Mark Anthony Holsombach v. State of Arkansas

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Not designated for publication. DIVISION III  CACR07­304  DECEMBER  5, 2007  MARK ANTHONY HOLSOMBACH  APPELLANT  APPEAL  FROM  THE  VAN  BUREN  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CR­2004­27]  V. HON. DAVID L. REYNOLDS,  JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  REVERSED AND DISMISSED  Appellant Mark Anthony Holsombach was convicted on August 24, 2006, by a Van  Buren  County  jury  of  possession  of  firearms  by  certain  persons  pursuant  to  Arkansas  Annotated section 5­73­103(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 2003).  He contends on appeal that the trial  court erred in the following:  by denying his motion to dismiss for violation of the speedy­  trial rule; by overruling his motion for directed verdict; by allowing the State to amend the  information; by allowing the introduction of evidence of appellant’s possession of firearms;  by not allowing him to present evidence to support a mistake­of­law defense.  We reverse  and dismiss for violation of the speedy­trial rule.  Appellant was involved in a romantic relationship with Anne Throneberry, the wife  of Theodore Throneberry, the victim.  On February 28, 2004, Mr. Throneberry returned  home from work and was attacked and killed by appellant and William Frazier.  The victim  was struck in the head with a large hammer, bound with duct tape, and held against his will.  The victim was killed, his body was burned, and his remains were scattered on a farm road  on  his  property.    On  March  7,  2004,  the  Van  Buren  County  Sheriff’s  Office  received  information that the victim was missing.  Police unsuccessfully  attempted to contact the  victim and his wife.  An arrest warrant and a search warrant were issued, and on March 22,  2004, the Arkansas State Police encountered appellant and Frazier on appellant’s property  in Alread while executing the search warrant.  Shots were fired, and Arkansas State Trooper  Charlie Edmondson sustained a gunshot wound.  Appellant, Anne Throneberry, and Frazier  evaded capture for several days, but were eventually captured, charged, and tried for their  crimes.  Appellant was convicted in Van Buren County Circuit Court of the capital murder  of  Theodore  Throneberry,  the  attempted  capital  murder  of  Officer  Edmondson,  and  kidnapping.  For these convictions, appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without  parole, twenty­five years’ imprisonment with an enhancement of ten years for the use of a  1  firearm, and thirty years, respectively.  During  the  search  of  appellant’s  property,  several  guns  were  found.  By  felony  information filed March 19, 2004, appellant was charged with the Class B felony of violating  Arkansas Code Annotated section 5­73­103, which makes it illegal for a convicted felon to  possess firearms. The information was amended on August 18, 2006, when the State claimed  that appellant’s possession of a firearm subsequently involved the commission of another 1  Holsombach v. State, 368 Ark. 415, ___ S.W.3d___ (2007).  ­2­  CACR07­304  crime, which is a Class B felony.  Ark. Code Ann. § 5­73­103(c)(1)(B).  Also on August 18,  2006, appellant filed a motion to dismiss for violation of the speedy­trial rule.  This motion  was  denied,  and  appellant’s  objection  to  the  State’s  amendment  to  the  information  was  overruled.  Appellant was tried on August 24, 2006, and the State presented evidence of  firearms found on appellant’s property.  Appellant argued that this proof did not show that  appellant’s current possession of any firearm involved the commission of another crime.  He  moved for a directed verdict, arguing insufficient evidence, which was denied.  On a related  matter, he claimed that the State should not have been allowed to introduce the evidence of  the firearms without also proving that the possession of those specific firearms involved the  commission of another crime.  This objection was overruled.  Finally, appellant was not  allowed to present an affirmative defense based upon a mistake of law.  Appellant was found  guilty and sentenced to forty years’ imprisonment, said term to be served consecutive to the  sentence he is currently serving.  Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal  follows.  In  order  to  preserve  his  right  against  double  jeopardy,  this  court  would  normally  address appellant’s argument that the trial court should have granted his motion for directed  verdict.  However, because we are compelled to reverse the trial court on appellant’s speedy­  trial argument, we do not reach any of the other issues raised by appellant in this appeal.  See  Dunlin v. State, 59 Ark. App. 207, 955 S.W. 2d (1997).  Under Rule 28.1(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant must  be brought to trial within twelve months, unless there are periods of delay that are excluded ­3­  CACR07­304  under  Rule  28.3.  If  the  defendant  is  not  brought  to  trial  within  the  requisite  time,  the  defendant is entitled to have the charges dismissed with an absolute bar to prosecution.  Ark.  R. Crim. P. 30.1.  Once a defendant establishes a prima facie case of a speedy­trial violation,  i.e., that his trial took place outside the speedy­trial period, the State bears the burden of  showing that the delay was the result of the defendant’s conduct or was otherwise justified.  Yarbrough v. State, 370 Ark. 31, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007).  On appeal, we conduct a de novo  review to determine whether specific periods of time are excludable under our speedy­trial  rules.  Cherry v. State, 347 Ark. 606, 66 S.W.3d 605 (2002).  Here, the information was filed  on March 19, 2004.  Appellant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial on August  18, 2006.  Appellant’s trial began on August 24, 2006.  The filing of a speedy­trial motion  tolls the running of the time for a speedy trial.  E.g., Yarbrough, supra.  The period from  March 19, 2004, to August 18, 2006, consisted of 882 days, which constitutes a prima facie  showing of a speedy­trial violation.  Therefore, it is the State’s burden to show that the delay  was the result of appellant’s conduct or otherwise justified.  Id.  Appellant contends that the period from July 25, 2005, to August 18, 2006, the date  upon which his motion to dismiss was filed, should not be excluded for speedy­trial purposes  because the trial court stated in its order that the trial was delayed during that time due to  2  docket congestion.  He contends that pursuant to Berry v. Henry, 364 Ark. 26, 216 S.W.3d  93 (2005), a mere recital of “docket congestion” is not enough.  We agree. 2  The parties agree that the time period from June 12, 2006, until August 18, 2006,  is not excludable, and is not, therefore, addressed by this court.  ­4­  CACR07­304  In  Berry,  the  Arkansas  Supreme  Court  considered  specific  time  periods  for  their  excludability under the speedy­trial rule.  Time period “#3" therein was a ninety­four day  period of delay that the trial court noted was due to “docket congestion.”  The Berry court  stated:  Because “docket congestion” is not a just cause for violating the speedy­trial rule, and  because the trial court failed to offer any further explanation to satisfy Rule 28.3, the  period of delay set out in Time Period # 3 does not constitute an excludable period  under that rule. Therefore, this ninety­four day time period is not excludable from the  time that Berry may include in his speedy­trial calculation.  Id., 364 Ark. at 31­32, 216 S.W.3d at 97.  Arkansas  Rule  of  Criminal  Procedure  28.3  provides  in  pertinent  part  that  the  following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for trial:  (a) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant,  including but not limited to an examination and hearing on the competency of the  defendant and the period during which he is incompetent to stand trial, hearings on  pretrial  motions,  interlocutory  appeals,  and  trials  of  other  charges  against  the  defendant. No pretrial motion shall be held under advisement for more than thirty (30)  days, and the period of time in excess of thirty (30) days  during  which any such  motion is held under advisement shall not be considered an excluded period.  (b) The period of delay resulting from a continuance attributable to congestion of the  trial docket if in a written order or docket entry at the time the continuance is granted:  (1) the court explains with particularity the reasons the trial docket does not permit  trial on the date originally scheduled;  (2) the court determines that the delay will not prejudice the defendant; and  (3)  the  court  schedules  the  trial  on  the  next  available  date  permitted  by  the  trial  docket.  In conducting our de novo review, we conclude that the continuance granted by the  trial court due to “docket congestion” does not comply with Rule 28.3 or Berry, supra.  The  October 17, 2005 order of the trial court states in pertinent part as follows: ­5­  CACR07­304  4.  5.  6.  That Mark Holsombach, William Frazier and Anne Throneberry are hereby  severed as co­defendants.  That  the  offenses  against  Mark  Holsombach,  in  cases CR2004­30 and  CR2004­121, shall be joined for trial and are set for trial beginning November  1, 2005.  That  the  offense  against  Mark  Holsombach  in  case  CR  2004­27 shall be  scheduled at a later date, as the congestion of the Court docket permits, and  speedy trial time is tolled from August 31, 2005 until the date scheduled for  trial by the Court.  At  the  August  24,  2006  pre­trial  hearing  on  this  motion,  the  trial  court  stated,  “I  will  specifically say that because of the previous trial in this case, the preparation for the Frazier  case and others backed up our docket to such an extent that we are still trying to catch up and  that’s  the  reason  that  it  was  scheduled  for  now.”    The  order  before  us  attributes  the  continuance to docket congestion without saying more.  We might speculate that appellant’s  other cases and those of his codefendants are reasons for the congested docket.  However,  even with the trial court’s explanation on the record, and considering as we can under Rule  28.3 the trials of other charges of the defendant, this court is constrained to follow Berry.  Here,  the  trial  court  failed  to  comply  with  Rule  28.3(b)(1)  by  not  explaining  with  particularity the reasons the trial court’s docket did not permit trial on the date scheduled in  its written order or docket entry.  The State argues that appellant must make a contemporaneous objection at the hearing  where the time is excluded in order to preserve a speedy­trial objection for appeal.  E.g.,  DeAsis v. State, 360 Ark. 286, 200 S.W.3d 911 (2005).  The State argues that appellant’s  attorney failed to sign the order to indicate that he objected to it.  It was not until August 24,  2006, that a record was made of an objection to the continuance that was granted in the ­6­  CACR07­304  October 17, 2005 ruling.  The State contends that because appellant did not timely object to  the continuance, the trial court did not err by denying his motion to dismiss.  However, we  decline to hold that an attorney’s failure to approve of the form of a precedent constitutes a  failure to indicate his objection to it.  Accordingly, we reverse.  Reversed and dismissed.  HART  and GRIFFEN, JJ., agree. ­7­  CACR07­304 

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