Michael D. Dunlap v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  LARRY D. VAUGHT, JUDGE  DIVISION IV  CACR07­452  November 28, 2007  MICHAEL D. DUNLAP  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL FROM THE OUACHITA  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [CR­06­141­4]  HON. CAROL C. ANTHONY,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  A  Ouachita  County  jury  convicted  appellant  Michael  Dunlap  of  possession  of  a  controlled substance with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia for which  he was sentenced to 360 months’ and 120 months’ imprisonment respectively. On appeal,  he claims that there was insufficient evidence to support either conviction and, as such, the  trial court erred in its denial of his directed­verdict motions. We disagree and affirm.  A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. When  determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether the verdict is supported  by substantial evidence, which is evidence that is of sufficient certainty and precision to  compel a conclusion one way or the other. When determining if sufficient evidence exists, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Ladwig v. State, 328 Ark.  241, 943 S.W.2d 571 (1997).  On  appeal  Dunlap  first  claims  that  the  State  failed  to  carry  its  burden  on  the  possession­with­intent­to­deliver conviction  because it did not establish that the cocaine  recovered at the crime scene had ever been in his actual possession. Indeed, the testimony  from Carol Brewer established that Dunlap passed her some items to hold while he was  being arrested in front of his apartment—a black box with a ribbon on it, some keys, and  some money—but that she did not notice Dunlap handing her a plastic bag. However, she  also admitted that she was not paying close attention to what Dunlap was passing to her.  According to her testimony, after receiving the items from Dunlap, she placed them on a  nearby chair as she was ordered to do by one of the arresting officers, Romero Scruggs.  Officer Glen Gilbert of the Camden Police Department also testified at trial. He stated  that he came into contact with Dunlap after receiving a notification that there was an active  warrant  for  Dunlap’s  arrest.  Officer  Gilbert  stated  that  as  he  and  Officer  Scruggs  were  attempting to effectuate the arrest, Dunlap began pulling items from his pocket and handing  them to Brewer. Officer Gilbert testified that he noticed a “little square object that seemed  suspicious ... almost like a calculator” but that he did not observe the other items that Dunlap  removed from his pocket.  Finally,  Officer  Scruggs  testified  that  during  the  arrest,  he  observed—on  two  occasions—Dunlap remove items from his pocket and hand them to Brewer. According to  Officer Scruggs, during the second transfer, he witnessed Dunlap remove a small plastic bag 2  containing an off­white substance from his pocket. The substance was later determined to  be a “cookie” of crack cocaine.  Dunlap does not dispute that the substance recovered was cocaine; he merely disputes  the fact that he possessed it. However, based on Officer Scruggs testimony alone, the State  provided substantial evidence that the illegal substance was in Dunlap’s possession. Further,  the State presented testimony from Cassie Burns, a forensic chemist with the Arkansas State  Crime Laboratory, that the cocaine base recovered from the scene weighed 12.450 grams.  Contrary to Dunlap’s argument otherwise, this amount is well over the requisite one gram  that is necessary to create a statutory presumption of intent to deliver. See Young v. State, 77  Ark. App. 245, 72 S.W.3d 895 (2002).  Dunlap  also  argues  that  the  State  failed  to  provide  sufficient  evidence  that  he  possessed drug paraphernalia because the scale he possessed “could” be used for something  other than drug use. At trial he argued that he should not be convicted of the paraphernalia  charge because scales do not fit the description that provides for “planting, propagating,  cultivating, growing... .” Because a party may not change the scope or nature of argument  on appeal, but is bound by the objections made at trial, we do not reach the merits of his  newly formulated appeal argument. Abshure v. State, 79 Ark. App. 317, 87 S.W.3d 822  (2002).  Affirmed.  ROBBINS  and BAKER, JJ., agree. 3  4

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