physical force.  See  Ark. Code Ann. § 5­2­601(2)(Repl. 2006) (defining “deadly physical force” as physical force  that under the circumstances in which is it used is readily capable of causing death or serious  physical injury).  A person is justified in using deadly physical force upon another person  if the person reasonably believes that the other person is committing or is about to commit  a felony involving force or is using or about to use unlawful deadly physical force.  See Ark.  Code Ann. § 5­2­607(a)(1)­(2) (Supp. 2007).  However, a person is not permitted to use  deadly physical force in self­defense if he knows that he can avoid the necessity of using  deadly force with complete safety by retreating.  See Ark. Code Ann. § 5­2­607(b)(1)(A);  Heinze v. State, 309 Ark. 162, 827 S.W.2d 658 (1992). 2  Appellant also asserts that because he may have been reckless in forming his belief  that his use of deadly physical force was reasonable, he could be found guilty of no more  than second­degree battery based upon a reckless mental state.  See Ark. Code Ann. § 5­  2­614(a).  In essence, he purports to challenge the trial court’s refusal to reduce the  charge to second­degree battery.  However, while he cites to the relevant statutory  provisions, he provides no real argument on this issue.  Thus, we do not address it.  6  Moreover,  a  person  is  not  justified  in  using  even  mere  physical  force  on  another  person if, with the purpose to cause physical injury or death to the other person, the person  provokes the use of unlawful physical force by the other person.  See Ark. Code Ann. § 5­2­  606(b) (Supp. 2007).  A condition precedent to a plea of self­defense is an assault upon the  defendant of such a character that it is with murderous intent, or places the defendant in fear  of his life, or great bodily harm; thus, a mere assault is not sufficient to justify the plea of  self­defense.  See Girtman v. State, 285 Ark. 13, 684 S.W.2d 806 (1985).  Finally, if the  victim was the original aggressor, and withdraws from an altercation so that the danger has  passed,  a  person  is  not  justified  in  pursuing  him  to  continue  the  fight  or  to  use  deadly  physical force upon him.  See Thomas v. State, 266 Ark. 162, 583 S.W.2d 32 (1979).  Appellant here was not entitled to a justification defense, first, because the evidence  supports  that  he  could  have  safely  retreated  to  Richie’s  vehicle  and  left  the  scene.  Appellant’s mother said that “a minute or two passed” between the time Webb entered the  apartment and when he came back out.  Appellant fails to explain why that was not enough  time to retreat to Richie’s car and leave, especially in light of the fact that appellant, his  mother, and Richie were certainly able to run to the car and safely flee after the shooting.  Moreover, Webb was no closer than fifteen feet from appellant when he came out of  the apartment.  Appellant was only a few feet from Richie’s car.  Even if appellant backed  away as Webb approached him, appellant testified that he did not believe he could retreat to  Richie’s  vehicle  –  thus,  he  cannot  argue  that  he  attempted  to  retreat.    To  the  contrary,  appellant’s  conduct  in  taking  two  steps  back  as  Webb  approached  him  allowed  the  permissible inference that appellant anticipated the counter­attack and was simply buying the  time needed to produce the gun from his pocket and fire it.  See Burton v. State, 254 Ark.  673,  495  S.W.2d  841  (1973)  (rejecting  the  defendant’s  justification  defense  where  the  defendant armed himself and went to a bar in anticipation that the decedent would be there 7  and would attack him).  Second,  appellant  was  not entitled to a justification defense  because  he,  being  armed,  provoked  the  use  of  unlawful  physical  force  by  Webb.    The  evidence demonstrated that the original altercation ended when the fight between appellant  and Kevin broke up and the Webbs went into their apartment.  By thereafter throwing the  beer  can  at  the  apartment  door  and  insulting Kristen  and  Webb,  appellant  provoked  the  subsequent attack by Webb.  Webb admitted that he intended to “fight” appellant; however,  mere assault does not warrant a justification defense.  See Girtman, supra.  Affirmed.  HART  and GLADWIN, JJ., agree. 8 

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