Vernist McCraney v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  JOHN B. ROBBINS, JUDGE  DIVISION IV  CACR 07­396  NOVEMBER 14, 2007  VERNIST MCCRANEY  APPELLANT  APPEAL FROM THE CLEVELAND  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CR­06­47­5]  V. HONORABLE LARRY CHANDLER,  JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Appellant Vernist McCraney was convicted by a jury in Cleveland County of the  offense of delivery of crack cocaine, with an enhancement for having been committed within  one thousand feet of a church.  For this crime, he was sentenced to twelve years in prison for  delivery of the drugs, enhanced by ten years for having been delivered within that distance  from  a  church.  Appellant  challenges  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  to  support  his  conviction, attacking whether a drug transaction actually took place between him and the  confidential informant. We have examined the evidence under the proper standard of review  and  hold  that  the  State  presented  sufficient  evidence  upon  which  the  jury  could  rely  to  support its guilty verdict. A motion for directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.  Ross  v. State, 346 Ark. 225, 57 S.W.3d 152 (2001). The test for determining sufficiency of the  evidence is whether substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, supports the verdict. Id.  Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient certainty and precision to compel a conclusion  one way or another and pass beyond mere suspicion or conjecture. Id. On appeal, we review  the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee and consider only the evidence that  supports the verdict. Id.  The credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury and not the court. Phillips v. State,  344 Ark. 453, 40 S.W.3d 778 (2001). The trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any  witness's  testimony  and  may  resolve  questions  of  conflicting  testimony  and  inconsistent  evidence. Id. We will disturb the jury's determination only if the evidence did not meet the  required standards, thereby leaving the jury to speculation and conjecture in reaching its  verdict.  Id.  Circumstantial  evidence  may  constitute  substantial  evidence  to  support  a  conviction. Gregory v. State, 341 Ark. 243, 15 S.W.3d 690 (2000). Guilt can be established  without eyewitness testimony and evidence of guilt is not less because it is circumstantial.  Id.  Upon review, this court must determine whether the jury resorted to speculation and  conjecture in reaching its verdict. Id.  The test is one of substantiality. Id.  The evidence presented to the jury is as follows, viewed in the light most favorable  to  the  State.  On  the  evening  of  May  18,  2006,  confidential  informant  Ruby  Young,  an  admittedly  recovering  drug  addict  with  a  pending  burglary  charge,  met  with  sheriff’s  department investigators on Tyson Road, just south of Rison, Arkansas, in order to conduct ­2­  a controlled drug buy.  Young was patted down, in a frisk­type search of her person, to  ensure that she did not already have drugs with her.  Young was given $20 in cash, given an  audio  recording device  disguised  as  a  cellular  telephone,  and  instructed  to  make  a  drug  purchase.   One of the investigators testified that Young had worked with him on previous  drug buys, and he believed her to be very trustworthy. Young testified that she had been  working with law enforcement in exchange for leniency regarding the burglary charge.  Young drove to a location in Unionville where she knew drug activity took place. She  summoned a man to her car, who got into the passenger side.  She asked for twenty dollars  worth  of  crack,  which  she  said  he  produced  from  a  plastic  bag.  The  only  part  of  this  interaction recorded on audiotape was when the man asked Young “What do you want to put  it in?” and Young replied “A piece of paper.”  Young explained that the paper was to be used  to  wrap  the  crack  cocaine.    Young  immediately  returned  to  the  investigator  with  crack  cocaine, which the investigator sent to the State Crime Laboratory to verify that it contained  cocaine base. At trial, Young identified appellant as the man who sold her crack cocaine that  night.  The investigator testified that he heard the man’s voice on the recording and knew that  it  was  appellant’s,  because  his  voice  was  distinctive.  The  investigator  testified  that  he  personally measured the distance between where Young said the transaction took place and  the nearest church, Unionville Missionary Baptist Church.  The investigator stated that the  distance was 355 feet between the two locations. ­3­  Appellant’s counsel moved for directed verdict, arguing that the State’s case rested  on the testimony of a drug addict with a motive to work off a criminal charge.  The trial  judge, noting that this was an issue of credibility, denied the motion and its renewal.  The  jury deliberated and found appellant guilty.  This appeal followed.  Appellant critiques the investigation for having failed to use marked currency so that  the money could be traced to appellant, for having failed to conduct a thorough search of  Young’s person to ensure that she did not already have drugs, and for having used a faulty  recording device.  He contends that these deficiencies render the State’s case too frail to go  to the jury, and he asserts that he was more likely framed by the informant.  We disagree.  Appellant’s arguments are essentially directed to the believability of the confidential  informant.  The testimony of the informant alone, if believed by the jury, was enough to  sustain the jury’s conclusion that he delivered cocaine to her that night.  Compare Brunson  v.  State,  45  Ark.  App.  161,  873  S.W.2d  562  (1994)  (jury’s  acceptance  of  informant’s  testimony sufficient to sustain guilty verdict on delivery of drugs).  See also Warren v. State,  __ Ark. App. __, __ S.W.3d __ (Jan. 17, 2007).  Our appellate courts will not pass upon the  credibility of a witness and have no right to disregard the testimony of any witness after the  jury has given it full credence, unless the testimony is inherently improbable, physically  impossible, or clearly unbelievable.  Barnes v. State, 258 Ark. 565, 528 S.W.2d 370 (1975).  We affirm appellant’s conviction.  VAUGHT and BAKER, JJ., agree. ­4­ 

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