Kevin L. Allbright v. State of Arkansas

 Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  SAM BIRD, JUDGE  DIVISION IV  CACR07­458  DECEMBER  12, 2007  KEVIN L. ALLBRIGHT  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL  FROM  THE  GARLAND  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CR­05­82­4]  HON. LYNN WILLIAMS,  JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Kevin Allbright was convicted in a jury trial for one count of rape and two counts of  second­degree  battery,  and  he  was  sentenced  to  consecutive  sentences  of  imprisonment  totaling five hundred and four months. The rape victim was his twenty­two­month­old niece;  she and her brother, not quite three years old, were the battery victims.  Allbright raises two  points  on  appeal.  First,  he  contends  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying  his  motion  to  suppress his statement to police because it was not given voluntarily.  Second, he contends  that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing testimony about the presence of semen  on  the  niece’s  clothing.  We  hold  that  the  admission  of  the  involuntary  statement  was  harmless error, and we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s allowance of the disputed  testimony.  The convictions are therefore affirmed. The Denial of Appellant’s Motion to Suppress His Statement  At a hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress, Detective Paul Norris and officers of  the Hot Springs Police Department testified for the State, and appellant testified in his own  behalf. The trial court denied the suppression motion after hearing appellant’s argument that  he was intoxicated and had asked for an attorney.  Just before jury selection on the morning  of trial, appellant renewed his motion on the basis that he was intoxicated and that Norris  induced him to talk by falsely promising to obtain help for  him.    His  motion was again  denied.  Appellant  argues  on  appeal  only  that  his  statement  to  Norris  was  inadmissible  because it was obtained by a false promise of help and thus was involuntary.  A confession is not voluntary if the officer makes statements that are calculated to  deceive.  Pyles v. State, 329 Ark. 73, 947 S.W.2d 754 (1997).  An interrogator may try to  persuade an accused to tell the truth or to answer questions and may even misrepresent facts,  so long as the means employed are not calculated to procure an untrue statement and the  confession is otherwise voluntarily made.  See, e.g., id.  A misleading offer to “help” the  accused, however,  has been held to be a false promise rendering a statement involuntary and  thus inadmissible at trial.  Id.  In reviewing a ruling on the voluntariness of a confession, the  appellate  court  makes  an  independent  determination  based  upon  the  totality  of  the  circumstances.  Brown v. State, 354 Ark. 30, 117 S.W.3d 598 (2003).  Testimony at the suppression hearing revealed that Officer Chris Atkins responded  to a call of child abuse and suicide attempt at 1:00 a.m. on February 9, 2005.  Officer Atkins  found Brandon Folsum and Stephanie Allbright (appellant’s sister) standing outside the Park ­2­  CACR07­458  Motel. Each was holding a young child, and Ms. Allbright was crying.  The two children  were the niece and nephew of Ms. Allbright and appellant: S.M. had bruising about his face  and  back,  and  A.N.  had  a  bite  mark on  her  face.  Appellant  was  outside  the  rail  of  the  seventh­floor fire escape, hanging on by his hands.  Folsum and Ms. Allbright identified  appellant as the person who had injured the children.  Officers Atkins and Shoemaker entered the apartment and  convinced appellant to  come  back  onto  the  platform,  and  he  stepped  into  the  room.    There  was  an  odor  of  intoxicants about his person, and there were empty liquor bottles and beer cans in the room.  Appellant told the officers that he “just lost his job and . . . temper.”  He was sobbing and  his speech was unclear, but he did not appear to be intoxicated to the point of staggering or  stuttering  or  slurring.    Officer  Shoemaker  Mirandized  appellant,  handcuffed  him,  and  transported him to the elevator.  Appellant said, “I lost my temper and I hit them, but I didn’t  hurt them.  I f***** up this time.  I didn’t mean to hurt them.”  Officer Sawyer took custody of appellant at the motel and transported him  to the  county jail by patrol car.  Appellant hit his head against the cage of the car several times,  saying, “I beat them, but didn’t hurt them.”  Atkins advised appellant of his Miranda rights  again at the jail, where he initialed a written rights form and a waiver.  Atkins testified that  the statement at the elevator was not based on any prompting or questioning on his part, and  Sawyer testified that he did not prompt appellant’s statements in the patrol car.  Detective Paul Norris came into contact with appellant about 1:30 a.m. in the jail  when  he  was  signing  the  rights  form,  and  Norris  asked  what  had  happened.  Appellant ­3­  CACR07­458  explained  that  the  children’s  mother  was  a  “crack  whore,”  their  father  had  run  off  to  Massachusetts, and appellant had been watching the children for about two weeks.  He said  that he did not want to watch them but that they had been “put” on him.  He admitted that  he  had  slapped  S.M.,  might  have  forgotten  to  change  A.N.’s  diaper,  and  “might  have  whooped them.”   Appellant had an odor of alcohol on his breath and admitted that he had  drunk a bottle of tequila.  Norris testified that appellant was solemn, slightly unsteady on his  feet, and perhaps intoxicated; his speech was somewhat slurred, which Norris thought might  have been due to a speech impediment.  At 5:15 a.m. the next morning, February 10, Atkins transported appellant from the  county  jail  to  the  city  police  department  to  be  questioned  by  Norris,  who  had  spent  the  previous day investigating the case.  In Norris’s cubicle and with Atkins present, Norris read  appellant his Miranda rights and appellant waived them.  Norris, after telling appellant that  doctors had reported an injury to A.M’s vaginal area, asked appellant if he had “penetrated  with  his  penis.”    Appellant  replied  that  he  had  not,  and  Norris  asked,  “With  what?”  Appellant said that he had used one finger.  He signed a written statement that admitted to  this act and further stated, “I feel bad and I’m sorry.  I don’t know what to say.”  Atkins testified that appellant signed the statement of the interview without hesitation,  was cooperative, understood what was happening, and was neither aggressive, combative,  nor argumentative.  Norris described appellant as solemn, calm, and cooperative.  Norris  testified that appellant never requested an attorney or indicated a desire to end the interview,  which lasted approximately thirty minutes. ­4­  CACR07­458  Under cross­examination Norris testified that he had anticipated that appellant would  be appointed an attorney later in the morning, that the attorney would tell appellant not to  speak to the police, and that “part of the schedule” was to conduct his interview before the  court appearance.  Norris further testified:  I do remember telling Kevin [appellant] that I had talked to his family and that  I knew he needed help, and that I would get him help if he just cooperated  with me.  Honestly, offering to get them help is just something I say to try to get  them to cooperate, to get them to give up their rights and talk to me. I agree  that it is a “bait and switch.”  Knowing that this was an individual who has potential mental health  problems and who had been drinking, the efforts I took to make sure his rights  were enforced were just to read him his rights. ...  As part of the attempt to get Kevin to give up his rights, I impressed  upon him that he could help [A.N.] and his family if he told us what happened  so  that  [she]  wouldn’t  have  to  undergo  any  tests.  I  [preyed]  upon  his  sympathies.  Financial  obligations  regarding  the  tests  might  have  been  discussed, I’m not sure. Another element I mentioned was that by cooperating,  he  would  alleviate  any  pain  [she]  might  feel  or  have  to  undergo.  That  she  wouldn’t have to get any shots, and that he could really help her out by doing  this.  Appellant  testified  that  on  the  night  of  his  arrest  he  had  taken  about  seven  hydrocodones  and  had  drunk a  Bud  Light  twelve­pack as  well  as  a  fifth  of  tequila.  He  essentially  reiterated  Norris’s  testimony  that  the  detective  said  that  he  had  talked  with ­5­  CACR07­458  1  appellant’s family, knew of appellant’s need for help, and would try to get help for him.  Appellant stated:  Then he told me that [A.N.] had injuries to her vagina and he said it would  save my family lots of money and time if I would tell him what happened. I  told him I penetrated [A.N.] with my finger and we talked about [S.M.] and  what happened to him.... Then he asked me to sign the sheets of paper and I  signed the sheets of paper and that’s it.  I thought that by talking to Detective Norris I was helping my family  out, helping [A.N.] out.  Appellant testified that he did not say “I don’t want to talk to you” because he thought he  would be getting an attorney later that day and because Norris promised to get him help.  He  stated that he had completed the tenth grade.  The  threshold  issue  in  the  first  point  on  appeal  is  Norris’s  offer  to  get  help  for  appellant.  Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to declare his statement  involuntary  and  suppressing  its  admission  because  Norris  intentionally  misled  him  by  promising to get help if he would cooperate.  Noting his level of education and mental health,  the timing of the interview before his court appearance and appointment of an attorney, and  the preying upon his sympathies, he additionally argues that the statement was involuntary  under the totality of circumstances surrounding its procurement.  The State concedes that the  statement was not voluntary but asserts that its admission was harmless error. 1  Appellant’s testimony differed from that of the police officers regarding when and  if he requested an attorney, but that testimony is not pertinent to the argument raised on  appeal.  ­6­  CACR07­458  Norris admitted that his offer  to obtain help for appellant was simply a means of  trying to get his cooperation.  There was no indication that Norris planned to get any sort of  help  for  appellant,  nor  that  the  offer  was  fulfilled.  We  hold  that  the  statement  Norris  obtained from appellant through a misleading offer of help was involuntary and that the trial  court erred by failing to suppress the admission of the statement into evidence.  However,  we agree with the State that this error does not require reversal.  The admission of an involuntary confession is subject to a harmless error analysis.  Riggs v. State, 339 Ark. 111, 130, 3 S.W.3d 305, 316 (1999) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante,  499 U.S. 279 (1991)).  In Brunson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 39, 45­46, 848 S.W.2d 936, 941  (1993), we examined the role of the reviewing court in making such an analysis:  As  a  general  rule,  most  trial  errors,  including  constitutional  ones,  do  not  automatically  require  reversal  of  a  criminal  conviction.  Chapman  v.  California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Rather, if the  error is harmless, the conviction will be affirmed despite the error. Id. In order  to be harmless, a constitutional error must be harmless beyond a reasonable  doubt. The test is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence  complained  of  might  have  contributed  to  the  conviction.  Id.;  Fahy  v.  Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S. Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963); Vann v. State,  309 Ark. 303, 831 S.W.2d 126 (1992).  Here, Dr. Whorton testified that he examined both S.M. and A.N., and that both had  extensive injuries.  He described S.M. as “fearful,” with injuries “so numerous” that they  were documented by videotape. The injuries included extensive bruising across S.M.’s face,  a bite on his left cheek, bruising and petechiae around his eyes consistent with strangulation,  abrasions across his scalp, and extensive bruising of his entire back, groin, genitalia, thighs,  knees, and buttocks.  Dr. Whorton testified that none of the injuries occurred by accident. ­7­  CACR07­458  He said that there were clearly some fresh injuries, such as bruising and blood in S.M.’s ears,  but that the bruises appeared generally to be in various stages of healing, which suggested  infliction over a period of time.  Dr. Whorton testified that A.N.’s left eye was bruised, she had a fresh bite mark on  her right cheek, and there also was bruising on her abdomen, spine, and right thigh.  He  described an injury to her vagina as “so severe it was almost difficult to determine where the  normal anatomy was.”  Besides extensive vaginal swelling, her hymen had sustained “fresh”  injuries.  Dr. Whorton said that he had never seen anything that could approach the extent  of these “very, very severe” injuries. He testified that the vaginal injuries were caused by  penetration and, because of the degree of pain that the infliction of the injuries would have  caused, “absolutely” could not have been caused by A.N. herself penetrating her vagina with  her finger.  Appellant’s sister, Stephanie Allbright, described a series of family events in which  the children were left with her, she turned them over to appellant for a couple of months  when she moved to Pine Bluff, and she eventually decided to return to Hot Springs.  In the  early morning of February 9, 2005, she received a telephone call from a friend telling her that  appellant  had  “snapped”  and  that  there  was  something  wrong  with  the  children.    Ms.  Allbright went to the hotel and saw appellant hanging off of the fire escape.  He was pulled  back inside, and someone told her that she needed to “come see the kids.”  Ms. Allbright testified that S.M. was nude on the bed and A.N., lying with him, was  wearing only a sweatshirt and was bleeding from her vagina.  Ms. Allbright “jumped on” ­8­  CACR07­458  appellant  and  tried  to  push  him  back  out  the  window  again,  and  the  man  with  her  hit  appellant with a chair.  She wrapped the children and took them downstairs to await the  police, and appellant ended up hanging from the fire escape again.  She testified that she had  noticed  bruising  on  S.M.  the  previous  day,  had  confronted  appellant  about  it,  and  had  slapped him.  She testified that he admitted inflicting the bruises.  We  agree  with  the  State  that  there  was  overwhelming  proof  of  appellant’s  guilt,  wholly apart from the statement that he gave to Detective Norris.  There was evidence that  both children sustained extensive and severe injuries while in appellant’s care and that A.N.  had vaginal bleeding on the night of his arrest.  Additionally, appellant told the officers who  first encountered him that he had lost his temper, he admitted to Ms. Allbright the day before  that he had caused S.M.’s bruising, and at the jail he admitted that he slapped S.M., perhaps  forgot  to  change  A.N.’s  diaper,  and  perhaps  “whooped”  the  children.    In  light  of  this  overwhelming evidence of guilt, the trial court’s error in admitting appellant’s involuntary  statement that he penetrated A.N.’s vagina with his finger was harmless beyond a reasonable  doubt and requires no reversal.  Relevancy of Testimony  As  his  second  point  on  appeal,  appellant  contends  that  the  trial  court  abused  its  discretion  by  allowing  testimony  that  there  was  semen  on  the  sweatshirt  that  A.N.  was  wearing when appellant was taken into custody.  The semen was not tested for DNA.  Appellant’s attorney contended in a pretrial motion that testimony about the presence  of semen on the sweatshirt was irrelevant.  He argued, “As I understand it, the State’s theory ­9­  CACR07­458  is that there was digital penetration and not penile penetration. . . .  Therefore, the semen has  no relevance and can’t be linked to Mr. Allbright.”  He argued that there were other males  around the child, that the State had not attributed the semen to anyone, and that the length  of time it had been on the sweatshirt was unknown.  The State responded that the presence of semen was highly relevant as a part of a  sexual offense on the child.  The State maintained that the sample was so minimal that it  could not be further tested, which would be explained by trial testimony.  The State argued  that appellant had admitted “committing these acts” and was the only person with custody  of the children when the injuries occurred.  Finally, the State noted that, although appellant  confessed  to  digital  penetration  only  and  although  there  was  no  evidence  of  penile  penetration, the State’s information alleged that appellant had committed sexual intercourse  or deviate sexual activity.  The trial court denied the motion, stating that any problems could  be handled in cross­examination.  During  testimony  by  Officer  Atkins  at  trial,  the  trial  court  overruled  appellant’s  objection when the State offered  A.N.’s sweatshirt into evidence.  Jane Parsons, a forensic  serologist for the State Crime laboratory, then testified over appellant’s objection that she  identified blood and a small stain of semen on the sweatshirt.  The seminal stain, located on  the back of the garment, was “less than a quarter inch” in size, and Parsons testified that she  had to use all of it to verify that it was semen.  She eventually found two sperm cells through  confirmatory  tests,  but  the  tests  consumed  the  sample  and  left  nothing  further  for  DNA ­10­  CACR07­458  testing.  Her tests did not confirm appellant as the source, and she could not determine how  long the stain had been there.  She stated that the semen could have come from “any male.”  On appeal appellant argues that Parsons’s testimony had very little probative value  and should have been excluded because of its prejudicial effect on the jury.  He notes that  she could not identify him as the source of the semen stain on the sweatshirt.  We will not reverse a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence absent an abuse  of discretion, nor will we reverse absent a showing of prejudice.  McClellan v. State, 81 Ark.  App. 361, 101 S.W.3d 864 (2003).  For evidence to be relevant, it is not required that the  evidence prove the entire case; rather, all that is required is that it have “any tendency” to  make any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable.  Barrett v. State, 354 Ark. 187, 119 S.W.3d 485 (2003).  The State is entitled to prove a case  as conclusively as possible.  Smith v. State, 351 Ark. 468, 95 S.W.3d 801 (2003).  The State alleged in its information that appellant engaged in sexual intercourse or  deviate  sexual  activity  with  A.N.,  without  restricting  the  charge  to  digital  penetration.  Therefore, the State was entitled to put on any evidence tending to show that a sexual act had  occurred involving the child.  Even though the source of the semen could not be identified,  the  presence  of  semen  on  her  clothing,  at  a  time  when  she  was  bleeding  from  vaginal  injuries, had some tendency to show the occurrence of a sexual act.  We hold that the trial  court did not abuse its discretion by allowing testimony about the presence of semen on her  sweatshirt.  Affirmed.  PITTMAN, C.J., and ROBBINS, J., agree. ­11­  CACR07­458 

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.