Benjamin Seibert v. State of Arkansas

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  DIVISION I  CACR07­320  NOVEMBER 28, 2007  BENJAMIN SEIBERT  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL FROM THE UNION COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CR2004­622­4]  HON. CAROL C. ANTHONY,  JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Benjamin  Seibert  was  convicted  in  a  jury  trial  for  possession  of  cocaine  and  possession of drug paraphernalia.  He was sentenced to consecutive terms of three years’  imprisonment  for  the  cocaine  conviction,  three  years’  imprisonment  for  the  drug  paraphernalia, and fines totaling $6000.  Seibert now appeals his convictions, raising five  points.  His first two points concern rulings that the trial court made in closing arguments  about chain of custody and “common knowledge.”  In his third, fourth, and fifth points he  contends that the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause with regard to several  jurors,  in  not  requiring  the  State  to  produce  a  witness  statement,  and  in  allowing  the  introduction of Seibert’s arrest warrant.  We agree with the State that only the third point is  preserved for our review. Because the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to release  the jurors for cause, we affirm the convictions. We briefly recite the pertinent facts of this case, which began when law­enforcement  officers investigating a welfare concern went to an El Dorado motel room on September 13,  2004.  Seibert answered the door and gave permission for a search.  A cocaine pipe lay on  the floor by Seibert’s feet, and in the room and bathroom were other pipes, several rocks of  crack cocaine, and a Brillo pad such as is commonly used as a filter in making homemade  pipes.  At trial Seibert asserted that he knew nothing about these items and that, on the day  before the search, he had befriended two other persons who were in the room by lending  them his car and giving them a place to stay.  Closing Arguments regarding Chain of Custody  As his first point on appeal, Seibert asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to  allow him to argue the issue of chain of custody in closing argument and then allowing the  State to argue the issue.  We do not agree.  During Seibert’s closing argument, the State objected when he referred to the State’s  exhibits of “alleged drugs or powder” and asserted, “[T]hey did not provide you with a chain  of custody, did they?”  The trial court sustained the objection, which was made on the basis  that the exhibits had been admitted without objection.  Seibert then argued that “the chain  of  custody  is  not  a  question  of  admission  but  a  question  of  whether  it  is  appropriate  to  consider it as far as guilt.”  The State then made a rebuttal closing argument, during which it noted that Seibert  “mentioned a chain of evidence.” Seibert objected to this statement, noting that the court had  sustained the State’s objection to his mentioning the chain of custody.  The State responded ­2­  CACR07­320  that Seibert could not be allowed to improperly taint its case and the State not be allowed to  rehabilitate.  The court stated, “We can do it that way or I can give them a precautionary  instruction,” and Seibert requested the cautionary instruction.  The State requested that the  court explain to the jury that the State “established that the cocaine came out of that room,  that the crime lab came back and it’s in the courtroom.  That is what chain of custody is.  It  came in without objection.”  The court stated, “All right.  We’re not going to dwell on it.”  The State then argued to the jury:  Chain of custody, what it means is that amount of evidence that we have to offer you  to establish that the cocaine, the pipes, the things we got out of the room that these  are the same ones that we got out of the room, that we sent the same stuff to the crime  lab, they tested it and it came back to us and here it is for you.  That is the chain and  we can establish that with witnesses like we did . . . .  And the crime lab submission  sheets  and  the  crime  lab  report  .  .  .  .    It  came  in  without  objection,  there  is  no  legitimate issue there.  We will not address the issue Seibert now raises because he failed to obtain a specific  ruling on his objection at trial.  See, e.g., Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 852 S.W.2d 772  (1993).  Moreover, were we to address it, we would find that the trial court properly allowed  the State to rehabilitate in rebuttal closing argument.  See id. (State’s remark was an invited  comment made in response to the defendant’s closing argument, which “opened the door”  to the State’s remark).  Closing Argument regarding “Relative Resources” and DNA  As his second point on appeal, Seibert contends that the trial court erred in sustaining  the State’s objection to these remarks that he made in his closing argument: ­3­  CACR07­320  [W]e talk about this presumption of innocence and the resources of the State,  I was drawing an analogy to how in recent years there’s been a lot of publicity  about wrongfully convicted people who were convicted by a jury of twelve  good men and women.  It wasn’t until DNA came out that these people were  exonerated.  . . . I ask you to remember this when you weigh this evidence,  when you weigh the credibility because on these capital cases on these murder  cases,  on  these  rape  cases  where  these  people  have  been  subsequently  exonerated the State brought an incredible canopy of technology and resources  to convict these people.  The State objected, “These are not facts [in] evidence,” and Seibert responded that his  argument was “well known to the public.”  The trial court stated, “Let’s move on to this  case.”  Because the trial court did not specifically rule on the State’s objection, Seibert has  no specific error to argue on appeal.  See, e.g., Sheridan, supra.  Challenges for Cause  Seibert  contends  as  his  third  point  that  the  trial  court  erred  by  overruling  his  challenges for cause to jurors Les Chandler, Marvin Bagley, and Robert Farris because of  statements  that  they  made  during  jury  selection.  The  test  to  be  used  in  releasing  a  prospective juror for cause is whether the person’s views would prevent or substantially  impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror in accordance with the instructions and  oath.  Anderson v. State, 357 Ark. 180, 163 S.W.3d 333 (2004).  The decision to excuse a  juror for cause is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent  an abuse of discretion.  Id.  When a defendant argues that he was forced to accept a juror that  he would have refused, he must show that the trial court should have excused the juror for  cause, that the defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges, and that he demonstrated  prejudice in that he was forced to accept a juror against his wishes.  Noel v. State, 28 Ark. ­4­  CACR07­320  App. 158, 771 S.W.2d 325 (1989).  Chandler stated that he had a strong opinion about  drugs: he said that a nephew had a drug conviction, which would concern Chandler although  he could not honestly say that it would affect him.  He said that drugs affect a lot of innocent  people but he could set all that aside, look at the evidence, and weigh everything in the light  of his common sense and the law as he was instructed.  Seibert challenged Chandler for  cause because he had strong feelings, did not know if he could be impartial, and was of the  opinion that drugs affected a lot of innocent people.  The  trial  court overruled Seibert’s  objection.  Bagley stated that he had two sons­in­law who worked for the police department but  did not think that it would affect his view of the case.  He said that he was very close to his  sons­in­law  and  had  tried  to  discourage  them  from  police  work  because  of  the  dangers.  Seibert objected to Bagley for cause because of his relationship with these men.  The court  denied the motion,  noting that “we just put the Mayor on the jury so his relationship isn’t  an issue and besides that [Bagley] answered the question he could be fair and impartial.”  Farris  stated  that  “on  a  penalty  range  .  .  .  I  would  be  leaning  more  toward  the  maximum penalty because a few years ago my best friend got killed by somebody that was  on  drugs  and  I  think  that  may  affect  my  decision.”    He  expressed  his  feeling  that  the  punishment did not match the crime in a lot of cases and that in drug cases, “They just give  them a little slap on the hand and they go back and do it again.  If we had it a little more hard  . . . they might think twice about it.”  Seibert objected for cause because Farris leaned toward ­5­  CACR07­320  the maximum penalty.  The court denied the objection because Farris indicated that he could  consider the full range, and Seibert exercised a peremptory challenge against him.  The State notes that Juror Chandler stated that he could be impartial, and Seibert did  not  exercise  an  available  peremptory  challenge  to  exclude  him.    Thus,  Seibert  has  not  established how he was prejudiced by  Chandler’s presence on the jury.  Seibert has not  established that Farris, who stated that could consider the entire sentence range as instructed  by the court, had any bias that would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his  juror  duties  in  accord  with  his  oath  and  instructions.    Moreover,  Seibert  exercised  a  peremptory challenge to exclude him.  Finally, Seibert failed to demonstrate bias by Bagley,  who said that his decision would not be affected by his relationship with his sons­in­law in  law enforcement, and he was excused by a peremptory challenge that Seibert exercised.  We  find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its denial of Seibert’s challenges for cause of  these three jurors.  Request for a Witness Statement  As his fourth point on appeal, Seibert contends that the trial court erred when it did  not require the State to produce a statement of witness Lisa King, which Seibert requested  for impeachment purposes.  The State had asserted that there were no statements referenced  in the file, and during a short break the court allowed the prosecutor to speak with law­  enforcement officers to determine if King had given a statement.  The court then stated to  Seibert that the prosecutor had indicated that there were no statements. ­6­  CACR07­320  Siebert acknowledges that he did not obtain a ruling, but he asserts that the court  improperly denied him access to impeachment materials by its refusal to acknowledge or rule  on his multiple requests.  He cites no authority or case law in support of his arguments.  The  merits  of  an  argument  on  appeal  will  not  be  addressed  when  the  appellant  presents  no  citation to authority or convincing argument in its support and it is not apparent without  further research that the argument is well taken. Williams v. State, 363 Ark. 395, 214 S.W.3d  829 (2005).  Furthermore, the State denied that it had a statement from King, and Seibert did  not offer any evidence of the existence of such a statement.  Introduction of an Arrest Warrant into Evidence  Seibert raised a relevancy objection at trial to the State’s introducing into evidence a  certified copy of a bench warrant issued to him in November 2004 for failure to appear.  The  relevancy  argument  that  he  presented  to  the  court  was  that  the  issue  was  whether  he  possessed drugs and drug paraphernalia.  The State responded that the fact of Seibert’s flight  from the court’s jurisdiction was evidence of his guilt.  The court overruled his objection.  Seibert now asserts that it is improper to introduce arrest warrants into evidence for  any purpose because of the dangers of hearsay and prejudice.  Because he has changed the  nature of his objection on appeal, this issue is not preserved for our review.  A party cannot  change the grounds for an objection or motion on appeal but is bound by the scope and  nature of the arguments made at trial.  Green v. State, 365 Ark. 478, 231 S.W.3d 638 (2006).  Affirmed.  GLADWIN  and HEFFLEY, JJ., agree. ­7­  CACR07­320 

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